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ABSTRACT 
This study uses a social constructivist epistemology and a compatible 
methodology to look at models of HR in three disparate organisational contexts: 
a British public sector organisation, an entrepreneurial European private sector 
company in high growth mode, and the Asian operation of the same company 
in the lead up to a major acquisition, providing an opportunity to examine an 
organisation in a time of considerable change and upheaval. 
The study originated in a dissatisfaction with the ability of current models of HR 
to explain the diversity of approaches to HR found in organisations, most 
notably theories of SHRM, best practice and best fit approaches and 
contextually based HR. It attempts to develop a new descriptive research 
model of HR which incorporates the discrete RBV and neo-institutional 
frameworks of HR into a flexible model which can explain the operation of HR 
in a variety of organisations. 
The social constructivist perspective allows the model to take a view of strategy 
formulation and implementation which gives weight to the profound influence of 
the actors on HR strategy and its deployment. 
The conclusion of this study is that a viable descriptive research model can be 
produced, which utilises contextually based HR as a diagnostic, but gives 
substantial weight to the influence of the organisational actors. Further 
research is, however, required in order to fully test the model and resolve 
several areas about which the projects in this study raised questions. 
CHAPTER ONE - INDENTIFICATION OF 
RESEARCH AGENDA AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
This chapter will present the research agenda, will briefly outline the prior 
research and organisational context for the studies, which will be described in 
greater detail in the individual projects. 
1. THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
The research agenda for this project is the consideration of the ability of a 
number of HR models to describe the operation of HR in three disparate 
organisational contexts. It uses a social constructivist epistemology to provide 
a deeper level of analysis than would be possible using a more positivist 
methodology. The aim of the research is to create a descriptive model of HR 
which can explain the operation of HR in a variety of organisational contexts. 
The discipline of human resources has evolved from personnel to HR to its 
latest incarnation, SHRM ('strategic human resource management'). SHRM 
has been seen as the universal panacea and the natural evolution of HR to a 
more strategic role, promising efficiency and performance improvement via 
deployment of a new strategic approach to HR. 
The impetus for this study is a dissatisfaction with the concept of SHRM. 
Issues can be raised with SHRM both an evidential point of view (the 
multiplicity of SHRM studies have failed to provide a robust definition of SHRM, 
and its link to organisational performance is thus obfuscated) and a major 
theoretical omission: the essentially unitarian constructions of SHRM fail to 
meaningfully incorporate industrial relations into the SHRM literature. 
Whilst evident in private sector research, these issues are magnified in the 
public sector, which has vehemently rejected HRM' as inappropriate to a public 
sector value set, as well as criticising the approach for its failure to recognise 
the pluralistic employee relations which are still a significant feature of the 
public sector environment. 
Even in a non industrial relations environment, however, the SHRM model 
raises issues: it does not adequately consider the role of the actors in strategy 
formulation, it presumes a relatively stable environment and largely fails to 
address issues of HR in use. 
I The terms'SHRM' and 'HRM' are used to refer to the same concept in the literature, the former term more prevalent 
in US research, the latter more common In the UK. This paper will use the term 'SHRM' unless referring to a body of 
work where the term'HRM' is used. 
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This study will review HR models in three different contexts and build a 
descriptive research model which provides a framework which addresses these 
issues. 
The research questions for this study, consequently, are as follows: 
How well do current models of HR describe the operation of HR in 
disparate organisational contexts? 
Can a social constructivist epistemology be illuminating when 
considering the processes of HR strategy formulation and 
implementation in organisations? 
Can a new descriptive research 
describes the HR strategy 
process as a social process? 
model of HR be developed which 
formulation and implementation 
2. PRIOR RESEARCH 
The prior research which pertains to this study is wide ranging, therefore will 
largely be incorporated into the individual projects, rather than the literature 
review. However, a discussion of models of HR, concentrating on SHRM, will 
be provided as an over-arching research framework. 
The main bodies of prior research which will be reviewed are shown in figure 
one. 
Body of Research Section 
Models of HR Literature review 
Industrial relations Project one 
Change management, HR and the British 
public sector 
Project one 
Organisational politics, power and conflict Project one 
Contextually based HR theory Project two 
Definitions of 'strategic' Project three 
Dynamic capabilities and organisational 
agility 
Project three 
Figure 1: Main Bodies of Prior Research 
3. ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
The research comprises three projects. Project one is set in a traditional British 
public sector company, where industrial relations is the dominant form of HR 
enacted within the organisation. The long history of conflict and resistance to 
change in London Underground (LUL), along with its exposure to neo- 
institutional forces and external influences, make it an ideal environment to look 
at HR as a socially constructed process. 
Project two is set in the European arm of a private sector company in the 
Financial Services industry, an organisation which differs in almost every 
aspect from its public sector predecessor in project one: Thomson Financial is 
fast moving and entrepreneurial in culture and multi-national in scope. Without 
the strong neo-institutional pressures confronting LUL, and in a relatively 
benign competitive environment, the Thomson organisational actors have 
considerable freedom to operate, providing a good environment in which to 
study both business and HR strategy formulation as socially constructed 
processes. 
Project three also studied an organisational context which provided a useful 
test of the social constructivist approach's ability to explain HR as a social 
process: whilst sharing the same parent company as project two, project three 
moved to Thomson Financial's Asian operation, with the intent of studying HR 
strategy formulation within a high growth, volatile environment. However, as 
the project commenced, the organisation announced a major acquisition, 
resulting in a twelve month period of uncertainty and reactive change. This 
allowed a further aspect of HR strategy development to be examined: how is 
HR strategy formulated in an environment where strategic planning is not 
possible. 
A more detailed review of the organisations will be provided in each of the 
individual projects. 
CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As shown in figure 2, the initial literature review used the systematic review 
technique and identified 845 articles on SHRM ('Strategic Human Resource 
Management'). 
UK 1696 845 
Artces SHRM Public Articles Sector 
.ý 
Figure 2: Literature Map: SHRM and the British Public Sector 
These almost 'exclusively related to the private sector, ' therefore, this literature 
review will concentrate ' mainly on personnel management- and SHRM in the 
private sector. It will, however, also review the small number of articles (20) 
which do review SHRM in the public sector. 
2. PRECURSORS OF SHRM 
2.1. Models of HR 
Much of the literature assumes a longitudinal progression from 'personnel 
management' via 'human resources' to 'SHRM', driven by isomorphic forces 
and the profession's pursuit of acceptance and a more strategic role. 
This paper will, however, argue that the longitudinal model is misleading, ' and 
precludes a contextually appropriate HR strategy. It is reasonable to suggest 
that, amongst other factors, size, the complexity of a business, and its history 
and culture will determine the most appropriate HR model for that organisation 
at that point in its development. As Guest commented: 
"Given the significant constraints, many UK companies would not 
want to practice human resource management. The 
'professional' personnel management found in many successful 
organizations is one alternative. In many of the more stable 
bureaucratic organizations, policies based on administrative 
efficiency and cost-minimization make sense, while in production- 
driven companies cost-effective support policies may be most 
applicable. " (Guest, 1987, p518) 
In other words, the local garage, employing 10 people, is unlikely to need more 
than basic "personnel" services (recruitment, payroll, administration), whereas 
the HRM model will be appropriate to a multinational business employing 
thousands of people, some of which are difficult to recruit and retain. This 
need for contextual appropriateness appears, however, to have been 
obfuscated in the HR profession's desire for legitimacy, despite warnings in the 
very earliest SHRM literature of the probable inappropriateness of HRM to the 
UK: 
"Almost all the research, the conceptual writing and the advocacy 
of human resource management emanates from the USA. 
Arguably it is less relevant to the UK because of a number of key 
factors including a well established 'professional' structure of 
personnel management, the relatively strong position of the 
unions, the different orientation of workers and, perhaps most 
importantly, the pluralism and the range of entrenched interest 
groups within industry and society in general. " (Guest, 1987, 
p517/518) 
It will be argued that our understanding of the various models of HR, and, the 
articulated superiority of HRM relative to HR relative to personnel, reflects the 
constructed nature of these models of HR and the values which have been 
associated with them by practitioners and academics. 
This paper will argue for a different approach to strategic HR, which has its 
basis in a model of context specificity and contextual appropriateness. 
2.2. Personnel Management and HR 
Setting out on the search for a new model of HR, it is useful to understand that 
the activities and the focus of the function have changed dramatically over the 
years. A number of models, some competing and co-existing, have been used 
to describe the HR function and the changes in the function's focus over the 
years. A useful review of the transition from its origins in welfare, through 
industrial relations and manpower control to the recognition of the function -as a 
profession is provided by Tyson & Fell (1986). 
2 For instance, the CIPD's textbook on SHRM (Armstrong & Baron, 2002) spends a chapter discussing the views of key 
writers such as Guest, Legge and Purcell, but presents no alternative to SHRM, or suggests no circumstances in which 
an alternative to SHRM is appropriate. 
The transition from Personnel Management to HR is described in three 
alternative ways by Guest (1987, p506): 
"A change of name, with no discernable change of role; 
"A new way of re-conceptualising personnel roles and the work of 
personnel departments; there are a number of such re- 
conceptualisations, stressing variably: 
" employee relations, employee resourcing and employee 
development (CIPD, referenced in Guest, 1987) 
" employee influence, human resource flow, reward systems and work 
" Systems (Beer et al, 1985) 
" selection, appraisal, rewards and development (Tichy et al, 1982). 
" HRM, where HR is integrated into strategic management. 
Suffice to say that 'human resources' is a relatively recent term, attributed to 
Peter Drucker in 1954, reflecting the "more complex understandings about 
worker motivation among HR practitioners and an interest in shedding the 
clerkish, bookish image associated with the previous name" (Ogilvie & Stork, 
2003, p255). 
This is an important perspective when reviewing research on HR: the 
profession has long suffered from a sense of inferiority and has sought a 'real' 
strategic role in business through attaching itself to a number of titles (HRM 
and SHRM being the latest), as. well as its hijacking of concepts such as 
knowledge management which appear to offer a route to the Board Room. A 
review of HR's attempts to relieve itself of its origins within administration and 
welfare is beyond the scope of this paper, and is covered adequately in most 
basic HR textbooks. The reader is referred, however, to Ogilvie & Stork (2003) 
for a more academic article on the subject. 
This paper will proceed to review the literature on SHRM, but will contextualise 
it in the light of the HR profession's pursuit of legitimacy and a strategy role, 
and will consider SHRM as the tool which is currently being deployed to that 
end. 
3. SHRM RESEARCH 
3.1. Introduction 
Research on SHRM has been the focus of much attention, both in practitioner 
and academic circles, from the first appearance of the term in the late 1980s3, 
through to the present day. In the words of one of its major contributors, Peter 
Boxall (1996, p59), SHRM is: 
3 David Guest (1987) is widely attributed with bringing HRM to the UK, although the term had already gained 
considerable currency in the US through the Harvard Business School group Beer et al (1985) and researcher such as 
as Tichy et al (1982), Ross (1981) and Alpander (1982). 
"... an area of difficult definitions and contentious theory. " 
Keenoy (1999, p1) goes further: 
"... the concepts, practices and what some, carelessly, call the 
theory of HRM have been a continuing source of controversy, 
confusion and misapprehension. " 
Whilst many researchers have attempted to establish a link between SHRM 
practices and organisational performance4, there is no consensus about how 
this relationship actually works. SHRM lacks a consistent definition: 
"... it appears that HRMism does not even encompass a set of 
coherent managerial practices; it is merely a map of what has 
turned out to be an ever expanding territory. Indeed, despite 
claims that HRM is a distinctive form of practice ... we seem to have reached a position where virtually anything to do with 
managing the employment relationship ... has come to be identified as 'HRM'. " (Keenoy, 1999, p3) 
And the wide variety of approaches to SHRM is bewildering: 
"... there has been continuing confusion about the conceptual- 
theoretic identity of HRM. Leaving aside the suggestion that it is 
merely re-imagined personnel management, HRM has been 
projected as an adjunct to theories of strategic management, a 
theory of competitive advantage, a theory of general 
management, an alternative to pluralist personnel management 
... and as a euphemism for cultural change programmes. And, in 
addition to these various identities, there are supplementary 
cultural variations: 'Japanese' HRM, 'East European' HRM, and 
the European 'model' or models of HRM. " (Keenoy, 1999, p 3-4) 
Given this lack of agreement, the first task for this literature review will be to 
describe the major factions within SHRM, in order to map the SHRM 
'landscape' for appraisal within this study. 
The factions of SHRM can be grouped around the following 4 major 
"conversations" in the SHRM literature: 
" best practice/best fit 
" the significance of internal coherence 
"8 major theoretical approaches to SHRM 
" epistemological approaches to SHRM. 
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e. g. Huselid, 1995; Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Huselid, Jackson & Schuler, 1997. 
Despite this diversity, there is a domination of the literature by positivist, 
quantitative research conducted largely in American companies, as evidenced 
by: 
the preponderance of large scale quantitative studies (e. g. 
Huselid, 1995) 
the 'model' organisations of SHRM being American 
unitarian companies such as Hewlett Packard, IBM and 
others 
the continued positivist construction of SHRM, despite the 
contrary views of renowned researchers such as Karen 
Legge and the absence of evidence to support a single 
view of SHRM. 
These four categorisations and reasons for the dominance of the positivist, 
quantitative model will be discussed below. 
3.2. The "Four Conversations" of SHRM 
3.2.1. The Best Practice/Best Fit Debate 
The SHRM literature broadly divides into arguments for "best practice" and 
arguments for "best fit". 
Looking firstly at "best practice", this approach' views SHRM as the search for 
a single "utopian" (Purcell, 1999, p26) HR system ("HR bundle"), which will 
facilitate and support a commitment model of employee management. This is 
referred to variously as (in the UK) High Involvement Management (Lawler, 
1987) or High Commitment Management or HCM (Wood, 1995) or (in the USA) 
High Performance Work Systems or HPWS6. The commonly held view of HCM 
is an SHRM system, normally including some combination of systematic 
recruitment and selection methodologies, compensation systems which 
incentivise performance and learning & development activities which are linked 
to business need (Becker, Huselid, Pickus & Spratt, 1999): "HR bundles" 
(Boxall, 1996, p 171)"'. 
Probably the most sophisticated variant of the HPWS approach is the HR 
Scorecard methodology (Becker, Huselid & Ulrich, 2001). 
5 Significant papers include Walton (1985), Guest (1987,1990), Pfeffer (1994). Case studies: Storey (1992), Wood & 
Albanese (1995) 
e The theory of HPWS was dev eloped by Appelbaum & Blatt, 1994 and Appelbaum, Bailey & Berg, 2000. A number of 
case studies have also been produced, including Thompson, 1998,2000 and Lowe, Delbridge & Oliver, 1997. 
7 Boxall uses this phrase, citing Ishniowski et at, 1996 and McDuffie, 1995. 
A key proponent of the "best practice" approach to SHRM is Appelbaum. 
Appelbaum & Blatt (1994) produced a case study approach to the search for a 
universally applicable, "high performance" HRM system. Appelbaum linked two 
HPWS models ("American lean production"8 and "American team production"9) 
from which she claims enhanced organisational performance is generated. 
There is evidence to support the "best practice" model, but there are a number 
of methodological, theoretical and empirical issues (detailed in figure 3) which 
raise the question of 'under what circumstances is an HCM model appropriate'? 
(Purcell, 1996, p28). 
Research Much of the work substantiating this approach is quantitative, using 
methodology large quantities of questionnaire data (e. g. Huselid, 1995). This is 
critiqued by Purcell (1996) and Ishniowski et al (1996), who question 
the validity of the research design, the exclusion of hard-to-measure 
items where results are influenced by a multiplicity of interrelated 
factors, exclusion of certain employee categories (e. g. contractors, 
agency staff), the possibility of a Hawthorne effect and questions of 
causality. 
Empirical evidence The model fails to explain the lack of universal application of HCM: 
Wood & de Menezes (1998) questioned how one explains the omission 
of HCM in a number of successful organisations, if HCM is a universal 
key to or anisational success. 
Theoretical issues There is a failure to link HCM to business strategy. As Purcell 
indicates, "the adoption of different types of HCM can only be 
understood if they are related to company strategies in markets, 
technology and organisation" (1996, p28). 
HCM is essentially unitarian: it allows for no behaviour on the part of 
employees which is not in the firm's interests, which limits its 
applicability in, for instance, an industrial relations environment (Boxall, 
2003). 
Figure 3: Issues with the Best Practice' Model 
Furthermore, "best practice" may lead to the isomorphism (the process 
whereby organisations come to resemble one another), described in the 
section below on institutional theory: what begins as a source of competitive 
advantage becomes a necessary pre-requisite for organisational legitimacy. 
Best practice in SHRM may be institutionalised in 3 ways: coercive institutional 
pressures (e. g. employment legislation), normative pressures (e. g. professional 
bodies such as the CIPD and SHRM) and mimetic pressures (as evidenced by 
the vast amount of case study based practitioner literature). 
The qualified applicability of the "best practice" model suggests a move towards 
a contingent "best fit" (Hendry & Pettigrew, 1990; Peck, 1994; Wright, 
8 The ALP model is based on the Baldridge Award criteria. Although the Award itself fails to emphasise human 
resource policies and practices, Appelbaum makes the point that award winners pay careful attention to HR 
Appelbaum & Blatt, 1994, p131). 
The ATP model links soclo-technical job design and self-directed teams with TQM, SPC, JIT, the American HR model 
and approach to industrial relations. The ALP model implies worker participation in setting HR policies, particularly in 
respect of hiring, compensation and training (Appelbaum & Blatt, 1994, p139). Appelbaum comments the ATP model 
is more likely to be found in unionised environments, the ALP in non-unionised. 
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McMahan & McWilliams, 1994; Tyson 1995) approach to SHRM. The "best fit" 
approach is typified by attempts to model the HR strategy which corresponds to 
a specific business strategy (Miles & Snow, 1978; Jackson & Schuler, 1995). 
This allows for the existence of a variety of approaches to SHRM, of which 
HCM is only one. The "best fit" approach needs to address fundamental 
questions about business strategy (Boxall, 1996), such as: what is strategy and 
how is it formed. The corollary of this is the implication that the use of business 
analysis tools to determine organisational priorities and drivers (e. g. Pennings, 
1985; Johnson & Scholes, 1993; Schendel & Teece, 1994) is a necessary 
precursor to the development of an effective HR strategy; much research in this 
area is based on Porter's strategy categorisations (Porter, 1980). 
One of the key papers in this area of "best practice"/"best fit" is Tyson (1997), 
whose review of the literature moves away from "best practice" to promote the 
"best fit" approach to SHRM. He sees SHRM as a way of managing the inner 
context of the organisation in relation to the external environment, emphasising 
the importance of developing an HR strategy which reflects external forces and 
is internally congruent. This is represented diagrammatically in figure 4. . 
STRATEGIC FIT 
Fit with external economic and 
social conditions 
Fit with senior managers' 
expectations of HR 
Legge, 1988; 
OUTER 
(IN 
R Internally coherent 
Baird & 
Meshoulam, CONTEXT EXT policies and practices 988; Paauwe, 
1991 
Tyson & Fell, 1986 
Fit with organisation's stage of 
development 
HRM as a way of managing the 
inner context in relation to the 
outer context (Hendry & 
Pettigrew, 1990) 
Figure 4: HRM and Strategic Fit 
Tyson's view of HR strategy is as a process resulting from an emergent 
formulation of business strategy (i. e. a view of business strategy not as a 
rational process, but rather as negotiated and emergent), which may be more 
appropriate to a public sector environment driven as much by politics as 
rational business decision making processes. 
I' 
One major school of thought is the "strategic choice" perspective (Child, 1972), 
which sees strategy as a set of choices about the business, its relationship with 
its external environment and the way in which a business is conducted. SHRM 
gains particular importance in this context, as the achievement of an 
organisation's strategic aspirations (e. g. market share, profit) will depend upon 
its ability to marshal its internal resources. This forms the basis of the 
Resource Based View (RBV) theory of SHRM discussed later. 
Like "best practice", however, "best fit" has a number of issues, which are 
detailed in figure 5, leading researchers to the development of a theory of 
"idiosyncratic contingency" (Collins & Montgomery, 1995). This perspective 
accommodates both path dependency and causal ambiguity. This views 
strategy formulation as the result of a series of managerial choices, based in 
bounded rationality and influenced by political as well as business 
considerations. This creates a link to institutional theory, which will be 
discussed later. 
Research 
methodology 
The case study approach makes it difficult to control variables, where 
comparison is attempted. 
Empirical evidence There is a lack of empirical support for the 'best fit' model ("the 
empirical testing has proved disappointing", Purcell, 1006, p31), due to 
the fact that (i) strategy always occurs in a context of bounded 
rationality and (ii) strategy formulation and strategy implementation 
have an imperfect correlation. 
Theoretical issues The over-reliance on Porter and other shareholder value based 
formulations of strategy fail to explain strategy in public or not-for[profit 
sections, where political dynamics may be as, or more, important than 
business considerations in strategy development. 
Figure 5: Issues with the Best Fit" Model 
Adding in the recent focus on business strategy as a creator of organisational 
agility (Dyer & Shafer, 1999), a clear link can be drawn between Prahalad & 
Hamel's concept of core competencies, and the development of an appropriate 
HR strategy which facilitates the acquisition, building, utilisation and retention of 
those competencies (Capelli & Croker-Hefter, 1999). 
Despite the huge potential of this concept, however, work on the role of HR in 
building and facilitating organisational agility is extremely limited. A detailed 
review of the literature which does exist will be provided in project three. 
3.2.2. Internal Coherence 
Typically as an adjunct to discussions around best practice or best fit, a further 
key concept in the literature is discussion around the need for the internal 
coherence of HR components within an HR strategy. Boxall (1996, p171) 
typifies this: 
"... the idea of a bundle of HR practices that is a combination of 
mutually supportive practices ... which appear to have 
12 
performance outcomes where these are appropriate to firm 
strategy. "" 
Building on Tyson (1997) and the HCM model's concept of "HR bundles", it is 
obvious that an effective HR strategy must have internally coherent 
components, which work together to deliver business strategy. This creates a 
clear link between this view of SHRM and the principles of general systems 
theory (reviewed in the following section). 
3.2.3. The Major Theoretical Approaches to SHRM 
Existing SHRM research divides broadly into 8 theoretical approaches. These 
are derived from the disciplines of economics, sociology, psychology and 
management and are summarised in figure 6. 
A review of the various theoretical perspectives, in the context of their 
applicability to the private and public sector organisations under review in this 
study, suggests that economics based and sociological theories may be limited 
in their applicability to public sector organisations: economics based theories 
are better suited to pure private sector environments, whilst sociological 
theories fail to fully consider the business imperative created by 
commercialisation. 
General systems theory and resource dependency theory can provide 
explanations of certain aspects of the public sector environment. The former 
has the potential to explain commercialisation and the transition from closed to 
open system which the public sector is currently undergoing, whereas resource 
dependency theory is useful in explaining the power trade unions exert in the 
organisation via control of valued resources. 
The SHRM theories which appear to have utility in both the private and public 
sector environments are the resource based and the institutional theories of 
SHRM. The resource based approach offers a business model tied to 
concepts of competition and market; this may enhance its appropriateness to 
the UK public sector, which has been under pressure from the last two 
governments to operate in a more business like fashion". The institutional 
model allows for the inclusion of political and social drivers12, which are 
particularly evident in the public sector. 
These two approaches, resource based view and institutional theory, are 
outlined in the text, providing firstly an overview, then discussing the application 
10 Boxall cites Ishniowski et al, 1996 and McDuffie, 1995. 
11 
e. g. public-private partnerships for funding, Increasing pressure to operate on a business like (if not a commercial 
basis), dependence on revenue, increased public disclosure of accounting. 
12 c. f. Ferris et at, 1998, who proposed that workplace climate, culture and politics mediate the links between HR, 
individual and organisational processes. 
13 
of the theory to HRM, and concluding with an indication of their 
appropriateness to the organisations with which the projects are concerned. 
14 
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3.2.3.1. Resource Based View 
One of the most widely utilised theories of SHRM is the Resource Based View 
or RBV (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991). RBV claims that an organisation is a 
bundle of resources, and some of these resources can be used by the 
organisation to gain and sustain competitive advantage (Ambrosini, 2002). 
The roots of RBV are to be found in the late 1950s in the work of Selznick 
(1957), who advanced the concept of distinctive competencies, and Penrose 
(1959), who laid the theoretical foundations for a view of competition which 
saw firms as heterogeneous, the value could be gained by the exploitation of 
the differences: competitive advantage. This concept was picked up by a 
number of writers in the mid-eighties and early nineties13. 
Sustainable competitive advantage is that which is difficult for competitors to 
copy, and for which there are no ready substitutes available. Prahalad & 
Hamel (1990) evolved this approach, viewing competitive advantage as the 
consequence of building organisational core competencies which are superior 
to those of the competition. 
This view was extended by Barney (1991), who developed the concept of 
sustainable competitive advantage, i. e. competitive advantage which was 
difficult for other firms to copy, defeat or imitate. Barney defined the criteria 
which resources must have to create sustained competitive advantage: value, 
rarity, imperfect imitability, imperfect mobility, and non-substitutability. 
There are a number of divergences from this view of RBV, most notably 
Michael Porter and the industrial organization economics perspective (10), 
which sees competitive advantage as a product of market positioning. 
Porter's (1985) fundamental assumption was that gaining and sustaining 
competitive advantage is the key to organisational success, but he saw this as 
a result of the organisation's positioning, given its external environment (this is 
seen in the 5 Forces Framework, illustrated in figure 7). 
13 e. g. Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Grant, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992; Amit & Shoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993. 
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Figure 7: Five Forces Diagram 
This has similarities to the RBV (for instance, in the 10 concept of `barriers to 
entry' and the RBV concept of 'mobility barriers'; Ambrosini, 2002, p141), and 
may be complementary to the internally focused RBV. 
These theories have an intrinsic appeal, for a number of reasons: they are not 
static, they explain the formation of core competencies over time (Teece, 
1985; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Kay, 1993; Teece et al, 1992; Amit & 
Shoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993) and they are not deterministic (Hambrick, 
1987; Hunt, 1995; Baden-Fuller, 1995), that is, they imply the need to build 
strategic management processes such as leadership, learning and 
innovation). They also, crucially, create a potential new role for HR, as the 
provider of one category of resource: in Barney's (1991) parlance, "human 
capital". 
Human capital, clearly, can be both a sustainable and inimitable core 
competency, particularly when viewed in the context of the complex inter- 
relationships with the firm's other resources (physical, financial, legal etc. ). 
The possibility of provision of the strategic role which HR has long craved has 
resulted in the generation of a significant amount of academic literature on 
RBV and SHRM. 
Notable amongst this work is Peter Boxall, who's writing suggests that the 
resource based approach to SHRM, building on Porter's (1980,1985) theory 
of competitive advantage and Prahalad & Hamel's theory of core 
competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), may be useful in the development of 
a model of HRM. These theories are focused on acquiring, developing and 
utilising core competencies for sustainable competitive advantage. Boxall 
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moves beyond the "matching"/"best fit" models of SHRM (which link HR 
strategy to business strategy) into a more fluid model. This approach allows 
HRM to be flexibly deployed in business scenarios where environmental and 
organisational change require agility. 
Boxall's approach, furthermore, also rejects the "unitarian" perspective which 
assumes that employees will follow the organisation's direction 
unquestioningly (a characteristic of the "matching" model). This allows for the 
inclusion of industrial relations into the model. 
RBV does, however, have a number of limits to its applicability to the public 
sector. Notably, it fails to address the implicit assumption in the resource 
based model that organisations are rational systems, and will behave in a 
fashion which maximises stakeholder value. For instance, although Boxall 
rejects the unitarian perspective, and references the potentially derailing 
influence of industrial relations, unlike Tyson (1997), his work does not 
explicitly consider the negotiated and political nature of strategy formulation in 
organisations. 
This produces an apolitical theory which has limited applicability in the 
politicised public sector environment. It may serve a useful purpose as an 
indication of the SHRM interventions which may drive the organisation 
towards modernisation, i. e. RBV may be very useful in the creation and 
communication of a vision for the future. In of itself, however, it will need the 
inclusion of the political dimension to describe and bring about change within 
the public sector environment. 
3.2.3.2. Institutional Theory 
Given the limitations identified with RBV, to gain a wider view of how SHRM 
may work in a high profile, politically sensitive, public sector environment, it 
will be necessary to incorporate a consideration of political influences into any 
analysis. This should consider both intra and extra organisational influences. 
The institutional theory of SHRM may have something to offer in the search 
for a model for HR in a politicised public sector environment. Its basis is the 
assumption that organisations are, first and foremost, social entities, and will 
conform to gain social legitimacy and acceptance, and hence secure 
resources, from multiple stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977, 
1987; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional theory has 
similarities to resource dependency theory, but emphasises social legitimacy 
rather than resource exchange as the key feature of organisational 
relationships. 
This study will take the broad sociological definition of institutional theory, as 
summarised by Tsai & Child: 
"An institution is defined by sociologists as a collective and 
regulatory complex consisting of political and social agencies 
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which dominate other organizations through enforcement of 
laws, rules and norms. " (Tsai & Child, 1997, p5) 
Whereas RBV assumes that organisations will face pressures of an economic 
nature, institutional theory proposes that organisations have cultural and 
social pressures directed at them: 
"Environments ... may make social and cultural demands that 
require organisations to play particular roles in society and to 
establish and maintain certain outward appearances ... Environments dominated by social demands reward 
organisations for conforming to the values, norms, rules and 
beliefs of society. " (Hatch, 1997, p83) 
Or as DiMaggio & Powell more succinctly expresses: 
"Organizations compete not just for resources and customers, 
but for social as well as economic fitness. " (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1983, p150) 
Various sources of institutional pressure have been identified. Scott (1987), 
for instance, refers to regulatory structures, government agencies, laws and 
courts, professions, interests and mobilized public opinion. The most 
widespread categorisation, however, is provided by seminal writers on 
institutional theory, Powell & DiMaggio (1991), who grouped the different 
types of institutional pressure driving organisations towards conformity (as 
shown in figure 8). 
Coercive Institutional Pressure Pressure to conform from government regulations 
or laws 
Normative Institutional Pressure Pressure to conform from cultural expectations 
(e. g. the professional training of organisational 
members) 
Mimetic Institutional Pressure The desire to look like other organisations, arising 
from uncertainty 
Figure 8: Powell & DiMaggio's Types of Institutional Pressure 
Powell & DiMaggio postulate that these pressures operate on organisations to' 
create institutional isomorphism (i. e. organisations, over time, come to 
resemble each another): 
"Early adopters of organizational innovations are commonly 
driven by a desire to improve performance ... As 
innovation 
spreads, a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides 
legitimacy rather than improves performance. " (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1983, p148, quoting Meyer & Rowan, 1997) 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) went on to describe a mechanism whereby these 
institutional pressures and the behaviours they promote become "rationalised 
myths", i. e. shared belief systems. Organisational actors create the 
organisation's social reality via these shared belief systems. They create 
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rational arguments which are used to explain non-rational, emotionally based 
decisions. Rationalised myths are things which cannot be tested in an 
organisation, but are unchallenged as they are regarded as unquestionably 
true. In other words, institutionalisation is seen as a social process whereby 
individuals tacitly agree a shared conceptualisation of social reality. Likewise, 
organisations reflect the myths of the society in which they are embedded 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These myths are institutionalised in products, 
services, techniques, policies and programmes. 
This is a variant of institutional theory: neo-institutionalism (Selznick, 1957; 
Meyer & Scott, 1983; March & Olsen, 1984; Scott & Meyer, 1987; Meyer at al, 
1988; Scott, 1992) looks at the way in which belief systems develop, rather 
than the more straightforward legitimacy/social acceptance model of DiMaggio 
and Powell. Neo-institutionalism views institutions and institutional actions as 
constructed, given shared meaning through "repeated actions and shared 
conceptions of reality" (Hatch, 1997, p84). Neo-institutionalism also questions 
the assumption that every decision is derived from a conscious, rational 
decision making process (Meyer & Scott, 1983; March & Olsen, 1984; Scott & 
Meyer, 1987; Meyer at al, 1988). This provides links to work on bounded 
rationality and causal ambiguity. 
A corollary of the institutional view is that organisations which are subject to 
institutional pressures are inherently change resistant (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theory appears to offer useful insights in to the public sector, due 
to the influence of political and 'non-rational' drivers in public sector 
companies. This is particularly relevant, given the significant influence of 
industrial relations (Bach & Winchester, 2003). Furthermore, intuitively, public 
sector companies are likely to be more "dominated by social demands" 
(Hatch, 1997, p83) than their private sector counterparts. Social constructivist 
approaches such as neo-institutionalism may prove useful when examining 
public sector companies from the perspective of the actors within it, and has 
obvious resonance with the proposed discourse analysis methodology for this 
study. 
3.2.4. The Epistemological Approaches to SHRM 
As alluded to earlier, the majority of SHRM research takes a positivist 
approach, as evidenced by: the relative popularity of RBV and other 
economics based approaches to SHRM; best practice models; and the 
quantitative work of authors such as Huselid (e. g. Delaney & Huselid, 1996) 
and Patterson (e. g. Patterson et al, 1997). Constructivist approaches such as 
institutional theory are to be found, and a number of researchers are working 
within this epistemology (e. g. Karen Legge), but, as Harley & Hardy (2004) 
point out, these are relatively marginalised. 
The positivist construction placed on SHRM has led some researchers to see 
SHRM as a replacement for the pluralistic employee relations discourse which 
preceded it (Keenoy, 1999; Harley & Hardy, 2004). Authors such as Legge 
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(2001) have been overtly critical of writers on SHRM "socially constructing" 
the phenomena under study by means of a positivist epistemology and use of 
statistics. 
Linked to the positivist/constructivist debate is a further categorisation of 
SHRM approaches into 'hard' or 'soft' (Storey, 1987; Hendry & Pettigrew, 
1990; Legge, 1995). The 'hard' approach (also called 'unitarian 
instrumentalism') is led by business strategy: 
"... emphasises the rational, quantitative and calculative aspects 
of business by focusing on the integration of human resource 
policies and systems with business strategy. " (Morgan & 
Allington, 2002, p35) 
The soft approach, conversely, sees the key to the integration of HR policies 
and business objectives as the employees: 
"... treating employees as valued assets and as a source of 
competitive advantage through their commitment, adaptability, 
motivation and skills. " (Morgan & Allington, 2002, p35) 
4. SHRM in the Public Sector 
As one of the companies hosting the study will reside within the public sector, 
it is relevant to examine the limited literature on SHRM in the public sector. 
The majority of the work on SHRM reviewed above has been based in the 
private sector, but there is a small literature which links SHRM (more 
commonly referred to as HRM in British public sector studies) to the public 
sector. 
The literature makes a case for a distinctively different public sector HR, 
particularly in respect of employee and industrial relations. 
"... in the area of HRM at least, organizational policies and 
practices in the public and private sectors remain different in 
many important respects. In particular the traditional style of 
paternal, standardized and collectivized HRM is more prevalent 
in public than private organizations. " (Boyne et al, 1999, p417) 
A notable article in this under-researched area is Farnham & Horton's (1996) 
analysis of differentiated approaches in the public and the private sectors. 
They identified 4 major areas of difference: management style, employment 
practices, industrial relations and the 'model employer' status of the public 
sector. This model is briefly reviewed in figure 9, illustrated via Boyne et al's 
contrast with the private sector. 
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Public sector Description Private sector 
characteristics characteristics 
Farnham & Horton, Boyne et al, 1999 
1996 
Paternalism A paternalistic style of management, Rationalism, individualism 
emphasising the health, safety and 
welfare of employees 
Standardisation Standard employment practices typify Flexibility 
the public sector, i. e. consistency of pay, 
terms and conditions for people doing 
the same job or providing the same 
service, irrespective of geographical 
location 
Collectivisation Emphasis on staff participation and Rationalism, individualism 
consultation, strong role for trade 
unions, high levels of union 
membership, focus on collective 
bargaining 
'Model employer' The public sector aspires to be a 'model The end or the private 
employer', setting employment and HR sector's assumption of the 
standards to which other sectors should model employer role 
follow 
Figure 9: Model of Public Sector HRM 
Authors have tended to use Farnham & Horton's categories to stress the 
differences between HRM in the public and private sectors, as the following 
quote indicates: 
"In particular the traditional style of paternal, standardised and 
collectivised HRM is more prevalent in public than private 
organisations. Furthermore, activities associated with the 
conventional state role as model employer, such as staff training 
and the promotion of equal opportunities, are still more likely to 
be found in public organisations. " (Boyne et al, 1999, p417) 
The research typically cites the "model employer" status enjoyed by the public 
sector until the mid-1970s: 
"... the traditional role of the State as a model employer, in 
which public employers set an example for other public and 
private sector employers to follow ... public sector employers 
provided a model of employment which was essentially 
collectivist, paternalistic, bureaucratic and welfare centred. " 
(Farnham, Horton & Giles, 1994, p98) 
The 'model employer' title is seen by a number of authors (Hood, 1991; Du 
Guy, 1994; Rhodes, 1994) as having subsequently been transitioned to the 
private sector (Morgan & Allington, 2002, p 35; Farnham, Horton & Giles, 
1994, p 98), and HRM is a consequence of the private sector 'model 
employer' now leading the public sector: 
"... these changes have given rise to a reversal of roles, in which 
public employers are now encouraged to follow and emulate the 
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`best' practice in the private sector ... this 
has meant that current 
personnel practice are being influenced by new employer-led 
approaches, emerging in private sector personnel management, 
generically termed as Human Resources Management (HRM). " 
(Farnham, Horton & Giles, 1994, p 98. ) 
The literature, however, is contradictory, even within articles. Boyne et al 
(1999), despite setting up in their literature review an argument that the public 
sector has moved towards the private sector, showed strong quantitative 
evidence to support the continued existence of a distinctive HRM in the public 
sector environment (Brook, 2002). 
Boyne et al's (1999) questionnaire based study found greater paternalism, 
standardisation, collectivism and 'model employer' characteristics in public 
sector companies than in their private sector counterparts. However, lack of 
longitudinal data in this study made it impossible to determine whether there 
had been movement in the public sector away from these characteristics over 
time, and, if so, whether that movement was in parallel to or convergent with 
changes in the private sector. 
Farnham et al propose a hybrid model, recognising the potential of HRM 
whilst acknowledging the unique features of the public sector environment and 
the perceived threat which HRM constitutes within it. However, the majority of 
public sector writers seem disinterested in this potentially useful compromise, 
and use the differences between private and public sectors to dismiss HRM. 
Many of the articles have a polemical tone which belies the bias of the 
researcher and raises questions about the objectivity of the research. Many 
of the debates are explicitly located in the political context, using pejorative 
language: 
"... the Conservative governments in the UK encouraged public 
sector managers to 'emulate' the behaviour of their private 
sector counterparts. This implied the replacement of the 
traditional methods and ethos of public administration by 
supposedly superior private sector practice. " (Boyne et al, 1999, 
p 407, my emphasis) 
HRM is often linked to the unwelcome pressure from government upon public 
sector organisations to improve their efficiency, and hence is rejected. The 
following article, ostensibly about the use of HRM in the Further Education 
sector, is typical: 
"In practice, the Labour Government is not seeking partnership 
and neither are employers. In the context of the employment 
relationship there is no reason why they should. Employees are 
being told in no uncertain terms across the public sector that 
they are less efficient than their private sector counterparts and 
that they must accept changes, especially in pay systems, 
structures and working practices. " (Burchill, 2001, p156) 
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In a less overtly critical article, Morgan & Allington (2002) bemoan the fact that 
'hard' HRM has been used in the public sector (evidenced in their study by 
application of HRM practices in job restructuring, protective trade union 
legislation and public sector pay), whilst 'soft' HRM would have been much 
more appropriate to the public sector environment: 
"The soft model is more relevant to the public sector where the 
standards of quality of services are highly dependent upon 
employee motivation, skills and service orientation. " (Morgan & 
Allington, 2002, p35) 
For Morgan & Allington, the implications of this "inappropriate" application of 
'hard' HRM to the public sector has a range of undesirable consequences. 
These include a deterioration in the quality of advice to ministers from public 
servants concerned about job security, an "assault on collectivism" (2002, 
p40) and recruitment and retention difficulties arising from "lower relative pay" 
(2002, p40). Burchill (2001) is even clearer in his rebuke to the Further 
Education sector: 
"... the discourse of current management practices had infected 
(managers') culture. " (Burchill, 2001, p2, my emphasis) 
HRM is therefore inextricably linked to the 'commercialization' of the public 
sector, and consequently reviled by public sector writers. Given the antipathy 
with which successive governments' programmes to modernise the public 
sector (as reviewed in project one), it is to be expected that some guilt by 
association will linger in the minds of public sector employees and trade 
unionists. 
This leaves the researcher in something of a quandary: the lack. of unbiased 
literature on the application of HRM in the public sector creates a gap in the 
literature, but also provides little theoretical basis for a study of HRM in the 
public sector. It is clear that consideration of institutional pressures and 
context specific models of HRM will be essential in the public sector 
environment. 
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CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
The study of SHRM from the theoretical viewpoints of resource based and 
institutional theories suggests that a social constructivist methodology may be 
the most useful: political considerations are subjective and constructed through 
language (rather than possessing an empirically observable reality). Discourse 
analysis, a methodology for dealing with natural language data developed by 
social psychologists, appears to be a suitable methodology for a study of this 
type. 
1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
There are a number of theoretical conceptualisations of discourse and 
discourse analysis, which can be broadly grouped into two schools of thought 
(Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). The first concerns the study of social text (both 
written and oral) in organisations, which seeks to linguistically make sense of 
organisations and organisational attributes. The second, which this study will 
utilise, sees discourse as both constructed by and constructive of social reality. 
This second conceptualisation of discourse analysis has been defined as 
follows: 
"... the constructed and constructive use of language and on the 
functions and consequences of language use. " (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p206) 
The major contention of this approach to discourse analysis is that language is 
not neutral, but is used by individuals to do things (e. g. to justify a position, a 
stance or to create a social reality). This constructed view of language is 
echoed in the management research context by Fairclough (1992). Discourse 
analysis is a particularly appropriate tool with which to examine the rich 
linguistic data with which participants are constructing (often complex) 
philosophical constructs into everyday conversation, constructs which are 
intrinsically tied up with issues of ideology, power, political positioning, 
persuasion and justification. 
It seems, thus, admirably suited to the exploration of the political and "non- 
rational" influences operating on HRM in TfL, particularly when utilising 
institutional and neo-institutional theory as theoretical bases for the research. 
2. KEY CONCEPTS 
Discourse analysis has its origins in three traditions - speech act theory, 
ethnomethodology and semiology - which create the three research principles 
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which guide discourse analysis: the functionality of language, variation and 
social constructivism. 
2.1. Functionality 
Both speech act theory and ethnomethodology stress that people use language 
to perform particular tasks: to accuse, to ask, to persuade, to command. 
Language is thus not seen as a neutral representation of events, objects, 
people etc., but as subjective and value-laden, tailored to achieve certain 
discursive purposes: discourse analysis takes a view of language as functional. 
2.2. Variation 
A consequence of the functional view of language is variation. Discourse 
analysis assumes that a participant's language is functional, and that this 
functionality is related to context. It thus follows that, as the context changes, 
the representation of events, motives and actions which is functional within that 
context will also change. One would thus anticipate considerable variation in 
peoples' accounts, as Potter & Wetherell intimate: 
"In general, we find that if talk is oriented to many different 
functions, global and specific, any examination of language over 
time reveals considerable variation. " (Pottter & Wetherell, 1987, 
p33, their emphasis) 
Potter & Wetherell's claim, however, goes further than this: they suggest that, 
as variability arises as a consequence of the discursive functionality of a 
particular discourse, one can begin to deduce to what function the speaker is 
using that discourse: 
"As variation is a consequence of function it can be used as an 
analytic clue to what function is being performed in a particular 
stretch of discourse. That is, by identifying variation ... we can 
work towards an understanding of function. We can predict that 
certain kinds of function will lead to certain kinds of variation and 
we can look for those variations. " (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 
p171) 
This immediately diverges from more positivist searches for global rules and 
generic principles. However, Potter & Wetherell delimit variability to the level of 
the individual: 
"... discourse is variable in the sense that any one speaker will 
construct events and persons in different ways according to 
function. " (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p172) 
26 
They go on to claim that there is regularity in discourse, but analysts must look 
more broadly, at larger tracts of data involving a number of subjects or a 
number of discursive situations. The search becomes for patterning in 
responses: under what circumstances do particular kinds of discursive 
representation regularly appear? 
This search for regularity led Potter & Wetherell to adopt the concept of 
"interpretative repertoires" (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Mulkay, 1982, 
1985; Wetherell, 1986) as the categorisation system which underpins discourse 
analysis. "Interpretative repertoire" has been defined as follows: 
"Interpretative repertoires are recurrently used systems of terms 
used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other 
phenomena. A repertoire ... is constituted through a limited 
range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical 
constructions. " (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p149) 
The concept of the interpretative repertoire is a useful one, because it allows 
the examination of variability as a topic of interest in its own right (what function 
is the speaker intending, which has created the variation) rather than dismiss it 
as a research anomaly or'noise' in the data. 
2.3. Construction 
The final element of discourse analysis is its emphasis on the constructed 
nature of language: 
" ... people are using their language to construct versions of the 
social world. The principle tenet of discourse analysis is that 
function involves a construction of versions, and is demonstrated 
by language variation. " (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p33, their 
emphasis) 
Language is seen as both a product of the social world and constitutive of that 
world. This builds on a long philosophical tradition of seeing language as an 
important influence in the construction of social reality (Wittgenstein, 1995, 
1961; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The key metaphor here is that of 
manufacture; language is not simply a reflective representation of an 
independent reality, but an account which is devised, developed and which, in 
turn, constructs that reality. 
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3. SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED DISCOURSES 
3.1. First-Order and Second-Order Realities 
It is useful at this point to introduce the concept of a hierarchy of realities. Ford 
uses Watzlawick's (1990) concept of first-order and second-order realities and 
Bohm's (1996) presented and represented realities in his important 1996 paper. 
Ford defines first-order reality thus: 
"First-order, presented realities refer to the physically 
demonstrable and publicly discernible characteristics, qualities or 
attributes of a thing, event or situation ... 
first-order realities, 
therefore, are composed of uninterrupted facts and data that are 
accessible (i. e. in the world), measurable, and empirically 
verifiable. " (Ford, 1999, p481) 
However, he indicates that the constructivist perspective indicates the profound 
influence of language on the representation of these first-order realities: 
"In a constructivist perspective, the discourse which constitutes 
first-order realities is itself a construction ... and different language games will give different constructions, understandings 
and testings of reality. " (Ford, 1999, p482) 
The concept of second-order reality develops this idea further, seeing the 
addition of meaning as the difference between first-order and second-order 
reality: 
"What differentiates second-order reality from first-order reality is 
the attachment of meaning. Second-order, represented realities 
are created whenever we attribute, attach, or give meaning, 
significance, or value to a first-order reality. " (Ford, 1999, p482) 
Second order realities are important because people create them as reality as 
they act upon them: 
"... second-order realities create a reality apart from first-order 
realities because of the `consequences' of these attributions of 
meaning, create concrete results of a personal and societal 
nature, i. e. people act on the basis of their interpretation. " (Ford, 
1999, p482) 
Ford goes on to indicate that the fundamental implication of this hierarchy of 
realities is their obfuscation in everyday use: 
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"The significance of these two realities lies in our failure to 
distinguish between them and to understand the nature of their 
interconnection ... the representation (second-order reality) fuses 
with the presentation (first-order reality) so ... the result is what Bohm calls a net presentation in which the two realities fuse and 
mingle together, occurring as one, seamless reality. " (Ford, 1999, 
p482) 
This, Ford argues, has significant implications for change and change 
management, where "shifting conversations" can be a powerful driver for 
change. This will be discussed below. 
3.2. Power and the Definition of Social Realities 
This leads to the concept of socially constructed discourses. Early proponents 
of discourse analysis advanced the concept of rhetorical psychology, which 
suggests that individuals have access to a variety of socially shared 
discourses: 
" ... the content of the dialogue has historical and ideological 
roots, for the concepts involved, and their meanings, are 
constructed through the history of social dialogue and debate. " 
(Billig et at, 1989, p6) 
As the post-structuralist philosopher, Michel Foucault, indicates: 
"Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: 
that is the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function 
as true. " (Foucault, 1977, p93) 
In the late 80s, social psychology adopted this model as a core concept of 
discourse analysis. Individuals can draw upon socially shared discourses (the 
Foucauldian "regime of truth", although socially shared discourses may also be 
produced by sub-groups, and dominant discourses may be subverted to the 
use of the sub-group) variably, to their own functional ends. Interpretative 
repertoires are attempts to capture these socially shared discourses. This will 
be a key concept in this study, as it links the individual's use of language to 
shared and socially shared themes: 
"... the rhetorical approach does not start by considering 
individual motivations or individual information processing. It 
starts from the assumption that knowledge is socially shared and 
that common sense contains conflicting, indeed dissonant, 
themes. " (Billig et al, 1989, p20) 
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Rhetorical psychology, thus, draws an important link between discourses 
available in society and a functional and variable view of language in use. 
The corollary of the socially shared nature of discourses is an intrinsic link with 
power: power will be used to ensure certain discourses will gain currency, and 
discourses that are used by the powerful are likely to be pre-eminent. 
This owes obvious allegiance to Marx & Engels' critique of Feuerbach in 'THE 
GERMAN IDEOLOGY': 
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, 
i. e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the 
same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the 
means of material production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby 
... the 
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production 
are subject to it ... 
The individuals composing the ruling class 
regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age. " 
(Marx & Engels, 1888, p64) 
Marx & Engels, however, did not allow for the possibility of idea production by 
sub-groups or individuals who are not members of the ruling class. This paper 
will argue that power is a shifting phenomenon, subject to conflict and 
negotiation, hence changes in the power dynamic will change representational 
meanings: 
".. there is no reason to expect that representations will remain 
contextually and historically stable but every reason to think that 
they will shift. Power will thus be implicated in attempts to fix or 
uncouple and change particular representational relations of 
meaning. " (Clegg, 1989, p151-2) 
As participants compete for power and status, language representations may 
change (Francis, 2002(a)), and, consequently, meaning is continually 
negotiated and re-negotiated (Pettigrew, 1985; Dawson, 1994; Doz & Prahalad, 
1988). The implication of this is that it is the powerful who construct "truth": 
"'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which 
produce and sustain it, and to effect of power which it induces 
and which extend it. " (Foucaullt, 1977, p94) 
This is echoed in the occupational context by McCloskey (1994, cited by 
Francis, 2002, p2), who defined rhetoric as a form of "wordcraft" used by senior 
managers to construct, justify and legitimise a particular "world view" of the 
employment relationship. 
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4. VALIDATION 
Validation of a discourse analysis study is handled in a very different way to 
validation of more positivistic methodologies (where a range of statistical tools 
may be used for validation purposes). In the words of Potter & Wetherell: 
"The goal is to present analysis and conclusions in such a way 
that the reader is able to assess the researcher's interpretations 
... a representative set of examples ... must be 
included along 
with a detailed interpretation which links analytic claims to specific 
... aspects of the extracts ... each reader is given the possibility 
of evaluating the different stages of the process, and hence 
agreeing with the conclusions or finding grounds for 
disagreement. " (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p172) 
In other words, the transparent presentation of the data and the analytic 
process acknowledges that the researcher is producing one of a number of 
possible competing interpretations, and the reader is invited to critique the 
researcher's coding and proffer their own. There is no attempt to produce one 
"true" representation of events, attitudes or internal states from the discourse 
data. Validation, consequently, in discourse analysis, is embedded in the 
transparency of the process and in the critique of the reader. 
In short, discourse analysis does proceed on a rigorous basis, using coding 
schemata ("interpretative repertoires"). This methodology is described in detail 
in project one, when discourse analysis is used for the first time, and coding 
schemata for each project are presented in the appropriate section. Whilst 
discourse analysis may not meet the validation criterion of replicability which is 
required by positivist methodologies, its validation lies in the transparency of 
the coding schemata used and the inclusion of the raw data selected to support 
the conclusions drawn. 
5. DILEMMATIC DISCOURSES, COMMON SENSE 
AND IDEOLOGY 
One further concept of the social constructivist model of discourse analysis 
which is potentially useful is that of dilemmatic discourse (Billig et al, 1998): the 
notion that individuals will use language to debate issues over which they have 
internal dilemmas: 
"The contrary themes of common sense provide more than the 
seeds for arguments: they also provide the seeds for thought 
itself. The justification for suggesting this is based upon the 
notion that thinking and arguing are closely connected. When 
one thinks about a dilemma, wondering whether to pursue one or 
other course, one arranges the reasons as in an argument, sifting 
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the balance of justifications and criticisms ... In a real sense 
social argumentation can be seen as providing the model for 
social thinking. " (Billig et al, 1998, p17) 
A further important construct is contained within this extract: the notion of 
"common sense" which contains contrary themes which give rise to dilemmatic 
thinking: 
"The common sense of all societies will possess contrary themes, 
which provide the possibility of argument and deliberation. " (Billig 
et al, 1998, p18) 
This "common sense" is socially shared and socially constructed: 
U... the currents of ideological history can quietly pass through our 
thinking, in a way which ensures that our thinking is not purely our 
own. Moreover, the cross-currents and contrary tendencies of 
this history can continue to shape the contents of our thinking 
about the dilemmas of present ordinary life. " (Billig et al, 1998, p 
42) 
In this extract, Billig at al have moved from "common sense" to "ideology", 
taking as their assumption that "intellectual ideology" ("a system of political, 
religious or philosophical thinking ... the product of intellectuals or professional thinkers", Billig et al, 1998, p27) passes into "lived ideology" ("the social 
patterning of everyday thinking", Billig et al, 1998, p28), thence to "common 
sense" ("the commonsensical origin of intellectual notions, which can be 
returned in a transformed state back to common sense and thereby further 
transformed", Billig et al, 1998, p26), in an iterative process. 
Contrary themes and dilemmatic thinking, in Billig et al's terminology, show 
themselves as explicit and implicit dilemmatic discourses. Whilst it is obvious 
when an individual explicitly expresses both sides of an argument (for instance, 
to show reasonableness in considering a less preferred side of the argument or 
to anticipate potential criticism), an implicit contrary theme will require greater 
analysis to uncover it, as the overt meaning may conceal its negative in the 
semantic structure of the discourse 74. 
The significance of the concept of contrary discourses to the notion of "shifting 
conversations" (Ford & Ford, 1995), which will be discussed later, is high. 
14 Billig et al, 1998, use the example of discourse on education, which demonstrates the explicit theme of 
egalitarianism, but contains as implicit theme of authoritarianism. 
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6. USE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN MANAGEMENT 
RESEARCH 
The majority of papers which use discourse analysis as a methodology reflect 
its origins in social psychology. There is, however, a growing recognition that it 
can be a useful descriptive tool in management research, with recent papers 
using discourse analysis to study areas as diverse as the setting of cod quotas 
in the Russian and Norwegian fishing industries (Honneland, 2004), speeches 
on information technology by the World Bank's President (Thompson, 2004) 
and airline alliances (Vaara, Kleymann & Seristo, 2004). 
Discourse analysis, however, may be more than a purely descriptive tool. A 
small number of studies have recognised the potential of discourse analysis to 
create alternative social realities for the participants (Francis, 2002. The 
negotiated nature of social construction identifies a role for discourse analysis 
which goes beyond the diagnostic: if new meanings are created, or alternative 
meanings are given pre-eminence, can that in itself be a driver for 
organisational change? This builds on the work of a number of authors (e. g. 
Storey, 1992; Tyson, 1995; Caldwell, 2001; Ulrich, 1997) who have postulated 
a role for SHRM in changing meanings for employees (Tyson 1995,1997, for 
instance, sees the "strategic value" of SHRM as resting in its potential to 
provide a "meaning structure" which will enable managers to develop a 
common language around change) and reinterpreting symbols. 
Useful in this context is the work of Ford and Ford (1995), which uses the 
phrase "shifting conversations" to describe the way in which change may be 
generated by creating shifts in language use and alternative "conversational 
realities" (Francis, 2002). The overtly political nature of this process is 
recognised: 
"... any fundamental shift in organisational routines and 
behaviours must be rooted in the orders of discourse and 
attempts at political influence to inform conversations for change. " 
(Francis, 2002, p323) 
There is a strong link between this notion of "shifting conversations" and Billig 
et al's notion of dilemmatic discourses. It seems self-evident that the 
exploration of divergent discourses in the speech of an individual or a group will 
highlight areas in which cognitive dissonance may already exist, and where the 
individual/group may be amenable to having their conversation "shifted". 
Fundamental shifts in behaviour, it is implied, will follow a shift in the 
conversation, although this is questioned in other studies (Knights & McCabe, 
2002) and inferred rather than substantiated in Francis's (2002) case study. 
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The language of change management and the constraining influences of "top 
down" models of change becomes a valid issue for research (Butcher & 
Atkinson, 2000). Classic papers by Ford (Ford & Ford, 1995; Ford, 1996) take 
a social constructivist approach to change, arguing that conversations 
constitute and are constituted by organisations. Change, in this context, is no 
more and no less than the ascendancy of new conversations within an 
organisation, and that there are useful sequences of conversations which can 
initiate and drive change. Change, in this view, becomes the creating and 
embedding of new conversations, hence new social realities: 
"It is possible to consider organizations as networks constituted in 
and by conversations. Accordingly, producing and managing 
change involves shifting that network of conversations by 
intentionally bringing into existence and sustaining 'new' 
conversations whilst completing (and removing) existing 
conversations. Rather than being simply a tool, conversations 
are the target, medium, and product of organizational change. " 
(Ford, 1996, p496) 
Perhaps because of the overwhelming interest in positivist epistemologies, 
however, this exciting area remains under-exploited. 
7. USE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS IN SHRM 
RESEARCH 
To take this argument to its logical conclusion, one must construct SHRM itself 
as a discourse, used by HR practitioners, academics and organisations, to 
create a particular social reality. This was posited by Kennoy, who 
conceptualises SHRM topics such as excellence, customer care and 
empowerment as fluid discourses which potentially create an alternative 
organisational reality: 
"... a conceptual re-envisioning of work relations in which 'nothing 
has changed' but everything will be perceived differently. " 
(Kennoy, 1997, p836) 
Keenoy's scholarly article demonstrates the scope of the HRM definition 
problem. He raises 4 issues with HRM: 
There is no clear agreement on what the term HRM 
means, which leads to a multiplicity of competing theories; 
There is a failure to demonstrate empirically the spread of 
HRM through UK organisations 
There is an inability to 'fix' HRM linguistically (i. e. the 
language of HRMN is ambiguous and changeable); 
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The environments in which HRM is practices are 
themselves under transformational change, and concepts 
such as 'the organisation', 'the employee' and 'the 
employment relationship' are progressively being eroded. 
Keenoy sees these questions as the consequence of the adoption of a realist 
epistemology, and his view of HRM as "a socio-cultural artifact implicated in the 
'management of meaning"' (Keenoy, 1999, p 2) has much appeal to social 
constructivists. Keenoy sees HRM as both creating and being created through 
social interaction, as the following quote indicates: 
"HRMism is a phenomenon which has been constituted and 
enacted by significant social actors - including managers, 
employees, unions, politicians, consultants, academics and 
publishers. " (Keenoy, 1999, p2) 
If one sees HRM as a social construction, one can envisage how normative 
institutional forces are being brought to bear upon it (as is apparent from 
Keenoy's "significant social actors") and definitions of HRM are determined by 
those who possess Foucauldian power: 
"The 'real HRM phenomena' ... is constructed ... by managerial 
elites in particular organizational locales. " (Keenoy, 1999, p8) 
To illustrate this, he describes the way in which organisations such as HP and 
IBM have come to epitomise the "discursive identity and ontology" (Keenoy, 
1999, p5) of HRM. Keenoy assets that there is a connection between this pre- 
eminence and their non-union, unitarian, individualistic culture; this link is 
obviously As Keenoy indicates: 
"... they demonstrated how to manage without unions and 'living 
proofthat the unitary shibboleth was achievable. " (Keenoy, 1999, 
p5) 
This is diametrically opposed to the UK's pluralistic employee relations model, 
and to the public sector "model employer" of Farnham & Horton. It is a small 
step from Keenoy's social constructivist view to see HRM as little more than a 
rhetorical gloss, highly functional for (primarily US based) HR practitioners who 
wished to develop such an employment culture to support the move towards 
the less employee centric working practices (downsizing, restructuring, cost 
cutting, job insecurity etc. ) which have come to dominate the global 
marketplace. 
Keenoy's metaphor of HRM as a hologram has an intrinsic appeal to social 
constructivists: to exist, a hologram needs both technical (lasers, boxes, light 
sensitive plates) and a constitutive social process (it needs a viewer to utilise 
the technology and interpret what is perceived). Secondly, a hologram varies 
according from where and by whom it is viewed: 
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"... holograms underline the point that what we see also varies 
according to where we, quite literally, stand. As we have seen, it 
appears to be much the same for HRM. " (Keenoy, 1999, p11) 
8. THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS VARIANT USED IN 
THIS STUDY 
This study will concentrate on the functional use of language and development 
of social constructions via language. As such, the highly detailed form of 
discourse analysis which incorporates every pause, repetition and interjection 
will not be used. Instead, the quotes will derive from verbatim transcripts, but 
will be 'cleaned up' to omit these elements and improve readability. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
AND SUMMARY OF APPROACH 
1. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
The previous section reviewed a variety of models of HR, and provided a 
detailed review of the factional nature of SHRM. A number of gaps in the 
literature have been identified: 
The combination of RBV and institutional theories of 
SHRM has the potential to provide a description of the 
forces impacting HR in organisations, allowing for 
consideration of political as well as business drivers. 
" There is a need to develop a model of strategic HR which 
is compatible with non-SHRM environments. 
The literature review shows that literature on HRM in the 
public sector in the main is polemical and resistant, and 
there is a clear need to establish a definition of HRM 
which is broader than job reductions and cost savings, 
and which has greater resonance with public sector 
values. 
Discourse analysis may be useful in diagnosing change 
and change resistance, by application of its constructivist 
view of language. 
The application of discourse analysis to SHRM 
interventions is an under-researched area, both in terms 
of utilising the concept of SHRM itself as an alternative 
discourse, and/or providing HRM interventions as a 
means of promoting alternative discourses. 
All of the above points suggest that there is a need to build a new descriptive 
research model of HR which is appropriate to non-SHRM environments. 
These projects offer the opportunity to test such a model in environments 
which contain many of the elements which make SHRM problematic (i. e. 
industrial relations, pluralistic employee relations, the impact of political and 
'non-rational' drivers in the organization; an environment which lacks strong 
contextual drivers and has concomitantly more influential actors; an 
environment of radical, unplanned change). 
RBV, neo-institutional theory, social constructivism and discourse analysis 
provide appropriate theoretical, epistemological and methodological bases for 
such a study. 
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The research contribution to knowledge, hence, is the application of a social 
constructivist epistemology to the issue of HR strategy formulation and 
implementation in organisations. It will develop and test a new descriptive 
research model for HR which is applicable in diverse environments, which 
incorporates the following elements: 
" The model will utilises contextually based theories of HR as a 
diagnostic framework (including both resources based and institutional 
elements) 
" The model will give centrality to the influence of the actors, recognising 
strategy formulation as a negotiated, emergent and iterative process 
" The model will consider HR strategy implementation as well as 
formulation. 
2. SUMMARY OF APPROACH 
Given the organisations under study (a politicised public sector organisation 
and a private sector organisation where the actors have considerable freedom 
to determine strategy) it appears that certain of the approaches are more 
appropriate than others. 
An indicative approach is represented diagrammatically in figure 10. 
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This is presented an indicative approach, but this section will further consider 
the approach in the light of the literature reviews on industrial relations and 
the UK public sector, and in the context of the methodology section in chapter 
three. 
Arising out of theoretical concerns which arise from consideration of the 
literature in chapter two, a series of projects were devised, looking at SHRM 
in different organisational contexts. This study takes as its general topic how 
the meaning of SHRM is negotiated in different organisational contexts and 
the process of HR strategy development and implementation. 
This was the broad guiding principle of this study, but research questions 
evolved in a logically incremental fashion, and are detailed in figure 11 below. 
Project One Can neo-institutional theory be useful in explaining the 
factors influencing HR strategy and implementation? 
Can a constructivist view of language be useful in 
explaining the factors influencing HR strategy and 
implementation? 
How can the operant model of HR best be described in a 
non-SHRM environment? 
Project Two What can RBV and neo-institutional theories of SHRM, a 
social constructivist approach and a discourse analysis 
methodology tell us about how HR strategy is created and 
how HR is enacted? 
What influence do different contexts have on the creation of 
HR strategy and the enactment of HR? 
How do actors' perceptions influence the creation of HR 
strategy and the enactment of HR? 
Project Three What can a social constructivist approach and a discourse 
methodology tell us about the formulation of HR strategy? 
What can a social constructivist approach and a discourse 
methodology tell us about the implementation of HR 
strategy? 
Can a new model of HR strategy formulation and 
implementation be developed which can provide a better 
explanation for the operation of HR in an organisation than 
'best fit' or contextually based theories of HR? 
How can change best be reflected in a model of HR 
strategy formulation and implementation? 
Figure 11: Summary of Research Questions 
Detailed literature reviews are contained in each project. 
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The Linking Document attempts to bring these three projects together, and 
attempts to refine a descriptive research model of HR, evolved over the 
course of the three projects. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines discourse around trade union relations in an important but 
under-researched organisation, London Underground (LUL). It uses discourse 
analysis as its methodology, taking as its fundamental assumption that 
individuals will use language functionally and variably, to construct their social 
reality. 
In one of the few academic papers to study LUL, Darlington (2001) contented 
that left wing union activists were critical in collectivising employees, proposing 
in support of this claim that 4 factors sustained continued militancy in LUL. 
One of these factors was managerial belligerence towards trade unions. He 
did, however, fail to include data from the influential senior management group, 
whom one would reasonably suppose to hold different views from the unionists 
and HR. staff whom Darlington interviewed. 
This study argues that senior managers do reference Darlington's 4 factors, 
including 'acknowledging a managerial contribution, but fail to support his 
contention for the critical role of union activists. There is greater evidence in the 
managerial data of the socially shared use of contrary discourses and themes 
not referenced by Darlington. This study concludes that managers' 
representations were more complex and ambiguous than suggested by 
Darlington, due to the fact that managers are using language functionally, to 
explain and justify ongoing militancy. 
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1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR PROJECT 
1.1. Introduction 
Project one looks at the discourses around industrial relations in London 
Underground (LUL). In LUL, Industrial Relations (IR) dominates the HR and 
business agendas, to the extent that IR is a proxy for HR in LUL. Little other 
HR activity takes place, and the managerial and HR staff are all, to a greater or 
less extent, involved in IR related activities. This project provided an 
opportunity to study an organization which has a radically different model of HR 
to that studied in the majority of HR research: an organisation in which HR has 
been subsumed by and conflated with IR. 
This project is part of a wider study 
institutional and resource based views 
argument for the inadequacies of the 
environment. 
which will examine SHRM, looking at 
of SHRM. This project will support an 
SHRM model in an industrial relations 
Both the study and this project adopt a social constructivist epistemology, and 
use discourse analysis as their methodology. 
Data comprise interviews with managers and HR staff at various levels in their 
respective organisations. The participants comprised senior managers and 
employee relations staff involved in the London Underground pay negotiation 
2004, and were interviewed during or shortly after the negotiation had 
concluded. Two trade union officials who had key roles in the pay negotiation 
were also included. Three additional London Underground interviewees were 
added, because of their key roles in historical events, as were two Transport for 
London (TfL) senior managers who had close associations with the industrial 
relations events surrounding the pay negotiation. 
As an under-researched organization (Urquhart, 1992), this study will draw 
upon the only academic paper to look at industrial relations in London 
Underground: Darlington's 2001 paper on left wing militancy in London 
Underground. 
Whilst the academic study of industrial relations (at least in the UK) has been 
interdisciplinary, taking contributions from sociology, economics, law, 
psychology and history, the potential of mainstream social sciences to provide 
both theory and methodology has been under-explored (Edwards, 2003b, p 
16). This paper attempts to use discourse analysis, a methodology from 
mainstream social psychology, to illuminate an industrial relations topic of 
study. 
Discourse analysis takes as its fundamental assumption that managers are 
constructing their social reality through their language, and that social reality is 
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constructed through language. This therefore has potentially considerable 
implications for industrial relations practice in the organisation. 
The coding for the project data was generated through a grounded theory 
approach, where the data determine the analytic categories; discourse analysis 
has an affinity with this approach. The data was coded in three ways: 
" Accounts of the industrial relations history of London Underground. 
"A review of data to support Darlington's contentions for the 
continuation of militancy in London Underground. 
" Socially shared discourses in the participants' discussions of current 
events. 
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1.2. Rationale 
The business and academic rationales for this project are shown in figure 12 
below. The project's contributions to knowledge are contained within the five 
components of the academic rationale. 
Business Industrial relations is perceived as the most significant blocker to change 
Rationale in London Underground. Change management activities are difficult and 
time consuming, due to the powerful blocking influence of the trade 
unions. 
Academic Examination of an HR SHRM has been dominated by quantitative, 
Rationale model in a non SHRM positivist research". It has tended to take a 
environment unitarian view of employees, and, in the few 
cases where trade union environments have 
been studied, has cast trade unions as the 
'losers' if SHRM is implemented, or has 
demonised them as a barrier to SHRM 
implementation. 
This project will provide a study of the 
operation of HR as pluralistic employee 
relations, as a potential alternative to the 
SHRM model which dominates most 
research. 
Neo-institutional theory Neo-institutional theory will provide a 
theoretical framework which will support the 
analysis of forces cited by participants as 
inhibitors to change in LUL. 
Constructivist view of This project will examine how industrial 
language relations actors use discourses around trade 
unionism functionally, to explain, for instance, 
a failure to modernise. 
It will also suggest possible alternative 
discourses around partnership which could be 
provided to the organisation and its trade 
unions. 
14 Note that this Is a theoretical Issue, which is debated in chapter 2 In the literature review on SHRM. 
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Applicability of social This paper takes up Edward's call for the use 
psychological of social psychological methodologies in 
methodologies to industrial relations research, by exploring the 
industrial relations utility of discourse analysis in researching this 
research topic. 
Critique of existing work This project will argue that the only significant 
on London Underground piece of academic work on LUL (Darlington's 
2001 paper) fails to include the views of an 
influential stakeholder group, and, as such, its 
presentation of a 'true' version of events in 
the organisation is over-simplistic. 
Figure 12: Business and Academic Rationales for Project One 
The anticipated output of this project is likely to be recommendations for the 
provision of new discourses, but implementation would require the completion 
of a further study. 
The research questions for this project, hence, are as follows: 
" Can neo-institutional theory be useful in explaining the factors 
influencing HR strategy and implementation? 
" Can a constructivist view of language be useful in explaining the 
factors influencing HR strategy and implementation? 
" How can the operant model of HR best be described in a non-SHRM 
environment? 
Note that, in an environment wholly dominated by industrial relations, HR is 
conflated with IR for the purposes of this project. 
1.3. Background 
1.3.1. Organisational Context 
1.3.1.1. Introduction 
The host company for this project was London Underground (LUL). At the time 
of the study, London Underground had just become part of Transport for 
London (TfL), the integrated company responsible for London's transport 
system, accountable for both the planning and delivery of transport facilities, 
including London Underground, London's buses, London Underground, the 
Docklands Light Railway and London Tram and River boat services. 
This was a time of considerable change and upheaval for LUL and the other 
TfL organisations. The individual operating units ('modes') had strong identities 
and cultures (particularly LUL), and were resistant to TfL's central control. The 
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organisation and its various components were highly resistant to what was 
perceived as centrally mandated change. 
As well as modal integration, at the time of the study, TfL was experiencing a 
schism between public sector and private sector views, attitudes and 
approaches, as a large number of senior managers were recruited between 
January and April 2003, from primarily private sector backgrounds. These two 
polarities reflect the organisation's often conflicting dual role of operating a 
business and functioning as a significant element of the Mayor of London's 
political positioning. It was a highly politicised organisation, subject to 
considerable financial and business pressures as well powerful institutional 
forces. 
The context of the study was the TfL 2004 pay negotiation, which occurred in 
the heightened political environment of a mayoral election, in which Ken 
Livingstone was endeavouring to be re-elected for a second term. The LUL 
pay negotiations were the first to commence, and would set the benchmark 
level for the rest of TfL. The major trade union players were the RMT (Railway, 
Maritime and Transport Union), ASLEF (Associated Society of Locomotive 
Steam Enginemen and Firemen) and TSSA (Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association), with a number of other trade union players with smaller 
memberships (TGWU, BTOG and Prospect). 
The pay negotiation was prefaced by years of industrial unrest and a resistance 
to modernization of trade union relations. This is described in detail in section 
6.1. 
Given the influential and contentious relationship with TfL and its unique 
culture, this project will provide a detailed review of TfL as well as LUL. The 
analysis of TfL will look at the organisation (its profile, structure, history, vision 
and purpose, and its culture and will also review HR and IR in LUL). 
The section on organisational context will also cover LUL, where the 
organisation's position is relatively discoverable and subject to little debate (e. g. 
organisational structure). However, in many areas (e. g. industrial relations), 
there is no single shared view within LUL, suggesting that these topics may be 
more amenable to a different approach (such as social constructivism), which 
may better reflect the complexity and the differing organisational views which 
exist in these areas. 
1.3.1.2. Transport for London (TfL) 
1.3.1.2.1. Introduction 
Transport for London (TfL) is the integrated company responsible for London's 
transport system. TfL is accountable for both the planning and delivery of 
transport facilities, including Surface (Buses and Street Management, including 
Congestion Charging), London Underground, London Rail (surface rail, 
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including Docklands Light Railway) and London Tram Link, River Boat Services 
and the London Transport Museum. 
This section will profile TfL, based on extensive analysis of TfL and McKinsey 
documentation, and on insights gleaned by the researcher in her tenure as a 
senior manager in the organisation. 
The analysis was informed by regular interaction with the Managing Directors 
(MDs), particularly the MD, Corporate Services, to whom the researcher 
reports. She also had daily or weekly contact with the Corporate Services 
management team, the Heads of HR group (which comprises both business 
unit and corporate HR), the Group HR team and the London Underground 
operations management. The analysis was supplemented by a number of 
formal interviews on areas in which the researcher was less involved, such as 
Business Planning. 
At the time of the project, TfL was in a post merger integration phase, having 
incorporated London Underground (LUL) 1 year previously. The individual 
operating units ('modes') had strong identities and cultures (particularly LUL), 
and were resistant to TfL's central control. The organisation and its various 
components were highly change resistant. 
As well as the challenges of modal integration, within TfL a schism also existed 
between public sector and private sector views, attitudes and approaches. 
Over 100 senior external hires were made to facilitate the organisation's 
integration, the majority of them from the private sector. This resulted in the 
development of competing world views, both of which have positive and 
negative attributes. These are shown in figure 13. 
Positive Values Negative Features 
Public Sector Model Representativeness, social Entitlement culture, cult of 
responsibility, respect for the mediocrity, task rather than 
individual results focus 
Business Model Business focus, customer Bullying, disrespectful 
service orientation, flexibility, behaviour 
performance based 
Figure 13: Values of the Generic Public Sector and Business Models (Barrett, 2003, p3) 
These two polarities reflected the organisation's often conflicting dual role of 
both operating a business and as functioning as a significant element of the 
Mayor of London's political positioning. It was a highly politicised organisation, 
subject to considerable financial and business pressures as well powerful 
institutional forces. 
This created two organisational challenges: modal integration and public 
sector/business model integration. These challenges were reflected in a 
number of different 'conversations' within the organisation, and the lack of a 
shared vision and shared social reality was seen as hindering the integration 
process. 
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This section will continue with a more detailed review of TfL and will cover the 
following topics: 
" The Organisation 
" Organisational profile 
" Structure 
" Organisational history 
" Vision and purpose, reporting and the business planning process 
" Culture 
" HR in TfL 
" IR in TfL. 
1.3.1.2.2. The Organisation 
1.3.1.2.2.1. Organizational Profile 
TfL is the integrated company responsible for London's transport system, 
accountable for both the planning and delivery of transport facilities. It was 
formed from 15 predecessor bodies from central and local government and the 
voluntary sector. Many of these predecessor organisations had long histories 
and strong cultures (London Underground being the most extreme example of 
this). 
TfL's strategic role is defined as follows (Audit Commission, 2004, p9): 
" Taking an overall long term view of London's transport needs; 
" Integrating transport services across the Modes; 
" Integrating transport policies with other Mayoral objectives, to support 
sustainable development; 
" Administering circa £140 million transport funding annually to the 33 
London boroughs. 
The organisation employs over 18,000 people directly, the majority of whom 
are operational staff in London Underground. Through Public Private 
Partnership (PPP), maintenance was contracted out and the majority of bus 
drivers are also outsourced through a franchise agreement. 
TfL has a budget (2004/2005) of some £4.9 billion, just over half of which 
comes through government grant. 
This section will look at the organisation's vision and purpose, reporting and 
constituent elements and, finally, the organisation's future. 
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1.3.1.2.2.2. Structure 
TfL comprises three operational business units ('Modes') and a corporate 
centre. 
The top level TfL organisation chart is shown in figure 14, which includes the 
corporate centre. A more detailed modal organizational chart (and a discussion 
of the mode) is provided only for London Underground, as the project 
concentrated on the corporate centre and LUL, and only respondents from 
these units were interviewed. 
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London Underground Limited (LUL) carries over three million passengers a 
day, covers a route of 253 miles and serves 275 stations. LUL was formed in 
1985, but its history dates back to 1863, when the world's first underground 
railway opened in London. 
LUL was transferred to TfL in July 2003, following protracted debate and 
negotiation around funding for essential infrastructure investment. 
The LUL environment is a difficult one, beleaguered by militant trade unionism 
and an infrastructure which is outdated and suffers from years of under- 
investment. A good review of LUL's pre-integration industrial relations 
environment is to be found in Darlington (2001). In terms of infrastructure, 
many stations and lines operate at full capacity and much of the infrastructure 
is old, with difficult access and track conditions which lead to cancellations 
and delays. 
The solution proposed to the infrastructure problem was a Public Private 
Partnership (PPP). Under the PPP, London Underground continues to specify 
and run services, employing train and station staff, but LUL has entered into 3 
30-year contracts with private companies (called Infracos) who have promised 
to deliver the rehabilitation and maintenance of the Underground's track, 
tunnels, rolling stock, signal systems and stations. This arrangement was 
organised by arranging the Underground system into three groups of lines: 
" SSL: (Sub-surface lines); Circle, District, Metropolitan, 
Hammersmith & City and East London Line 
" BCV: Bakerloo, Central, Victoria and Waterloo & City 
" JNP: Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly. 
The Infracos responsible for maintenance are Metronet and Tube Lines, the 
staff of which are largely ex-London Transport staff who were transferred to 
the companies when they were set up. Residual links remain to these 
organisations through associated pension schemes and other informal 
connectivities. The relationship between TfL and the Infracos is tense, given 
the outspoken objections which continue to be raised to privatisation by both 
the Commissioner and the Mayor. Examples of this are to be found in 
accounts of the Camden derailment (for which Metronet was blamed by both 
Bob Kiley and the RMT: Transport for London, 2004e) and in documents as 
high profile as the Annual Report, as the following statement from Bob Kiley 
indicates: 
"Although we have been forced to accept the constraints that 
come with the ... PPP arrangements ... 
both the Mayor and I 
have been open regarding our views on this. " (TfL, 2004b, p5) 
Indeed, this opposition to the PPP is possibly the only issue on which TEL and 
the trade unions publicly agree on. 
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An organization chart for LUL (current at the time of the study) is shown in 
figure 15. 
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The three Modes are supported by TfL's corporate function: the Office of the 
Commissioner (including Equality & Inclusion), Corporate Services (HR, IM, 
Procurement and Property & Facilities), Finance & Planning, General Counsel 
and Group Communications. These are described in figure 16. 
The Commissioner is supported by a Chief of Staff (who liaises with 
Office of the the various businesses on a range of issues of importance to TfL and 
Commissioner actively drives forward ongoing initiatives of particular concern or 
interest to the Commissioner). 
The Head of Equality & Inclusion (E&I) also reports to the 
Commissioner and works closely with the businesses to develop and 
implement plans for embedding equality and inclusion across TfL. 
Comprises HR, IM, Procurement and Property & Facilities. 
Corporate Services 
HR is divided into 2 components: Group Human Resources and HR 
Services. Group Human Resources is responsible for informing TfL's 
strategic decisions from an HR perspective, leading the development 
of TfL-wide HR strategy and policy to underpin the delivery of business 
objectives and providing specialist expertise to support the HR 
functions in London Rail, Surface Transport and LUL. HR Services is 
responsible for the implementation of a programme which will deliver 
technologically enabled high-volume services to TfL, including 
resourcing, learning & development and HR systems and 
administration. 
Group Information Management (IM) was established to provide the 
governance that will ensure all IS/IT information management practices 
across TfL are aligned to support the objectives of the business plan, 
as well as to manage those common IM services that enable the 
organisation to work on an integrated basis. 
Group Procurement provides strategic direction to the different Modes 
on what, where and how to procure goods and services across TfL. 
Group Property & Facilities provides the TfL community and all its 
parts with the full range of property related services, from concept and 
strategy to delivery and operation. 
Responsible for the group components of the Finance, Corporate 
Finance & Planning Finance, Transport Planning and Policy, Borough Partnerships, 
Marketing and Fares and Ticketing functions. The group's financial 
position and performance are the remit of F&P. F&P also have the 
prime responsibility for securing funding from the Greater London 
Authority, Government and capital markets. 
Assists TfL and the Board in meeting their multiple fiduciary obligations 
General Counsel and ensures that the corporate governance of TfL is carried out in line 
with best practice. 
Responsible for Public Affairs, Media Relations, Internal 
Group Communications, New Media and Publishing, Communication 
Communications Planning and London's Transport Museum. 
Figure 16: T/L's Corporate Functions 
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The reporting line of E&I direct to the Commissioner (rather than the more 
usual line into Corporate Services or HR) indicates the action of institutional 
forces on the organisation: this will be considered in more detail later. 
The entities from which the TfL organisation was built were classic Weberian 
bureaucracies (Weber, 1947). 
Weber believed that bureaucracy was a pervasive feature of modern society, 
and set out an 'ideal-type' of bureaucracy, the characteristics of which were: 
elaborate hierarchical division of labour; use of explicit, impersonally applied, 
official rules to direct that labour, applied inside and outside the organisation; 
staffing by full time, life time professionals who do not own the 'means of 
administration' (computers, files, property etc. ) but draw a salary rather than 
live from income generated directly by the performance of their jobs. Both the 
professionalism of the staff, their salaried status and their dissociation from 
the `means of administration' support consistent application of rules, 
according to Weber. 
Bureaucracy is the dominant form of organisational structure for public sector 
organisations, which leads one to consider why this has evolved. Meyer & 
Rowan (1977, p343) discuss the way in which organisational forms become 
legitimised and come to be viewed unquestioningly as rational in 
organisations, due to the impact of isomorphic institutional forces on 
organisations which cause them to become like one another. Mimetic forces 
(where organisations in similar industries come to resemble one another) or 
coercive forces (where regulatory forces operate on an organisation to force it 
to behave in a specific way), it may be surmised, may have contributed to the 
dominance of bureaucracy as a public sector organisational form. 
One can further propose that, whilst bureaucracy was an initially sensible 
organisation structure for administrative public sector activities, the 
appropriateness of this design has diminished with the modern pressure on 
public sector companies to commercialise. 
TfL, in common with other public sector organisations, has a bureaucratic 
structure. This is most clearly seen in London Underground, with its 
militaristic, command and control culture. LUL has developed bureaucracy as 
the optimal structure for an organisation which has large numbers of blue 
collar staff, and is governed by an over-arching requirement to assure safety. 
The public sector heritage of the Modes also predisposes the organisation 
and the staff (typically long serving) towards bureaucracy. 
TfL functions exclusively as a hierarchy: power is strictly apportioned on the 
basis of level, access is restricted to senior staff and merit, talent and 
performance are less important than rank. This can be related to one of the 
criticisms leveled at Weber, namely that he failed to distinguish between 
hierarchical and professional authority in his ideal-type of bureaucracy, and 
that the tension between these two authorities will create conflict in an 
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organisation (Gerth & Wright Mills, 1946), in contrast to professional authority, 
based on superior knowledge, skills and competencies. 
This is interesting in the context of TfL, given its exclusive reliance on the 
hierarchical definition of authority. This is signified in a number of ways, 
which will be discussed in the section on culture. 
This lack of recognition of professional authority is an issue for a number of 
ex-private sector employees, inculcated in meritocratic organisations, where 
professional authority is accorded a level of significance. Individuals brought 
in at very senior levels have found their lack of authority in TfL difficult to 
accept. 
McKinsey's proposed matrix organisation was the intended successor to this 
bureaucratic model, where Modes were provided with centralised services, to 
allow them to concentrate on their core business of running their operation. 
This semi-centralised structure has, however, created significant boundary 
issues which remain unresolved and, as a result, has neither been accepted 
or adopted. 
The result is neither a bureaucracy nor a matrix - the Modes have maintained 
their bureaucratic structures, and the matrix structure imposed over the top of 
it is regarded as additional and, to a large extent, irrelevant. 
As indicated in the section above, the consequence of this was the 
"dysfunctional organisational structure" noted in the Branded study (Branded, 
2004, p14). There is a lack of clarity in accountability and responsibility - 
typically, no one has clear accountability for any task. It also creates 
inefficiency, duplication, and an increase in transaction costs as both the 
Modes and the Centre spend considerable time trying to manage their 
counter-parts. 
1.3.1.2.2.3. Organisational History 
TfL is the successor organisation to London Transport (LT), an organisation 
which variously operated under the control of the GLC and central 
government in the 1970s and 1980s. LT's responsibilities for London Buses, 
Dial-a-Ride, Victoria Coach Station and London River Services were 
incorporated as Transport Trading Ltd on 4 May 2000, following the first 
Mayoral election in London. These, along with Croydon Tramlink, Travel 
Information Call Centre, LT Museum, Lost Property and the central support 
activities were transferred to TfL on 3 July 2000. 
TfL also inherited Docklands Light Railway, Public Carriage Office, Traffic 
Control Systems Unit, Traffic Director for London, Woolwich Ferry and parts of 
the Highways Agency that dealt with London's roads. 
London Underground Limited (LUL) remained independent until July 2003, 
when it was belatedly incorporated into TfL. The organisation had poor 
relations with Ken Livingstone, who famously referred to the management 
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team as "knuckleheads and dullards" (The Guardian, 2002a). This has two 
implications: it created feelings of betrayal and distrust from LUL management 
which still permeate the organisation today, but it is also routinely and 
opportunistically quoted by opponents of LUL such as Bob Crow (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2004), Socialist Worker (2004) and the 
Revolutionary Communist Party (2004). 
At the time of the project, TfL was in a post merger integration phase, having 
incorporated London Underground (LUL) 1 year previously. The individual 
operating units ("Modes") have strong identities and cultures (particularly 
LUL), and were resistant to TfL's central control. The organisation and its 
various components were highly change resistant. 
1.3.1.2.3. The McKinsey Project 
When the decision was taken to integrate the disparate businesses and 
create the umbrella TfL organisation, McKinsey were appointed to design the 
high level structure for the new organisation. After a lengthy and expensive 
project (over £10 million), they developed an organisational structure which, it 
can be argued, was influenced by the operation of institutional forces as much 
as by business rationality. The top level organisation chart produced by 
McKinsey is reproduced in figure 17. 
BOB KILEY Office of the 
Commissioner Commissioner 
ISABEL PIP HESKETH 
DEDRING Head of Equality R 
Chief of Staff Inclusion 
JAY WALDER MAGGIE BELLIS 
MD, Finance & MD, Corporate 
Planning Seances 
" Finance " HR 
" Corporate Finance " Procurement 
" Transport Planning Information Management 
" Borough Partnerships " Property & Facilities 
" Marketing 
" Fares & Ticketing 
MAGGIE 
BOEPPLE GARETH DAVIES (Interim) Director General Counsel 
of Group 
Communications 
" Media & Publik Affair " legal 
" Internal Communlcahons " Corporate Governance 
" Health, Safety £ Environment 
" Internal Audit 
PETER HENDY 
IAN BROWN MD, Street TIM OTOOLE 
MD, London Rad Manage ment 6 MD, Underground 
Surface Transport 
Figure 17: McKinsey Organisational Structure (TfL, 2003) 
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The model proposed by McKinsey was based on Dave Ulrich's shared 
services model, recommending the centralisation of standardised functions 
(e. g. Learning & Development - L&D, Resourcing, HR Services, IT, Financial 
Accounting) and strategic development (e. g. Group HR Strategy, Finance & 
Business Planning). Decentralisation was recommended where business 
efficient. 
The project commenced 18 months after the McKinsey design was produced, 
and it was at that point evident that a number of issues had arisen during the 
implementation of the model: 
The new organisational design recommended decentralisation where 
business efficient, which was interpreted by the Modes as a decentralisation 
policy, and by the Centre as promoting centralisation. 
A number of activities remained unspecified by McKinsey (e. g. IT and 
Procurement were set up as central functions, but the majority of staff 
remained in the business units); this led to a 'resource war' as (typically) new, 
externally appointed senior managers attempted to centralise functions and 
modes retained their own staff or set up 'shadow' organisations. 
The implementation of the McKinsey project failed to meet the basic 
requirements for organisational design (i. e., to use Fayol's principles of 
organisational design, authority with corresponding responsibility, unity of 
command and direction, and scalar chain of command: Brunel University, 
2004). Given strong political and cultural drivers in the Modes towards 
independence (particularly in LUL), such ambiguity in accountability and 
reporting line allowed the Modes to maintain and create their own 'shadow' 
organisations. 
The latter was a source of considerable friction, as the Centre endeavoured to 
fulfil its role and implement its new strategy into largely unresponsive 
business units. Modal managers, who saw their reporting line as exclusively 
to their modal MD, interpreted the attempts of the centre to deploy strategy as 
interference. Likewise, the Centre interpreted this behaviour as obstinacy and 
resistance to change. 
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Despite (Central) Finance's attempts to police budget and headcount, shadow 
organisations continued to exist. The lack of a strong integration message 
from the leadership team meant that such behaviour remained unchallenged. 
The antipathy between the Modes and the Centre was clearly documented in 
the research on brand conducted in 2004 (Branded, 2004)17, which 
characterised the relationship between the Centre and the Modes as one of: 
"... a stepfather coming into an existing family: uninvited, yet to 
prove itself, not one of us/not a blood relative, unable to assert 
itself, no mutual respect, struggling to find its role, struggling to 
communicate in the family's language". (Branded, 2004, p8). 
A further problem was that McKinsey were not asked to define organisational 
structures below Director level; it was left to the Modes and the Centre to 
decide optimal staffing (although McKinsey provided Saratoga benchmarks) 
and reporting lines for this headcount. In a politicised environment, this was a 
recipe for conflict, resulted in a frustrated Centre and resistant business units 
(overtly, via resistance and dissention, or covertly, again, in the setting up of 
shadow organisbtions). 
The consequences of the implementation of the McKinsey model, coupled 
with the organisation's history, political dynamics and the characteristics of its 
leadership team was a highly dysfunctional organisation. The diagnosis of the 
'Branded' study (Branded, 2004, p14) listed the organisation's "significant 
issues" as follows: 
" Unclear role of TfL brand externally and internally 
" Poor working relationships between the modes and the 
centre 
" Confusion over customer relationships 
" Dysfunctional organisational structure 
" De-motivated employees 
" Business inefficiencies. 
Within the organisation, this state of affairs was largely attributed to the 
McKinsey model, although the model had not been seriously questioned, let 
". This study interviewed 137 people throughout the organisation, across all Modes and all levels. 
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alone disassembled. Reasons for this are suggested in the later discussion 
on institutional forces. 
1.3.1.2.4. The HR Experience 
To look specifically at the impact on HR, an example of the difficulties 
encountered in implementation of the McKinsey design is shown in figure 18, 
which shows their proposed HR design. 
PROPOSEDTOP-LEVEL'HRSTRUCTURE`, ý_ý-: ý'-ý`": ': , ToýiFTeg: zss 
Director of 
Corporate May combine with shared 
Services services from other 
functions, e. g. payroll 
Functional reporting line 
TBC, but likely to be Head of 
Group HR 
Heads of Modal 
HR (x4) 
Head of Group HR 
Head of Corporate 
Centre HR 
Head of HR 
Services 
Figure 18: McKinsey HR Organisational Structure (McKinsey & Co, 2002) 
Whilst some resources (L&D, Resourcing) were brought into the Centre 
(McKinsey was used as a mandate for coercive change), HR business 
partners remained in Modes. Despite the organisational chart shown in figure 
21, there were no dotted lines in actuality from the Modes to the Centre, and 
the absence of other integrating mechanisms (shared objectives, 360 degree 
feedback) allowed the Modes to function largely independently of the Centre. 
This caused conflict and frustration in both Central and Modal HR. 
The implementation of the Shared Service model created a further difficulty in 
HR by dividing Group HR and Group HR Service (HRS) between two 
directors. HRS had responsibility for putting in SAP and setting up an HR 
service operation, as well as delivering commodity L&D and resourcing. 
Although the individuals appointed into these roles endeavoured to manage 
this relationship and prevent conflict, the product emerging from Group HRS 
was vanilla, un-customised either to the Group HR strategy or the business 
environment into which it was to be implemented. The critical 'go-live' date in 
December had already been expensively delayed due to a failure to consider 
the business requirements (complexity of rostering operational staff in the pre- 
Xmas and Xmas period), and at the time of the project plans were underway 
to revise the McKinsey model and combine the 2 HR organisations under one 
head. 
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1.3.1.2.5. Staffing the New Structure 
In January 2003, an extensive process commenced to fill roles in the new 
organisation. This began with the assignment of existing staff into roles in the 
new organisation ('preferencing'). Employees were categorised as 'mapped' 
(where posts were substantially unchanged - i. e. 60% or more of the job 
content was the same), 'hybrid' (where posts were substantially unchanged, 
but the number of staff required was less than the existing staff; in this case, 
selection was carried out on a 'closed list' basis) or 'at risk' (where new posts 
were created or posts were substantially different, selection occurred on a 
'closed list' basis, with unsuccessful staff being formally displaced). 
In parallel with the 'preferencing' exercise, external recruitment commenced. 
151 positions were identified in top 4 levels of the new structure, 39 of which 
were deemed to be out of scope and 15 of which were resourced through 
block moves. This left 97 jobs to be filled, through the parallel processes of 
internal and external sourcing. Around 70% of these 97 jobs were recruited 
externally, creating a senior management cadre where over two thirds of the 
incumbents had been newly recruited, largely from the private sector, without 
public sector experience. These individuals were expected to work alongside 
the few internal placements placed in stretch assignments. 
Corporate Services was a typical example of this process. An externally 
appointed managing director (ex British Airways and DHL) recruited her team 
from the private sector (Axa, Barclays, Capital One, American Express) to 
work alongside a sole internal placement. Although this caused few issues 
within the Corporate Services group, elsewhere it was highly problematic, in 
terms of the culture clashes, differing work ethics and a mutual lack of 
respect. 
1.3.1.2.6. Vision and Purpose, Reporting and the Business Planning 
Process 
1.3.1.2.6.1. Vision and Purpose 
TfL's purpose is the provision of integrated transport across the Capital, 
through realisation of its vision, "A world class transport system for a world 
class city". 
In 2004/5, this was directly linked to the Mayor's overall vision of London as 
an exemplary, sustainable world class city. 3 of the 15 objectives which 
underpinned the Mayor's vision were directly linked to transport, namely: to 
improve and expand public transport in London; to reduce congestion in 
London; to improve international, national and regional transport in London. 
Other objectives (e. g. improving safety, health, tourism, the economy and the 
environment) also had strong links to transport. 
London itself creates challenges in terms of its transport infrastructure: it has 
a population of some 7.1 million (younger and more ethnically diverse than 
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the rest of the UK, speaking some 300 languages, and expected to increase 
by 800,000 by 2016) and 3.8 million people who work in London (723,000 of 
whom commute). The majority are employed in a small part of central 
London, leading to high levels of demand and congestion. London is the 
economic, business and financial centre of the UK and generates more wealth 
than any other region (whereas London has 12% of the population, it 
contributes 18% of the UK's output). 30 million tourists visit London each 
year, contributing £15 billion to the economy, and 75% of international arrivals 
to the country pass through London (figures from Transport for London, 
2004). 
In consequence, there is little spare capacity on road, rail or underground 
systems at peak times, an exceptionally high proportion of travel is 
undertaken on public transport, much of which is old. 
TfL's business plan is driven by a number of documents, including the 
government's transport objectives, the London Plan, the Mayor's Transport 
Strategy. 
1.3.1.2.6.2. Reporting 
In terms of reporting, TfL is part of the Greater London Assembly (GLA) 
group, comprising the London Development Agency, Metropolitan Police 
Authority and the London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority. 
TfL is headed by a Commissioner who reports directly to the Mayor of 
London. In 2005, the Commissioner was Bob Kiley, the Mayor, Ken 
Livingstone. 
The Mayor has extensive powers over TfL, although the London Assembly is 
responsible for the scrutiny of the activities of both TfL and the Mayor. The 
GLA Act 1999 requires the Mayor to chair the TfL board of directors and the 
appointment of board members is entirely at the Mayor's discretion (although 
in practice the GLA Code of Conduct introduces an independent element into 
this process). 
There were 14 board members at the time of the project, representing a wide 
variety of interests, expertise and background, including 2 trade unionists from 
ASLEF and TGWU (Bob Crow, General Secretary of the RMT, resigned as a 
board member following the Mayoral election). Three Special Advisors also 
attend the Board meetings, with the agreement of Board Members, but are 
not entitled to participate in decisions or vote on any issues considered by the 
Board. 
This structure caused issues: the concept of a worker representative board 
(with membership from trade unions as well as special interest groups such 
disability representatives) is well understood in Scandinavia and other social 
democrat countries, and works because all of the parties are obliged to work 
in the interests of a successful business. Bob Crow, especially, with no such 
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obligation, was unwilling to take a business perspective, and ensured that the 
Board was a showpiece, and decision making was positioned elsewhere. 
The problematic nature of worker representative boards in the UK has been 
articulated since 1983 (Batstone, Ferner & Terry, 1983), and the TfL Board 
shows many of the characteristics described by Batstone (the impingement of 
worker representatives on strategy and decision making, the establishment of 
alternative decision making bodies and the discomfort and fragmentation of 
the union side). 
Batstone further commented that the inherent conflict between the worker 
representative and trade union role and the opposition of management are 
such that it is such arrangements: 
"... are likely to occur on any scale only when the political 
climate is favourable to the extension of workers' rights. " 
(Batstone, Ferner & Terry, 1983, p5) 
TfL was such an organisation, the worker representative board illustrating the 
conflict between the organisation as a political entity (part of Ken Livingstone's 
electioneering) and running a business, and the operation of institutional 
forces on the organisation. This will be discussed in greater detail at the end 
of this chapter. 
The worker representative board created a further problem, as the issues with 
the composition of the board resulted in management of the business lying 
with the Commissioner and a group of managing directors and chief officers. 
However, the MD group meetings ('COG' - Chief Officers' Group) was largely 
regarded internally as a talking shop and not a decision making forum. 
This left the organisation without an executive decision making forum, with the 
result that anyone wishing to initiate an activity within the organisation had to 
'walk' the idea to every stakeholder, and even if approved by each of the 
stakeholders, decisions were regularly reversed if a change in the political 
climate made that expedient. 
1.3.1.2.6.2. The Business Planning Process 
TfL's business plan derived from the government's transport objectives, the 
London Plan and the Mayor's Transport Strategy. The business plan set out 
TfL's priorities for investment in the transport system, including expenditure 
plans, resource requirements and targets. 
Business planning was conducted around a decentralised view of 
organisational structure in financial matters, which gave each chief officer 
local authority to manage and incur significant levels of expenditure. Finance 
& Planning (F&P) co-ordinated the development of an annual business plan 
and budgeting cycle. They also monitored performance and progress against 
business plan targets throughout the year. 
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'Best Value' was an integral part of the business planning process. Legislated 
through section 6 of the Local Government Act 1999 and related Statutory 
Instruments and guidance notes, Best Value was a framework which 
challenged public sector companies to improve services and imposes a 
requirement on TfL to assess performance and put in place measures which 
sought continuous improvement in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of 
service delivery. 
TfL used a scenario based financial planning system, in recognition of 
uncertainties around continuity of the political agenda and availability of 
funding. 
1.3.1.2.7. Organisational Challenges 
Project one was completed in early 2005. At that point, the future of TfL - and 
LUL - was subject to two sets of forces: political and business. 
The political future of the organisation had largely been determined for the 
next 4 years by the re-election of Ken Livingstone for a second 4 year term in 
June 2004. This had given the organisation continuity and a level of stability 
to pursue its longer term strategy. This was particularly significant, given that 
the Chief Officers' contracts were typically linked to the Mayoral term, and the 
election of a candidate other than Ken Livingstone would have triggered the 
automatic termination of the majority of the Chief Officers' contracts, as well 
as the disestablishment of the Board. 
Given the nature of the organisation, changes on a national political level 
were likely to be highly influential, but the consistency of direction in public 
sector policy adopted by successive Conservative and Labour governments 
suggested that this was unlikely to result in the organisation being 
disaggregated or having to undertake a major change of direction. 
The business forces operating on the organisation had been changed 
radically by the government's introduction of public sector prudential 
borrowing. This allowed public sector companies to borrow to fund capital 
projects, and had resulted in a total of £lObn in investment being allocated to 
TfL over 5 years. This comprised £3bn in new borrowing, £3bn in capital 
investment funded by government grant and revenue surpluses and Mn 
scheduled to go into LUL as a result of existing PPP and PFI contracts. 
The organisation had an ambitious 5 year investment plan, including projects 
to grow the network, improve access and safety and environment friendliness 
(Transport for London, 2004f). This was in addition to TfL's involvement in 
Crossrail (the major east-west rail link, the route of which is Paddington - 
Bond St - Tottenham Court Rd - Farringdon - Liverpool St - Whitechapel), 
then estimated for completion in 2013. At the time of the project, funding for 
Crossrail was still under negotiation. Crossrail is London's key infrastructure 
project and is integral to any plan involving future transport capacity 
management in London. 
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Such an investment programme would create huge change in the 
organisation, requiring project management expertise, railway engineering 
capability and a level of organisational agility which the organisation did not 
possess. This ambitious investment programme will posed huge challenges 
to every aspect of the organisation. 
1.3.1.3. Culture in TfL 
This section will look at some of the cultures and sub-cultures in TfL and 
indicate some conclusions about how culture impacts on the organisation and 
its personnel. It will draw a cultural web (Balogun & Hope Halley, 2004, p53) 
to create a picture of the organisation, then will look at two specific elements: 
organisational dichotomies and change resistance. 
1.3.1.3.1. Cultural Web 
The cultural web is a descriptive tool used to illuminate organisational culture. 
The basic format is shown in figure 19. 
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A simple cultural web was developed for TfL. The purpose of this was to 
illuminate the organisation's paradigm, i. e.: 
"the shared, often taken for granted, assumptions and beliefs of 
the organisation that shapes the way things are done in an 
organisation. " (Balogun & Hope Hailey 2004, p53) 
i) Symbols 
TfL's symbols are indicative of its constituent elements, rather than its 
integrated brand. All of the TfL entities are branded using the LUL roundel in 
different colours, which indicated both the significance of LUL to the 
organisation and the power of the LUL brand. 
Offices also reflected the LUL heritage: the grade 1 listed Art Deco building 
occupied by London Underground is a grand property, redolent of the 
organisation's glory days in the 1930s. It is, however, markedly unsuitable as 
a modern office building, its cruciform design creating rows of individual 
offices, where closed doors are guarded by personal secretaries. The wood 
paneled executive and conference floors make a significant statement about 
power and position, exacerbated in summer as the only floor to have air 
conditioning is the 7th (executive) floor. 
In Windsor House, the TfL building, this theme is continued. The structure of 
hierarchical authority in denoted in a number of ways, including job titles (e. g. 
"Commissioner" and "Chief Officers" have a quasi-political denotation), office 
space (whilst the organisation is extremely short of space, and open plan 
accommodation is the norm for all staff including heads of department and 
directors, Chief Officers have extremely large, enclosed offices including 
conference space), decision making authority and budgetary control (both of 
which rest exclusively with the Chief Officers and are not delegated, formally 
or informally). 
A more detailed cultural web will be developed, which will include an 
examination of the language and terminology used in the organisation. 
ii) Power structures 
The most powerful managerial groupings in the organisation are likely to be 
associated with core assumptions and beliefs about what is important. 
The hierarchy of Chief Officers was very evident at this time: the 
Commissioner was likely to listen to and accommodate the MDs of the 2 
major operational businesses and the Finance Director in preference to the 
other MDs. This was evident in the response of the Commissioner to pay 
demands from the MDs (particularly the Finance, Legal and major operational 
- LUL and Surface - MDs, who have considerably higher salaries than their 
colleagues (Transport for London, 2004d, p13) and in the lack of challenge to 
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activities conducted in LUL and Surface which cut across the integration 
objective. 
The Commissioner operated as a 'Chairman', rather than a CEO. This was 
exacerbated by the age of the Commissioner (69) and the perceived 
likelihood of his departure, which created infighting for CEO role (and 
potentially succession to the Commissioner's position) between the Surface 
and Finance MDs. This resulted in an MD population who were involved in 
political positioning, running the business on this basis rather than business 
rationality. 
Directors had to utilise their MD to gain access to this group, as direct access 
was highly restricted. As indicated earlier, the organisation functioned as a 
hierarchical bureaucracy, and the existence of professional bureaucracy was 
very limited. 
The style of the Leadership Team was diverse, but the Commissioner's old 
style management practices (project participants quoted him as saying that "a 
little management by fear isn't a bad thing) and American "macho 
management"m sit uncomfortably with the public sector environment. 
Likewise, the FD was seen as "intellectual bullying" and ruling his department 
through fear and intimidation. However, charismatic leaders such as the MDs 
of Surface and LUL provided some counter-balance to this. 
Whilst the percentage of females in the Managing Director group was 
reasonable (20%), they were concentrated in the 'typical' female professions 
of Corporate Services and Legal. The only ethnic minority in this group was 
fired after 5 months in post, and had been replaced by an interim whom is 
white and male. 
Looking at the directorates as a whole, leadership style varied by unit, and by 
the extent of the transformation process already conducted. Figure 20 plots 
the dominant leadership style of the major units using Blake & Moulton's grid 
(1964). 
"C. f. quote from participant AC in project one. 
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Figure 20: Mapping of leadership styles 
iii) Organisational structures 
The most powerful managerial groupings likely to be associated with formal 
and informal power structures which delineate important relationships and 
emphasises what is important in organisation. 
This is covered in the section above. 
iv) Control systems 
Measurement and reward systems monitor and therefore emphasise what is 
important in the organisation and focus attention and activity. 
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The organisation's primary targets are passenger journeys, percentage of 
schedule operated and kilometres operated (Transport for London, 2004c, 
p4), and operational areas were rigidly monitored on these and a vast array of 
additional targets (e. g. incidents, ONA 'operator not available', adherence to 
timetable). Monitoring of the non-operational areas was, however, more 
sketchy. 
Whilst Central Finance endeavoured to take control of headcount and 
budgeting through the establishment of the CIRG group (Corporate 
Investment Review Group), the legitimacy of this body had been questioned 
and it was accommodated as an organisational routine to be gone through, 
rather than as an integral part of a well managed organisation. 
Individual performance management, even at the most senior levels in the 
organisation, was haphazard. Notably, the 'performance contracts' set up by 
McKinsey to support the integration exercise had been ignored, and the 
shared objectives for MDs generated in the performance contracts had been 
replaced by modal performance management systems or nothing at all. A 
new performance management system was being piloted in a number of 
areas at the time of the project, which had the objective of bringing cross- 
modal 360 degree feedback into the organisation, but this was still some 6 
months from full implementation. 
v) Routines and rituals 
A more detailed study of routines and rituals will be found in the main body of 
the project, as this is a topic more amenable to a social constructivist analysis 
than a summary here, looking at how people behave towards each other, and 
towards people in other parts of the organisation with which they interface? 
The main body of the project will also consider what the rituals of 
organisational life (e. g. training programmes, promotion, assessment) say 
about what is important, reinforce "how things get done around here" and 
signal what is valued? 
The approach to internal communications is a major indicator here, as its 
prescriptive style, use of limited media and its one-way approach were 
illustrative of the style of the organisation. Whilst internal communications 
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had dramatically increased their provision of information, their limited 
approach appeared to reflect the historical hierarchical approach to 
information and information sharing (the "need to know basis"). One can also 
see this in the adoption of the "Team Talk" process in LUL, the commendable 
vision of which was a discussion forum to support engagement of staff by their 
managers. However, its prescriptive, mandated form diminished its relevance 
and turned it into a mechanistic process which is disliked by both managers 
and employees19. 
vi) Stories 
The body of the project will also examine what stories members of the 
organisation tell to each other, outsides, to new recruits etc. about 
organisational history, important events and personalities. It will also look for 
variance between different levels and units within the organisation. 
LUL, with its history, had the largest number of stories, a number of which 
centred around the last major restructure ("Company Plan") and the activities 
of the previous HR director, Bob Mason. 
vii) The Paradigm 
The rudimentary cultural web drawn above has a number of elements which 
can be extrapolated as a paradigm, namely: 
" Individual performance does not matter 
" Integration does not matter 
" The command and control structure supports hierarchical authority 
" The organisation has difficulty in determining whether it should be a 
business first and a political entity second, or the other way round. 
19 C. f. quote from participant DH in project one. 
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1.3.1.3.2. Dichotomies 
There are a number of clear dichotomies in the organisation. 
" Mode/Centre 
" Public sector/private sector 
" American/British 
" Politically oriented/business oriented. 
The importance of these dichotomies is not to be underestimated: they 
polarised the organisation to the extent that opposing views were not 
reconciled, and that strategy formulation and implementation were seriously 
impeded. 
i) Mode/Centre 
This is dealt with in the sections above. 
ii) Public Sector/Private Sector 
As well as modal integration, TfL also had a schism between public sector 
and private sector views, attitudes and approaches. Over 100 senior external 
hires were made to facilitate the organisation's integration, the majority from 
the private sector. This resulted in the development of competing world 
views, both of which had positive and negative attributes. These are shown in 
figure 21. 
Positive Values Negative Features 
Public Sector Model Representativeness, social Entitlement culture, cult of 
responsibility, respect for the mediocrity, task rather than 
individual results focus 
Business Model Business focus, customer Bullying, disrespectful 
service orientation, flexibility, behaviour 
performance based 
Figure 21: Values of the Generic Public Sector and Business Models (Barrett, 2003, p3) 
These two integration challenges (modal integration and public 
sector/business model integration) were reflected in a 'number of different 
`conversations' within the organisation, the lack of a shared vision or shared 
social reality hindering the integration process. 
These two polarities reflected the organisation's often conflicting dual role of 
operating a business and functioning as a significant element of the Mayor of 
London's political positioning. It was a highly politicised organisation, subject 
to considerable financial and business pressures as well powerful institutional 
forces. 
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iii) American/British 
The Chief Officer group was divided between American (Commissioner, FD, 
MD LUL) and UK (MDs of Surface, Legal, Corporate Services, 
Communications and London Rail) personnel. This appeared to cause few 
problems at the executive level (although different attitudes and approaches 
to industrial relations were a source of tension), but the number of Americans 
holding senior positions in what was perceived as a quintessentially British 
organisation was a source of dissent at lower levels in the organisation. 
iv) Politically Oriented/Business Oriented 
This is dealt with in the sections above. 
1.3.1.3.3. Change Resistance 
A final comment should be made in this section under the heading of change 
resistance. As expected in a public sector organisation, with its exposure to 
institutional forces, the organisation was inherently change resistant. 
This had implications for the role of change agents, who typically find their 
activities regarded with suspicion and covertly or overtly blocked. 
This resulted in a variety of change strategies being adopted. The two most 
common were 'coercive' and 'virus'. The 'coercive' strategy endeavoured to 
force through change via ensuring resource dependency by taking control of 
resources, whereas the 'virus' strategy attempted to create user 'pull' via 
piloting projects in sympathetic areas. 
The former strategy in TfL had greater success, as demonstrated by the 
progress made in HRS (where McKinsey centralisation of resources created 
resource dependency in the areas of HR information, administration, learning 
& development and resourcing) and Group HR (where projects such as 
performance management were only now beginning widespread roll out, due 
to the lengthier timeframe of the 'virus' process). In the long term, however, 
the levels of user resistance generated by the HRS approach may ultimately 
mean that the 'virus' approach was more suitable for generating long term buy 
in. 
1.3.1.3.4. HR in TfL 
The status of HR at the time of the project was problematic: HR had been for 
years seen in the TfL predecessor companies as administrative, bureaucratic, 
proceduralised and lacking in both competence and business focus. Despite 
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the recruitment of a new HR team in the early part of 2003, that legacy had 
been difficult to redress. 
The Commissioner had no strong empathy with HR, as demonstrated by the 
positioning of HR on the organisational charts: HR was not represented 
directly on the Board (its reporting line was via the Managing Director, 
Corporate Services), and the senior HR role was a director, not a managing 
director. In a hierarchical organisation, this was indicative of the view of HR 
which was taken. Furthermore, the Commissioner had an arcane and 
selective view of HR (his major requirement from the function over the 
previous year had been a closed door succession planning process). 
HR had for many years operated as a closed system, as figure 22 (an 
analysis of the function against best practice) shows. 
Area of HR Best Practice (open system) TfL HR (closed system) 
American style compensation Traditional pay structures 
practices (Berger & Berger, pp17-40) predominate (IPD Report Number 9), 
becoming more prevalent, i. e.: features of which include: 
Variable pay (and increasing use of Fixed pay with minimal variable 
competency based as well as results element 
based bonuses) 
Contribution/business value add Little or no contribution or business 
based pay value add based pay 
Pay points based on market/external Pay points based on internal equity 
equity Entitlement culture 
Gainsharing/stock options & No stock options or profit share (by 
restricted stock/profit share to definition) but also little use of Q 
encourage ownership gainsharing W Grading structures tend to be based Elaborate grading structures (many 
o: on very broad bands levels and sub levels, incremental 
seniority based progression over a 
number of years) 
Formal job evaluation may be limited Elaborate formal job evaluation 
or may not be used at all (typically Hay or similar KSA based 
Increasing use of customised system) 
remuneration strategies to achieve No reward strategy or strategy 
specific business objectives20 unlinked to business objectives 
(CIPD Survey Report, p4) 
Increasingly flexible and innovative Traditional set benefits package 
approach to benefits and benefits based on assumption of a static 
delivery (Phelps, p48) workforce 
20 e. g. Berger's Alignment Model, in Berger et al, p7. 
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Area of HR Best Practice (open system) TfL HR (closed system) 
External recruitment at all levels Internal resourcing for all but most 
Key role succession planning only, if junior levels (although senior 
at all; talent management becoming recruitment has latterly tended also 
increasingly common to be external), 
Selection based on competencies Elaborate succession planning at all 
Management of attrition through levels; talent management 
wide ranging (and often stock and programmes unusual z 
V cash based) retention strategies Selection based on experience and 
Large scale redundancy technical skills 
programmes in economic downturns Little need to manage attrition as 
W 
Equality promoted as making good high retention, supported by 
business sense incremental seniority based 
promotion scales and final salary 
pension arrangements 
Degree of insulation from economic 
downturns 
Equality promoted as a pre-eminent 
or anisational value 
Area of HR Best Practice (open system) TfL HR (closed system) 
Companies operate as "learning Traditional training and development 
organisations", where staff take function teaches job skills 
responsibility for their own learning 
Self-directed learning Organisationally driven and selected 
Supports individual learning learning 
Supports employment proposition of Supports immediate job 
employability requirements 
Individually tailored programmes Sheepdip, not individually based 
May use a wide variety of Learning & development tends to 
developmental interventions equal formal classroom training 
Management development Management development 
concentrates on leadership ability at concentrates on top leadership 
many levels in the organisation Organisational development equates 
Organisational development to learning & development and 
supports a wide range of topics perhaps limited involvement in 
including change management, counseling 
cultural interventions, organisational 
architecture and design and 
individual, interpersonal, group & 
organisation wide interventions 
Area of HR Best Practice (open system) TfL HR (closed system) 
Business focused Paternalistic 
Employability Job security W >Z Employer of Choice 
og Wealth creation through ownership 
0. and equity stakes 
all 
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Area of HR Best Practice (open system) TfL HR (closed system) 
TU partnerships moving towards Conflict model 
WZ European model of co-determination Limited management of 
° Performance managed by reward performance, little difference in 
äg and discipline, significant differences treatment of high and low performers 
wW between treatment of high and low 
performers 
Area of HR Best Practice (open system) TfL HR (closed system) 
w Service centre driven to gain Arcane, often manual processes 
efficiency and consistency 
Increasing trend towards outsourcing 
ZD of administrative processes 
H 
Figure 22: Appraisal of TfL Versus Best Practice (Barrett, 2003a) 
In 2004/5, the modernisation initiative in the public sector had reached HR, 
but its attempts to introduce best practice prior to the McKinsey restructure 
were poor. An attempt to bring in competency based 360 degree 
performance management was over-engineered, introduced without business 
buy in and consequently not used; PRP (performance related pay) was 
'neither fish nor fowl', providing for performance related bonuses, the concept 
of which was then emasculated by consolidation of those bonuses into salary. 
Employee relations was likewise unsatisfactory: terms & conditions were 
fragmented, inconsistent and inequitable, innumerable TUPE transfers which 
had not been followed by harmonisation activities creating significant 
disparities in pay and conditions (most noticeable of which is the £12,000 
salary gap between bus and train drivers). The employee relations 
atmosphere was unhealthy, employees relying on grievances, harassment 
claims and tribunals to resolve internal disputes, or to deflect attention from 
their own misdemeanors or under-performance, even at very senior levels in 
the organisation (a 2004 example involved a head of department accusing 
another head of department of discrimination following the initiation of a 
disciplinary investigation into the conduct of the former). 
Industrial relations was old fashioned and adversarial. Industrial relations in 
LUL wa a throwback to an earlier generation of industrial relations practice: 
the complex multi-union environment, the use of LUL as a political pawn by 
militant trade unions, entrenched and bitter actors with long histories on both 
management and staff sides, and pockets of unsympathetic and adversarial 
management created one of the most difficult industrial relations 
environments in the UK. LUL's IR climate was epitomised in the following 
quote: 
"The RMT on London Underground, with its left wing leadership, 
seems to typify the image of so-called old-fashioned militant 
trade unionism which many commentators assumed had long 
ago been abandoned. " (Darlington, 2001, p5) 
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Surface Transport, in contrast, had relatively cordial relations with its TGWU 
dominated union environment, largely due to the long relationship between 
union personnel and the managing director, Peter Hendy, and his personal 
management of union relations. London Rail, a newer organisation, had little 
entrenched union history and a satisfactory, if occasionally difficult, industrial 
relations environment. 
Typical of both Modes and Centre was the contemptuous treatment of 
moderate trade unions by managers and HR staff alike: only trade unions who 
had the capability and the willingness to take industrial action were taken 
seriously. 
TfL lacked an industrial relations strategy, hence appeared caught in an 
eternal cycle of pay rounds, ballots and industrial action. The two main 
strategies for proactive management of industrial relation, union substitution 
activities or partnership working, had, at the time of the project, by-passed 
London Underground, although vestiges of the latter were to be seen in the 
non-LUL businesses and a successful move towards partnership in the 
Centre. 
An ambitious programme of modernisation in HR was currently underway, 
although resistance in the senior management and Modes was proving very 
difficult to overcome. 
The major areas of change were SAP implementation (HR shared service, 
L&D and resourcing) and an organisational efficiencies programme which was 
mid-way through exiting large numbers of staff or reassigning them to different 
roles. 
Organisational Capability, employee relations and compensation & benefits 
were all undergoing significant and transformational change, with new 
strategies being adopted in each of these areas. 
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1.3.1.5. Industrial Relations in TfL 
1.3.1.5.1. Introduction 
TfL has high levels of trade union membership, including significant 
management representation, despite the fact that this group is not covered by 
a collective bargaining agreement. It operates in a multi-union environment, 
with a range of unions from moderate to militant21. 
It has 4 main union players (ASLEF, RMT, T&GWU and TSSA), small 
memberships of two large unions (GMB and Unison), as well as a number of 
very small trade unions with insignificant membership (BTOG, Prospect). 
Figure 23 describes the TfL trade unions and their characteristics,,. 
21 Kelly's (1996) definitions of 'militant' and 'moderate' will be used throughout, which define militancy as 
preparedness to take industrial action, having an ideology of conflicting Interests and a reliance on the ability to 
mobilise members. 
22 Membership figures are TUC figures, Jan 2003. 
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1.3.1.5.2. History of the Trade Unions 
This section will present a brief history of the 3 major trade unions: RMT, 
ASLEF and TSSA. 
RMT 
RMT are viewed within TfL as the most politically motivated of the trade 
unions. A general union, with major memberships in the train driving and 
station assistant populations. The origins of the RMT lie in the 1870s, with 
the establishment of the NUR (National Union of Railwaymen). The RMT can 
be described as a 'syndicalist' trade union, i. e. they believe that workers 
should organize into a single group to take control of means of production and 
abolish wage system. They are a semi-closed union, in that members have to 
be associated with the railway or maritime industries, but they accept a broad 
range of workers within that industry (from train drivers to station assistants). 
ASLEF 
ASLEF, whilst categorized within the organisation as a militant trade union, 
have very different origins, based within a 'craft' or a 'professional guild' 
tradition rather than a syndicalist one. This is clearly indicated in their 
manifesto: "To promote at all times a pride in our craft and to act in a 
professional manner, committing ourselves to providing a public service and 
safety ethos at all times" (ASLEF Publications, 2004, p5). 
Established at roughly the same time as the RMT (1880), ASLEF is a wholly 
closed union, membership of which is only open to train drivers. 
TSSA 
TSSA occupy a very different niche to RMT and ASLEF. Whilst a general, 
open union, their origins as a staff association both define their membership 
(managerial and white collar staff, although they do have a significant 
membership within the station assistant population, bringing them into 
competition for members with the RMT) and constrain their strategy (white 
collar staff are less easy to collectivise and mobilise, and less tolerant of 
adoption of militant tactics). 
81 
1.3.1.5.3. Industrial Relations Strategy in TfL 
At the time of the project, TfL had modal industrial/employee relations 
strategies which were implicit rather than articulated, and were based on 
traditional models of negotiating machinery and dispute resolution. There was 
no over-arching industrial/employee relations strategy for TfL. 
The absence of clear strategy, multiple strong, politically motivated trade 
unions and government intervention had led to years of appeasement 
behaviour which reinforced the power and position of militant trade unionism 
in London Underground, impacting TfL as a whole. 
Multi-unionism can create difficulties for organizations (Salamon, 1998, p147): 
competition between unions for both members and jobs, creating job 
demarcation disputes; complicated collective bargaining; duplication and 
dilution of union efforts to recruit, represent and service members; and the 
need to form joint shop stewards' committees and other co-ordination 
mechanisms. 
Multi-unionism can, however, also create opportunities for organisations: 
internal and external politics mean that three of these unions in TfL were "in 
play" at the time of the project, as shown in figure 24. 
TSSA 
Hph managerial membershp 
"Fledng muscles"? 
GMB 
Currently disinterested in TfL, but 
major general union wth some 
membership in TfL 
4#ý( TAG 
"Social responsibility" dialogue 
Moving from hardine perspective of 
early 90s 
RMT 
Anti-capitalist Idedogy 
Marxist philosophy 
Hardliners 
Moderate Militant 
Figure 24: Trade Union Positioning in Transport for London (Barrett, 2004) 
However, the opportunities presented by multi-unionism had not been 
exploited (particularly the more moderate influences of TSSA and T&G). The 
organisation continued to be reactive to its militant trade unions and, at best, 
Professional membership 
Organisation in chaos after 
moderate leader replacing hardiner 
fired for misconduct 
Could go either way 
4SLEF 
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tolerated its moderate trade unions. The environment continues to be 
adversarial, typified by protracted negotiations, threats of or actual industrial 
action and inter-union conflict and competition for members. 
A forcefield analysis was conducted for the industrial relations aspect of TfL, 
as shown in figure 25. 
Enablers Blockers 
TSSA desire for greater influence History of appeasement behaviour 
SR 2004 and budget pressures ("burning 
platform") 
Organisational lack of experience and 
expertise in change management 
Inter and intra union fragmentation Inter and intra union fragmentation 
Lack of trust (management and TUs) 
Variable managerial capability 
Success of TUCF move to modern model Presence of adversarial and politically 
motivated trade. unions 
Interference from political element, 
restricting em ployee communications 
"Command and control" culture 
Figure 25: Industrial Relations Force field Analysis (Barrett, 2004a) 
A tripartite industrial relations strategy was under development in late 2004, 
based on formal partnership negotiations, the move to a local representative 
de-escalation/early engagement model and employee engagement (with a 
strong emphasis on managerial capability). This was, however, not yet in 
place. 
Industrial relations in LUL is complex and profoundly influenced by historical 
events, and although there was a level of commonality in the views of IR 
which were expressed, there were also widely differing perspectives on 
historical events, the current state and suggested future strategy. As such, 
this makes IR in LUL more amenable to a deep social constructivist analysis 
than to attempt to provide an overview here. Section 6 will use discourse 
analysis to provide a richer analysis of the state of IR in LUL. 
7.3.7.6. Summary 
This chapter described the Transport for London organisation and has 
endeavoured to provide a flavour of the organisation's culture, creating the 
framework in which the analysis of LUL can be situated. 
A clear theme running through the organisational analysis is the operation of 
institutional forces on the organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and the conflict 
that these institutional forces create with business and operational pressures. 
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Examples of the influence of institutional forces include: 
The positioning of E&I (Equality & Inclusion) as a direct report to the 
Commissioner reflected the importance placed upon this issue by 
the Mayor and its centrality to his political positioning and 
electioneering. 
The 'fudged' organisational structure proposed by McKinsey, which 
is neither decentralised nor centralised. As the organisational 
structure fails to meet the basic requirements for organisational 
design, one has to surmise that the aim of the structure was to 
appease the key players in the organisation rather than to create a 
workable business structure. 
The McKinsey model remained unchallenged, despite the obvious 
issues which it causes throughout the organisation and the fact that 
applications of the same model were being dismantled by 
organisations (like BT) who implemented similar structures under 
the guidance of McKinsey; one may surmise that it was sustained 
by political forces within the organisation (both the Finance Director 
and Chief of Staff being ex-McKinsey; an expensive project is rarely 
criticised by the management team which commissioned it). 
The worker representative board structure, despite evidence of its 
lack of success elsewhere and its results on organisational 
dynamics (decision making has had to be made elsewhere), may be 
interpreted as a political decision made by Ken Livingstone to 
bridge his ideology as a trade unionist and his responsibility as the 
ultimate authority of Transport for London. 
The lack of a 'burning platform' (i. e. a compelling business reason to change) 
allowed the organisation to continue to operate with a level of inefficiency 
which would be untenable in a private sector company (TfL ran at a £757m 
deficit in 2003/4; Transport for London, 2004b), despite having higher ticket 
prices in LUL than any similar system in the world); this lack of balance to 
institutional forces allowed them to propagate within the organisation. 
The consequence of this was an organisational structure which actively 
blocked modernisation (RBV), instead pandering to political forces 
(institutional theory). It was unlikely that the organisation will progress without 
addressing this fundamental issue. 
The natural role to raise this was the MD, Corporate Services. This individual, 
however, was unlikely to be able to drive this through. She was 
disadvantaged by the operational versus non-operational hierarchy imposed 
by the Commissioner, which devalued her role relative to the operational MDs. 
A number of personal characteristics further precluded her from challenging 
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the organisation - her style was conflict avoidant and service oriented 
(upward management being her major priority), coupled with a lack of interest 
in 'rocking the boat' (this was her last job, from which she expected to retire in 
18-24 months). People further down the hierarchy were unlikely to be able to 
influence, due to strength of hierarchy, therefore change was unlikely in the 
medium term. 
1.3.2. Specific Literature Review 
The initial literature "map" used for this research is shown in figure 26. 
20 
Articles 
UK 845 1696 
Articles SHRM Public Articles Sector 
Change 
management 
36 12 
Articles Articles 
2535 
Articles 
Figure 26: Initial Literature Map for Research Area 
As can be seen above,,, there is considerable research in each of the three 
areas of SHRM, UK public sector and change management. The literature 
" The figures relate to the number of scholarly articles found referencing each area in the citation and abstract, 
including the usual antonyms, using the ProQuest search engine. The EBSCO database produces similar results. 
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within each of the "intersections" on the Venn diagram, however, is small. 
Using this methodology, there is no scholarly research which links the three 
areas (indicated by the '0' in figure 26, which suggests a gap in the existing 
literature. A literature review was conducted for the intersection between the 
two remaining topics, based on the principles of systematic review, and this 
will be summarised in section 1.3.2.1. 
Similar literature reviews were conducted on the areas of industrial relations 
(section 1.3.2.2. ) and public sector industrial relations (section 1.3.2.3. ). 
Section 1.3.2.4. will look at the literature in the intersection between IR and 
SHRM. The literature maps, for these areas are shown in figure 27. 
109 
Articles 
V 
2780 8773 
Articles SHRM IR Articles 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
10 
Articles 
Figure 27: Literature Maps for Key Industrial Relations Areas 
111 
Articles 
1654 UK 8873 
Articles Public A 
III Articles 
Sector 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
12 
Articles 
The figures relate to the number of scholarly articles found referencing each area in the citation and abstract, 
including the usual antonyms, using the ProQuest search engine. The EBSCO database produces similar results. 
This was supplemented by a title and abstract search through the last 10 years' editions of three key journals the 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Industrial Relations Journal and Employee Relations. 
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Section 1.3.2.5. will consider 4 specific writers on industrial relations who have 
work of particular relevance to the LUL studies: Darlington, Batstone, Kelly 
and Fox. 
No attempt was made to review the extensive literature on change 
management, but section 1.3.2.6. provides a review of the limited literatures 
on change management, HR and the British public sector. This will be 
supplemented in section 1.3.2.7. by a review of arguably one of the most 
important elements of public sector change literature: commericalisation and 
modernisation. A brief review of the most relevant articles on organisational 
politics, power and conflict will also be included (section 1.3.2.8. ), although 
this did not use the systematic review methodology. 
1.3.2.1. Literature Review: SHRM and the Public Sector 
As indicated by the paucity of articles on public sector SHRM in the literature 
map, the majority of the research in this area has been conducted in the 
private sector, implying that SHRM is either not relevant to the public sector or 
that there is no difference between public and private sector SHRM. This 
raises the question of whether there is a distinctive form of HR which is unique 
to the public sector? 
1.3.2.1.1. Insights From SHRM 
It is relevant to preface this section with a review of the attempts which have 
been made to characterise SHRM in the public sector". 
The literature makes a case for a distinctively different public sector 
environment, particularly in respect of employee and industrial relations. 
's The terms HRM and SHRM will be used interchangeably in this section, as the latter term is rarely used in the 
context of public sector environments. 
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"... in the area of HRM at least, organizational policies and 
practices in the public and private sectors remain different in 
many important respects. In particular the traditional style of 
paternal, standardized and collectivized HRM is more prevalent 
in public than private organizations. " (Boyne et al, 1999, p417) 
Farnham & Horton (1996) identified 4 characteristics which defined HRM in 
the public sector, which clearly defined an industrial relations model for the 
public sector. This model is briefly reviewed in figure 28. 
Public sector Description Private sector 
characteristics characteristics 
Farnham & Horton, Boyne et al, 1999 
1996 
Paternalism A paternalistic style of management, Rationalism, 
emphasising the health, safety and individualism 
welfare of employees 
Standardisation Standard employment practices typify Flexibility 
the public sector, i. e. consistency of pay, 
terms and conditions for people doing 
the same job or providing the same 
service, irrespective of geographical 
location 
Collectivisation Emphasis on staff participation and Rationalism, 
consultation, strong role for trade individualism 
unions, high levels of union 
membership, focus on collective 
bargain ng 
'Model employer' The public sector aspires to be a 'model The end or the private 
employer', setting employment and HR sector's assumption of 
standards to which other sectors should the model employer 
follow role 
Figure 28: Model of Public Sector HRM 
Boyne et al's (1999) questionnaire based study confirmed that there were 
statistically significant differences between the sectors on the majority of 
factors under each of the above headings, suggesting that there is still a 
distinctive HRM for the public sector. 
There is thus evidence to support the existence of a distinctive HRM in the 
public sector environment (Brook, 2002), but is industrial relations itself 
manifest in a different way in the public sector? 
When one looks at the industrial relations dimension of this research, the 
questionnaire based approach paid limited attention to the role of trade 
unions, preferring to ask questions about generic employee participation. 
Boyne et al's study does, however, suggest that staff consultation and 
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participation are significantly more likely to be found in the public than private 
sector organisations, and that this difference is more marked where trade 
unions are involved. 
This evidences the claim for a distinctive public sector industrial relations, 
based on pluralism, with a high emphasis on trade unions as the employee 
voice mechanism. 
Any claim for a unique public sector industrial relation is, however, inevitably 
limited by the wide range of employee groups represented. The moderate 
professional services trade unions (such as the Royal College of Nursing) 
which perhaps typify public sector trade unionism are one end of a spectrum, 
the opposite pole of which is represented by ASLEF and the RMT in London 
Underground. It is difficult to see how one theory can explain such an 
ideological spectrum and suggests, rather, that the public sector shares the 
diversity of industrial relations models of the private sector. 
This perspective is echoed by Fairbrother (1996a), who saw the upheaval in 
the public sector in the 1980s as an opportunity to move from "traditionally 
centralised and hierarchical unions", (Fairbrother, 1996a, p110) and develop 
"more vibrant and participative forms of union (sic)", (Fairbrother, 1996a, 
p142). His study is, however, inconclusive on whether this is being achieved: 
whilst civil service unions have "begun to reorganise in more participative 
directions", (Fairbrother, 1996a, p140), in local government there has been a 
"reaffirmation of centralised and hierarchical forms of union organisation in the 
context of a decentralisation of managerial structures and organisation", 
(Fairbrother, 1996a, p140). 
Fairbrother attributes lack of progress in the latter to "managements which 
have continued to insist on centralised bargaining procedures and 
negotiations" (Fairbrother, 1996a, p140), but it seems likely that fundamental 
differences in organisational context, membership and leadership preferences 
and management style make generalisations about public sector trade 
unionism very difficult. 
1.3.2.1.2. Differentiating Factors 
Differences between the two sectors inevitably arise due to the higher 
concentration of union membership in the public sector (Brook, 2002), 
especially in managerial grades (Brook, 2002). 
However, the public sector is also subject to greater institutional pressures 
than the private sector, both in the expectation that it is the bastion of 
exemplary employment practices (if not the 'model employer' of yesteryear), 
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and its exposure to greater political influences, not least of which is the 
prescription to act in the "public interest" (Salamon, 1998, p316). 
Bach & Winchester support the argument for public sector uniqueness by 
citing the important differentiator of institutional forces: 
"... the degree of public scrutiny, and the amount of political 
intervention in key public services, has no equivalent in the 
private sector. This public scrutiny is likely to continue to 
influence change in employment relations. " (Bach & Winchester, 
2003, p310) 
One must also look to the differences in the values of the organisation and the 
employees within it: public sector values are distinctively different to those 
found in private sector companies; Boyne et al (1999) find evidence to support 
Pratchett & Wingfield's (1996) claim for a "public sector ethos", which again 
may create a differentiation between public and private sectors. 
All of these factors (membership concentration and profile, institutional forces 
and employee values), one may surmise, are likely to constrain use of less 
union-friendly options within industrial relations strategy, and may suggest that 
the pluralistic employee relations model may be the most internally and 
externally acceptable option. 
A further case for uniqueness may be the more limited exposure to market 
forces experienced by the public sector: 
"The driving force behind the management of organizations in 
the public sector is materially different from that in the private 
sector ... Although it is true that public sector organizations can find themselves the subject of a hostile takeover or an 
unwelcome merger, the recipients of public funds do not often 
go bankrupt ... [public sector organisations] are not 'in business' for the same purpose ... they are involved in managing for social 
result. " (Thomson, 1992, p38) 
1.3.2.1.3. Convergent or Parallel Tracks? 
Given that there is some evidence for a distinctive public sector model, the 
question then arises of whether the public sector is a unique model, or 
whether it represents the vestiges of an older form of HR, the transformation 
of which private sector companies (exposed to greater commercial pressure) 
managed some years ago. 
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"The differences we have identified could simply reflect a lag in 
the adoption of new management practices by public agencies, 
perhaps because private companies are more quickly influenced 
by 'management fads' ... 
in this case, public and private 
management may always appear to be significantly different, 
even if they are both moving in the same direction. " (Boyne et al, 
1999, p417) 
There certainly appears to be a degree of convergence and cross-pollination 
between the public and private sectors, which mitigates against the idea of a 
persistent difference: 
"Although our results show that HRM varies significantly 
between public and private sectors, it is possible that the 
distinctions have become less pronounced over time. In other 
words, the absence of homogeneity does not rule out a process 
of convergence which is not yet complete. " (Boyne et al, 1999, 
p417) 
"It can be argued that a partial convergence between public and 
private sector employment relations has occurred, but the 
diversity of institutional arrangements and employment practices 
and outcomes ... seem more notable than the similarities. " (Bach & Winchester, 2003, p310) 
Government policy is seen as a driver of convergence: 
"The cumulative effect of Government policy has been to blur 
the line to some extent between the private and the public 
sector. " (Thomson, 1992, p38) 
Specifically, policy concerning the involvement of the private sector in public 
sector reform is seen as a significant driver. Exposure to the private sector, 
through commercialisation (represented as an isomorphic process) or cross 
sector labour mobility, is seen as a key factor creating convergence: 
"... the extent of convergence between public and private 
management is likely to vary across public agencies. 
Organizations that have been commercialized ... may be driven to 'emulate' their private competitors. Similarly, public 
organizations with a large number of new staff may follow 
private sector practices more closely, especially if such staff 
have been recruited from the private sector. " (Boyne et al, 1999, 
p417) 
91 
The link between convergence and labour mobility between the public and 
private sectors was also noted by Newman & Clarke (1994, cited in Boyne et 
al, 1999, p 407).. 
The question, however, remains unanswered. Is the public sector on the 
same trajectory as the private sector, but running to a slower timeline, or are 
they on parallel tracks, or indeed divergent, courses? This is partly answered 
by the longitudinal quantitative study of Poole et al (1995), who saw a degree 
of convergence between public and private sector values in the areas of 
enterprise culture, industrial relations and the organisational and employment 
context, which they attributed to the impact of "the enterprise culture and ... 
market values" (Poole et al, 1995, p85) on the public sector during the 
Thatcher years. 
1.3.2.2. Literature Review: Industrial Relations 
This section will review in detail 7 areas of the extensive literature on industrial 
relations (IR). 
" History of industrial relations 
" Models of trade unionism 
" Categorisations of trade unionism 
" Roles of the actors 
" Alternatives to trade unionism 
" Partnership 
" Public sector industrial relations. 
This section will draw upon a number of classic texts in this area by Eric 
Batstone, John Kelly and Gregor Gall. 
1.3.2.2.1. The History of Industrial Relations 
The literature on the historical evolution of the trade union movement is 
beyond the scope of this study, but the interested reader is referred to Hyman 
(2003), who provides a basic review of the topic. 
It is, however, pertinent to make a few comments on IR in the UK today. The 
current environment for trade unions is confusing. Having confronted 
decades of declining membership following the Miners' strike and the 
Conservative Government's use of legislation and polemic to advance an anti- 
union agenda, the trade union movement finds itself supported by the current 
government, given access to the policy making arena, and the beneficiary of a 
slew of protective and facilitatory EC legislation (Earls, 2002, p1). 
92 
However, despite the stabilisation of the decline in trade union membership 
reported by the DTI (Brook, 2002), trade unionism is fragmented (e. g. 
Unions2l, 2003). Increased militancy is demonstrated in a number of 
organisations (e. g. the Transport industry, the Royal Mail, the Fire Brigade) 
whilst the TUC and the Labour Government continue to endorse partnership. 
The trade union movement appears uncommitted in its response to 
partnership, but a significant number of trade unions and union bodies have 
recognised the "changing political and ideological mood" (Ackers & Payne, 
1998, p531), which was brought about by the EC Social Chapter. The Social 
Chapter dramatically increased employment protection in law, with a 
concomitant decline in the requirement for the union's traditional role as a 
defender of members' interests (Dietz, 2004, p5). 
Likewise, the much discussed "fracturing of collectivism" (Bacon & Storey, 
1996, p43) has impacted on traditional trade union membership bases and 
has resulted in the articulation of a number of alternative union strategies 
(Storey et at, 1993). This describes a consequence of structural changes in 
the labour market, declining manufacturing and increasing service sector 
employee bases (Institute of Employment Research, 1987), the growing 
phenomenon of part time, contract and temporary workforces (Jenson, Hagen 
& Reddy, 1988), and the decreasing size of business units (Purcell, 1994), as 
well as management strategies aimed at fostering a relationship with the 
individual employee (Bacon & Storey, 1996, p 43). 
Trade unionism in the UK, thus, appears to be at a juncture, represented at 
the militant26 end of the spectrum by the FBU, the CWU and the RMT (which, 
as Darlington commented, "seems to typify the image of so-called old- 
fashioned militant trade unionism which many commentators assumed had 
long ago been abandoned. ", Darlington, 2001, p5). At the other extreme are 
the partnership agreements brokered by a diverse range of companies 
26 'Militant' is a term which is used in a variety of ways in the industrial relations literature; it will be deconstructed in 
the project results. 
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including Blue Circle (IRS, 1997), Welsh Water (IRS, 1998a)27, Littlewoods 
(Terry, 1999), Legal & General (IRS, 1998b) and Tesco (Allen, 1998). 
Confronted by the challenges to their viability, the trade unions' response has 
varied. In recent years, the UK has seen significant increase in industrial 
unrest2e, making the universality of a move towards partnership more uncertain 
than ever. 
1.3.2.2.2. Models of Trade Unionism 
This section will first look at the variety of organisational responses to trade 
unionism, illustrating this via reference to comparative industrial relations. 
This will be followed by presentation of a typology of employment 
relationships. 
1.3.2.2.2.1. Comparative Industrial Relations 
This typology of trade unions has been mirrored with a diversity of approaches 
taken by organisations. A full review of IR models is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it is relevant to outline the major models and comment on their 
application in the UK. As a caveat, these models can only be described in 
terms of generalisations, as the variety of forms of trade unionism and 
industrial relations is significant, even within these broad models. 
Ackers, Smith & Smith characterise this diversity as follows: 
'While unions are found throughout the global economy, their 
position in the employment relationship ... varies 
historically 
sectorally and between capitalist societies, as do their 
complexion and role ... 
National differences have created unions 
27 Welsh Water was renamed Hyder Utilities. 
28 At the time of the literature review, days have recently been lost to Industrial action in organisations such as 
London Underground, Royal Mail, British Airways and the Fire Brigade. 
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with distinctive religious, political and occupational forms and 
divisions ... Any such 
broad categorisation, however, conceals a 
myriad of local factors ... the meaning of unionism varies, 
from 
the more politicised agencies ... to the more institutionalised and 
workplace-oriented organizations. " (Ackers, Smith & Smith, 
1996, p2) 
However, it is still pertinent to make 
of unionism29: the American model, 
and British models. 
an attempt to describe the major models 
the European social model, the Japanese 
i) American Model 
The American trade union movement shows a similar decline in union 
membership to that experienced in the UK post 1984, but, despite a growing 
public sector membership, it shows no sign of the stabilisation evident in the 
UK figures (Nissen, 2003, p1). US trade unions tend to have low 
membership and tend to be focused on collective bargaining rather than 
political lobbying. 
As a general rule, American organisations, confronted with weak trade unions, 
have a unitarian, adversarial view of trade unions. In Nissen's words, "It is 
virtually indisputable that employer opposition to unionization, both legal and 
illegal, has grown enormously from the 1960s to the 2000s" (Nissen, 2003, 
p2). 
There is much evidence of a strong anti-union emphasis (Ferner, 2003, p93) 
which makes sense in the context of low trade union membership, the history 
of trade unionism in the USA (unlike the UK, US unionism was not born in 
traditions of feudalism, hence lacked the association with class and had a 
greater acceptance of industrial capitalism), and a legislative system which 
provides for minimal employment protection. 
29 Note that these are not, however, exhaustive; other models (e. g. political trade unionism in South Africa) do exist. 
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Non-unionism in the USA is often supported by "union substitution", which 
deploys modern HR practices (including higher pay than comparative 
unionised firms, employer of choice and other initiatives aimed at increasing 
the employee's "psychic" stake in the organisation) to reduce the chance of a 
successful union recognition claim. Again quoting Nissen, "union substitution" 
occurs when employees feel no need for union protection due to pro- 
employee measures undertaken by managers" (Nissen, 2003, p4). 
Edwards described "the American model of weak trade unions and extensive 
flexibility" (Edwards, 2003, p8) but there are some significant exceptions, such 
as the adversarial and politically motivated Teamsters. There is likewise 
academic research in Kochan et al's (2003) "mutual gains" or "productivity 
coalition"30, which proposes a hybrid alternative to the unitarian model 
described above. 
The American unitarian model is in sharp contrast to the UK's traditionally 
pluralistic industrial relations model, but the numbers of American multi- 
nationals in the UK have inevitably been a strong influence on UK industrial 
relations: 
"Americanization embraces the continuing decline of unions and 
the assertion of a market-driven model. " (Edwards, 2003, p7) 
Much SHRM research is written by Americans and/or based in American 
organisations, which provides a reason for the lack of consideration of IR in 
the SHRM literature. 
30 Quoted In Sisson & Marginson, 2003, p 172. 
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ii) European Social Model 
To say there is a European model of industrial relations is something of a 
misnomer, as there are a number of different models which pertain, for 
instance, to modernising Eastern European countries and the Southern 
European model (France, Italy and Spain), which is "characterised by 
competing Catholic, Socialist and Communist National Federations" (Ackers, 
Smith & Smith, 1996, p2) 
However, what has come to be regarded as the European social model 
(Northern European model), endorsed by the legislative powers of the 
European Community, is the social democrat model typified by Germany, 
Holland and Scandinavia. 
The European social model is diametrically opposed to that of the USA. In its 
most advanced from it is based on co-determination, where worker 
representatives are found in decision-making bodies in the organisation. Co- 
determination emphasises the joint responsibility of managers and workers to 
manage the business for business success. This is represented in an entirely 
different approach, utilising partnership working, works councils, and worker 
representatives sitting at Board level to facilitate the co-management of the 
business. 
iii) Japanese Model 
Trade unionism in Japan is prevalent at the level of the individual enterprise, 
although they are not 'company' unions and retain their independent identity. 
It is common to find a single union which represents all employees in a 
company (including managerial staff), Japanese union not being based in the 
'craft' tradition which creates demarcation in the UK and US trade union 
movements (Bean, 1985, p32-3). 
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The Japanese model has had a profound impact on British industrial relations. 
It is typified by single union deals in traditionally unionised areas, with non- 
unionisation as the preferred option elsewhere. High commitment 
management is a feature of the Japanese IR strategy, although it is utilised to 
a very different end than the American high commitment model, emphasising 
team work and long term employment stability. 
The adoption of the Japanese model has, however, been far less significant 
than potentially anticipated: "there have been doubts as to how deeply these 
innovative practices have taken root even in Japanese subsidiaries" (Ferner, 
2003, p 6), and the term "hybridization" (Abo, 1994), ' was coined to describe 
the partial adoption of Japanese practices by UK firms. 
iv) British Model 
The foreign models are fully represented in the UK: the Japanese model is 
seen in Nissan in Sunderland and Toyota in Derby, the American model (of 
non-unionism supported by HCM practices) in relatively young companies 
such as Capital One. Co-determination has been translated into increasing 
number of partnership agreements in organisations such as Blue Circle, which 
can take a unitarian or a pluralist perspective. 
This heterogeneity raises a question: given the influence of the various foreign 
industrial relations models, is there still a distinctively British industrial 
relations model? 
Ferner (2003) argues that there is a British industrial relations, but does not 
attempt to define it. It seems sensible to use Hyman's (2003, p 55) division of 
British industrial relations into two categories: traditional and management led. 
Hyman describes the traditional model as follows: 
" Quoted in Ferner, 2003, p96. 
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"There remains a declining but substantial sector in which trade 
union organization is still relatively intact and employment is still 
regulated by collective bargaining - although its agenda and 
substantive outcomes may be very different from the past. " 
(Hyman, 2003, p 55) 
Examples of this model include British Airways, the Royal Mail and London 
Underground. 
Hyman's description of the second category is less satisfactory, but is seen as 
a management dominated system which is disadvantageous to employees: 
"The second system ... allows management almost unrestricted 
autonomy in defining terms and conditions of employment. The 
weight of evidence ... suggests that the outcomes are rarely benign. " (Hyman, 2003, p55) 
This resembles the "sweetheart" deal of emasculated compliant trade unions 
and echoes Kelly's (1996) fears for trade unionism under the partnership 
agenda. 
Hyman's polarity does, however, omit the large number of organisations who 
have developed from the traditional model, creating relatively constructive 
relationships with trade unions which have not lost their independence. This 
model would be typified by organisations such as Tesco and Legal & General. 
In conclusion, one may say that British industrial relations defies 
categorisation: it runs the full gamut from partnership to militancy. As 
described by Bean (1985, p21), attempts to typify British industrial relations 
have, however, resulted in a number of generalisations. British unions tend to 
be more involved in the pursuit of worker rights (particularly collective 
bargaining) than political or class consciousness (the converse is true in 
France and Italy). Feudalism has, however, grounded UK unionism in class 
division and the 'craft' tradition (Bean, 1985, p29), which has resulted in strong 
occupational solidarity and job demarcation. This has resulted in 
fragmentation and a multiplicity of competing unions (as opposed to post-War 
Germany, which consolidated into only 16 unions), often exacerbated by 
religious and ideological divisions. 
Many of these generalities have been eroded over time (the trend away from 
national collective bargaining, substantial consolidation of the union 
movement via mergers), but this brief review indicates some of the tenets of 
British industrial relations. 
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1.3.2.2.3. Categorisations of Trade Unionism 
As well as industrial relations models which deal with cross cultural 
organisational approaches to trade unions, the literature also provides models 
of the employment relationship. 
1.3.2.2.3.1. Typologies of Employment Relationships 
One of the most influential typologies of ideological approaches to the 
employment relationship was developed by Fox (1974). These form a 
continuum along which different trade unions position themselves. This is 
illustrated in figure 29. 
Unitarian Pluralist Radical (Marxist) 
m 
Evolutionary change - 
Authoritarian - Paternalistic Co-operation - Conflict Revolutionary change 
Capitalist society Post-capitalist society Capitalist 
Coalescence of sectional Division between labour and 
.° Integrated group of people groups capital 
E 
M Imbalance and inequalities 
a Common values, interests Different values, interests in society (power, economic 
and objectives and objectives wealth etc. ) 
Single authority and loyalty Competitive authority and 
structure (that of loyalty structures (formal Inherent in economic and 
ö management) and informal) social systems 
Z8 Inevitable, rational and Disorder precursor to 
Irrational and frictional structural change 
ö. t 
0 N 
0) 
° Coercion Compromise and agreement Change society 
Employee response to 
ö Intrusion from outside Legitimate capitalism 
E 
Internal and integral to work Expression and mobilisation 
Historical anacronism organisation of class consciousness 
d) Accepted role in both 
0 Only accepted in economic economic and managerial Develop political awareness 
relations (if forced) relations and activity 
Figure 29: Fox's typology of Employment Relationships (adapted from Salamon, 1998, p5) 
i) The Unitarian Perspective 
Batstone (1988) provided a useful elaboration on the features of these three 
categorisations of industrial relations, commencing with the unitarian 
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approach. The unitarian approach sees conflict as neither "a necessary or 
legitimate feature of industrial relations" (Batstone, 1988, p11), and that 
mutually supports the employment relationship (the employee can only 
continue to be paid if the organisation is profitable, and profitability depends 
on the skills of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur's authority, consequently, 
is constructed as legitimate, within the unitarian perspective. 
Batstone draws the following conclusion from the unitarian perspective: 
" ... the achievement of optimal welfare requires that workers 
should not be able to obstruct the working of the market; 
second, they should defer to the wisdom and skills of those who 
provide their livelihood - the entrepreneur. " (Batstone, 1988, 
p11) 
Batstone, concurring with Fox, depicts a range within the unitarian 
perspective: at the extreme, the unitarian perspective totally rejects the 
concept of collective organisation, whereas the less extreme view accepts a 
role for "responsible" trade unions, with limits as to their power, who impede 
neither the operation of the market or the exercising of managerial (i. e. 
entrepreneurial) skills. 
The 'problem' of industrial relations, from a unitarian perspective, is the 
excessive power of the trade unions and the irresponsible usage of that 
power. Industrial action becomes, for a unitarian, subversive or misguided, 
strikes potentially endangering the interests of both the organisation and the 
union members who depend upon it for their livelihood. 
ii) The Radical Perspective 
Batstone is equally lucid in his description of the radical perspective. 
Radicalism argues that industrial relations can only be understood in the wider 
social context, and that the actors are conditioned by their positions within the 
social structure. The radical perspective sees a society characterised by 
fundamental inequities, deep societal divisions and irreconcilable conflicts of 
interest. For the radical, even participating in collective bargaining is 
perpetuation of a mechanism of oppression and inequality. 
The radical perspective can be divided broadly into Marxian and non-Marxian 
schools of thought. However, they share the belief that a major upheaval of 
the social structure is required to transform the structural inequalities in 
society. 
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Radicalism assumes that workers' behaviour and attitudes are shaped by an 
unconscious acceptance of the dominant ideology (what Batstone calls "'the 
hidden faces of power' - the mobilization of bias involved in institutions and 
structures and the ability to create and promulgate an ideology supportive of 
the powerful", Batstone, 1988, p13), and concomitantly sees a role for union 
activists in raising class consciousness and awareness of oppression. 
This argument, one might further suppose, also serves as a justification for 
the schism between union leaders and membership, and wards off 
accusations that the union fails to act'in the members' interests'. 
The 'problem' of industrial relations, from a radical perspective, is the need for 
a fundamental change to the social order, to overthrow fundamental inequities 
and divisions in society. 
iii) The Pluralist Perspective 
Pluralism recognises: 
"The legitimacy of employer and trade union interests and their 
equal social and moral status. " (The Guardian, 2002) 
As Fox's taxonomy indicates, the pluralist perspective can take a variety of 
conceptualisations, from co-operation to conflict. 
The pluralist perspective sees no fundamental problem with the balance of 
power between trade unions, employees and employers, and that, whilst 
conflicts of interest inevitably exist, compromise is possible and desirable. 
The solution to the industrial relations 'problem', consequently, becomes 
orderly compromise though the formalisation of "coherent and explicit 
agreements between the parties" (Batstone, 1988, p2). 
Batstone (1988) locates the tradition of 'liberal pluralism' (Batstone, 1988, p3) 
and the important work of the Donovan Commission (1968) in the centre of 
Fox's continuum from unitarianism to radicalism. The 1968 Donovan Report 
was, if not the initiator of the pluralist approach to industrial relations, certainly 
catalytic. 
The Donovan Report was a response to the perceived 'problem' of industrial 
relations, which the Report saw as caused by a conflict between the 'formal' 
system (enshrined in pan-industry collective agreements) and the 'informal' 
system (the actual behaviour of the stewards, employees and managers, 
trade unions and employers' associations, custom and practice, unwritten 
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codes and understandings). These 2 systems, Donovan proposed, mutually 
weaken each other: pan-industry agreements are diminished by 
comprehensive plant agreements and the "disorderly" (Batstone, 1988, p5) 
realities of day to day negotiation; the informal system results in fragmentation 
of bargaining, competitive and chaotic agreements and, when combined with 
the reliance upon unwritten agreements and custom and practice, lead to 
greater likelihood of industrial pressure and unrest and restrictive practices. 
Donovan's recommendations argued for factory agreements, the extension of 
collective bargaining and the need for more extensive rights for workers and 
unions, particularly in the definition of the "rights and obligations of shop 
stewards within the factory" (Donovan Commission, 1968, p41). This has 
been criticised by academics and practitioners of all persuasions. Unitarists 
supported a reduction in trade union power within the workplace, and 
Donovan's strengthening of union rights and the rights of shop stewards was 
interpreted as playing into the very hands of the most problematic group. For 
radicals, Donovan's assumption of the equal distribution of power between 
employees and employers was a sign that he had looked only superficially at 
the behaviour of actors, and failed to consider the way in which this behaviour 
is shaped by the fundamentally unequal distribution of power. For radicals, 
Donovan was "basically managerialist, in practice if not in intention" (Batstone, 
1988, p14). 
Donovan has also been critiqued by pluralist writers, notably the Oxford 
School (a number of researchers working around the Donovan Commission, 
including Turner, Flanders and Clegg) and Fox. Their initial championing of 
the pluralist perspective was reversed to question the academic legitimacy of 
the entire pluralist approach (Fox, 1973). The Donovan Report does, 
however, still mark a watershed in the study of British industrial relations, 
undoubtedly creating the theoretical and practical basis for the partnership 
approaches to industrial relations discussed in subsequent sections. 
1.3.2.2.3.2. Implications for Trade Union Relations 
Fox's categorisations have a profound impact on the industrial relations 
strategy selected by management, constraining the options and the 
applicability of the industrial relations models described earlier in this section. 
A unitarian "management ideology" (Fox, 1973) is likely to align with an 
industrial relations strategy focused on alternatives to trade unionism. The 
authoritarian pole may be demonstrated in overt anti- or non- union 
environments and de-recognition. The paternalistic manifestation of the 
unitarian ideology is likely to be direct participation (employee voice) and 
union substitution linked to high commitment management practices (as 
described in the section on the US model of industrial relations). At the border 
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of unitarianism and pluralism may be what Storey described as a senior 
management attitude of "benign neglect" (Storey, 1992, p258) towards trade 
unions. 
The pluralistic perspective is compatible with partnership agreements (co- 
operation), but also covers the pluralistic British employee relations model 
which, whilst recognising the legitimacy of trade unions, may find that 
relationship conflictual (Fox, 1973, p196). The pluralist perspective may 
utilise direct or indirect mechanisms of employee voice, or may use both 
("dualism"; Storey, 1992). Both management and unions may hold a pluralist 
philosophy. 
The radical perspective is the preserve of militant trade unionists (Hyman, 
1975). Whilst the evolutionary change pole may be compatible with 
reasonably co-operative industrial relations, it is unlikely. Trade unionists 
focusing on revolutionary change are likely to be motivated by political 
agendas as well as representing their members' interests. As Darlington 
comments, "it would appear that the politics of union leadership is an 
important ingredient 
... to an understanding of the dynamics of workplace industrial relations and trade unionism" (Darlington, 2001, p3, his emphasis). 
This may show itself in destructive behaviour. 
1.3.2.2.3.3. Definitions of Trade Unionism: Militancy and Moderation 
Before proceeding, it is also necessary to look at definitions of the terms 
'militancy' and 'moderation'. As indicated by McClendon & Klass (1993, p 
561), there is considerable ambiguity in the literature around the term 
'militancy', and the term is often used as a truism, little attempt being made to 
deconstruct the construct's meaning. The exceptions to this are Allen, Kelly 
and Gall; this paper will build upon their definitions. 
Allen (1996) provided one of the most useful early expositions of militancy, 
defining it in terms of "good union practice" (Gall, 2003, p10), i. e. the use of 
various means (including, but not limited to, industrial action) to achieve better 
terms and conditions of employment. Militancy, for Allen, has two 
components: the full exploitation of market forces by workers to achieve 
improved terms and conditions; and, secondly, a refusal to compromise with 
management or what Gall (2003, p10) calls the "forces of socialisation" (which 
cite issues such as 'national interest' to pressurise workers to reduce 
demands and withdraw industrial action). Avoiding the agenda of employers 
and/or government is a key feature of Allen's definition of militancy. 
Gall (2003, p11) does, however, indicate a number of ambiguities and points 
of clarification required by Allen's work, and criticises his concentration on 
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economic militancy (to the exclusion of political militancy), a focus on union 
rather than worker militancy and on national rather than workplace unionism. 
To move on to the second significant writer in this area, the left wing writer 
John Kelly recognised that Allen's model lacked consideration of union power 
bases, and failed to assess the implications of union ideology. In response, 
Kelly divided militancy into its component parts, building a multi-dimensional 
model of militancy, shown in figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Kelly's Components of Union Militancy and Moderation (adapted from Kelly, 1997) 
Moderate demands with some 
or many concessions 
(Accommodation) 
Strong reliance on employers, 
third parties or law 
(Demobilisation) 
Willingness to experiment 
with/support non-bargaining 
institutions (Subordination) 
Infrequent threat or use of 
industrial action (Quiescence) 
Ideology of partnership 
(Incorporation) 
There are two important aspects of this model: firstly, militancy and 
moderation are not seen as absolutes, but are rather poles on the continuum 
and, secondly, the `hierarchy of depth and persuasiveness'. 
To look first at Kelly's concept of a continuum, this raises several important 
points. The union's place on the continuum is influenced by their environment 
and by other actors (particularly the State and employers), and there may not 
be a direct correlation between militant intention and militant action. The 
implications of this are fourfold: 
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" The avowed goals, methods and resources of the trade union may 
not be a true reflection of the preferences of the union leaders, 
officials and members, due to the impact of the wider environment 
in which unions operate. 
" Trade unions must necessarily be responsive to their environment 
and pragmatic in their response to it; this implies taking a pragmatic 
approach to each situation. Kelly (1996, p100) draws this into a 
distinction between "policy-neutral contingency" (where the union 
does not have a preference for militancy or moderation, and will 
take a stance on a case by case basis) and "policy based 
contingency" (Kelly, 1996, p100), under which a strong orientation 
towards one or other of the poles on the continuum will guide 
decision making, although it is recognised that pragmatic 
compromises may have to be made. 
" The actors themselves may also be profiled on the moderate- 
militant continuum (one can, for instance, envisage a militant 
employer coercively changing terms and conditions). 
" Unions may move along the continuum (e. g. the militant TGWU of 
the1970s has moved significantly towards moderation over time), 
therefore militancy is not necessarily a stable or enduring construct. 
Moving on to the second implication of Kelly's model, the "hierarchy of depth 
and persuasiveness", Kelly sees his 5 components as ranging from the most 
expedient (goals, which may be sacrificed for the achievement of other goals) 
to the most durable (ideology, which may change over time, but is likely to 
show greater permanence than methods or the two types of resources). This 
hierarchy allows unions to be more or less militant on different dimensions 
(e. g. militant ideology, moderate bargaining goals). It also means that, to 
define a trade union as militant, one must profile it on all of the dimensions. 
Kelly's writing must, however, be contextualised by an appreciation of his left 
wing perspective. His work sees union militancy as the only response to an 
environment in which employers are increasingly antagonistic to trade unions: 
"... what employers object to is not a particular form of trade 
unionism but the very fact of its existence. " (Kelly, 1996, p89) 
Industrial action, for Kelly, leads to a stronger trade union with greater 
recruiting power, and that strikes lead to gains, both directly for the members 
and indirectly for the union by providing a consolidating force which creates a 
sense of conflicting interests and a greater ideological coherence. Indeed, 
Kelly perceives moderate trade unionism to be the danger: 
"... the more radical forms of moderation can seriously weaken 
trade unions, and leave them vulnerable to employers' attacks, 
106 
because they erode both the willingness and the capacity of 
members to resist and to challenge employer demands. 
Ideologies of partnership and co-operation can damage the 
perception of conflicting interests. " (Kelly, 1996, p101) 
Kelly sees militancy as a legitimate and necessary foil to employer power: 
"... militant trade unionism quite rightly seeks to defend the right 
to strike and to maintain the willingness and capacity of the 
membership to take collective action. Trade unionism without 
these attributes depends on employers and the state for its 
survival, whereas militant trade unionism builds on the only 
reliable foundation, namely its membership and their willingness 
to act. " (Kelly, 1996, p102) 
And perceives militancy as a response to hostile employers: 
"Ultimately it is sustained by the hostility of employers to 
independent trade unionism and by the antagonistic interests of 
workers and employers. " (Kelly, 1996, p102) 
Once Kelly's writing has been thus contextualised, it provides a very useful 
analytical framework. 
Gall, however, argues that Kelly concentrates on union militancy to the 
exclusion of other forms, and that it is necessary to view 'militancy' as a much 
more fragmented and less coherent phenomenon. Gall argues for five 
categorisations of militancy, as shown in figure 31 (although his definition of 
these categories is vague). 
Type of Militancy Definition 
'Labour' militancy Workplace based, concerned with local 
issues 
Worker' militancy Focused on wider issues with a more political 
basis, e. g. women' ri hts 
'Union' militancy Kelly's concept that some unions are more 
predisposed to militancy than others 
'Union political' militancy Gall defines this as "intra-union groups, 
sections and factions" (Gall, 2003, p13) 
'Industrial' militancy Gall does not offer a definition of this, but it is 
presumed to refer to industries, such as 
transport, which have typically had difficult or 
adversarial industrial relations for a number 
of years 
Figure 31: Gall's (2003) Categorisations of Militancy 
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`Union political' militancy is a particularly important concept for Gall, as he 
uses this concept to explain the different viewpoints of union leaders and 
members, and the different factions within trade unions. 
Gall adds to this fragmentation by claiming that each of these elements may 
have sub-forms (such as 'wage' militancy), suggesting that there are variants 
of militancy which take an economic or a political orientation. Furthermore, 
Gall distinguishes between the different ideological basis operating within the 
trade union movement, noting that the world view of trade unionists who 
believe they are engaged in class struggle will differ from those who see their 
role as the upholding of workers' rights. 
Gall, disappointingly, stops short of providing his own, alternative, definition of 
militancy (particularly given that the title of his book is 'The Meaning of 
Militancy? '), but one can extrapolate his model from the following quote: 
"Militancy relates to, and is defined by, workers' aims, outcomes 
and methods of bargaining and collection (sic) actions. The 
definition of aims is worker-centred, ambitious and far-reaching, 
infused with some ideological notions of wider social change ... this definition must be related to levels of union structure and 
internal collections of workers. " (Gall, 2003, p22) 
The lack of an agreed definition of militancy points to the socially constructed 
nature of the term, which is potentially the best way to view the construct. As 
a shorthand, Kelly's (1996) definitions of 'militant' and 'moderate' will be used 
throughout this paper. Kelly views militancy as preparedness to take 
industrial action, having an ideology of conflicting interests and a reliance on 
the ability to mobilise members, but the multi-dimensionality of his model 
allows for militancy to be divided into its component parts, so providing a more 
comprehensive analytical framework. Project one will examine assumptions 
around militancy and moderation, the functional use of the terms and the 
implications of the usage of the term. 
1.3.2.2.4. The Roles of the Actors 
A major strand of industrial relations research has concentrated on the roles 
of the actors. A comprehensive review of the literature in this area is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but it is pertinent to make a number of points. The 
reader is referred to work by Beynon (1984), Batstone (1977,1978), Kelly 
(1996) and Gall (2003) for more in-depth discussion. 
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1.3.2.2.4.1. The Shop Steward 
A number of authors, including Beynon, Batstone and Kelly, have made 
important contributions in looking at the roles of shop stewards in the 
industrial relations environment. 
i) Beynon 
An important early industrial relations case studies was by the industrial 
sociologist, Huw Beynon. His 'WORKING FOR FORD', originally published in 
1973, has much to say about shop stewards and their role. 
Beynon is particularly lucid on the motivations of shop stewards. Whereas he 
recognises their motivation to represent their members' interests: 
"Trade unions exist because working people need them. It is 
this need that leads straightforward 'ordinary men' ... to become 
shop stewards. " (Beynon, 1984, p202) 
he sees a political orientation as a necessary precursor to becoming a 
steward: 
'While there was a general agreement that working men need 
trade unions for protection, the union meant more than that to 
most of the stewards ... It represented the struggles fought by 
workers over generations, it was a living tradition based upon 
collectivistic values of unity and brotherhood. " (Beynon, 1984, 
p202) 
Beynon calls this the "dualism ... between ... the 'ideological' and 'business' dimensions of unionism" (Beynon, 1984, p203), but sees no conflict between 
the two roles. Discussions of this conflict, however, will represent a major 
theme of the discourse both of managers and trade unionists in project 1. 
ii) Batstone 
Batstone and his collaborators (1977,1978) provided one of the most detailed 
discussions of the role and nature of shop stewards. They proceeded largely 
through case study work, using a grounded theory approach and observation 
and interviewing as their major techniques. 
Their systematic work is probably the best exposition of the role of shop 
stewards in organisations, and it is pertinent to make two points here. 
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Firstly, Batstone et al see a symbiotic relationship between stewards and 
management: 
"... the steward organizations often have strong organizational 
interests and consequently a considerable degree of 
dependence upon management. " (Batstone, 1977, p2) 
They contrast this to conveners and full time officials: 
"... many conveners are frequently full-time in that job and may 
be divorced from the membership through their contacts with 
management and their use of a variety of company-provided 
facilities such as offices, and freedom to come and go as they 
please. " (Batstone, 1977, p2) 
This concept of mutuality will be particularly important in the study of London 
Underground, where respondents argue that the public sector's lack of 
mutuality is a significant factor in the continued industrial unrest. 
Secondly, Batstone's analysis divides stewards into 4 ideal types, as shown in 
figure 32. 
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Figure 32: Ideal Steward Types (Batstone et al, 1977) 
Batstone et al (1977) categorise the poles as follows: representatives shape 
the issues that they deal with (either by initiating issues or by amending or 
refusing to take up issues raised by others) and tend to deal with issues 
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themselves, without reference to more senior officials. High pursuit of union 
principles is characterized by reference to the norms of steward leadership, in 
preference to references to members' interests. 
Whilst 'leaders' can both play a representative role for his members and 
implement union principles, 'nascent leaders' are committed to the latter but 
find the representative role difficult: they may be a junior representatives 
sponsored by a leader. The 'cowboy' can play the representative role (at least 
in the short term), but is likely to be focused on advantage for his group of 
members rather than union principles. The 'populist' acts as a delegate, 
without commitment to union principles, and generally operates in accordance 
with the articulated wishes of his members. The 'nascent leader' and the 
'cowboy' are typically roles of short duration and are less common: Batstone 
et al's study found that 'populists' were the most common type, both in staff 
and shop-floor organisations. 
iii) John Kelly & Mobilization Theory 
Kelly (1998) drew upon work by Garrison (1992), McAdam (1988) and Tilly 
(1978) to create his theory of mobilization, attempting to address the 
fundamental question of "how individuals are transformed into collective 
actors willing and able to create and sustain collective organization and 
engage in collective action against their employers" (Kelly, 1998, p 28). From 
these sources, Kelly developed a sophisticated model of mobilisation, based 
on the 5 elements of Tilly's mobilization model (shown in figure 33 below). 
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Organization 
(the structure of the group, 
specifically in relation to 
structural factors which 
facilitate or impede its 
capacity for collective 
action) 
Interest 
(how do people come to 
define their interests, 
- --- - specifically subordinate 
groups, and how do they 
align their interests with 
those of others) 
---- ----T -_. --- --- - 
Mobilization 
(how does the group 
collectively gain control 
over the resources it 
requires for action) 
Repression/facilitation 
(the costs of repression by 
the controlling group) 
Opportunity/threat 
(the opportunity for 
subordinate groups to 
pursue their claims) 
Collective action 
(different forms according 
to the balance of the other 
factors) 
Figure 33: Tilly's Mobilization Model (from Kelly, 1998, p26) 
Power 
(the balance of power 
between the parties) 
Kelly overlaid this with a sociological framework derived from McAdam which 
indicated the role of injustice, agency, identity and attribution in the shaping of 
workers' interests (figure 34). 
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Using the mobilization theory, Kelly (1997) theorised that the future of trade 
unionism will be determined only partly by structural factors (such as 
unemployment, over which the unions have little control). Instead, Kelly 
hypothesises that, even in a favourable environment, unions still have to 
mobilise employees, a process of "collectivisation" (i. e. unions must persuade 
employees that they have collective interests, establish that those interests 
conflict with employers' interests and that resolution is only possible via 
collective organisation and action). A sense of injustice is a necessary 
precursor to this process (Kelly takes data from the British Social Attitudes 
Survey to substantiate an increasing dissatisfaction with employee 'voice' and 
increasing pay gap between high and low paid, leading to a growing distrust 
of management) . 
Kelly (1997,1998) proposed that there are 4 roles which left wing shop floor 
activists play in the role of collectivising employees to create a body which can 
be mobilised by the trade unions (shown in figure 35). 
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Figure 34: McAdam's Model of Collective Action (Kelly, 1998, p28) 
1 Construct a sense of grievance amongst workers, attributing blame to employers or 
the State, rather than to uncontrollable economic forces 
2 Promote group/social identity, encouraging workers to become aware of their common 
interests in opposition to employers 
3 Urge workers to engage in collective action (which is essential, given the cost of such 
action to the employee and the inexperience of employees in taking action) 
4 Legitimate collective action against employer's counter claims 
Figure 35: Kelly's Roles of Shop Floor Activists 
Left wing, politically motivated trade union activists are problematic to 
organisations: 
"... left wing union representatives with an overtly ideological 
and solidaristic (rather than instrumental and individualistic) 
commitment to trade unionism, can play a crucial role in 
translating shop-floor discontent into a sense of injustice, which 
then enables them to mobilise workers for collective action 
against management ... a commitment to building the strength 
of workplace organisation through an adversarial approach to 
management prerogative. " (Darlington, 2001, p3) 
Darlington goes on to indicate that left wing activists oppose moderate trade 
unions and encourage members (who may not share their ideology) to 
engage in militant collective activity. Darlington's paper is particularly 
interesting, as it is the only paper to study industrial relations in the context of 
London Underground, and will be reviewed in more detail in the literature 
review for project one. 
1.3.2.2.4.2 The Union Leadership 
The influence of the unions' executive committees and leadership is central to 
debates about trade unionism; a number of authors (eg. Batstone, 1977; 
Kelly, 1998; Darlington, 2001) note a potential difference in aims and 
objectives between the union leadership and their membership. Two models 
allow for a schism between the leadership and the membership: the Marxist 
perspective and Kelly's militancy model. 
The Marxist perspective, as indicated in the section on radicalism, assumes 
that workers' behaviour and attitudes are shaped by an unconscious 
acceptance of the dominant ideology, and union activists therefore have a role 
in raising class consciousness and awareness of oppression. This model 
suggests an almost inevitable conflict between the "aware" trade unionists and 
the "unaware" workers, and a justification for the schism between union 
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leaders and membership is the need to challenge the unconscious 
acceptance of the capitalist status quo by the membership. 
Kelly's militancy model allows for a schism between the leadership (keepers 
of the ideological component of trade unionism), the stewards (who may be 
ideologically motivated but may be more concerned with institutional, 
membership or goal components) and the membership (who are likely to be 
goal focused, those goals varying from individual to individual). 
On a pragmatic level, the degree of influence the union leadership exerts on a 
workplace is a significant topic. Batstone (1977) did look at this area, but 
found that the two unions in his case study were largely independent from the 
larger union, although stewards did rely upon the larger union for much of the 
their identity and legitimacy: 
"... stewards often place great emphasis on the importance of 
the larger union as the embodiment of union principles and as a 
basis for their self-identity. " (Batstone, 1977, p185) 
The influence of the larger union on domestic organisations via the shop 
stewards, hence, may be quite limited. However, the involvement of full time 
officials, particularly in negotiations, is likely to exert a more durable (in terms 
of Kelly's model) form of trade unionism on the organisation. 
In London Underground, however, the role of the union leadership will be a 
much more significant issue than it was to the organisation in Batstone's 
study, both because the RMT is an overtly political organisation (the RMT 
claims as a constitutional goal, "to work for the supersession of the capitalist 
system by a socialistic order of society"; RMT, 2004) and, secondly, London 
Underground is a pivotal organisation which can be used as a pawn by the 
union to put pressure on politicians (specifically the Labour Government and 
the Mayor) to accede to their demands (particularly as concessions achieved 
in LUL, with or without government intervention, are likely to be translated to 
other, privatised/part-privatised parts of the transport industry). 
1.3.2.2.4.3. The Employee 
As can be seen from the work of Kelly and Darlington reviewed above, the 
tendency in the literature appears to be to see the employee as a passive 
recipient of the influences of the trade union and the management (indeed, 
Batstone (1977, p5) alludes to the `dual loyalty' of employees, to the employer 
and to the union which is widely noted by authors such as Purcell, 1953). 
Workers tend to be defined in terms of their relationship to the other actors, as 
in Batstone's work. 
115 
Batstone sees the relationship between stewards and their membership is 
pivotal; as he comments, "Steward leadership depends ultimately upon the 
ability either to by-pass the membership or to win their support" (Batstone, 
1977, p100). 
Batstone defines employees in terms of their relation to stewards: on the shop 
floor, where steward leadership is more important, and the union is central to 
the work experience, shop stewards have a fundamental role. Collectivist 
behaviour is the norm. On the shop floor, 'leader stewards have influence 
over their members because: 
" The union is considerably more central to the organization of work than 
in staff areas. 
" They tend to be opinion formers and have strong links with other 
opinion formers 
Batstone indicates that 'leader' stewards (who have the ability to initiate 
issues or choose which issues to pursue) may gain some independence from 
their members because of previous success in bargaining (Batstone, 1997, 
p100). It is notable, however, in Batstone's work, that there is a difference 
between operational and staff environments: in the latter the union assumes 
lesser importance, and, as individualism is the dominant tenet, the role of the 
steward assumes less centrality. 
Other researchers tend to take up this view of employees as passive. Gall's 
2003 exposition on militancy in the Royal Mail saw little raised consciousness 
on the part of the workers: 
"Most postal workers remain committed to 'low collectivism'. 
Most believe their interests and other workers' interests should 
be represented a party (sic) of the working class. Only a 
minority is of a more elevated consciousness. The former see 
the need for managers and do not wish to run industry 
themselves but they see conflicts of interests in how 
management carry this out reflected in strikes. Thus, only a few 
see their interests as either antagonistic to RM's (Royal Mail) per 
se or in class terms. Striking has made little impact in 
developing widespread existence of higher levels of union and 
class consciousness. " (Gall, 2003, p247-8, his emphasis). 
Gall clearly sites the Royal Mail employees within the category of 'labour' 
militancy: 
"... labour militancy has dominated the behaviour of those postal 
workers with tendencies towards militancy, generally based on, 
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and conditioned by, workplace localism ... Much less evidence 
of union or worker militancy was found. " (Gall, 2003, p274) 
Gall sees his employee base as largely inert: 
"... passivity, inactivity, sectionalism, lower trade union 
consciousness and attendant organsational expressions are 
more dominant (than militancy) amongst postal workers. " (Gall, 
2003, p 275) 
Although he does make the point that this inactivity does not actively oppose 
militancy, therefore possibly offers it tacit support. 
This constriction of employees within 'labour' militancy contrasts with claims 
made by Kelly (and picked up by Darlington) that a critical role for shop 
stewards is the instilling of a collective consciousness in employees (Kelly, 
1997,1998; Darlington, 2001). 
1.3.2.2.4.4. The State 
The fourth actor with a profound influence on industrial relations is the State. 
Much has been written about the role of the State, particularly in the study of 
comparative industrial relations. Union recognition legislation is probably the 
most visible sign of a national approach to industrial relations (e. g. the UK's 
transition from the disassembly of protective trade union legislation under 
Margaret Thatcher to the raft of European legislation implemented under the 
Blair regime). 
However, although legislation has a profound influence on workers and their 
trade unions, recognition legislation is not a universal panacea for trade 
unions. As Gall (2003a) points out: 
"They are not universal laws, operating in a blanket fashion 
where employers are subject to punitive measures for not 
recognizing unions ... Unions are cast in the position of always having to take the initiative and demonstrate their support. The 
onus is on them and the laws in themselves guarantee nothing, 
however supportive they are viewed to be. " (Gall, 2003a, p231) 
The State, according to Gall, simply reflects the existing labour-capital 
inequities: 
"Little evidence can be found of recognition laws constituting, or 
providing opportunities for, substantial challenges to managerial 
prerogative. " 
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Gall also references the debate around the dependency of unions upon the 
State: should unions be independent from the State, and thus able to 
withstand periods of reduced State support or State antagonism, or should 
they accept the support of the State (which may be essential if weaker trade 
unions are to develop into a position where they are sufficiently powerful to 
gain that independency). Gall, unfortunately, does not develop this debate 
further. 
The State manifestly has a more profound influence on public sector 
companies, which are held to higher standards of conduct and compliance 
with legislation. However, the still high levels of union membership in the 
public sector probably relate to factors unique to the public sector 
environment, rather than the more direct influence of the State. 
1.3.2.2.4.5 Management 
It is notable that the case study research which characterises industrial 
relations research largely omits management. Articles which study 
managerial attitudes towards trade unionism are limited, and many have a 
quantitative basis (e. g. Poole et at, 1995) and there is a dearth of work which 
looks at the perceptions of individual managers from a social constructivist 
perspective. 
Looking at the detailed qualitative industrial relations studies produced by 
authors such as Beynon, Gall and Darlington, their coverage of managerial 
attitudes is almost negligible (although, in their defence, it must be said that 
access to this population is difficult). Although they all reference the influence 
of managers, they view this population through the second hand lens of the 
workers and trade unionists, which inevitably produces a view of managers as 
belligerent and/or incompetent. 
Beynon (Beynon, 1984, p112) neatly divides criticism of managers into 
'structural' (the Marxist argument that they perpetuate the inequities of the 
capitalist state) and 'moral' (criticism of the actions that managers take), but 
the Ford managers to whom he refers are only represented in the views of the 
workers and the trade unionists Beynon interviewed. 
Darlington (2001), likewise, conducted extensive interviews with workers and 
union activists, but his only representatives of management were employee 
relations staff, and the 'sanctioned' views of official documentation. Gall 
(2003) interviewed 40 full time officials and lay representatives in his study of 
the Royal Mail, but, from the management side, interviewed only the national 
industrial relations manager, relying on company documentation and Martinez 
Lucio's work on management strategy to fill in the gaps. This is problematic in 
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that the only view of management attitudes Darlington and Gall have, 
excepting the second order representations of the interviewees, is the officially 
sanctioned one embodied in formal documents and articulated strategy. 
Batstone is perhaps more helpful on this issue, as the first volume of 
Batstone's observation based study, 'SHOP STEWARDS IN ACTION' (1977), 
provides greater opportunity to examine the role of management within the 
industrial relations context. His research focus, however, remains the 
stewards, and management are only referenced in terms of their influence on 
the stewards. 
Management, Batstone argues, influence steward leadership in two ways: 
firstly, their organization of work and working conditions influences the extent 
to which a steward can assume a leadership role and the role which a union 
can play. Secondly, management exert an influence via how they deal with 
individual stewards, i. e. how far they involve stewards, accommodate or 
otherwise stewards' demands, and whether the relationship between steward 
and manager is seen as sufficiently independent and non-compromising. This 
last point is important to the credibility of the steward, as Batstone comments: 
"... a particularly close relationship between management and a 
shop steward may be self-defeating if members begin to suspect 
the steward is no longer primarily pursuing their interests. " 
(Batstone, 1977, p 5/6) 
This is actually viewed more strongly by a number of authors, who see the 
"close" relationship between the management and unions as collusion. Whilst 
alluded to by the Donovan Report and by Batstone, critics of management go 
much further, as indicated by this broadcaster's view of LUL: 
"Ridley (Tony Ridley, MD of London Transport, 1980) felt it was 
a conspiracy between the management and the unions because 
negotiations 'just went on and on without ever getting 
anywhere'. " (Wolmar, 2002, p51) 
Two other authors pick up this central role of management, but interpret it in a 
very different way. Boxall & Purcell see management as the only body which 
can drive the transformation of the industrial relations 'tone' in an organization: 
"It is management who are the prime initiators here since they 
determine the fundamental approach. Unions are inevitably 
reactive to the style of management. It is extremely difficult for 
them to be proactive and to create a climate of 'partnership'". 
(Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p177) 
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Kelly (1996), however, takes a very different stance, regarding any 
relationship between organisations and trade unions based on moderation 
and co-operation as one which will weaken trade unions: 
"... (bargaining structures based on company councils or 
managerial sponsorship) identify the goodwill of the employer as 
the key to union survival and high membership density. It is the 
extreme dependency of the union on the employer which is truly 
alarming in these cases, a dependency reinforced by the 
absence of the normal countervailing powers of trade unionism. " 
(Kelly, 1996, p96) 
And leave them exposed them to anti-union activities on the part of the 
employer: 
"It is this dependency which renders moderate trade unionism so 
vulnerable to an employer's counter-offensive in the event that 
they ever wished to dispense with unionism altogether. " (Kelly, 
1996, p96) 
Returning to Batstone, he argues that management will work to reduce 
uncertainty, and that their strongest relationships will be with stewards who 
can help them manage uncertainty. As labour is a major source of uncertainty 
and crisis, uncertainty is typically greater in shop floor as opposed to staff 
environments, and that stewards who provide strong leadership are more 
effective in controlling their members, his theory is that shop floor stewards 
who are strong leaders are most likely to be useful to management in 
reducing uncertainty; stewards with these characteristics are likely to have the 
strongest relationships with managers. 
Batstone locates this argument within a context of management politics, and 
the "networks of co-operation and evasion" (Kelly, 1996, p96) which managers 
must establish to help them achieve goals, essential to protect managers in 
scenarios where uncertainty and crisis will necessitate rule breaking. This 
model is developed through the second volume, THE SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION OF STRIKES (1978). 
Batstone's survey data raises a number of interesting points. Managers saw 
shop floor workers as having a greater capacity to create uncertainty (by 
refusal to co-operate with management) and having a greater willingness to 
use that capacity. Shop floor stewards, concomitantly, assumed greater 
power than staff stewards, and "improving relations with stewards" was 
reported as the top industrial relations goal for 56% of shop floor managers 
(Batstone, 1977, p162); collective relations has a centrality for shop floor 
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managers not shared by managers of staff departments (who expressed 
greater concern over individual issues, largely around morale and motivation): 
"For most shop-floor managers were convinced that it is through 
'responsible' shop stewards who can control their members that 
their industrial relations problems will be overcome. " (Batstone, 
1977, p161/2) 
Batstone's final discussion in his chapter on manager-steward relations is the 
definition of the conditions under which a strong bargaining relationship can 
develop. He paraphrases Brown's (1973) definition of a strong bargaining 
relationship as follows: 
" ... the development of a relationship between steward and 
manager which goes beyond the minimum formal relationship 
which necessarily exists between them. At the minimum, this 
relationship is specific in terms of goals, affectively neutral, and 
universalistic in the sense that people are substitutable within 
the relationship. A strong bargaining relationship exists where 
the negotiating relationship becomes particularistic and 
affectively positive. As a consequence, certain kinds of 
information confidential to each side are exchanged, 'off the 
record' discussions occur, and to a degree each is concerned 
with protecting the relationship and the other party. The basic 
opposition of interests which exists within negotiation is 
therefore mediated by personal relationships which facilitate the 
constructive resolution of problems. " (Batstone, 1977, p168/9) 
Strong bargaining relationships develop because they help both parties - 
stewards and managers - achieve goals. However, such a relationship is a 
double-edged sword for management: unions can glean much information 
about management politics which, if a conflict situation develops, can be 
utilised by the union to determine the most effective time and method for the 
taking of industrial action. 
To be sustainable, a strong bargaining relationship must have two 
components: it must be based on "a broad balance of power between the two 
persons involved ... 
if a strong bargaining relationship fails to bring 
advantages to both parties, then there is little attraction in maintaining it", 
Batstone, 1977, p171). Secondly, there has to be a relationship of trust 
(facilitated by the exchanges of confidential information described above). 
Batstone argues that the formulation of a strong bargaining relationship with 
influential stewards (i. e. those who lead and control their members 
responsibly) aids both managers and stewards in the achievement of their 
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goals, with the likelihood of strengthening the position of both within their 
respective organizations. Batstone presents a model of mutually beneficial 
co-operation between two individuals with an equal balance of power between 
them, rather than a collusion between managers and stewards. This is 
obviously a very different model from Kelly's emasculated dependent trade 
unions. 
Batstone's second volume of this series, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
STRIKES, begins to evolve a more sophisticated view of management-union 
relations. Whereas the first volume, SHOP STEWARDS IN ACTION, 
presented a view of management as relatively homogeneous and uniformly 
focused on achieving production goals (although varying in their prioritisation 
of production needs, depending on their proximity to the shop floor), THE 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF STRIKES explicitly articulates a heterogeneous 
view of management: 
"Different managers have differing sets of priorities and 
sanctions exerted by workers are likely to have varying degrees 
of impact on different managers. " (Batstone, 1978, p37) 
The addition of management politics builds a model of shifting power 
dynamics within the management group (i. e. production will be omnipotent 
when production is badly needed, sales may gain pre-eminence where supply 
exceeds demand). 
The second development in Batstone's second volume is a comprehension 
that there may be occasions on which management seek, "an excuse for 
interruptions to production, and to avoid or alleviate the costs normally 
associated with such interruptions' (Batstone, 1978, p 37). Batstone sees this 
as a management technique ("because some groups are important in the 
production process, it is possible for management to stir them to strike action 
to avoid having to pay those laid off when breakdowns occur, markets slump, 
or supplies run short, Batstone, 1978, p29), albeit one to which union 
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representatives are wise ("At times, notably when demand was low or there 
were shortages of supplies, the conveners ... suspected that management 
were purposely 'setting the men up'. Accordingly, they would advise against 
strike action", Batstone, 1978, p57). 
1.3.2.2.5. Alternatives to Trade Unionism 
1.3.2.2.5.1. Employee Voice 
The term 'employee voice' has gained a degree of currency in the HR 
literature 32, as it attempts to find a theoretical and practical way to explain and 
reconcile the plurality of interests in the workplace. Boxall & Purcell define 
'employee voice' as follows: 
"... a whole variety of processes and structures which enable, 
and at times empower, employees, directly and indirectly, to 
contribute to decision-making in the firm. " (Boxall & Purcell, 
2003, p162) 
Although by definition, the term 'employee voice' includes "indirect" 
mechanisms for employee voice (i. e. trade unions), its interest to managers 
and HR practitioners appears to be in its "direct" form, i. e. direct 
communication with and participation of employees. 
Marchington & Wilkinson's (2000) key paper in this area examined a range of 
options for employee voice (information, communication, consultation, co- 
determination and control), and cites changing economic and political 
circumstances as the determinant of the option selected (Marchington & 
Wilkinson, 2000, p 340). 
32 The reader is referred to Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p 162 - 182 and Bach, 2004. 
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This was elaborated upon by Millward et al (2000, p118), who defined as 
important within these changing circumstances as the protracted decline in 
trade union membership, the reduction in the centrality of the unions provided 
by collective bargaining and the increasing managerial focus on direct 
participation and engagement. The latter was also observed by Cully et al 
(1999), who observed that managers expressed a preference for direct rather 
than indirect consultation in 72% of workplaces. A further impetus has 
appeared in the guise of the existing European, and the pending national 
information and consultation directives, which legislates for provision of 
employee voice mechanisms, but does not prescribe that these must be 
indirect. 
This gives us three possible reasons for the interest in employee voice: 
declining union membership, managerial focus on direct participation and 
European legislation. All of these can be used to also explain the transition 
from indirect towards more direct forms of employee voice noted by Boxall & 
Purcell (2003, p 170). 
The preference of managers to prefer direct forms of voice is likely to be a 
particular driver of the increased interest in this area. This was noted by 
Sissons (1997), who linked this to a unitarian partnership approach, and 
confirmed in the review of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 
data conducted by Cully et al (1999). 
Employee voice, in summary, has been postulated as a real alternative to 
indirect employee consultation and participation. 
1.3.2.2.5.2. Employee Engagement 
An extension of the employee voice concept, employee engagement is a topic 
currently generating much interest in the HR literature, but little academic or 
robust practitioner research current exists (the exception is the large scale 
NHS study (Robinson, Perryman & Hayday, 2004) on which much of this 
section is based). Employee engagement refers to the fostering of the direct 
relationship between employees and the organisation, and has been defined 
by the Institute of Employment Studies (IES) as follows: 
"A positive attitude held by the employee towards the 
organisation and its values. An engaged employee is aware of 
business context, and works with colleagues to improve 
performance within the job for the benefit of the organisation. 
The organisation must work to develop and nurture 
engagement, which requires a two-way relationship between 
employer and employee. " (Robinson et al, p9) 
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A number of advantages, accruing to both employee and employer, have 
been attributed to employee engagement (figure 36). 
Benefit Researcher Date 
Increased job satisfaction Vandenberg & Lance 1992 
Increased job performance Mathieu & Zajac 1990 
Increased total return to shareholders Walker Information Inc. 2000 
Increased sales Barber et al 1999 
Decreased employee turnover Cohen 1991 
Decreased intention to leave Balfour & Wechsler 1996 
Decreased intention to search for 
alternative employment 
Cohen 1993 
Decreased absenteeism Cohen 1993 
Barber et al 1999 
Figure 36: Benefits of Employee Engagement (source: IES, 2003) 
Research indicates that engaged employees demonstrate a number of 
characteristics (figure 37). 
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personal cost better 
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beyond the helps colleagues 
require IS of to perform more 
the job effectively 
Figure 37: Characteristics of Engaged Employees (source: IES, 2003) 
A public sector case study (Robinson et al, 2004, p24) has suggested that 
there are many drivers of engagement, the strongest of which is a sense of 
feeling valued and involved. This breaks down into a number of pre-requisites 
to employee engagement, as shown in figure 38. Engagement is multi- 
dimensional (Robinson et al, 2004, p 30), where no one factor guarantees or 
precludes engagement. Two elements were added to the IES model to reflect 
the. Transport for London environment. The final element (vix) does not 
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appear in the IES report, but is particularly pertinent to an environment in 
which IR is central. (x) was included in the TfL model because of the 
perceived link between engagement and identification with the organisation. 
(i) Good quality line management 
(ii) Two-way communication 
(iii) Effective internal co-operation 
(iv) A development focus 
(v) Commitment to employee well-being 
(vi) Clear, accessible HR policies and practice, to which managers at all levels are 
committed 
(vii) Fairness in relation to pay and benefits 
(viii) A harmonious working environment 
(vix) Co-operative relationships between the organisation and employee 
representatives 
x Creation of an organisation with which employees can identify 
Figure 38: Activities Driving Employee Engagement (source: IES, 2004, with additions by TIL, Barrett, 2004a) 
Employee engagement, hence, may be regarded as an extended version of 
employee voice, covering all elements of the employee relationship, but with 
communication and consultation as its focal points. 
1.3.2.2.5.3. Non-Unionism, Anti-Unionism and De-Recognition 
A review of these three topics, beyond the discussions already provided in the 
sections on the American IR model, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
It is, however, pertinent to make a number of points. Non-unionism is not a 
unitary phenomenon, but shows a number of variants. In its most positive 
incarnation, it is supported by union substitution and HCM practices which 
negate the perceived need of employees to seek union membership. At its 
most negative, it is Sisson's "Bleak House", (Sisson, 1993, p207) where 
employees have neither high quality HR practices nor the protection of a trade 
union. 
Anti-unionism has been discussed in the section on the American IR model, 
but the UK's protection for trade unions and statutory recognition mechanisms 
suggest that anti-unionism will be demonstrated in a less overt way in the UK, 
perhaps better described as union avoidance by substitution. 
Union avoidance has been categorised into 2 strategies (Beaumont, 1987; 
Blyton & Turnbull, 1998): substitution (providing benefits to reduce the 
likelihood of an employee joining a union) or suppression (the imposition of 
costs on workers for joining trade unions, typified by the US strategy of paying 
higher wages in non-union 'shops'). This has been regarded as an over- 
simplification (Dundon, 2002, p236), however, and was developed into a5 
step schema for union avoidance by Roy (1980), unsurprisingly a US study, 
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which was extended to 7 steps and applied to the UK by Gall (2004). It also 
appears that opposition to union recognition campaigns is increasing in the 
UK, with both use of both suppressionist and substitutionist tactics (Heery & 
Simms, 2003, p5), supported by Gall's recent review (2004). Gall refers to 
this as "counter-mobilization" by employers (Gall, 2003a, p79), and (although 
admitting that these behaviours are less common in the UK than in the US) 
claims that a variety of tactics, both illegal (Gall claims that, in the "time 
honoured tradition" (Gall, 2003a, p93) the victimisation of activists, including 
sackings and harassment, takes place) and legal (such as establishment of 
non-union workplace forums and employee voice mechanisms), are being 
used to promote a union-free workplace. 
This suppressionist-substitutionist approach to anti-unionism is not without its 
problems (Dundon, 2002, p267); for instance, it assumes free choice on the 
part of managers, is of dubious predictive value, it is static rather than 
dynamic in nature, and, perhaps most problematically, has been hi-jacked by 
left wing writers such as Gall to make a political point. This aside, it does 
potentially offers a richer understanding of anti-union behaviours. 
De-recognition is an under-researched phenomenon 33, perhaps because it is 
relatively rare. Gall & McKay's review, the most comprehensive attempt to 
review the topic, concludes in 1998 with a finding that the rate of de- 
recognition is falling, after increasing in the early 90s (Gall, 2004, p38; Gall & 
McKay, 1999) , but there 
is no academic literature which brings the topic up to 
date. 
"A ProQuest search revealed only 17 references, the most recent of which was 2001. 
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1.3.2.2.6. Partnership , 
1.3.2.2.6.1. Introduction to Partnership 
The last 20 years in the UK have seen a significant decline in the trade 
unions' traditional power base (Edwards, 2003, p31) in national collective 
bargaining and industrial action, coupled with enhanced employment 
protection in law (and the concomitant devaluing of the trade unions' role in 
protecting employees' rights). Globalisation, the emergence of "social 
partnership" models34, the introduction of HRM and contemporary programmes 
such as Blair's "Third Way" (IPA, 2004a) have furthered the decline in trade 
union membership. 
This has led many trade unions and many organisations to look at alternatives 
to traditional industrial relations model of national collective bargaining and 
conflictual relations. 
Partnership potentially promises a radically new approach to industrial 
relations: 
"As a rhetoric it is very powerful, implying a markedly new role 
and new relationship for trade unions both with employers and 
with union members, potential and actual. " (Boxall & Purcell, 
2003, p173) 
This purported to have advantages to trade unions as well as employers: 
"... [the social partnership model] appears to offer unions a 
central place ... this prepares them to become joint architects of British partnership ... social partnership appears as a more 
proactive policy with an expansive vision of the part unions 
" For an early attempt to define this term, see Ackers & Payne, 1998. 
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might play in British and European society. " (Ackers & Payne, 
1998, p530/1) 
Partnership is not, however, without its critics, one of the most vocal being 
John Kelly (1996), who saw partnership as weakening the unions' ability to 
oppose employers. 
However, the promise and the threats of this concept seems unfulfilled: there 
is little evidence that partnership agreements have achieved a wholesale 
transformation of British industrial relations, but neither have they resulted in 
union emasculation. Why has partnership failed to deliver the benefits 
promised by the concept? 
There are a number of possible reasons. Partnership resembles SHRM in 
that it suffers from a similar lack of agreement on the definition of the term and 
the content of the partnership construct. It also lacks empirical evidence as to 
the benefits it accrues to participants. 
From an academic perspective, work to date on partnership lacks empirical 
verification: 
"Despite ... widespread approval of the idea (of partnership), 
very few genuine examples have been identified. " (Dietz, 2004, 
p5) 
And theoretical robustness is also absent. Work on partnership to date: 
"... leave(s) uncertain the precise content of partnership and the 
practices that must be put in place for an organisation to be 
described as a partnership organisation. " (Guest & Peccei, 
2001, p211) 
Research is also limited on the final question of the existence or otherwise of 
a link between partnership and valued outcomes for the participants. 
This leaves us with four issues to consider: 
" the search for a definition of partnership; 
" the content of partnership; 
" the enactment of partnership in organisations; 
" the existence or otherwise of a link between partnership 
and valued outcomes for the participants. 
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1.3.2.2.6.2. The Four Issues of the Partnership Literature 
i) Definitions of Partnership 
One of the major reasons for this lack of robustness is the lack of an agreed 
definition of partnership; as Ackers & Payne (1998, p530) indicate, 
"partnership combines seductive rhetoric with ambiguous and shifting 
meaning". 
Partnership has been promoted by a diverse range of proponents, including 
the Government and government bodies, trade unions and trade union bodies 
and employer and professional associations. 
The Labour Government (Fairness At Work, DTI, 1998) set up the Partnership 
Fund to suppose a variety of partnership initiatives, and has argued that 
partnership was a major purpose of the Employment Relations Act, 1999. 
The TUC assumed that partnership is an inherently more productive model of 
industrial relations for both organisations and employees (TUC, 1998). The 
TUC takes the pluralist definition of the IPA (the Involvement and Participation 
Association), endorsing the view that employers and employers have 
legitimate but separate interests and perspectives, but that these may be 
managed to avoid overt conflict (IPA, 2004b). 
The largest trade unions (including Unison, TGWU, GMB, Amicus and Usdaw) 
have all participated in partnership initiatives within organisations. ACAS, the 
Industrial Society, the Fabian Society and the Royal Society of Arts have all 
lent their support to the concept (Dietz, 2004, p5).. 
There are, however, a number of rather more qualified views of the 
partnership concept. The CBI and the CIPD have taken a more unitarist view 
to partnership, and their endorsement has been considerably more cautious. 
As can be seen, even given the brevity of the above review, there is a division 
in the literature between unitarian and pluralistic conceptualisations of 
partnership. This led Guest & Peccei (2001) to propose a taxonomy of 
partnership definitions, based around pluralistic, unitarian and hybrid models. 
This is summarised in figure 39. 
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Approach Pluralist Unitarian Hybrid 
Description Representative Three variants: unitarian model Hybrid mutual gains 
partnership built supported by financial stake, model takes pluralist 
around legislation direct participation or psychic assumptions 
and grounded in stake in the organisation (representative 
the pluralist systems) combined 
tradition with direct 
involvement 
View on Acknowledges Explicitly tries to reconcile, Acknowledges 
capital differences whilst simultaneously differences, but tries 
versus maximising involvement and to reconcile where 
labour commitment common ground 
interests exists 
Method Representative Number of variants: Normally requires a 
systems Financial stake (financial formal joint 
emphasised incentives and shared governance system. 
(employee ownership) 
representatives or Direct participation and Example is mutual 
trade union involvement of employees in gains model (Kochan 
representatives) day to day activities (but & Osterman, 1994), 
over direct typically only if increased where employees 
employee productivity results and (direct and through 
participation typically limited to job and not representatives) work 
(although latter not wider employment with management 
explicitly excluded). opportunities) towards shared 
benefits (e. g. job 
Supported by Psychic stake in the security) 
legislation (most, organisation (HCM type 
evolved model is approach designed to 
German co- maximise individual- 
determination organisation links and 
model) generate high satisfaction, 
commitment and loyalty) 
Figure 39: Guest & Peccei's Taxonomy of Definitions of Partnership 
ii) The Content of Partnership 
Dietz attempt to define the content of partnership, although problematically 
only considered the topic from two of the most pluralistic of bodies: the TUC 
and the IPA. Dietz reconciled the two organisations' models (the major 
difference between these being, unsurprisingly, that the latter model allowed 
for non-union forms of participation, whereas the former did not), reproduced 
below in figure 40. 
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Partnership Element IPA TUC 
A joint declaration of commitment to organisational success Y Y 
Mutual recognition of the legitimate role and interests of 
management, employees and trade unions where present 
Y Y 
Commitment and effort to develop and sustain trust between the 
organisation's constituencies 
Y 
Means for sharing information (IPA)/Transparency (TUC) Y Y 
Consultation and employee involvement, with representative 
arrangements for an independent employee voice" 
(IPA)/Transparency (TUC) 
Y Y 
Policies to balance flexibility with employment security (IPA/TUC) Y Y 
Sharing organisational success (IPA) Y 
Adding value (TUC) Y 
Improving the quality of working life (TUC) Y 
* Implied in the text but not an explicit part of the model 
Figure 40: The Content of Partnership (from Dietz, 2004, p8) 
Guest & Peccei (2001) created a slightly different model, analysing 4 
principles of partnership, as shown in figure 41. 
1 Good treatment of employees now and in the future 
2 Empowerment: creating the opportunity for employee contribution 
3 Employee rights and benefits 
4 Employee responsibilities 
Figure 41: 4 Principles of Partnership (from Guest & Peccei, 2001) 
Assessing these principles via a questionnaire sent to management and 
employee representatives, Guest & Peccei found that these items were likely 
to be rated higher in companies which reported high progress towards 
partnership, although interestingly there were differences between the scoring 
of the management and staff representatives, suggesting the latter may be 
less sure of the benefits of a partnership approach. 
iii) The Enactment of Partnership in Organisations 
This brings us to the third of the four questions posed by the partnership 
literature: is there a consistency in the practices that must be put in place for 
an organisation to be described as a partnership organisation? 
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Guest & Peccei again provide a detailed examination of this, creating 8 
classes of partnership practice which they assessed against the organisation's 
progress towards partnership. These are shown in figure 42. 
1 Direct participation by employees in decisions about their work 
2 Direct participation by employees in decisions about personal employment issues 
3 Participation by employee representatives in decisions about employment issues 
4 Participation by employee representatives in decisions about broader organizational 
policy issues 
5 Flexible job design and focus on quality 
6 Performance management 
7 Employee share ownership 
8 Communication, harmonization and employee security 
Figure 42: 8 Classes of Partnership Practice (from Guest & Peccei, 2001) 
This is a useful 'checklist' of partnership practices, although it combines 
elements of the unitarian and pluralistic models, and is not generalisable to 
the public sector due to its inclusion of share ownership. 
iv) Partnership and Valued Outcomes 
The last of the four questions posed by the partnership literature is the 
existence or otherwise of a link between partnership and valued outcomes for 
the participants. 
Evidence in this area is conflicting. Dietz (2004) found that evidence that 
there were benefits to managers, employees and trade unions in his case 
studies of three organisations who fulfilled the IPA's definition of partnership, 
although he based his explanation of this in the success of individual and 
informal relationships ("trust") rather than formal policies and procedures. 
Guest & Peccei likewise claim benefits for all participants, linking a subset of 
their partnership practices to more positive employee attitudes and 
behaviours, thence to more positive employee relations, thence to higher 
productivity, thence to more positive sales and performance. They do, 
however, emphasise that the relatively small number of respondents would 
require their conclusions to be validated. 
One may, however, surmise that the positive view of partnership, promulgated 
by the organisations listed above, is likely to conceal the likelihood of 
imbalance in the advantage accruing to the participants. Guest & Peccei 
themselves identify a significant difference in the responses of managerial and 
staff representatives, and make the point that: 
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"... mutuality lies at the core of the concept of partnership; yet 
the results ... suggest that the mutuality may be somewhat 
unbalanced .... management would appear to be gaining more from the practice of partnership. " (Guest & Peccei, 2001, p231) 
This is echoed by Martinez Lucio & Stuart (2002), who conducted a 
quantitative study in 2002 on the impact of partnership on a group of MSF 
representatives. Whilst finding some cautious acceptance of the concepts of 
partnership, they found little evidence that partnership was producing valued 
outcomes for the unionists, failing to meet the TUC's "acid test" of partnership 
(greater job security, transparency, involvement and quality of working life). 
v) Summary: Reasons For The Differing Perspectives On Partnership 
There are two possible reasons advanced for this imbalance in mutuality: 
firstly, partnership has been adopted by trade unions as an enforced reaction 
to their changing environment (hence in a time of weakness) and, secondly, 
the impetus for a partnership is surmised to rest with management. 
To look at the first possible explanation, the decline in trade unionism has led 
many trade unions to the recognition that developing an alternative to their 
traditional adversarial role was necessary to their ongoing survival: 
"... with the collapse of unions' traditional roles in many, but not 
all sectors, they are left with a difficult choice of being 
marginalised and continuing to lose members, or of seeking new 
forms of relationship based on cooperation and joint problem- 
solving. " (Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p177) 
In other words, much of the literature sees partnership as a response forced 
upon trade unions by their changing/shrinking marketplace and diminishing 
power. 
To move to the second possibility, it has been claimed that the impetus for 
partnership working will always rest with the organisation rather than the trade 
unions; organisations need to give permission for partnership to work. 
"... this pre-supposes that management is willing to accept a 
joint philosophy and work to make it meaningful ... It is 
management who are the prime initiators here since they 
determine the fundamental approach. Unions are inevitably 
reactive to the style of management. It is extremely difficult for 
them to be proactive and to create a climate of 'partnership'. " 
(Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p 177) 
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Although this may be something of an overstatement, it does hint at the power 
imbalance implicit in trade union-management relations. A consequence of 
the partnership literature has been a lack of focus on workplace conflict (Gall, 
2004, p36): development of an industrial relations model which rebalances 
this is appropriate. 
1.3.2.3. Public Sector Industrial Relations 
1.3.2.3.1. Trade Union Membership in the Public Sector 
Arguably the clearest distinction between the public and private sector is 
levels of trade union membership. Whilst declining or static at best in the 
private sector, trade unionism is flourishing in the public sectors in both the 
UK (Brook, 2002) and the USA (Nissen, 2003). 
The 2001 Labour Force Survey (Brook, 2002) indicated that 59% of public 
sector employees were union members, as opposed to 19% of private sector 
employees. 73% of public sector employees were covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, contrasted to 22% in the private sector. Reductions 
in trade union membership have occurred at an equal rate in the public and 
private sectors (which adds some weight to the parallel track theory advanced 
below). 
A key difference between the public and private sectors is the phenomenon of 
managerial membership of trade unions; as Poole et al (1995) point out, the 
majority of public sector managers in 1990 still reported that they believed it 
was necessary to have a trade union to represent their personal interests, 
despite increasing opposition to managerial trade unionism (Maclnnes, 1987; 
Beaumont & Harris, 1992). This phenomenon has shown only limited decline 
and limited convergence with the private sector trend, therefore suggests 
managerial trade unionism may be an enduring feature of the public sector 
environment. 
The higher levels of managerial union members in the public sector may also 
explain Poole et al's (1995, p276) second point: there is considerably less 
hostility towards trade unions in the public sector. 
There is also a division within trade union representation in the public sector. 
Staff associations or trade unions which represent professional groups have 
created a generally moderate environment, but this is by no means universal. 
In the RMT and ASLEF, TfL has two of the most militant trade unions 
operating in the UK today, and the threat to jobs posed by recent government 
prescriptions has resulted in trade unions such as PCS adopting militant 
tactics. The private sector trend for trade unionism to follow a uni-directional 
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transition from adversarial behaviour to collaborative working has been 
replicated in areas of the public sector (e. g. the NHS), but this is by no means 
universal. One could even argue that industrial relations in a number of public 
sector organisations is regressing to a conflict model. 
1.3.2.3.2. The Impact of Public Sector Reform on Industrial Relations 
To understand public sector industrial relations, one must consider the context 
of the political pressure to modernise placed upon the public sector during the 
1980s. This is reviewed elsewhere. This modernisation process 
(privatisation, commercialisation, fragmentation, exposure of the public sector 
to market forces in areas such as competitive tendering and market testing, 
increased managerial autonomy in typical collective bargaining areas such as 
work organisation and pay systems) significantly impacted public sector 
employee relations: 
"Trade unions, although faring much better than most of their 
private sector counterparts, were excluded from national 
policymaking and often faced severe difficulties in safeguarding 
their members' terms and conditions of employment. " (Bach & 
Winchester, 2003, p285) 
This modernisation process was, however, only partially successful when 
Labour succeeded the Conservative Government in 1997, leaving a 
"contradictory legacy" (Bach & Winchester, 2003, p285). 
The Labour Government's approach to this situation was to refuse to reverse 
the modernisation process, but to temper it though the 'best value' initiative 
(which mitigated the prescriptiveness of Compulsory Competitive Tendering) 
and increased public expenditure. A further element of Labour's approach to 
the public sector was an emphasis on partnership working and higher 
emphasis on HRM in areas such as benefits and family friendly working. 
The responses of public sector trade unions to this process have been varied. 
Job losses have provoked a number of previously moderate trade unions (e. g. 
recent protests by PCS over the Department of Work and Pensions 
restructuring, with its concomitant severe job losses) into industrial action, 
whereas the NHS have managed their radical restructuring with a minimum of 
disruption. One can surmise as to the reasons for this difference (Bach, 
2004) (the NHS contains professional groupings such as nurses, and their 
unions present themselves as "professional guilds" and staff associations, 
which are typically apolitical and non-militant; the fragmentation of the NHS 
through the modernisation process made organising difficult, greater 
consultative management in the NHS, less radical restructuring), but one must 
look to the literature to determine the reasons. 
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1.3.2.4. Literature Review: Industrial Relations and SHRM 
As already inferred, industrial relations is a major omission in theories of 
SHRM and HRM, particularly in its positivist/"best practice" orientations, which 
are essentially unitarian and fail to adequately explain industrial relations 
environments. As Boxall indicates: 
"The primary problem is the model's [SHRM] implicit 
unitarianism: it tends to assume that workers will fall into line 
with management's perception of the required behaviours ... The need for compromise with worker rights and interests is 
overlooked. " (Boxall, 1999, p77) 
Why should this omission have occurred? Kamoche concurs with Boxall, but 
proposed an additional reason: 
"Efforts to reconcile ideological differences and achieve some 
kind of consensus ... have not been sufficiently articulated in SHRM, partly because of the manifestly unitarist nature of the 
latter and partly because industrial relations concerns are not 
viewed as particularly relevant to professionals and managers. " 
(Kamoche, 1999, p102) 
An interesting view begins to emerge of the formulation of a definition of 
SHRM as a political process. 
The majority of SHRM work ignores industrial relations and, indeed, largely 
assumes that employees will unquestioningly follow the company line. The 
pluralism of employee relations is largely invisible in SHRM literature and, 
indeed, SHRM is explicitly constructed in a number of articles as the 
"replacement" for or alternative to pluralistic employee relations, as the 
following review by Guest suggests: 
"Given the significant constraints, many UK companies would 
not want to practice human resource management. The 
'professional' personnel management found in many successful 
organizations is one alternative. In many of the more stable 
bureaucratic organizations, policies based on administrative 
efficiency and cost-minimization make sense, while in 
production-driven companies cost-effective support policies may 
be most applicable. " (Guest, 1987, p518) 
The limited SHRM research which does reference industrial relations tends to 
deal with industrial relations in two ways: trade unions are seen as "losers" 
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when HRM initiatives are implemented, or are demonised as barriers to such 
implementation. Both of these are reflected in the following extract: 
"... the adoption of a 'full blown' model of HRM is likely to 
undermine the existence of trade unions because of its 
underlying philosophy of unitarianism and individualism. This, 
however, underestimates the barriers to the implementation of 
HRM policies and practices in settings where employees belong 
to trade unions ... many of the 
American companies that are 
used as exemplars of HRM ... are non-union companies. 
" 
(McGovern, 1999, p143-5) 
Some of the literature, indeed, precludes HRM as an approach for industrial 
relations environments. 
"[HRM's] focus on management activity and policy issues 
accords traditional industrial relations a marginal role at best. As 
such, human resource management becomes a particular 
approach which is distinct from other approaches found in 
organizations where trade unions are powerful. " (Guest, 1987, 
p510) 
Although there is an element of truth to this, and the applicability to a US 
labour relations context is clear, this simplification fails to reflect the 
successful realities of partnership working and shared objectives, in areas 
such as workplace learning and safety, demonstrated in the European co- 
determination model. 
There is also a paucity of research which looks at the trade union response to 
SHRM: exceptions to this are Martinez Lucio & Weston's analysis (1992) of 
the TUC's response to HRM and Fairbrother's longitudinal 1996 study. 
This is a simplification, however: one distinctive thread of research claims that 
HRM is actually more likely to be found in unionised workplaces (e. g. Sisson, 
1993): Storey called this "dualism" (1992), to reflect the phenomenon of trade 
unions which drive transformation, but are not part of the transformation 
process. It must be said, however, that this is not a widely espoused view. 
Particularly given the significance of employee relations and the embedded 
nature of trade unions in the UK public sector, there is a need to develop a 
model of HRM which recognises the pluralistic nature of employee relations. 
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1.3.2.5. Literature Review: Project Specific Review 
Whilst the above provides a general literature review on industrial relations, it 
is relevant to outline here the main theoretical bases for this specific project: 
Darlington's paper on LUL, Batstone's work on power in industrial relations, 
Kelly's definition of militancy and theories of industrial relations conflict. 
The aim of this study will be to review Darlington (as one of the few academic 
papers to study LUL), and to use the other 3 writers to aid interpretation of the 
important industrial relations concepts articulated by the respondents. 
1.3.2.5.1. Darlington 
In his 2001 paper on left wing militancy in London Underground, Darlington 
(Darlington, 2001) contended that four factors drive the continued militancy 
experienced by the organisation. This study examines whether these factors 
are referenced in the discourse of a group of senior managers and trade 
unionists in London Underground, three years after the Darlington study. 
Darlington's case study approach was based on semi-structured interviews 
with union officials, employees and human resource personnel. It does not 
appear that he included any data from the senior management group, who are 
substantively responsible for the development and implementation of 
industrial relations policy and practice. This is particularly problematic, given 
that Boxall & Purcell see management as the only body which can drive the 
transformation of the industrial relations 'tone' in an organization: 
"It is management who are the prime initiators here since they 
determine the fundamental approach. Unions are inevitably 
reactive to the style of management. It is extremely difficult for 
them to be proactive and to create a climate of 'partnership'. " 
(Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p 177) 
This study attempts to provide the view of a group who have a fundamental 
role to play in the setting of the industrial relations climate, but who are 
omitted from Darlington's study. It will also provide an update Darlington's 
work following the merger of London Underground into Transport for London 
and its change of control to the Mayor of London. 
Darlington characterises the LUL environment as follows: 
"The RMT on London Underground, with its left wing leadership, 
seems to typify the image of so-called old-fashioned militant 
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trade unionism which many commentators assumed had long 
ago been abandoned. " (Darlington, 2001, p 5) 
Darlington does, however, recognise that ASLEF, the second of the major 
trade unions in London Underground, take a somewhat different stance: 
°... although there is an informal left-wing grouping ... within ASLEF there has been a fairly conservative Labour tradition on 
the London Underground, albeit with an occasional militant 
industrial edge. "(Darlington, 2001, p 6) 
Darlington fails even to mention TSSA, despite their position as the second 
largest union in LUL. 
Darlington identifies a number of features of the London Underground 
environment which he regards as factors which perpetuate the climate of 
industrial unrest: 
" The schism between the union's leadership and its 
members (this links to a distinctive view of employees). 
" Managerial contribution to industrial unrest. 
" Accounts of factors driving militancy. 
" Conflict between unions. 
Darlington's factors are reviewed below, and discourse on these topics will be 
a major part of the study, the data reviewed in section 6.2. 
i) The Schism Between the Union's Leadership and its Members 
Darlington's paper is focused on an exploration of the role of left wing militant 
workplace activists in the creation of militant collective activity by employees. 
In this, Darlington draws upon mobilization theory, developed by writers such 
as Tilly, McAdam and Kelly (reviewed in chapter 3). 
Implicit in the concept of mobilization theory (and indeed the radial 
perspective on trade unionism per se) is that trade unions leaders and 
members may not share a common view of the 'proper' role of trade unions 
(i. e. one would expect, as a generalization, union leadership to have greater 
political motivation, and workers to have greater focus on obtaining workplace 
concessions). As discussed in chapter 3, mobilization theory indicates that, 
even where the view is common, leaders have a role to play in creating a 
collective consciousness from a sense of individual injustice. Leaders have a 
need to `collectivise' employees in order to utilise them, whether the goal is 
political or workplace based. 
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Darlington's paper picks up on this concept of a potential schism between the 
union's leadership and its members. He quotes a Victoria line activist who 
discuses the difference between the union leadership and the membership: 
"You have an RMT leadership that desperately wants to fight 
and wants to try to galvanise the membership to fight the kind of 
political struggle that is needed. But they have a membership 
that is a lot less sure. The leadership are well to the left of the 
membership and the membership are not convinced of having a 
political strike. They make rational decisions about 'Am I going 
to get something back for all the money I'm losing'. " (Quoted by 
Darlington, 2001, p 14) 
This is linked to Gall (2000), who drew a distinction between union (the 
organisation as an entity) and labour militancy (workplace behaviour and 
activity). 
This leads Darlington to express a view on employees: despite the schism he 
notes between the leadership and the membership, he views employees as 
not unquestioningly militant. This supports his claim that left wing union 
activists are critical in motivating employees to take collective action: 
"... workers did not just respond automatically to environmental 
opportunities (and limitations). On the contrary, the role of 
leadership in focusing workers' varied grievances upon common 
objectives to ensure united action was also of central 
importance. " (Darlington, 2001, p 16) 
This view of employees, as passive until motivated by the union, will also be 
explored in this study. 
ii) Managerial Contribution to Industrial Unrest 
Darlington is categoric in his attribution of blame for the continued conflict to 
the London Underground management: 
°... this militancy has not merely been a reflection of the 
preferences of the union's left wing leadership ... 
London 
Underground management's general industrial relations 
belligerence (particularly towards the RMT) ... acted to sustain 
such militancy and create conditions in which there has been 
little basis for the type of 'social partnership' advocated by many 
commentators. " (Darlington, 2001, p 15) 
141 
"Kelly (1996) seems justified in arguing that militant trade 
unionism is ultimately sustained by the hostility of employers to 
independent trade unionism. "(Darlington, 2001, p 18) 
As managers would be expected to produce a rather different view of events, 
this will be a topic of considerable interest in the current study. 
iii) Accounts of Factors Driving Militancy 
Darlington attributes blame to London Underground management, but also 
references a number of other factors driving militancy: privatisation, monopoly 
position and the composition of the militant unions' membership. 
The first factor Darlington suggests is privatisation and the resulting threat to 
jobs and conditions: 
"... the impending threat posed to jobs and conditions by 
privatisation ... acted to sustain ... militancy. " (Darlington, 2001, 
p 16) 
The potential for privatisation to weaken the strength of the trade unions is 
also referenced: 
"Even if ... militant trade unionism on the London Underground has been relatively successful in the past, it may prove much 
more difficult in the future within a potentially more hostile and 
part privatised environment. " (Darlington, 2001, p 18) 
Conversely, however, Darlington also indicates that the presence of a 
monopoly situation, which reduces the pressure on jobs, is a driver for 
militancy: 
"... the monopoly public service context in which Underground 
passenger demand and services have continued to grow rapidly 
and where the hard-faced realities of viability and compulsory 
redundancy common to many other industries have been felt 
less acutely, has encouraged workers' self-confidence and 
provided favourable opportunity structures for collective action. " 
(Darlington, 2001, p 16) 
The final factor Darlington draws out is the RMT's different membership 
composition: 
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"The RMT's broader based union membership and weaker 
bargaining position compared to ASLEF also needs to be taken 
into account in explaining why they have engaged in strike 
action so frequently. "(Darlington, 2001, p 16) 
iv) Conflict Between Unions 
This leads to Darlington's final point: conflict between RMT and ASLEF. The 
fundamental difference between the politically motivated RMT with its more 
general membership (e. g. station staff, ticket office staff, some train drivers, 
signalers), and the professional 'craft' union of ASLEF (train drivers only) is 
exacerbated by differences in the policies of the leadership: 
"ASLEF leadership has traditionally taken a much less 
confrontational stance than the RMT, and refused on a number 
of occasions during the 1990s to support industrial action 
mounted by the RMT ... such differences have been 
compounded by the history of different and sometimes very 
acrimonious relationship between the two unions. " (Darlington, 
2001, p6) 
1.3.2.5.2. Batstone's Determinants of Trade Union Power 
Batstone (1978) saw that there were 4 sources of trade union power: 
substitutability, criticality, immediacy and the impact on uncertainty. 
He defined these 4 types of power as follows: 
" SUBSTITUTABILITY: skills which are difficult to substitute, which may 
be determined by the scarcity of the skills (Clegg, 1970) or the 
acceptability of substitutes to the remaining workers; 
" CRITICALITY: occupancy of a critical position in the production 
process (Sayles, 1958), although power derived from this may be 
weakened if a number of other groups can also disrupt it (Batstone's 
example is assembly workers, or an area in which the managers 
choose to incite that area to strike); 
" IMMEDIACY: the immediacy with which workers can disrupt the 
company (Sayles, 1958; Clegg, 1970) - workers may take steps to 
increase the immediacy of the impact of strike action by, for instance, 
reducing output over proceeding weeks so reducing stock piles, 
managers may take the converse action; 
" UNCERTAINTY: the creation of uncertainty or the coping with 
uncertainty in a process (Crozier, 1964); workers who break of rules or 
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follow informal practices (e. g. maintenance crews using 'short cuts') 
may create or help manage uncertainty. 
This study will look at whether elements of Batstone's model are used by 
managers in LUL to explain trade union dynamics. 
1.3.2.5.3. Kelly's Definition of `Militancy' 
This paper will take as a reference point Kelly's (1996) definitions of 'militant' 
and 'moderate'. Kelly defines militancy as preparedness to take industrial 
action, having an ideology of conflicting interests and a reliance on the ability 
to mobilise members. As indicated in the literature review, a number of 
authors have written on militancy, but Kelly's model is arguably the most 
comprehensive. 
As discussed in the literature review, Kelly divided militancy into its 
component parts, building a multi-dimensional model of militancy, shown in 
figure 43. 
I COMPONENT 
L 
MILITANCY MODERATION 
MOST Ambitious demands (scale Moderate demands with some 
EXPEDIENT GOALS and scope) with few or many concessions 
concessions (Accommodation) 
CO xCL 
W 
WZ 
pw 
w> 
O 
Uc 
rw 
wp 
MOST 
DURABLE 
MEMBERSHIP Strong reliance on Strong reliance on employers, 
RESOURCES mobilisation of union third parties or law 
membership (Demobilisation) 
I 
INSTITUTIONAL Reliance on collective Willingness to experiment 
RESOURCES bargaining and/or unilateral with/support non-bargaining 
regulation Institutions (Subordination) 
METHODS Frequent threat or use of Infrequent threat or use of industrial action industrial action (Quiescence) 
IDEOLOGY Ideology of conflicting Ideology of partnership interests (Incorporation) 
Figure 43: Kelly's Model of Militancy 
It is, however, important to note that these terms require deconstruction, and a 
significant part of this project will be the analysis of the use of these terms by 
the industrial relations actors in London Underground. 
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1.3.2.5.4. Theories of Industrial Relations Conflict 
Theories of industrial relations conflict can be grouped according to the Fox 
taxonomy discussed in chapter 3. The unitarian, pluralist and radical 
perspectives have different constructions of industrial relations conflict, which 
will be useful to relate to the discourse of the various participants. These are 
detailed in chapter 3, but are summarized below. 
At one extreme, the unitarian perspective presents conflict as irrational and 
dysfunctional. The supremacy of the role of the entrepreneur and the 
managerial prerogative to which it gives rise depicts the only legitimate 
authority structure in the organisation being that of the management. The 
unitarian perspective, hence, constructs conflict as illegitimate as it potentially 
endangers the interests of the organisation and the workers who depend upon 
it. 
At the opposite pole, the radical perspective sees conflict as an inevitable 
consequence of fundamental social inequities and a necessary precursor to 
societal change: conflict, hence, is an integral and vital component of the 
trade union role. 
Between unitarianism and radicalism lies the pluralist perspective. As Fox's 
taxonomy indicates, the pluralist perspective can take a variety of 
conceptualisations, from co-operation to conflict. 
The pluralist perspective sees that conflicts of interest inevitably exist, but that 
compromise is possible and desirable. This view is picked up by Batstone 
(1977), who presents conflict as the exception rather than the norm. He sees 
day to day trade union activities as assuming "an essentially accommodative 
hue" (Batstone, 1977, p 11), given that even a strong union operates within a 
"web of rules (which) recognizes and reinforces the position and certain goals 
of management"(Batstone, 1977, p 12). 
These views of conflict are mirrored in the discourse analysed in this 
framework, and will be discussed in the appropriate results section. 
1.3.2.6. Literature Review: Change Management, HR and the British 
Public Sector 
As indicated in the introduction, this section will not attempt to review the 
extensive literature on change management, as most of this pursues a 
positivist and managerialist model of change: 
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"... much of the established vocabulary of change is embedded 
in assumptions associated with a top-down, managerialist 
approach to change, which relies on a rational, hierarchical 
paradigm of organisation ... within a context which remains 
stable and resistant to change. " (Butcher & Atkinson, 2001, 
p555) 
Exceptionally, however, conventional texts on change management may 
usefully provide a descriptive, if not an analytical, framework. One such text 
takes "best fit" as the underpinning theory of SHRM, and building upon the 
work of Johnson & Scholes (1993), Balogun & Hope Halley (2004) develop a 
context specific model of change, which considers "non-rational" features of 
the organisational environment (e. g. power and readiness) as well as rational 
(e. g. capacity, capability, scope, time) in their "change kaleidoscope" (Balogun 
& Hope-Hailey, 2004, p14). 
This review will, however, concentrate primarily on the small literatures on 
change management and HR (section 4.1), change management and SHRM 
(section 4.2) and change management, SHRM and the public sector (section 
4.3). As these literatures are small, however, the section will begin with a 
more general review of the change management literature in relation to HR. 
1.3.2.6.1. Change Management and HR 
Despite the increasing linkage of the two topics in practitioner literature (a 
scan through the CIPD's 2004 index includes articles such as "A Change as 
Good as the Rest" "Signs of Change", "How to Manage Organisational 
Change", CIPD, 2004, p 48), there is a surprising paucity of scholarly literature 
linking the two topics, as figure 44 shows. 
Human 
resources or HR 
N 
00 Ü 
Change 
management 
Figure 44: Literature Review - Change Management and Human Resources 
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Of the 78 articles produced, only 27 remain after the application of the usual 
exclusion criteria,,. Of these, a number focus on leadership and were also 
excluded. Because of the limited success of the search, a different strategy 
was used, i. e. a Proquest topic search (HRM and organisational change 
yielded 792 results, although selection of scholarly articles only reduced this 
to 360). Reviews were also conducted of two of the major journals in this 
area, Journal of Organisational Change Management and Journal of Change 
Management to provide an additional perspective. 
1.3.2.6.2. Change Management and SHRM 
Given the extensive literature on both SHRM and change management, it 
seems curious that few authors have explicitly considered the potential for 
organisational transformation inherent in SHRM. From an original literature 
search producing 36 articles, only 4 remained after the application of 
exclusion criteria: a review of HR's historical approaches to change 
management (Ogilvie & Stork, 2002), a study of organisational subcultures 
and their role in enabling or constraining HR strategy (Palthe & Kossek, 2002) 
and a study of change and HRM in the voluntary sector (Kellock Hay, Beattie, 
Livingstone & Munro, 2001). The final article (Francis, 2002) takes a very 
different tack and takes a social constructivist approach to change, which will 
be discussed in section 4.2.2. 
Rather than discuss these 3 unexceptional articles, it is perhaps more 
interesting to surmise why a more considerable literature does not link these 
two topics. One possible explanation is that far more linkages are made at 
the practitioner level than in academic circles, and that there is a lack of cross- 
over between academic and non-academic writing. However, a second, 
perhaps more interesting explanation, rests with the positivist constructions of 
SHRM discussed earlier. 
" Not about HR, concerned only with a specific area (e. g. teleworking, IIP, diversity or patents), focused on a non-UK 
geography or non-relevant industry, leaders/book reviews, published before 1990. 
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1.3.2.6.2.1. Positivist Approaches to SHRM and Change Management 
If one considers HRM from a positivist epistemology76, HRM as a driver for 
change is relatively processual. However, this may be over-simplistic, as 
Francis & Sinclair point out: 
"... the conceptualization of change processes concerned with 
the deployment of HRM strategies typically ignores or plays 
down the complexity and significance of conflicting values and 
interests at the workplace. " (Francis & Sinclair, 2003, p686) 
This literature review, hence, will concentrate on the limited literature which 
adopts a social constructivist methodology. 
1.3.2.6.2.2. Social Constructivist Approaches to SHRM and Change 
Management 
As Francis (2003) points out, approaches to change and change management 
are largely positivist in orientation (Francis, 2003, p 309). She does, however, 
suggest an alternative: the interpretation of change management through the 
lenses of a social constructivist epistemology and a discourse analysis 
methodology. A number of articles begin to define this alternative approach: 
Ford & Ford (1995), Ford (1999), Butcher & Atkinson (2001), Francis (2002, 
2003), and Francis & Sinclair (2003). 
This approach links the social constructivist approach (which proposes that 
people construct their social reality and are constructed by that reality) with 
the functional and variable view of language articulated by discourse analysis. 
This model assumes that language has a fundamental role to play in the 
change of attitudes and behaviours: 
As typified by writers such as Delaney & Huselid, 1996, Patterson et al, 1997 and Guest 1997,2001. 
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"... any fundamental shift in organizational routines and 
behaviours must be rooted in a shift in the orders of discourse 
and attempts at political influence to inform conversations for 
change. " (Francis, 2003, p323) 
Change, this model argues, can only occur within language: 
"Change as an organizational phenomenon necessarily occurs 
in a context of human social interactions, which constitute and 
are constituted by communication ... These interaction produce 
and reproduce the social structures and actions people know as 
reality ... From this perspective, change 
is a recursive process 
of social construction in which new realities are created ... 
sustained, and modified in the process of communication. 
Producing intentional change, then, is a matter of deliberately 
bringing into existence, through communication, a new reality or 
set of social structures. " 
Using these concepts to inform a theory of change, the role of the change 
agent becomes the re-presentation of an alternative social reality to those 
affected by the change: 
"In this context, the job of change leaders is to bring into 
existence a new 'conversational reality' that frames the context 
within which subordinates develop new interpretive frames and 
behaviours in the workplace. " (Francis, 2003, p311) 
Ford described this phenomenon as "shifting conversations" (Ford, 1999), and 
developed a change management model which was based on the concept of 
using 4 "conversations" to drive change: initiative, understanding, 
performance and closure. This is summarized in figure 45. 
Initiative conversations Signal the beginning of change and rely on 
assertions, directives, promises, and 
declarations to focus attention on what could 
or should be done. 
Conversations for understanding Characterised by assertions and 
'expressives' (the latter are expressions of an 
affective state such as apology or desire). 
Used to determine cause-effect relationships, 
which provide an opportunity to examine 
assumptions (and implications) that underlie 
thinking, develop a common language among 
change participants and create a shared 
context in which people learn to talk to each 
other. 
149 
Conversations for performance (getting into Combinations of requests and promises 
action) spoken that focus on generating action and 
intended results (expressives or assertions 
are considered 'noise' at this stage). 
Performance conversations are necessary for 
co-ordinated action, required to move the 
change forward. 
Conversations for closure (completing the Characterised by assertions, expressives and 
change) declarations to bring about an end to the 
change process, these involve summaries, 
justifications for termination, expressions of 
positive sentiments, and discussions of 
continuity in which things are related to a 
larger context that is not ending. 
Figure 45: Ford & Ford's Four Conversations of Change (adapted from Francis, 2003, p 313) 
This model is useful in that it can be used to study both the initiation and 
management of "intentional" (Ford & Ford, 1995, p541) change as well as 
adjustment and accommodation to "unintentional" change (also discussed in 
terms of "bottom up" or "eruptive" models of change, Finstad, 1998) resulting 
from the action of external events and/or wider social changes (there are links 
here to processes which purport to allow people to progress more quickly 
through the change curve, e. g. coaching and counselling interventions). 
The role of HRM in such 'managed' change is the topic of interest for Francis 
(2003), and her study supports a valuable role for HRM in supporting 
'proactive' change, particularly in the first two 'conversations' described 
above: 
"... the discourse of HRM may be used to actively manage 
'conversations' according to their (managers') own particular 
orientations, interests, and organizational context. " (Francis, 
2003, p 324) 
However, it is important to note the argument made by Kennoy (1999) at this 
point: given a social constructivist perspective, HRM becomes one of a 
number of possible discourses, and is subject to the same processes of 
power, negotiation and competing "conversations" as any other discourse: 
"This article ... (reveals) the socially contested nature of HRM- based change and the essentially fluid nature of the discourse 
that surround such programmes. " (Francis & Sinclair, 2003, 
p692) 
In other words, HRM has the potential to create change, but the social 
constructivist perspective more richly conceptualizes HRM as a one of a 
number of competing discourses struggling for pre-eminence, rather than the 
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positivist approach which regards HRM as a singular, measurable 
phenomenon. 
This raises a further interesting point about this approach to change: it can 
accommodate the action of power dynamics: 
"... meanings and positions created by change leaders through 
alterations in language use are always open to re-articulation as 
organizational participants struggle to complete for power and 
status. " (Francis, 2003, p311) 
as well as negotiation and conflict: 
" ... the processes by which organizational members generate 
shared meaning are always in process of negotiation and/or 
conflict. " (Francis, 2003, p312) 
Ford & Ford take this argument further, seeing change as a process through 
which power is claimed, disputed and displayed: 
"Change is sometimes seen as a mechanism for the acquisition 
and use of power intended to bring about an alteration in the 
status of participants ... Under these conditions, communication is not considered neutral: it is something that can be 
manipulated by actors in the pursuit of their own self-interests. " 
(Ford & Ford, 1995, p568) 
Language is, however, a volatile resource; actors may "manipulate" language, 
but cannot predictably manage the outcome: 
"Although managers can appropriate these (HRM concepts such 
as empowerment and team working), they cannot fully control 
the ways in which others will interpret and act upon them ... 
case-study accounts ... reflect a constant struggle for meaning 
amongst participants. " (Francis & Sinclair, 2003, p687) 
This links neatly to Fairclough's (1992,1995) concept of "hegemonic 
struggle", described by Francis & Sinclair as follows: 
"Fairclough argues that discursive practices create and 
challenge existing power relations and become facets of 
'hegemonic struggle' in which dominant groups seek to achieve 
hegemony over the meanings and minds of others. " (Francis & 
Sinclair, 2003, p687) 
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As well as this competition for control of "conversations", this model can see 
change as embedded in a wider social and political context, as noted by 
Francis & Sinclair (2003) in their case study of 2 manufacturing companies. 
To summarise, one can see how this model of change enacted in language 
can provide a rich, multi-dimensional view of change and resistance to change 
in organisations, and this approach will be used throughout the projects. 
1.3.2.6.3. Change Management and the UK Public Sector 
The modernisation/commercialisation of the public sector has produced a 
range of literature looking at change in the UK public sector, and a selective 
review is contained below. 
McHugh et al's 1999 paper discusses the inadequacies of a top down 
approach to change. She and her colleagues both recognise the difficulties of 
initiating change in a public sector environment: 
"It is acknowledged that changing public sector organizations is 
a mammoth task, which is made even more difficult by the long 
term stability and the deeply-embedded culture which exists as a 
relic of the past within the public sector generally (Brooks and 
Bate, 1994). " (McHugh, 1999, p66) 
Whilst also seeing the imperative for change: 
"... ignoring the task of change is likely to lead to a situation 
whereby public sector organizations may assume the 
characteristics of seriously maladaptive bureaucracies amortized 
in "self-reinforcing equilibrium" (Crozier, 1964). " (McHugh, 1999, 
p66) 
McHugh et al (1999) point out the inadequacies of a top down approach in 
somewhat pejorative language: 
"... managers are generally fearful of such workplace democracy 
and avoid sharing decision making with employees ... This is 
particularly evident in bureaucratic cultures characteristic of 
public sector organizations where Kanter (1997) argues, 
powerlessness turns the powerless into controlling petty tyrants 
who guard their own small patch of turf, rather than seeking to 
focus on the pressing demands being made upon the 
organization. " (McHugh et al, 1999, p557) 
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McHugh et al continue to itemise the difficulties with public sector change 
management: 
"Quite apart from the top-down nature of many organizational 
change programmes, the approach adopted by public sector 
organizations to the management of change is frequently 
reflective of an adherence to the values of scientific 
management and Taylorism (Taylor, 1947). When looking at 
change management there is a tendency to view the task in 
terms of its component parts, a legacy of FW Taylor. " (McHugh 
et al, 1999, p559) 
Finally concluding that the issue is disenfranchisement of those most 
fundamentally affected by the change: 
"In accordance with their underlying culture they frequently chart 
a logical and rational programme aimed at achieving desired 
results in the short term. In many cases, these strategies are 
formulated by a small team of senior managers, more or less in 
isolation from those whose support and commitment are vital 
ingredients for implementation, representing a top down 
approach to change management ... such an approach to 
change management is essentially short-sighted and limited. 
This is due to the fact that the implementation of this logical and 
rational programme over a longer time frame requires the 
continuous commitment of highly-skilled and satisfied 
employees. These employees must be sufficiently empowered 
by managers who are themselves innovative, and seek to foster 
innovation in others. " (McHugh, 1999, p69) 
McHugh at al's argument is that change which "commences at the periphery 
and is led by relatively junior front line staff, with senior management 
practitioners acting as facilitators of organizational transformation" (McHugh et 
al, 1999, p556) is far more likely to be successful than top down change 
imposed by distant managers. 
Despite its somewhat polemical tone, this is a useful article, linking the 
bureaucratic heritage of public sector organisations to their resistance to 
change. 
One interesting theme to be produced by this literature search was a number 
of articles who viewed the employee's experience of change, and the ability to 
construct that experience, as central. At the extreme of the social 
constructivist pole is Francis's explicitly discourse analysis based study 
(Francis, 2003), which proposes (after Ford, 1995; Ford & Ford, 1996) that 
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language has a central role to play in the conditioning of the acceptance of 
change. There are, however, a number of articles which whilst less overtly 
social constructivist in nature, still stress the importance of communication in 
conditioning employees' responses to change (McHugh et al, 1999; Skinner, 
2004). 
Skinner's 2004 article, for instance, applies a social constructivist view to 
public sector change management, but concentrates on the importance of 
accessing employees' perception of events, arguing that managers may 
assume a reality which is not shared by the mass of employees. Skinner 
makes a case that concentrating on recognition and sharing of perception and 
experience at every level of the organisation may be a useful way of 
increasing the acceptance of organisational change. 
1.3.2.6.4. Change Management, SHRM and the UK Public Sector 
Scholarly literature which explicitly links the three topics was not found in the 
literature reviewed. However, a number of comments on the applicability of 
SHRM and change management to the public sector can be found in more 
general texts. Two interesting points emerge: the lack of ability to chose one's 
own destiny: 
"In organisational terms, many change texts assume that an 
organisation's management team have full latitude of discretion 
in terms of the choices they can make about change. In reality, 
many organisations are constrained in what they can undertake 
by their relationship with other institutions. This is particularly 
true of public sector organisations contemplating change. They 
may not be allowed to choose the obvious or best course of 
action because of constraints placed upon them by their political 
masters. " (Balogun & Hope-Hailey, 2004, p89) 
This infers a clear role for institutional theory in creating explanations for the 
selection of specific change management approaches in the public sector. 
1.3.2.7. Literature Review: Public Sector Commericalisation and 
Modernisation 
1.3.2.7.1. Public Sector Commercialisation and Modernization 
The public sector has been subject to radical reform over the last 2 decades, 
which has been summarised into seven categories (Thomson, 1992, p33): 
privatisation, delegation, competition, enterprise, deregulation, service quality 
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and curtailment of trade union powers. The Conservative Government's 
policy on reform is summarised in figure 46. 
Main themes of Goverment Policy 1979-1991 and their implications for the 
management of human resources in the Public Sector 
Main themesof Broad 
An agenda for Goverment Characteristics Evinced in implications for 
management policy management 
" Privatisation Privatisation of Flotation of More Esphrd 
some State utilities: Water, 'managerial' management ut 
" Delegation monopolies Electricity, BT, approach change 
Gas 
" Competition Delegation of NHS reforms Adjustment of Organisational budgetary systems and culture change 
" Enterprise authority 
Reforms in 
processes 
education Strategy for 
" Deregulation Competition of Creation of New human resource 
" Service quality 
delivery of TECs relationships management 
local serviceLocal 
" Curtailment of Creation of 
Government New May drive adjustment 
trade union reforms frameworks of of 
nternal remuneration powers 
markets Financial organisation 
Management Contraction of estructure 
" Focus on small Initiative workforces performance 
and medium Next Steps management 
Underpinning sized reforms. Emphasis on leadership style 
principles enterprises creation of arm's quality or operational ethos 
length service management 
" Deregulation of Executive provision development 
" Efficiency 
some public Agencies increase in modes of working 
services Various central customer 
focus altitudes and " 
" Effectiveness Trade Union government uehav ours Explicit 
reward and 
" Economy reforms 
programmes management incentive 
(value for Deregulation of of change structures 
money) some transport 
" union Organisational Trade 
" Emphasis on reform culture shift 
management Citizen's Charter 
Figure 46: The Conservative Government's policy on reform (Thomson, 1992) 
Figure 46 does, however, imply a degree of strategic planning which may not 
have existed: as Thomson comments: 
"Many of the initiatives outlined were not evolved as a part of a 
master plan, but, rather, were ad hoc responses to changing 
political and economic circumstances. " (Thomson, 1992, p34) 
The result of this was that much of the intended reform remained uncompleted 
by the 1997 election: 
"Despite the introduction of market-type incentives to foster 
change, traditional hierarchies and long-standing working 
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practices remained intact in some parts of the sector. " (Bach & 
Winchester, 2003, p285) 
On winning the 1997 election, the Labour Government's approach to the 
public sector was to continue the process of modernisation commenced by 
the Conservatives: 
"It accepted most parts of the radical organizational restructuring 
of the public services introduced under the Conservatives. " 
(Bach & Winchester, 2003, p290) 
After an initial restraint on public spending, substantially increased public 
sector expenditure in the 2001-2004 spending review increased public 
pressure for service improvement, but the public sector was suffering from 
years of systemic under-investment: 
"In many areas of the public services, such as health and 
transport, increased expenditure from 2000-1 has been 
insufficient to remedy decades of underinvestment. " (Bach, 
2002, p323) 
Increased spending raised the public's expectations about improved service, 
which the public sector failed to deliver on, generating a widespread 
perception of a public sector in crisis. 
Reform of public services remains central to the Labour Party's policies. They 
continue to emphasise increasing national competitiveness (including a 
recognition that poor transportation is an obstacle to same) supported by the 
state and state intervention. This is in contrast to the Conservatives' reliance 
upon market to achieve the same end. 
Reform of public-sector pay continues to be problematic due to equal value, 
recruitment and retention difficulties and the commitment to pay for 
performance in a reluctant public sector. 
1.3.2.7.2. The Impact of Commercialization on Public Sector Industrial 
Relations 
Relations between the Labour Government and the trade unions have been 
strained by a number of Labour policies: continuation of the modernisation 
programme and a disinterest in ownership issues. The Government has also 
been criticised for its failure to genuinely work in partnership, as well as for its 
manner of implementation of the modernisation programme. 
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Although the Conservatives' cost minimisation model was replaced by one 
favouring service quality orientation and standards monitoring, the 
continuation of the modernisation programme was to the dismay of the trade 
union movement, who have continued to pursue an anti-privatisation agenda 
(Bach & Winchester, 2003, p309). High profile disputes in occupational 
groups with a history of militancy (e. g. London Underground, Royal Mail, Fire 
Brigade) continue to be a feature of the industrial relations climate (Bach, 
2002, p321). 
The Labour Government has focused on regulation rather than ownership 
(Bach, 2002, p326). They view delivery of services as pre-eminent, and 
ownership as secondary. In particular, the involvement of the private sector in 
public sector reform has incurred the wrath of the trade union movement: the 
Government continued the Conservatives' policies in areas such as the 
involvement of senior private sector executives to examine issues in public 
sector reform, privatisation and, most contentiously, the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI). 
The PFI, a means of using private sector financing to fund public sector 
capital expenditure, has been particularly reviled, the trade unions seeing this 
as a short step towards a privatisation which they believe will disadvantage 
trade unions and result in a deterioration in terms and conditions (Bach, 2002, 
p329/330). This has been exacerbated by the Government's "muddled 
approach" (Bach, 2002, p336) to the issue. In the light of evidence to suggest 
the PFI provided limited value for money (IPPR, 2001), the Government's 
continued pursuit of public-private partnerships (for instance on London 
Underground) has resulted in a major rift between the trade unions and the 
Government. 
The unions have likewise been critical of the Labour Government's approach 
to policy development. An inclusive model of policy development and 
implementation was to be expected from a Labour Government, which has 
shown a willingness to enter into discussion with trade unions about public 
sector modernisation. The approach taken to this, however, has been social 
partnership, rather than the co-deterministic models of the European Social 
Democrat countries. This has resulted in criticism from the TUC (2001, p13) 
as a lack of genuine commitment towards partnership working. 
Furthermore, the method of implementing modernisation, described by Bach 
as "overly centralized and authoritarian" (Bach, 2002, p336), has also 
exposed the Government to the criticism of the trade unions: 
"Public-sector trade unions have often been sympathetic to the 
goals of government policy, but concerned about the manner in 
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which policies have been implemented with minimal staff 
consultation. " (Bach, 2002, p327) 
The combined result of this disillusionment with the Labour Party has led to a 
number of unions (notably FBU, GMB and Unison) to question their funding of 
the Party. Criticism of privatisation has become a tool for certain unions in the 
quest to recruit and retain members: 
"Uncompromising criticism of government policy on privatization 
... was also used as a means to raise its profile amongst public - 
sector workers. " (Bach, 2002, p330) 
Commercialisation has direct as well as indirect implications for industrial 
relations, as Boxall indicates: 
"... a rediscovery of the management prerogative ... 
is 
particularly evident in sectors where competitive pressures have 
intensified, but it is not universal. In the public sector ... union 
roles have changed only slowly and adversarial industrial 
relations remain the norm. Here, where public funding is 
constrained, adversarialism can remain the only avenue for 
unions to exert an influence on the allocation of resources in 
terms of jobs and pay". (Boxall & Purcell, 2003, pl77) 
Although this review and the militancy of a relatively small group of trade 
unions may exaggerate the gap between the trade unions and the 
Government, it is clear that industrial relations under the Labour Government 
is problematic and union support for modernisation limited and qualified. 
1.3.2.8. Organisational Politics, Power and Conflict 
It is beyond the scope of this study to offer a review of the multitude of 
research papers which exist on these topics, but it is useful to state the view 
taken to each of these constructs. This study, taking a social 
constructivist/institutional theory perspective, views each of these topics from 
this perspective. 
1.3.2.8.1. Organisational Politics 
Institutional theory presupposes that not all decision making in organisations 
is rational, and that decisions may equally be influenced by issues of politics 
and power. Organisational politics, consequently, becomes attempts to use 
power and/or politics to drive decisions towards a preferred outcome. As 
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Organisation Theory indicates, there is a fundamental link between politics 
and power. 
"Organizational politics involves those activities taken within 
organizations to acquire, develop, and use power and other 
resources to obtain one's preferred outcomes in a situation 
where there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices. " (Pfeffer, 
1981, p7) 
1.3.2.8.2. Power 
For the purpose of this study this review will utilise Dahl's definition of 
organisational power: 
"A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do. " (Dahl, 1957, p203) 
Importantly, Dahl sees power as existing within the relationship between 
social actors (which can be individuals, groups or organisations), rather than 
something which resides within the actors themselves, i. e. power is a social 
construction. 
Power can be overt, or it can function to suppress opposition. This links to the 
discourse analysis perspective which is discussed in the next chapter, which 
proposes that those who are powerful will have a greater ability to determine 
which discourses (and hence which social constructions) will dominate, i. e. 
they will have greater ability to construct what is regarded as 'truth' in an 
organisation. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
This study will move from the traditional authority based conceptualisations of 
power (see Pfeffer, 1981, for a discussion) towards a strategic contingencies 
theory of power, which sees power as follows: 
"... power derives from the ability to provide something that the 
organization highly values and that can only be obtained through 
a particular social actor. " (Hatch, 1997, p287) 
This view of power as control of resources will be fundamental to an analysis 
of an industrial relations environment. This notion has been applied and 
expanded in the industrial relations context by Batstone (1978), who saw that 
there were 4 sources of trade union power: substitutability, occupancy of a 
critical position, immediacy and the impact on uncertainty. 
Batstone further defined these 4 types of power as follows: 
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" SUBSTITUTABILITY: skills which are difficult to substitute, which may 
be determined by the scarcity of the skills (Clegg, 1970) or the 
acceptability of substitutes to the remaining workers; 
" CRITICALITY: occupancy of a critical position in the production 
process (Sayles, 1958), although power derived from this may be 
weakened if a number of other groups can also disrupt it (Batstone's 
example is assembly workers, or an area in which the managers 
choose to incite that area to strike); 
" IMMEDIACY: the immediacy with which workers can disrupt the 
company (Sayles, 1958; Clegg, 1970) - workers may take steps to 
increase the immediacy of the impact of strike action by, for instance, 
reducing output over proceeding weeks so reducing stock piles, 
managers may take the converse action; 
" UNCERTAINTY: the creation of uncertainty or the coping with 
uncertainty in a process (Crozier, 1964); workers who break of rules or 
follow informal practices (e. g. maintenance crews using 'short cuts') 
may create or help manage uncertainty. 
Batstone (1977, p178) also notes that there may be external influences on 
organisational power (e. g. the exerting of power on the union within an 
organisation by the 'parent' union), which is also considered by Stacey et al 
(1975) and Stein (1960). 
1.3.2.8.3. Conflict 
This literature review will look at two bodies of work on conflict in 
organisations: analysis of conflict developed in the field of industrial relations, 
where Marxist theory predominates, and organisational theory. 
1.3.2.8.3.1. Organisational Theory 
i) Theories of Conflict 
In its simplest form, conflict is the antithesis of co-operation (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979). This conflict as dysfunctional model, however, ignores the universality 
of conflict and its basis in different goals, values and sub-cultures. 
These inadequacies led to an alternative conceptualisation of organisational 
as the natural consequence of conflicting interests, scarce resources or 
limited opportunity (Pondy, 1967; 1969). Taking this perspective, conflict is 
natural and unavoidable. This was evolved into a theory which saw conflict as 
functional, creating adaptation, innovation and critical in the prevention of 
group think (Barnard, 1968). This, in turn, led to a contingency theory of 
conflict, which proposed an optimal level of conflict, neither too little (poor 
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decision making, apathy, stagnation) nor too much (unco-operative behaviour, 
open hostility). This is shown in figure 47 below. 
ZONE I ZONE 2 ZONE 3 
= STIMULATE OPTIMAL REDUCE 
= CONFLICT CONFLICT CONFLICT 
w 
U 
Z 
2 W 
W Work Units are: 
LL 
W 
W 
Poorly focused L Cohesive L 
Uncooperative 
L Unmotivated L Productive L 
Distracted 
Z Politicised L Not well L Cooperative with L Hostile to other integrated other units units 
0 
LEVEL OF High Low CONFLICT 
Strategies for conflict management appropriate to each zone are shown above the curve, whereas 
characteristics typical of those experiencing conflict in each zone are described beneath the curve. 
Figure 47: Curvilinear Relationship Between Conflict and Performance (from Hatch, 1997, p305) 
Organizational theory provides a further useful distinction: horizontal and 
vertical conflict. Horizontal conflict cuts across the hierarchical authority lines 
in the organisation (e. g. conflict between subsidiaries), whereas vertical 
conflict follows the lines of authority (e. g. conflict between headquarters and a 
subsidiary, management and labour conflict). 
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ii) Horizontal conflict 
Horizontal conflict is an area of considerable research37, but of particular 
interest to this study is a piece of work (Walton & Dutton, 1969) which defined 
the conditions under which such conflict may develop. A number of these are 
pertinent to TfL, namely: differentiation/integration pressures, common 
resources, communication obstacles and individual differences. 
Most important of these may be differentiation/integration pressures: 
"Differentiation and integration pressures are always in conflict 
within an organization and are inherent in the processes of 
organizing ... each unit 
faces the opportunity to develop its own 
identity and subculture within the organization ... When the differentiated units are expected to co-ordinate their activities 
and share resources and opportunities, the potential for conflict 
is confirmed. " (Hatch, 1997, p 309) 
It is reasonable to suggest that, when several organisations with already 
strong identities and cultures are merged (such as is the case in Transport For 
London), horizontal conflict will be magnified. 
This is exacerbated by establishment of a new corporate function which has 
taken over a number of the key resources previously "owned" by the business 
units (e. g. resourcing, learning & development), speaks a different language 
(private sector versus public sector). Individual differences may also play a 
role. 
A full analysis of horizontal conflict will require an analysis of the 
organisational context, as conflict may be generated through environment, 
strategy, technology, social structure, organisational structure and physical 
structure (Hatch, 1997, p 313). 
"The reader is referred to Hatch, 1997, p 308 - 315, for an introduction to this topic. 
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iii) Vertical conflict 
Vertical conflict, as indicated above, follows the lines of authority. The most 
widely used theoretical basis for work on vertical conflict is Marxist 
organisational theory; this creates the conventional understanding of 
workplace conflict as class conflict between the bourgeoisie (the capitalists 
who own the means of production) and the proletariat (the workers, who rely 
upon the capitalists to provide employment). This underpins much of the 
trade union ideology. 
Marx proposed that the inherent contradiction of capitalism was the conflict 
between owners seeking to maximise profit (maximising the 'exchange value' 
of labour, i. e. the revenues received from the sale of products/services 
produced by the labour) and workers seeking higher wages (the 'use value' of 
labour, i. e. what owners must pay to procure workers' labour). 'Surplus value' 
(i. e. profit) is the difference between the use and the exchange values, 
creating perpetual conflict between owners and workers as to what proportion 
of the surplus value should be apportioned to the workers. 
Competition was seen by Marx as a factor aggravating this conflict, creating a 
constant downward pressure on prices, and thus reducing the amount of 
surplus value available for distribution. 
Marx believed that this inherent instability in society between the classes 
would result in the replacement of one form of domination by another (slavery 
by feudalism, feudalism by capitalism), which would ultimately be overthrown 
by communism, which would given shared ownership of capital to all, hence 
ending class conflict. Post-modernism has viewed this in less revolutionary 
terms, seeing such instability as the necessary condition for change and 
innovation. 
iv) The Non-Rational Organisation 
Theories of conflict, power and domination are important to this study, both 
because they are central to the study of industrial relations, but also because 
they move away from the concept of the rational organisation. This leads to 
the social constructivist view of an organisation, and a view of rationality in an 
organisation as a social construction: 
"Marxists and non-Marxists ... claim that rationality is an ideological tool rather than a tool of reason ... rational argument 
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is a technique of persuasion founded on criteria designed to 
protect the interests of the powerful. " (Hatch, 1997, p320-1) 
The concept of rationality, Hatch argues (quoting Edwards and Benson) is a 
major force in the continued subjugation of the workforce: as long as they 
believe the capitalist system is rational, they will continue to work 
unquestioningly within in. Only once their class consciousness has been 
raised will they begin to challenge the capitalist construction of rationality. 
1.3.2.7.3.2. Industrial Sociology 
Industrial sociology provides an alternative way of viewing industrial relations 
conflict. 
Theories of industrial relations conflict can be grouped according to the Fox 
taxonomy referenced earlier. The unitarian, pluralist and radical perspectives 
have different constructions of industrial relations conflict, which will be useful 
to relate to the discourse of the various participants. These are discussed in 
chapter 3, but are summarized below. 
At the unitarian extreme, conflict is presented as irrational and dysfunctional. 
The supremacy of the role of the entrepreneur and the managerial prerogative 
to which it gives rise depicts the only legitimate authority structure in the 
organisation being that of the management.. The unitarian perspective, 
hence, constructs conflict as illegitimate and potentially endangers the 
interests of the organisation and the workers who depend upon it. 
At the opposite pole, the radical perspective sees conflict as an inevitable 
consequence of fundamental social inequities and a necessary precursor to 
societal change: conflict, hence, is an integral and vital component of the 
trade union role. 
Between unitarianism and radicalism lies the pluralist perspective. As Fox's 
taxonomy indicates, the pluralist perspective can take a variety of 
conceptualisations, from co-operation to conflict. 
The pluralist perspective sees that conflicts of interest inevitably exist, but that 
compromise is possible and desirable. This view is picked up by Batstone 
(1977), who presents conflict as the exception rather than the norm. He sees 
day to day trade union activities as assuming "an essentially accommodative 
hue" (Batstone, 1977, p11), given that even a strong union operates within a 
"web of rules (which) recognizes and reinforces the position and certain goals 
of management" (Batstone, 1977, p12). 
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2. PURPOSE OF PROJECT 
The project will firstly look at different accounts of the recent industrial 
relations history of London Underground. Whilst this is primarily included in 
the interests of context setting, it will also be used to start to identify some of 
the dilemmatic discourses operating within the organisation. 
The main purpose of the study is, however, the 
union relations in London Underground, to 
Darlington's factors are drawn upon by actors 
environment to explain and justify the situation. 
contrasted with the 'socially shared' discourses 
generated through free coding the data. 
3. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
No definition of terms is thought necessary. 
4. THEORETICAL POSITIONING 
study of accounts of trade 
examine to what extent 
in the industrial relations 
Darlington's factors will be 
of the actors, i. e. those 
This paper takes a social constructivist perspective, which is appropriate to a 
study of perceptions, opinions and views in a highly politicised environment. 
The theoretical basis for the project is institutional theory. The basis of 
institutional theory is the assumption that organisations are, first and foremost, 
social entities, and will conform to gain social legitimacy and acceptance, and 
hence secure resources, from multiple stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Zucker, 1977,1987; Scott, 1987; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theory proposes that organisations have cultural and social 
pressures directed at them: 
"Environments ... may make social and cultural demands that 
require organisations to play particular roles in society and to 
establish and maintain certain outward appearances ... Environments dominated by social demands reward 
organisations for conforming to the values, norms, rules and 
beliefs of society. " (Hatch, 1997, p 83) 
Given the importance of political and "non-rational" drivers in public sector 
companies, specifically the significant influence of industrial relations (Bach & 
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Winchester, 2003), and that, intuitively, public sector companies are likely to 
be more "dominated by social demands" (Hatch, 1997, p 83) than their private 
sector counterparts, it seems that institutional theory may offer useful insights 
into public sector companies. Social constructivist approaches such as neo- 
institutionalism may prove useful when examining public sector companies 
from the perspective of the actors within it, and has obvious resonance with 
the proposed discourse analysis methodology for this study. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Overview 
A pilot study, comprising interviews with 4 managers (2 LUL and 2 TfL) was 
conducted. The interviews for the pilot project were conducted during the 
London Underground 2004 pay negotiation, i. e. between May and August 
2004. A semi-structured interview format was used, the interview schedule for 
which is included in appendix 1. Interviews for the main project commenced 
in August 2004 and continued through to the conclusion of the pay round in 
October 2005. The last interview was conducted in January 2005. Interviews 
were supplemented by a review of company documentation and press 
releases, and, in addition to interviews with the managers and trade unionists 
involved in the pay negotiations, a number of interviews were conducted with 
staff that had historically played key roles. 
The interviews were transcribed and coded using NVivo. Discourse analysis 
was used for coding and subsequent data analysis. Discourse analysis, a 
methodology for dealing with natural language data developed by social 
psychologists appears to be a suitable methodology for a study with a social 
constructivist epistemology. The study of constructions of trade unionism in a 
public sector organisation, likewise, will inevitably involve consideration of 
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power, political and `non-rational' influences, which themselves are subjective 
and constructed through language (rather than possessing an empirically 
observable reality). Furthermore, discourse analysis is admirably suited to the 
theoretical basis of the project in institutional theory. 
There are a number of theoretical conceptualizations (Keenoy, 1997; 
Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) of discourse and discourse analysis; this study 
will utilise the version generated within social psychology, which sees 
discourse as both constructed by and constructive of social reality''. This has 
been defined as follows: 
"... the constructed and constructive use of language and on the 
functions and consequences of language use. " (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987, p 206) 
The major contention of this approach to discourse analysis is that language 
is not neutral, but is used by individuals to do things (e. g. to justify a position, 
a stance or to create a social reality). Discourse analysis is a particularly 
appropriate tool with which to examine the rich linguistic data with which 
participants are constructing (often complex) philosophical constructs into 
everyday conversation, constructs which are intrinsically tied up with issues of 
ideology, power, political positioning, persuasion and justification. 
This leads to the concept of socially shared discourses. Early proponents of 
discourse analysis advanced the concept of rhetorical psychology, which 
suggests that individuals have access to a variety of socially shared 
discourses: 
" 
... the content of the dialogue has historical and ideological 
roots, for the concepts involved, and their meanings, are 
constructed through the history of social dialogue and debate. " 
(Billig et al, 1989, p 6) 
"This constructed view of language is echoed in the management research context by Fairclough (1992). 
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As the post-structuralist philosopher, Michel Foucault, indicates: 
"Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: 
that is the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function 
as true. " (Foucault, 1977, p 93) 
Individuals can draw upon to these socially shared discourses variably, to 
their own functional ends. This will be a key concept in this study, as it links 
the individual's use of language to shared and socially shared themes: 
"... the rhetorical approach does not start by considering 
individual motivations or individual information processing. It 
starts from the assumption that knowledge is socially shared and 
that common sense contains conflicting, indeed dissonant, 
themes. " (Billig et al, 1989, p 20) 
Rhetorical psychology, thus, draws an important link between discourses 
available in society and a functional and variable view of language in use. 
The corollary of the socially shared nature of discourses is an intrinsic link with 
power: power will be used to ensure certain discourses will gain currency, and 
discourses that are used by the powerful are likely to be pre-eminent. 
Power is a shifting phenomenon, hence changes in the power dynamic will 
change representational meanings: 
".. there is no reason to expect that representations will remain 
contextually and historically stable but every reason to think that 
they will shift. Power will thus be implicated in attempts to fix or 
uncouple and change particular representational relations of 
meaning. " (Clegg, 1989, p 151-2) 
As participants compete for power and status, language representations may 
change (Francis, 2002a), and, consequently, meaning is continually 
negotiated and renegotiated (Pettigrew, 1985; Dawson, 1994; Doz & 
Prahalad, 1988). The implication of this is that it is the powerful who construct 
"truth": 
"'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power 
which produce and sustain it, and to effect of power which it 
induces and which extend it. " (Foucaullt, 1977, p 94) 
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This is echoed in the occupational context by McCloskey (1994), 9, who defined 
rhetoric as a form of "wordcraft" used by senior managers to construct, justify 
and legitimise a particular "world view" of the employment relationship. 
It must, however, be noted that Foucault determines that power is necessary 
for one to promulgate one's version of 'truth'. It is perhaps more likely that the 
existence of sub-cultures and divergent interest groups within an organisation 
will be manifested in a continued tension and conflict as actors attempt to 
negotiate and promote their particular view of 'truth' within an organisation. 
The concepts of socially shared discourses and the links between discourse 
and power will be critical to this study. 
A final reference point for this study is the work of Ford, which recognises that 
there is an objectively verifiable reality to which actors are reacting. Ford uses 
Watzlawick's concepts of 'first and second order reality' (Ford, 1999) to 
describe this relationship between 'reality' ("presented") and the constructed 
("represented") version of that reality in language. 
This constructed, "representational" conceptualization of social reality allows 
us to adopt a different approach to change management. If actors react 
according to their social construction of a social reality, the challenge in 
change management becomes: how does one persuade the actors one 
wishes to change to adopt a different social reality? This study will allude to 
Ford's concept of "shifting conversations" (Ford, 1999) and the role of the 
change agent in providing different and modifying existing discourses to 
initiate and help people understand and adapt to change. 
79 Cited by Francis, 2002, p 2. 
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5.2. Key Steps 
A pilot project was completed on project one which looked at one segment of 
the interviewees, i. e. senior managers (operational and HR). One interview 
was conducted with a trade union representative, to test the efficacy of the 
questionnaire on this group. The main study added additional senior 
managers and trade union representative interviews. 
The profile of the interviewees for the main study is shown in figure 48. The 
interviewees covered all of the managers directly or indirectly involved in the 
pay negotiation, as well as a number of historically and organisationally key 
figures. 
The trade unionists were senior full time officials in their respective unions, 
who were directly involved in the 2004 LUL pay negotiation. 
TRANSPORT FOR LONDON STAFF 
Managing Director Director/Head of De t Employee 
Operational HR Operational HR Operational HR 
Corporate 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LUL 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Surface 13 14 15 16 17 18 
London 
Rail 
19 20 21 22 23 24 
TRADE UNION OFFICIALS 
Z 
General 
Secretary/Executive 
Committee Member 
Full Time Official Lay Represe ntative 
rTSSA 25 26 27 
RMT 28 29 30 
ASLEF 31 32 33 
TGWU 34 35 36 
Figure 48: Interview Groupings 
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5.3. Basis for Establishing Rigour 
5.3.1. " Validation 
Validation of a discourse analysis study is handled in a very different way to 
validation of more positivistic methodologies (where a range of statistical tools 
may be used for validation purposes). In the words of Potter & Wetherell: 
"The goal is to present analysis and conclusions in such a way 
that the reader is able to assess the researcher's interpretations 
... a representative set of examples ... must be included along 
with a detailed interpretation which links analytic claims to 
specific ... aspects of the extracts ... each reader is given the 
possibility of evaluating the different stages of the process, and 
hence agreeing with the conclusions or finding grounds for 
disagreement. " (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p 172) 
In other words, the transparent presentation of the data and the analytic 
process acknowledges that the researcher is producing one of a number of 
possible competing interpretations, and the reader is invited to critique the 
researcher's coding and proffer their own. There is no attempt to produce one 
"true" representation of events, attitudes or internal states from the discourse 
data. Validation, consequently, in discourse analysis, is embedded in the 
transparency of the process and in the critique of the reader. 
5.3.2. Researcher Bias and the Role of the Observer 
It is relevant to discuss both researcher bias and the role of the observer. As 
this is a discourse analysis based study, the biases of the researcher and the 
perceptions of the participants in respect of the researcher will influence both 
the data and the analysis. 
These comments are made to allow the reader to judge the validity of the data 
collected and the analysis produced. 
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5.3.2.1. Researcher Bias 
To firstly discuss researcher bias, the researcher is a senior HR professional 
who has worked in both SHRM and traditional environments, and in Europe, 
the USA and the Far East as well as the UK. 
Her experience of industrial relations has ranged from the traditional conflict 
model in a downsizing blue collar environment to building partnership 
agreements on greenfield and traditional sites, including co-determination 
models in Germany and Holland and union substitution models in the UK and 
USA. 
She has been a long term member of a moderate trade union and has a 
commitment to trade unionism in the UK, which is a potential source of bias in 
her data collection and analysis. Her commitment to trade unionism is likely 
to be known by the participants. 
A further source of bias may arise from her academic background in social 
psychology, social constructivism and discourse analysis, which has 
predisposed her to a critique of positivist approaches in the area of 
management research. 
A final source of bias, which was not identified by the researcher at the time of 
the project but was noted afterwards, is her private sector background. The 
impact of this can be seen in a conscious use of business language by certain 
respondents (e. g. MB) who share that background, but may have been a 
potential barrier to discussions with respondents from entirely public sector 
backgrounds. 
5.3.2.2. The Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher is likely to influence the data produced in a number 
of ways. At the time of the study, the researcher was a senior manager of the 
organisation under study, which has the potential to create socially desirable 
responses and impression management in participants. 
The researcher's role obviously has a significant impact on the data produced. 
It is noticeable that the participants are trying to be helpful and provide useful 
data' (c. f. the beginning of 9.6 interview, where subject is at pains to clarify 
exactly what the researcher is looking for, so he doesn't "go off at a tangent", 
likewise 9.3). They also tend to be complimentary about the researcher's 
knowledge ("and with people like you on board, Liz": 9.6) and contribution 
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(9.2), aligning themselves with the researcher ("you and I know", "you and I 
have seen": 2.1). This suggests a degree of socially desirability in response 
which must be taken into consideration when evaluating the data produced. 
Her_ knowledge of London Underground is derived from her position as a 
member of the management team negotiating the 2004 pay deal, which 
created strong, supportive relationships with the managers interviewed. 
These relationships inevitably impact both the data produced (the familiarity is 
likely to mean that the managers are likely to be more candid in their 
responses) and the researcher's interpretation of that data. 
Her role with the trade union representatives is potentially more problematic: 
although she is well known to the participants on a social, as well as a 
business, level (which may mitigate some of the tendency to perform a role or 
to be guarded in response), there is inevitably a conflict of interests between 
the roles that the researcher and the union representative perform. Her 
position as a management negotiator during the pay deal would further 
exacerbate this perception of a conflict of interests. 
A further problem in the evaluation of the data produced is the unwillingness 
of the RMT trade union officials to be interviewed. This means that the data is 
incomplete, in that the unionist one would suppose who have the most 
strongly opposing view to that articulated by the managers (and to a certain 
extent the trade union officials in the study, who articulate views which could 
be reasonably categorized as moderate) are not represented in this study. 
This is a significant limitation of the work. 
5.3.3. Other Limitations 
This study is also limited by its small number of interviewees, which does 
place restrictions on the generalisability of the conclusions drawn, although 
this is mitigated to a certain extent, as the interviewees were selected on the 
basis of their centrality to industrial relations in LUL. 
A further issue arose in terms of the questionnaire design. On the basis of 
these interviews, the questionnaire was not necessary: participants talked with 
minimal prompting for 60 - 90 minutes, on the basis of the question "Could 
you describe in broad terms the industrial relations environment of London 
Underground? This does, however, raise a potential problem in comparability 
of interviews, although it does allow participants to select and discuss the 
issues they regard as most important, with minimal 'leading' by the 
interviewer. 
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6. RESULTS 
The data was coded in 3 ways: 
" The industrial relations history of LUL (section 6.1). 
" Darlington factors (section 6.2). 
" Socially shared discourses (section 6.3). 
The coding schemata for sections 6.1 and 6.2 were established by, 
respectively, emergent chronological breaks (note that this, however, is itself a 
construction) and academic literature. The coding for section 6.2 was 
generated through a grounded theory approach, where the data determine the 
analytic categories; discourse analysis has an affinity with this approach. 
The NVivo coding is summarized in appendix 2. 
The first area of review is the industrial relations history of London 
Underground (section 6.1). In an organisation with long established 
relationships, this is obviously of fundamental importance to the interpretation 
of modern events by the actors concerned. Their constructions of the 
organisation's history and its events have significant implications for modern 
industrial relations in LUL: in the words of one of the trade unionists, "we're 
dealing with an organisation that's got (a long memory)". [26.1: p25] Whilst 
there is undoubtedly a "first-order reality" (Watzlawick, 1990), in the 
introduction of agreements, the occurrence of ballots and industrial action, this 
paper will argue that the "net presentation" (Bohm, 1996) is far more greatly 
influenced by the "second-order reality" (Watzlawick, 1990) of the actors' 
linguistic constructions of events. 
The second area of review (section 6.2) will review data in support of the 
factors which Darlington claims facilitate the continuation of militancy in 
London Underground. It will be argued that Darlington's choice of 
interviewees (particularly his omission of the senior management group) 
limited his view of the dynamics of industrial relations in LUL and that the 
environment is far more complex and ambiguous than Darlington's paper 
suggests. 
To continue to support the argument for the limitations of Darlington's 
analysis, the results section will conclude (section 6.3) with an examination of 
the presence of socially shared discourses in the participants' discussions of 
industrial relations events. It will be argued that these socially shared 
discourses provide the clearest indication of the "second order reality" and 
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functional use of language created by the participants and used to create and 
communicate their social reality. 
6.1. The Industrial Relations History of London 
Underground 
It is firstly necessary to make some observations about the industrial relations 
history of London Underground, to provide some historical context and to 
begin to outline the linguistic themes in the data. 
This section uses documentation to review early events, notably the detailed 
review of the 1996 dispute, 'Moving Forward to Everest' (London 
Underground Limited, 1996). This is supplemented by interviews with key 
staff involved in these events. Accounts of later events are based on 
interviews (again with key staff) and the personal experience of the researcher 
as a management participant in the 2004 pay negotiation, and her 
conversations with operational managers, employee relations specialists and 
trade unionists between May and November 2004. It will also make limited 
use of a textual analysis of press releases issued between 2001 and 2005. 
This section will be a "net presentation" of the recent industrial relations 
history of London Underground, containing a mixture of description of the 
"first-order" events and the "second-order" representations of those events by 
the people involved. It must be noted that this is, in itself, a construction, and 
should be regarded as the researcher's version of events. 
6.1.1. Pre-Company Plan 
The recent organisational history can be traced back to the introduction of the 
'Company Plan' in 1992/1993. At this point, LUL had already experienced 
decades of industrial unrest and adversarial trade union relations, and was 
universally regarded as a bureaucracy beleaguered by inefficiency, 
overstaffing and restrictive practices. This period probably represented the 
nadir for London Underground, with the Kings Cross fire in 1987 and 
unprecedented levels of industrial action (14 one day strikes in 1989). 
Wolmar (2002) provides a good review of this pre-Company Plan period, 
albeit from a journalistic rather than an academic perspective. However, a 
number of his comments are illustrative and, corroborated by this study's 
interviewees' comments, they set the context for modern-day events. 
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Wolmar indicates that, prior to 1992, the relationship with the trade unions 
was already seen as a blocker to progress: 
"The relationship with the unions was key - and remains 
problematic to this day ... negotiations never got anywhere and 
... decisions were not implemented ... 
(the MD of LUL) felt it 
was a conspiracy between the management and the unions 
because negotiations just went on and on without ever getting 
anywhere. " (Wolmar, 2002, p 51) 
This is corroborated by a managerial participant in this study, who presents 
industrial relations at this time as bureaucratic and reactionary: 
" ... we had a huge amount of full time representation at here at 55 Broadway, the Sectional Councils as they were called in 
those days, and they basically became extremely powerful 
bodies almost dictating to management how the Railway was 
operated ... they were very much dominated by the train drivers' 
union, ASLEF, and NUR as it was then, National Union of 
Railwaymen 
... and there literally was almost a whole floor of this building 
... where these people sat, where these people drunk 
coffee and other things in the LT Bar as it was then. And a lot of 
deals were done, beer and sandwiches totally white, male, mid- 
50s old soaks ... they probably related to white, male, mid 
50s 
managers, and that's what it was like. And there were 
agreements, minutes, processes, thousands of restrictive 
practices. " [9.6: 34-44]x° 
Wolmar indicates that management capability was already identified as an 
issue, both in their intimidation by the trade unions: 
4° Extracts are identified according to the following notation [categorisation as per figure 2. instance:: paragraph 
number]. 
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"The management ... 'was afraid of the communist shop 
stewards who are allowed to sit in the canteen all day'. " 
(Wolmar, 2002, p 52/3) 
And their lack of operational ability: 
"The lack of managerial control was felt keenly throughout the 
organisation. " (Wolmar, 2002, p 53) 
6.1.2. Company Plan 
6.1.2.1. The Objectives of Company Plan 
Company Plan was LUL's answer to this state of affairs. It moved all staff 
(including train staff) to salaried status, providing an average increase in 
earnings of 6%. This was in return for productivity improvements achieved 
through more flexible rostering arrangements and related measures (including 
consolidation of grades, abolition of overtime, meal payments and Sunday 
double time), and a reduction in headcount from 21,000 to 16,000 (achieved 
from natural wastage and voluntary redundancy). Although the changes were 
negotiated and implemented (by issuing new contracts) without threat of 
industrial action, a London Underground review (London Underground 
Limited, 1996) indicates that both the changes themselves and the way in 
which the changes were implemented were extremely unpopular with train 
staff and the beginning of an enduring resentment. 
6.1.2.2. Accounts of Reaction to Company Plan 
The language used by managerial participants to describe Company Plan 
indicates the importance with which they regard it and their perception of the 
condemnation with which it was received: 
"... the infamous Company Plan. " [9.5: 20] 
"What changed the world was this word everybody y'know 
winces when you say it, 'Company Plan' in 1991. " [9.6: 44, my 
emphasis] 
"... Company Plan the notorious MacBeth like never referred to 
the Scottish Play. " [10.1: 296] 
A similar staff reaction to the Company Plan is articulated in Darlington's study 
(although he does, unfortunately, take the view of the staff and the union 
activists interviewed and represents it as his academic perspective): 
177 
"The combined package of changes, known as the Company 
Plan was presented to the unions virtually fait accompli with little 
negotiation. It represented a major challenge to workers' 
conditions and threatened to seriously weaken union strength. " 
(Darlington, 2001, p 9, his emphasis) 
Darlington makes little reference to the benefits Company Plan offered to 
employees,, i. e. salaried status (provision of health care and other benefits 
previously not available to 'blue collar staff) and an average 6% pay increase, 
which Darlington pejoratively regards as having been added in to "sweeten" 
the deal (Darlington, 2001, p10). One of the managers makes this point in the 
following extract: 
"And we negotiated that (Company Plan) through, very 
successfully, so we had no industrial action whatsoever, as a 
consequence. Lots of sabre rattling, but the reason we 
managed to get it through was that for train operators it meant 
more time turning the handle, but their hours dropped and their 
pay increased. " [9.7: 80] 
Managers vary in their accounts of Company Plan, the majority concurring 
with Darlington and echoing Darlington's "fait accompli". There are divergent 
views, however: this managerial participant concurs with Darlington and 
suggests that trade union involvement occurred only after the Plan had been 2 
years in development: 
"... when this company did Company Plan ... we spent 
2 years 
with a value analysis team developing proposals, developing 
where we wanted to be, the structure of the organisation we 
wanted. And after 2 years, we would then negotiate this with the 
trade unions, after 2 years of work. " [10.1: 296] 
Others see the consultation process as an attempt to engage the employees 
rather than the trade unions: 
"... when we did the Company Plan discussions, although it was 
very much a fait accompli, we would launch to the trade unions 
at the same time as the staff. We spent a whole 2 weeks down 
there, explaining to the people who work for us, what our plans 
were. So it was one to one, or we had gangs of managers go 
down there and say this is what we're doing, and you could 
answer questions. " [9.4: 115] 
Only one manager describes a trade union consultation process, 
substantiating this by citing the lack of industrial action: 
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" ... the infamous Company Plan, where we actually removed six 
and a half thousand jobs, em with no strikes, not one jot of an 
industrial relations problem at all. It's because we sat down, we 
worked out what our plan was to start sorting the company out, 
we sat down and at great length, for months, we talked to the 
trade unions about it. " [9.5: 20] 
This latter segment, however, should be contextualized: the speaker was one 
of the architects of Company Plan, and this extract is part of a wider discourse 
in which this respondent presents himself as trusted by the unions because of 
his preparedness to talk to them and involve them. 
6.1.2.3. The Legacy of Company Plan 
Managers tend to represent Company Plan as a major step forward in LUL: 
"... out of that massive effort on Company Plan ... from an industrial relations point of view, it was a success. It wasn't 
perfect, but it was a success. " 
[9.5: 139] 
The success of Company Plan is described both in terms of the results and in 
achieving a level of discipline in employee relations process which has never 
since been replicated: 
"Company Plan, it was structured. We had piles of sealed 
envelopes - letter A and letter B- ready to send out. We had 
the ER team, a virtual ER team, set up in this room actually. We 
had flip charts, the right font, branded the whole thing ... We had 
a comms strategy, we knew exactly what we were doing. " 
[9.4: 270] 
They do, however recognise that Company Plan has had an ongoing negative 
impact on industrial relations, creating long term unrest and setting a target for 
the TUs to erode all concessions made. In other words, Company Plan is 
constructed as a seminal event in the industrial relations history of LUL which 
has created an enduring negative impact on the organisation. As such, 
discussions of Company Plan become functional to managers in their 
explanation of the organisation's failure to modernise. 
"Now we were very very fortunate, 'cause in 1992 - 1993, high 
unemployment blah blah blah, all the reasons why one could say 
the trade union strength was not there: we had the high ground 
and we pushed it through. Or as a person said to me at that 
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time, 'you'll only ever do that once, get away with it once'. And 
we got away with it or did we? Because the echoes are still 
there. " [10.1: 296] 
Managers and trade unions draw remarkably similar pictures of the legacy of 
Company Pan, lending evidence to the fact that this has become a socially 
shared discourse: 
" ... they got a good 
big pay rise and things went reasonably 
well and the guys who did the deal felt that they got a good deal 
but, there was a lot of bitterness about this. Trade unions have 
continued on ... 13 years later, a new recruit will tell you, 'everything was alright until that Company Plan'. They'd never 
even known about it or been involved. Because I think a lot of 
the trade unions felt that their colleagues sold their soul for the 
money. Over that period between '91 and now, I think the trade 
unions have done a reasonable job, from their point of view, of 
gradually carving back in, less flexibility, more restriction and 
more power. " [9.6: 46] 
"I mean Company Plan a lot of my members got very resentful 
because before Company Plan booking clerks were paid more 
than train drivers. You can have a view on that, but when you sit 
down, start talking to them about what's gone wrong in London 
Underground, they always come back to Company Plan. Or 
they Company Plan was almost like y'know the worst thing that 
ever happened. And it's interesting because I mean I then think, 
'well, hold on a minute, you can't now talk about something 
that's actually 12 years ago'. " [26.1: 515] 
6.1.3.199511996 
In 1994/1995, as part of the 1994 annual pay review, the introduction of a5 
day week (replacing the existing 5.5 day week) was agreed and progressively 
implemented. The 5 day week was agreed on a self-financing basis. This did 
not reduce hours worked (38.5 per week), but extended shifts, with a greater 
proportion of the shifts being towards the maximum shift length of 8.75 hours. 
This again is reported in London Underground documentation as unpopular 
with train staff. 
The pay claims in 1995 were rejected by management on the grounds of 
affordability, and industrial action was averted by ASLEF only after a legal 
challenge by LUL was upheld in the High Court. The RMT held 3 one day 
strikes. 
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(London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.1.5). A Train Staff Morale 
JWP (joint working party) was also convened to address morale issues and 
design implementation of the 37.5 hour week and "appropriate measures" 
(London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.1.5). 
LUL reports suggest that the ambiguities of this 1995 agreement caused 
significant problems in subsequent years. Trade union support and 
commitment to the JWP process was extremely limited, and the JWP was 
very delayed in starting. In February 1996, ASLEF and RMT submitted 
"separate, different and significant pay claims" (London Underground Limited, 
1996, section 4.1.6), requesting RPI plus pay rises, further reductions in the 
working week and more annual leave. In the words of the management report 
commissioned to study the 1996 dispute: 
"It became progressively clearer that the interpretation of the 
1995 agreement was a major issue and that other outstanding 
issues from 1995 were likely to impact on the 1996 annual pay 
review. " (London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.1.6) 
Despite the increasing antagonism, central to which were arguments about 
the '1995 hour', and likelihood of a dispute, calls from the managers to assign 
a full time team to this issue were not taken up. 
1996 was a low point for LUL, with ASLEF and RMT balloting for, then taking, 
7 days of strike action. 4 of these were particularly damaging, being ASLEF 
and RMT joint strikes. Each of these strikes had virtually 100% support from 
train staff, creating an almost total loss of service. 
The widely held belief was that the 1995 deal was 'to blame', with an opinion 
survey suggesting that 42% of manager attributed the dispute to the fact that 
the deal was too vague, management had reneged on the deal or that little 
progress had been made in talks or the JPW since the previous year (quoted 
in London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.1.8). 
However, perhaps more influential were the existence of systemic problems 
within the organisation; a review of evidence dating from 1970 to 1996 (which 
included employee survey data) contained "persistent references to and 
evidence of morale, motivation, job satisfaction and job environment 
problems" (London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.1.9). 
The report on the 1996 strike made a number of recommendations, the 
majority of which related to underlying causation rather than the handling of 
events leading to the strike itself, which was seen as more or less inevitable: 
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"The organisation has failed to learn or has forgotten lessons 
learnt from previous disputes: 
" The agenda on which strikes appear to occur is set by the 
trade unions, with two consequences: these issues may 
not reflect members' concerns and managers are ill 
prepared or not prepared to respond on these issues; 
" Whilst management may be able to impose significant 
productivity improvements on a reluctant employee base 
without industrial action, it seems that these result in a 
cyclical, 'tit for tat' pattern, where a management 'win' 
exacerbates underlying discontent. " (London 
Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.2.3) 
The legacy of the 1996 dispute still resonates within the organisation, as 
demonstrated in the three points below. 
Firstly, in contrast to the 1995 dispute, a "calm and tolerant" approach was 
taken in 1996, avoiding both the public "slanging matches" between LUL and 
trade union leaders and the taking of punitive action against staff and trade 
unions . which had characterised the earlier dispute. 
Contemporary reports 
indicate that this "tolerant strategy" (London Underground Limited, 1996, 
section 4.3.5) was deliberately adopted in order not to exacerbate the dispute 
and to preserve relationships during the dispute. However, this was widely 
misunderstood, being interpreted as "intransigence or weakness" (London 
Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.3.6). This belief is still echoed in one 
manager's discourse in this study: 
'Where things all started to go wrong was when we started to 
give way for some reason to their demands. Aligned to a naive 
belief in partnership. And what this meant is that the annual pay 
round became absolutely purgatory where - the unions know 
the government don't want action. The unions - know that 
ideally management don't want action as well, 'cause that just 
makes them unpopular, with the press. Where(as) the unions 
really don't care what the consequences are, but believe that by 
showing muscle you increase your membership at the expense 
of others. And you had a situation in which the RMT decided to 
get highly politicised, highly organised, highly aggressive. 
As a consequence of that the ASLEF moved in that direction. 
Their reps all changed out to be vicious reps as well. And you 
have a spiral in which the RMT continue to try to outdo the 
ASLEF and the ASLEF try to outdo the RMT. " [9.7: 80] 
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This is supported by opinion survey data which sees the unions as more 
successful in achieving their aims than management; likewise, the unions' 
change of position was interpreted as "flexibility", in contrast to the 
management's change being seen as weakness (London Underground 
Limited, 1996, section 4.3.10). A body of opinion, evident at the most senior 
levels in TfL, today still articulates this discourse equating tolerance with 
weakness. This can be related to the'high moral ground' discourse discussed 
in section 6.3.2.1., where managers discuss the difficulties created by the 
public sector requirement to demonstrate high standards of behaviour. 
Secondly, other staff groups, managers and other trade unions (notably 
TSSA) expressed concern over the "special treatment" (London Underground 
Limited, 1996, section 4.3.7) of train staff and the "reward for poor behaviour" 
(London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.3.7), i. e. striking, whilst other 
staff and unions had behaved responsibly. This concept of "rewarding bad 
behaviour" is still a dominant social discourse in TfL today, and will be 
discussed in section 6.3.3.1. 
Thirdly, managers indicate that the 1996 Everest report's recommendations 
are as pertinent today as when written; little action has been taken to address 
the systemic problems underpinning poor morale and dissatisfaction. One of 
the questions asked in this study was, given such a detailed diagnosis of the 
causes of industrial unrest, why they had not been acted upon. As one 
participant indicates: 
"('Everest') was the executive summary of the review where a 
team of people had gone round, talking to trade unions, talking 
to staff representatives, to the members and talking to 
managers, and produced this document. And ... you could take that word for word now. And you could say this is just as valid 
today, in every respect, as it was in 1996. So we learnt 
something, did we? 'Cause we certainly didn't do anything 
about it ... there was about inadequate internal communications, 
and about resolving issues that should have been resolved, time 
taken - everything that you see today. And it just seemed to me 
that if you were a learning organisation, we didn't learn from 
that. Well we did but we didn't do anything about it. Why not? 
Well there must be something. Whatever the root cause we had 
because where are the people who are pushing forward in the 
development agenda. And I don't see it. " [10.1: 438] 
This theme, that of LUL's failure to be a 'learning organisation', is reflected by 
managers and trade unionists and can again be seen as an explanation for 
lack of progress: 
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" ... that's another characteristic, 
it's not what you'd call in the 
jargon, 'a learning organisation'. It resists it. It actually actively 
resists it. It's really weird. So one of the things that (we)... was 
we've gotta turn it into one that does listen and does learn. " 
[9.5: 377] 
" ... we're 
dealing with an organisation that's got that (a long 
memory). And as you said I mean, history has a chance of 
repeating itself because unfortunately some of the people 
dealing with it now, don't necessarily respect what happened in 
the past. And maybe haven't well they haven't learnt the 
lessons because they didn't actually learn the lessons. " 
[26.1: 521] 
6.1.4. From Tolerance to Belligerence 
After the Labour victory of 1997, the new government - widely expected to 
take a different stance to the outgoing Conservatives (Wolmar, 2002, p 102) - 
announced its intention to part-privatise the Tube, using the PPP (Public 
Private Partnership) as a mechanism to bring significant investment into LUL. 
Despite the stability of a multi-year pay deal, LUL was again at the forefront of 
industrial unrest as the RMT embarked upon significant resistance to the PPP 
and PFI (Public Finance Initiative). ASLEF saw its drivers as unaffected by 
PPP, and did not participate in the action. 
Darlington (2001) provides a good, if partisan, review of events during the 
1998-1999 period (Darlington, 2001, p14-15). 
This period saw one 12 hour and two 48 hour strikes in summer 1998, with a 
further 48 hour strike in early 1999, all of which, whilst not enjoying total 
support, severely disrupted services. However, the employees' support for 
this `politically motivated' action was waning, and no further strikes on this 
issue were called, although the PPP still remains a major source of discontent 
for the RMT (a view which, interestingly, they share with both the Mayor and 
the Commissioner), as a cursory scan of their website indicates (RMT, 
2004a). 
Following the departure of a MD and HRD who were, in the words of one 
manager, characterised by their "naive belief in partnership" [9.7: 80], London 
Underground then appointed a new HR Director, on an interim basis. The 
organization demonstrated progressive actions on a number of fronts; for 
instance, the introduction of 'Team Talk', a formalised way of ensuring that 
managers talked to their staff, brought in the first principles of employee 
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engagement in a way which was appropriate to the "verbal culture" of the staff 
(London Underground Limited, 1996, section 4.4.9.1). However, the new 
HRD had an adversarial style, as a quote from one of the management 
interviewees illustrates: 
"I think one of the mistakes we've made in the past, frankly, in 
this organisation is we've had the wrong personalities heading 
up employee relations ... 
I mean someone who would throw a 
newspaper across the table at a General Secretary of the trade 
unions you think you're kinda on a hiding to nothing. " [9.2: 162] 
This was compounded by the temporary nature of the appointment, which 
accounts indicate made it difficult for the new HRD to be taken seriously by 
the trade unions. A personality clash between the HRD and the General 
Secretary of the RMT, and subsequently with Ken Livingstone, ensured that 
this appointment would not be extended. 
The issue came to a head in the 2002 pay negotiation, over which the HRD 
had decided not to compromise: the decision was taken to impose a 3% 
settlement when negotiations had reached an en passe; in the words of the 
press release, "after exhausting all reasonable negotiations with our union 
colleagues. " (London Underground Limited, 2002,16 September) This highly 
confrontational move was guaranteed to upset the trade unions, as an ASLEF 
senior official reports: 
" ... there was a time ... when he (the LUL HR director) imposed 
a settlement, rather than negotiated one, and no union can 
accept that - that's just basic, y'know. You've gotta fight it. 
Albeit it was an increase they imposed rather than (laughs) a 
cut. Yeah, I say, it's just natural, that you must oppose that, an 
imposed settlement. " [32.1: 118] 
The HRD's style is also evident in the confrontational tone of the press 
releases produced by LUL in the period of August to October 2002, which 
differ dramatically from the anodyne press releases of subsequent years 
(although one may attribute the difference as much to the censorious 
influence of the Mayor's office as to the style of the personnel involved in the 
pay negotiation). 
"There was a low turnout of only 3,165 of the 8,000 members 
eligible to vote actually bothering to do so. But of the members 
who did vote, 2,518 voted in favour of strike action and 647 
against. The Tube's HR Director, Bob Mason said: "The 
justification for this ballot action is unclear but I know it has very 
little to do with pay and conditions. That much is clear from the 
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very small proportion of RMT members who have voted for 
strike action. " (London Underground Limited, 2002,3 
September, my emphasis) 
The press releases indicate that LUL attempted to mobilise both public and 
staff opinion in the dispute with the trade unions. Following a survey 
assessing customer reaction to the strike, which showed that 38% of those 
surveyed supported the strike, a press release was issued containing the 
following comment: 
"A London Underground spokesman said: 'This confirms what 
we already knew - these strikes are pointless'. " (London 
Underground Limited, 2002,25 September I) 
As well as staff: the title of the second September 25th press release, "800 
heroes refuse to be intimidated" marked a new level of polemic in the battle 
for the employees' hearts and minds, as shown by the emotive and 
confrontational language used in the press releases: 
"Despite attempts by RMT and ASLEF unions to intimidate Tube 
staff into striking, 56 per cent of those workers who run London 
Underground's stations still reported for work. Of the 1464 staff 
rostered on, 808 turned up to help frustrated commuters get to 
work as best they could ... 
'We are proud of the staff who 
reported for work and want to thank them for trying to do their bit 
to ease the difficulties caused by this needless action. ' LU 
Spokesman. " (London Underground Limited, 2002,25 
September II, my emphasis) 
"Almost half of London Underground's Tube lines were running a 
service today in defiance of a strike called by the RMT and 
ASLEF unions. 
More than 20 LU drivers refused to be intimidated by union 
picket lines and ran the trains so Londoners who depend on the 
Underground could use the service. " (London Underground 
Limited, 2002,2 October, my emphasis) 
"Almost 60 per cent of London Underground staff reported for 
duty during the strike called by the RMT and ASLEF unions on 
October 2. LU managing director, Paul Godier ... said ... 'Some 
of them (the staff) made superhuman efforts which were a 
tribute to the commitment that I know the majority of our people 
have, not only to this company, but also to the 3 million people 
we carry every day ... Their continued determination is much 
186 
appreciated'. " (London Underground Limited, 2002,4 October, 
my emphasis) 
The organisation also opened up a web site for comments, launched through 
a press release entitled "Get A Word In" on 26th September, where staff were 
asked to add their comments on the following questions to a web page: 
"Do you think LU's offer is reasonable? Do you think the unions' 
strike action is justified? Should LU simply pay what the unions 
demand each year to avoid disruptive strike action? What would 
you do to solve the situation? 
Tell us what you think on any strike-related matter. " (London 
Underground Limited, 2002,26 September) 
On the third day of strike action by the RMT, it was widely believed by the 
management that support for the strike was waning, and staff were beginning 
to return to work. Ken Livingstone (not at that time in charge of LUL) at this 
point met with Bob Crow (both are ex-Communist Party members, and the 
RMT supported Ken Livingstone politically and financially after Livingstone's 
expulsion from the Labour Party), the contents of which were not disclosed to 
the Underground management, and the RMT returned to work. LUL reported 
the event as follows: 
"The Mayor has stated that when he takes control of London 
Underground next year, he will enter into non-binding arbitration 
with the trades unions to agree a pay deal. " (London 
Underground Limited, 2002,9 October) 
LUL's public response to this was guarded but shows obvious discomfort: 
"Following a meeting with the Mayor of London, Ken 
Livingstone, the RMT and ASLEF have announced that they will 
not be calling further strikes in the current dispute. Underground 
bosses welcomed this decision. The Tube's Human Resources 
Director, Bob Mason said: 'It's good news that the unions have 
called off further strike action over pay. But the issue remains 
unresolved. It has simply been batted into next year, when the 
Mayor will face the same dilemma Underground management 
face today. Making the most of the limited money available to 
us, we have to pay our staff a fair wage and to improve the Tube 
for our customers'. " (London Underground Limited, 2002,9 
October) 
Although this manager is diplomatic in his comments over this event: 
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"... politically I can understand his (the Mayor's) motives - 
you've got the power to stop a strike, save London, why wouldn't 
you. " [9.2: 82] 
He recognises a legacy of feelings of betrayal and the negative repercussions 
on industrial relations in LUL: 
"... there was a lot of people in LU who were very very animated 
by the Mayor's intervention in the dispute last year... and 
actually that was at a point where the management of the Tube 
really believed that the strike was at the point of crumbling. And 
that would have been the first time for many years that would 
have happened. And the view was that he set us up. In a way 
that disabled a proactive, management led drive for change in 
employee relations, moving forward. " [9.2: 80] 
This story is also echoed by a moderate trade unionist: 
"I suspect if Ken Livingstone had his time again, he may not 
have intervened in the way he did 2 years ago ... 
Because the 
way he did 2 years ago, I think was the catalyst for these 
problems a week before election day ... The point I'm making is is that what he was after was the good headline 2 years ago, 
and I think he got that because generally Joe Public out there 
saw the Mayor sorting out the trade union problem, and indeed 
Joe Public out there has now seen the Mayor taking a tough 
stance against the trade union problem. But there again the 
actual 'sorting' of the trade union problems have probably been 
put back 2 years because of him. " [26.1: 12-20] 
These two quotes provide a particularly good example of the opposition 
between business and political forces in the organization. Whilst the HRD 
was adjudged to be doing the right thing for the business, he failed to correctly 
read the political forces: 
"(The HRD) didn't have the wrong idea, about what he was 
going, trying to do with the unions. What he didn't get right ... (was) timing and getting the support and have the political nouse 
to understand the reasons and the difficulties around that, he 
just didn't. And he paid the price for it. It pains me to say it but 
the guy did have the right idea on that. " [2.1: 64-68] 
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6.1.5. Recent Events 
The 2004 pay negotiation, which provides the context for project one, was 
divided into 2 distinct halves. Prior to the June 10th Mayoral election, the RMT 
were aggressive and unreasonable (claims for a4 day, 32 hour, week as well 
as an undefined but "substantial" pay increase), seemingly looking for an 
excuse to claim that negotiations had broken down and initiate industrial 
action. ASLEF and TSSA made their own demands but took a less 
oppositional stance. Despite negotiations still being under way, no final offer 
having been tabled by the management team, and the negotiating machinery 
being far from exhausted (referral to ACAS is a necessary step in the 
negotiating machinery prior to industrial action being called), RMT balloted for 
industrial action, gained a mandate, and planned a strike on election day 
itself. 
Although direct evidence as to subsequent events is limited, it is evident from 
participants' accounts that a deal had been struck between Bob Crow and 
Ken Livingstone, in which Crow had assured Livingstone that the RMT would 
not hold a strike on election day, and that the RMT were using the election as 
a bargaining chip to put pressure on LUL. Crow's call to not strike was, 
however, narrowly outvoted by his executive committee, and a strike was 
confirmed for June 10th. 
... it's significant that the decision to take industrial action, 
which again was going to be on Mayor's election day, despite all 
that Bob Crow might have given us his assurances not to do 
that. The ballot was swung by one of, there's 8 members of the 
Executive Council it was 53 and one person swung who was a 
Scottish Labour Party member ... the militant sort of Socialist Labour Party in Scotland. And in fact I think the majority of 
those that swung were actually from what used to be Scotrail, 
and you ask the question in terms of what on earth are Scottish 
trade union representatives doing deciding what happens in 
London. 
Well of course it didn't matter what they were doing in London, it 
was where they were going to get the most political clout, and 
the most sort of damage if you will. Because anti-government, 
anti-everything, no longer in the Labour Party, a trade union that 
no longer seems to be primarily concerned with the benefits and 
welfare of the membership, that will not sacrifice that for them 
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but will be guided on some occasions by purely political aims. " 
[10.1: 50-52] 
This is consistent with the representations of the RMT as a fragmented, 
factional organisation, over which even the General Secretary does not have 
control: 
"I think one of the problems he's (Bob Crow) got, though, is he's 
created certain parts of the agenda that he can't control. I 
honestly believe that Bob wants to bring things into line now, but 
he can't, because he's given some of the wilder men their head, 
for too long. As a result, I mean the internal politics in the RMT I 
think are quite mind boggling. " [26.1: 124] 
This is consistent with the militant political stance of the RMT, which claims as 
a constitutional goal, "to work for the supersession of the capitalist system by 
a socialistic order of society" (RMT, 2004). This can be contrasted with the 
language in ASLEF's version of the same objective: "To assist in the 
furtherance of the labour movement generally towards a socialist society" 
(ASLEF Publications, 2004). It seems that extremists within the RMT would 
see the appointment of Stephen Norris (the most likely challenger to Ken 
Livingstone for the Mayor of London, a right wing politician who had been 
openly critical of the LUL trade unions in the run up to the election) as an 
excuse for all out war, hence this apparently suicidal behaviour is explicable in 
terms of the RMT's political agenda, despite the apparent contradiction of a 
trade union attempting to damage the election chances of the left wing 
Livingstone. 
At this point, it appears that the General Secretary of the TGWU intervened, 
threatening to have the RMT banned from the TUC if they carried out this 
'anti-democratic' act: 
" ... the RMT, where you'd one vote to strike on the Mayoral 
election day. It was perverse by any standard. You'd actually 
got Bob Crow going in to try to reverse it, from the Executive I 
mean, they tossed it out. And then it needed somebody from 
the TUC to come in and say'Well you need us, and listen, this is 
an affront to democracy, this is what you should do", and the 
deal's struck and they decided to work it out. " [10.2: 201] 
"I knew what was happening with RMT. RMT were going for an 
election day strike. RMT were looking for the excuse to go for 
the election day strike ... at the end as you know that Friday we 
managed to get the strike called off. I'm pretty sure that was 
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down to the fact that T&G basically told Crow he wouldn't get the 
ILL vote again. " [26.1: 209-317] 
This account continues this idea, suggesting that the T&G intervention 
allowed Bob Crow to return to his executive committee (EC) and persuade 
them to have the strike postponed. 
A 24 hour strike subsequently took place on 29/30 June. The newly re- 
appointed Mayor had criticised the RMT for taking industrial action and, on 24 
June, had encouraged staff to cross picket lines. Bob Crow resigned his 
position as a TfL Board member of 25 June, citing as the reason that he had 
been "shocked, saddened and disappointed" by the Mayor's comments and 
could not "in all conscience" remain on the Board (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2004a). 
After the Mayoral election, the RMT were manifestly in a different place, 
obviously less secure in their relationship with the Mayor (to the extent that 
their lead negotiator was careful to establish that the pre-election offer from 
LUL was still on the table), as a manager relates: 
" ... (the RMT) got a little bit of a kick back when 
Ken didn't 
stand alongside them, when they thought he would, so they've 
actually lost their ace of spades, as Ken had said ... 
'come on 
guys, I'll support you but be reasonable about it. Make silly 
claims, for big money, and ... I'm going to sit with the 
management team because ... I have to pay the bill ... I know 
I 
want to spend money in other areas rather than just furnishing 
and lining your pockets'. So I think that's ... really put us on a 
more even keel with the guys. " [9.6: 80] 
Relationships between the RMT and the Mayor were strained still further over 
the Barrett case: Ken Livingstone was outspokenly critical of the RMT in their 
defence of an individual who had been sacked by LUL after being found 
playing squash when off sick with an alleged ankle injury. 
At the same time, the ASLEF organisation was imploding. The appointment 
of a moderate, Shaun Brady, as General Secretary was a 'palace coup' by the 
non-London membership, replacing the militant Mick Rix. The organisation 
was obviously divided in its loyalty to the old and new General Secretaries, 
and their different political stances, and accusations of financial irregularities 
were widespread. The ASLEF situation came to a head on 20th May, when a 
brawl at a barbecue resulted in the suspension and subsequent departure of 
both the President and General Secretary. Since Shaun Brady's sacking in 
August, ASLEF has subsequently been headed up by an 'Acting General 
Secretary', a relatively inexperienced official (Keith Norman), and appears 
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confused and lacking in direction. In consequence, and due to the imminence 
of elections for some of the full time officials, ASLEF became unpredictable 
and intermittently belligerent through the latter stages of the negotiation. 
Changes in the ASLEF leadership were mirrored in LUL's negotiating team. 
The long term Head of Employee Relations retired in July, and was replaced 
by an individual with a very different style: whereas the outgoing Head of ER 
was known as a deal maker and a 'fixer', his replacement set out his stall on 
the basis of his integrity and his refusal to break agreements. This change of 
personnel happened half way through the pay negotiation, and inevitably 
changed the dynamics of the negotiation as much as the outcome of the 
Mayoral election. 
The final element in the negotiation was the decision to have a senior 
operations director chair the negotiations, rather than an HR or ER person. 
His calm, implacable style, his knowledge of the operation and his long term 
relationships with the trade unionists allowed the negotiations to proceed in an 
even tempered, productive manner, with a considerable amount of good 
humour. 
This humour was also symptomatic of the fact that the 'real' deal was being 
done outside the formal negotiating forum, by the politicians and the senior 
trade unionists. A lack of mandate again resulted from the operation of 
political influences on the organisation cutting across business imperatives, 
and made the Company Council forum frustrating to all concerned, both 
managers: 
"... the one thing that's been different for me out of this pay 
round, is that a lot of it's been the same, the ducking and diving, 
but the one thing that has been different is that after the election 
Ken came out very clearly and said - 'Bollocks: you're not 
having it' ... 
Now, you know Ken's a powerful person in terms of 
his mandate, and what have you. And plainly there was 
differences of opinion of the political and the executive wing of 
the enterprise, if I put it like that, which didn't align until very 
shortly after the election. But when they did align, and it kind of 
felt like we had that session where we came from out of the 
meeting and came down here to wait for instructions and we 
were waiting for ... the hand of God. I don't know you're 
probably closer to it than me but it sort of felt like the politics and 
the executive were finally sorting themselves out and the next 
day we did have a consistent message. And that has changed 
the dynamics, because we went through the industrial action, 
what we talked about and the way we were talking at the JWP, 
at Company Council last week, you know it's as if it didn't 
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happen. And I think that has wrong footed the RMT. They don't 
quite know what to do next. " [9.1: 34-42] 
And trade unionists: 
"I got frustrated with ... having meeting after meeting where the 
people I'm meeting - and I can make the decision, I have 
authority in that meeting - haven't. " [32.1: 122] 
The influence of political forces on the organisation and a change of style is 
evident in the formal communications issued during 2003 and 2004. There is 
considerable less reference to industrial unrest in the later bulletins, and no 
overt attempt to win support from either the public or employees. 
Communications are conciliatory in tone, as the following typical example, 
under the heading of "LU Appeals for Union Patience" indicates: 
"London Underground today appealed to the rail union, RMT, 
not to take industrial action over safety concerns following the 
recent derailments. LU has asked the union to wait until 
investigations into the cause of the Piccadilly Line derailment at 
Hammersmith and the Northern Line derailment at Camden 
Town were completed before deciding what to do. 
Tube Managing Director Tim O'Toole said: 'I think certainly the 
union has every right to be coming in on this issue. There is no 
more important issue than safety. I do think this isn't a matter of 
confrontation between management and the trade unions or the 
employees because we're on the same side here. We want the 
same result. That's why I've asked for an emergency safety 
conference to be held with the trade unions on Tuesday, and I'm 
very grateful they have agreed to do it'. " (London Underground 
Limited, 2003,27 October, my emphasis) 
The press releases which were issued tended to focus on the (less 
controversial) safety issues, upon which public sympathy could be more or 
less guaranteed, rather than the pay negotiation. The progress of the 2004 
pay deal, unlike the 2002 negotiation, features in only 2 press releases, one 
prior to the proposed industrial action on the Mayoral election day which 
presents the organisation as reasonable: 
"London Underground (LU) today (May 17) reaffirmed its 
'commitment to continuing a constructive dialogue with the trade 
unions on pay and conditions ... A LU spokesperson said: 'We 
are surprised the RMT is proposing industrial action at this time, 
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as we are still in negotiations with them'. " (London Underground 
Limited, 2004a, 17 May) 
Even post industrial action, the tone of press releases is mild, non-adversarial 
and purposefully customer oriented, as "LU Boss Regrets Strike" indicates: 
"London Underground's Managing Director Tim O'Toole said: 'I 
very much regret the disruption caused by yesterday's strike 
action by some members of the RMT. Thanks to the efforts of 
many staff we were able to run some services and our bus, 
DLR, tram and rail colleagues greatly helped in getting people 
around the city. However, I know how badly affected your 
journeys were in many cases. I am sorry for the serious 
problems you were unnecessarily caused'. " (London 
Underground Limited, 2004a, 1 July) 
The contrast to the 2002 communications could not be starker, suggesting 
both a change of approach in LUL management as well as the editorial 
function of the GLA's press office. 
A two year pay deal was finally signed in late summer, at a reasonable cost to 
the company, with only one 24 hour strike. JWP negotiations continue on 
elements of the pay deal (shorter working week), but the organisation and the 
unions have the period of stability created by the 2 year deal to develop their 
working relationship. At the point of writing (January 2005), this stability does, 
however, appear fragile in the context of ASLEF's political machinations and 
the proximity of ASLEF elections, and the end of 2004 has been characterised 
by a number of ballots, strike threats and low level industrial action over 
relatively insubstantial issues. As an ASLEF official related: 
"(The Employee Relations Director) thought he was buying 2 
years' industrial peace, with that (pay) agreement and so did a 
lot of the other managers. All they bought was that headline 
annual row, over the pay ... So now, the reason I agreed it, was that I had another agenda, and that was to get some of the 
outstanding industrial relations issues addressed. " [32.1: 338- 
342] 
6.2. Darlington's Factors 
The study will next look for discourse around Darlington's 4 factors. The aim 
is not to support or otherwise Darlington's hypotheses, but to examine the 
accounts provided by managers around these issues. The Nvivo coding for 
this section is shown in figure 49. 
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Figure 49: NVivo Coding for Darlington Factors 
6.2.1. Collectivisation of Employees 
According to the radical perspective, one of the roles required of trade unions 
is the raising of the employees' awareness of their oppression, the raising of 
their class consciousness. This does provide a perhaps convenient 
explanation for the fact that the (enlightened) union leadership may not always 
operate in the direct interests of their (un-enlightened) members, as they may 
be pursuing a larger, political agenda, the aim of which is societal 
transformation. This may be used to explain any schism which is apparent 
between the trade union leadership and its members. 
Darlington makes two assertions under this heading. Firstly, there is a schism 
between politically motivated union leadership and the interests of members 
and, secondly, members are essentially passive, requiring left wing activists to 
galvanise them into collective action. This section considers whether the 
interviewees in this study corroborate these assertions. 
6.2.1.1. The Schism Between Trade Union Leadership and Members 
Discourses on the political motivations of trade unions and their leadership, 
used largely in opposition to a discourse about acting in members' interests, 
were a feature of the interviews. However, only one of the interviewees 
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(interestingly, a TfL interviewee who had the most distant relationship with the 
trade unions) explicitly described a gulf between the members and the union 
leadership: 
"I think there are agendas being pushed for individual purposes 
and I sometimes feel like the staff get squeezed out. And I think 
that's what goes on, quite a lot, in London Underground. I'm not 
sure that a lot of the battles are about staff; I think they're about 
political positioning and in some ways an excuse for a fight, as it 
were. " [2: 24] 
" ... it must add weight to anyone observing this process that the 
unions are in it for themselves, and there isn't consideration of 
the staff. " [2: 54] 
This theme was used functionally by this interviewee to question the 
legitimacy of the RMT's tactics. It also appears in the TSSA and ASLEF 
discourses as a differentiator between themselves and the RMT. 
" ... some of the RMT people, there is the political agenda and 
actually you're paying these people to be full time political 
activists, for the RMT. They're not doing what my people are 
doing, which is trying to sort out industrial problems. " 
[26.1: 495] 
" ... consequently some of the RMT members lost out. But 
surely, like the Signalling and like these people, if they'd been 
clever and said, accepted it for them, one group of their staff, 
surely then that strengthens your argument to get it for the other 
group of staff.... So why do they then do that? I mean I can't 
understand that as a negotiator. Right? You know you get your 
foot in the door. Instead they're happy to be waving the red flag 
outside the manager's door. When I see as a win-win then to 
get something for them then to improve on and build on in future 
years. " [32.1: 140-148] 
Interestingly, this ASLEF official sees the RMT's actions as actively 
disregarding members' interests, in contrast to how he defines his own role: 
" ... if you learn your history and I've seen it at the Post Office, Fords, British Leyland, people like the (senior RMT official) have 
you out on strike for 6 weeks, you've lost your mortgage, your 
wife's probably left, the kids are crying 'cause they're hungry, 
and they're saying it's a political victory, they see this is us 
against the employers, brothers, and you go trudging back to 
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work. I'm paid a lot of money to go in there and negotiate, and 
... they'll have received 27 and a half percent pay rise over those 5 years ... 43 days' leave, 35 hour week, and that's all been done through negotiation. " [32.1: 126] 
There is, consequently, some evidence that this discourse is used by 
participants to question the legitimacy of trade unions' political motivations. 
6.2.1.2. View of Employees 
There is, however, less evidence to support Darlington's contention that 
activists play a critical role in motivating employees towards collective action. 
Managers fail to reference the role of union activists, but instead produce a 
range of explanations for why members support the RMT, ranging from 
coercion to benefit led to management engendered. 
The coercion theme is used to similar ends to the 'schism' theme above, i. e. 
to question the legitimacy of the RMT's actions. Managers suggested that 
bullying and intimidation was a factor in the membership's continued support 
of the RMT: 
is ... if we really were really to uncover it I think you'd find that there's a lot of bullying and harassment that goes along with 
that, some of the drivers that maybe don't not want to join the 
union, not go on strike, who are maybe persuaded them that 
was the right thing to do was stand up and stand in line with their 
brothers and I would think that happens in varying degrees of 
nasty ways. " [4.1: 99] 
N ... then there was again intimidation ... It's a real problem out there. Because so many things are controlled by the staff reps 
out there: in the way people's duties are allocated, you know, 
the mafia system. `You'll be thrown out of the mafia if you cross 
that picket line, if you come to work or if you vote no and you 
don't support your trade union you'll be out of there'. And your 
whole life is probably geared around being able to get those 
turns of duty which suit your domestic arrangements. And 
likewise in terms of should you need representation, well it won't 
be there. You'll be on your own. And staff fear that kind of 
thing, the loss of the solidarity of the union behind them. " 
[10: 1: 84] 
This supports the consistent theme is of union, rather than labour, militancy; if 
anything, the study supports Darlington's view of the London Underground 
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workforce as apathetic, essentially passive, and manipulated by the trade 
union: 
" ... well, by and large the trade unions 
have often got things out 
of strikes that made it worth their while. And that was why the 
membership were kind of happy to go to the barricades without 
really understanding why. " [9.1: 56] 
" 
... the silent majority out there who are satisfied with 
their job 
who do believe they have good conditions etc. etc. and will put 
ballot papers into the bin and then bemoan the fact that they've 
been called out on strike and are losing money. A strange 
muted loyalty, is it loyalty, is it fear? And it's a combination 
probably of both. " [10.1: 180] 
"And if some of the membership had any idea about what was 
going on in these [pay] discussions, they would be saying 'hey, 
you're supposed to be representing us, where do I benefit out of 
this? "' [2.1: 50] 
" ... staff as well were 
brought up on this idea that of saying 'we 
don't really want to go on strike, we don't really need any more 
money, but we might as well support our trade union because 
we'll only get more, won't we'. Well, you know, they too, 
perhaps, do not understand those new realities in the situation. " 
[10.1: 26] 
Extracts 10.1: 184,2.1: 50 and 10.1: 26 are particularly interesting, as they all 
contain a pictorial representation of reported speech, an invocation of 
someone else's voice. This is a feature of discourse analysed by 
BakhtinNolosinov, as Maybin (2001, p 68) comments: 
"For Bakhtin and Volosinov, invoking a voice always also 
involves invoking an evaluative viewpoint, which may be used by 
the current speaker as a rhetorical resource to support their own 
speaking or writing purposes". 
It is interesting to surmise how this reported speech is being used by the 
respondents - perhaps to appropriate the employee's view and to suggest this 
is not simply a managerial world view which is being articulated. 
These discourses question the legitimacy of the trade union's actions and 
substantiate this via the 'appropriation' of the employee voice via 
representations of reported speech. However, these were set against a less 
pejorative discourse which suggested that the militant union was perceived as 
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having done a good job for its members, and members were unlikely to 
express dissatisfaction with the leadership: the 'benefit led' theme. This 
presents a view of employees as making a rational choice, choosing to 
support the RMT on the basis of previous benefit delivered. This is in contrast 
to Darlington's view of employees as manipulated by left wing activists: 
" ... if you're a train driver, you'd think that they've done a good job because their pay has gone up so much and that the 
Underground management seem to give into them ... And 
from 
a driver as far as someone who pays a membership 
subscription is concerned are you really going to have too much 
of a problem with what they've got, 'cause they'd be quite 
pleased. That's quite that's quite a significant thing for the 
union's positioning with its members, I think ... They'll (the RMT) become more moderate I don't think so. As long as the 
membership are happy, or the majority of the membership are 
happy, then I think that the union leadership is probably quite 
safe. " [4.1: 95] 
" 
... tremendous 
loyalty to the trade unions in what they're meant 
to do. And of course if you challenge people in terms of saying 
how well they're paid then the trade unions and particularly the 
RMT will say that's because we've pursued the policy that we 
have, that's because we've used the strike weapon. " [10.1: 24] 
At the furthest end of spectrum, a legitimate role for the trade unions is 
created by a discourse which cites the employees' perceived need for the 
protection of the union. This 'you get the unions you deserve' discourse had a 
number of sub themes", including the perceived need of the staff for union 
representation ('management engendered'): 
" This discourse contains a number of sub themes, including appeasement behaviour (links to 'conditioned 
behaviour'); lack of attention to employees (links to 'under-investment in people'); failure to resolve disputes; 
politically motivated trade unions (discourse created through opposition with 'acting in members' interests'). 
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" ... it's just this whole sort of atmosphere of distrust and tension. It fosters the need for people the feeling that the staff feel they 
need reps in the background to protect them if anything goes 
wrong. " [9: 14] 
" ... people empower their reps because they feel they need their protection, and you have to manage the reps and deal with 
the issues. But why do people feel that ... they need that 
protection? " [9: 56] 
In summary, the analysis on the first of Darlington's factors suggests that 
participants recognised the political motivations of the RMT's leadership 
(notably, this was not applied to ASLEF), but did not articulate a schism 
between membership and leadership. 
Instead, managers articulated a range of explanations for why employees join 
and support a militant trade union (from coercive to benefit led to 
management engendered) to explain continued high levels of membership. 
This is a much more complex version of Darlington's postulation of the role of 
activists in inciting employees to action. 
6.2.2. Managerial Contribution to Industrial Unrest 
Darlington, echoing Kelly, sees the "belligerence" of the management of 
London Underground as a contributory factor in the continued militancy. As 
one might expect, there are a complex set of discourses which are articulated 
around this topic. The study provides some evidence of managerial 
contribution, but also marked dilemmatic discourse. This again suggests that 
the situation is more complex than suggested by Darlington. 
As indicated in the previous section, the respondents all recognised that 
management had contributed to the continued unrest. 
6.2.2.1. Use of Socially Shared Discourses 
The two respondents (4.1 and 2.1) who were part of the TfL rather than the 
LU organisation were, as one might expect, most critical of the LU 
management. The first of these uses a 'conditioned behaviour' discourse 
(which will be discussed in more detail in section 6.3): 
"I think the management, the LU management their attitude to 
the unions is that they're a bit scared of them, and tend to give in 
and therefore make rods for their own backs. " [4.1: 125] 
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whereas the second respondent utilises a 'capability' discourse: 
"So there's a lack of capability but it goes back again, you know, 
to me this is surely about capability. It's about the business 
having strong management, strong leadership, strong capability 
to do the things that are right for the business and right for the 
people and I don't think this organisation has had that. " [2.1: 78] 
As expected, the current generation of managers are careful to make their 
references to poor capability retrospective: 
" ... back in 20 years ago 30 years ago the organisation wasn't 
well managed and the ... management had kind of abdicated 
really and it wasn't particularly focused on employees and I think 
allowed the trade unions to gather and to gather strength. " 
[9.1: 4-12] 
This serves to create a blame attribution which is unrelated to the present 
management and explains current lack of progress through the creation of a 
view of London Underground as a victim of its history. 
A sub-theme of the 'capability' discourse is inadequacy of communication. 
This attributes a degree of blame to the managers for failing to communicate a 
pro-organisational message to balance the unions' communications: 
'We probably don't do it well enough in terms of you know dispel 
this myth around the whole thing. Why do people coming in ... be alarmed by the fact that or concerned that they needed a 
trade union quickly to protect their interests because this wicked 
organisation is likely to be getting rid of them etc. " [10.1: 190] 
"This isn't all about job loss, it's about shifting the balance, it's 
about different skill sets ... But we're all back footed because 
we're not getting that message out there. And don't have a 
strong enough management capability to get those messages 
over. And, you know, maybe we wouldn't in an organisation 
that's as highly unionised as we are, but I do think we're missing 
something there, definitely. We're failing to sell the benefits to 
people as a win-win. " [2.1: 106] 
6.2.2.2. Self-Critical Discourse 
One managerial respondent, however, was critical of his own role in 
perpetuating the industrial relations environment: 
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" ... weaselling around things or pretending you didn't know, 
we've all been there. I mean I had an agreement on the 
Bakerloo Line which I kinda weaselled around for years, 3 or 4 
years, on how many times people can go up and down in a shift. 
And I knew if I kinda recognised this agreement that would be 
another constraint and I knew sooner or later they'll find the right 
piece of paper and they'd find out about this agreement and find 
the right process. " [9.1: 158] 
However, he does caveat this with a variety of explanations: learnt managerial 
behaviour, day to day operational pressures and political influence. He 
explains his negativity by use of the 'conditioned behaviour discourse, 
created by the employees themselves: 
" ... I've had some experiences, as ... a local manager you lose faith in human nature because all you see is people messing 
you about. You see the 20 percent of people who're taking the 
taking the mickey, and not coming in and blah-di-blah-di-blah 
and you become very suspicious, of everybody's motives and it 
does become a sort of powerplay where you don't want them to 
have one over on you ... So you know and it's not just local 
managers I mean it's symptomatic of the whole organisation. " 
[9.1: 14] 
And by day to day operational pressures: 
"I mean one of the most successful times I had in managing the 
Trains Functional Council was when for various reasons I was 
able to devote a whole day to it, every week ... we were heading 
all sorts of things off at the pass and by and large we were 
successful, y'know, that period. But if you know the day to day 
hurly burly doesn't generally allow you to do that. " [9.1: 20] 
The 'political influence' shared discourse is also is cited as a justification for 
lack of progress, inconsistency of approach being referenced as much as 
overt interference. 
6.2.2.3. The `Defining Moment' Discourse 
Managers also use the metaphor of the 'defining moment' to explain lack of 
progress. This metaphor appears in a number of discourses, either as a 
reason for a lack of change: 
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"And I think it's also true that we haven't had sort of our Wapping 
moment, if you like. We ... haven't sort of cleared the path of 
weeds or gone out and sort of said this is where we stand and 
we're repositioning the business and we're going to do a miners' 
or a Wapping and we'll take whatever it takes and we'll come out 
the other side. " [9.1: 32] 
Or as a catalyst, necessary for change in the future: 
"I think there's going to be a massive, massive punch up on the 
London Underground side, which will be something they won't 
get over, which will mean the union relationship will be 
damaged. It will split them - maybe it'll be a really long strike or 
something. ... I think that there'd be a big big thing that happens - that'll make the RMT a lot less strong, and will allow 
London Underground management a choice to do something 
that they've wanted to do ... I think RMT will shoot themselves, in the foot, big style, and with a clever management, we'll be 
able to exploit that. " [4.1: 578] 
"... (the MD, LUL) may get a big bang because the burning 
platform may be that the RMT completely lose the plot and 
decide to have an all out strike. " [2.1: 309] 
This is a widely used discourse which, one could suppose, serves the function 
for the speakers of explaining the failure to progress whilst also "buying time" 
for the organisation to change in the future. 
203 
6.2.2.4. Affinity as a Disclaimer 
A final notable sub theme is expressions of liking or affinity for the union 
representatives. One can surmise that this is operating as a disclaimer-12, 
warding off a possibly negative attribution from the listener, but it does 
suggest a degree of ambivalence inconsistent with Darlington's "belligerence". 
"... having said all of that these are the most delightful people, 
real fun people that I would every want to deal with, individually, 
and sometimes collectively. But then so can your irresponsible 
teenagers, be great fun to be with, and people who aren't 
mature can be childishly fun to be with, and they are, on so 
many occasions, even when you wonder'where the hell are they 
coming from? ' ... That's the kind of difficulty I get into. There's 
much to admire in the individuals, there's much fun to be had in 
your dealings with them. " [10.1: 108] 
This appears in a watered down version in the discourse of participant 4.1, 
who stresses the importance of personal relationships in managing industrial 
relations: 
"So much of this stuff at the end of the day comes down to 
personal relationships. It really just depends on what the 
person's like who's ... sat over the other side of the table from 
you or the person who's sat next to you advising you, as to what 
your opinion is of that particular union. " [4.1: 47] 
42 Potter & Wetherell, 1987, quoting Hewitt & Stokes (1975), use the term "disclaimer" to denote phrases such as "I'm 
not a racist but .. ", which are used by the speaker before making a comment which they are aware may be 
perceived pejoratively, as an attempt to pre-empt such an attribution by the listener. 
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In all likelihood, however, this represents the complexity of inter-personal 
relationships in industrial relations in an environment such as London 
Underground. The participants have an ability to distinguish between the 
personal and the collective, as articulated by 10.1 and 4.1. 
6.2.2.5. Summary 
To summarise, respondents undoubtedly recognised the contribution of 
managers to industrial unrest, but their explanations are far more elaborate 
than simple "belligerence", using shared discourses on conditioned behaviour, 
capability and political influence to justify their contribution. 
Many of these discourses are used functionally by managers and moderate 
trade unionist respondents, as explanations for lack of progress, to explain 
and excuse the ongoing militancy and the organisation's lack of 
modernisation. 
There are obvious links to institutional theory (normative pressures), 
resistance to change and the polemical and resistant public sector literature 
on "commercialisation". 
There are a number of possible reasons for this discrepancy with Darlington: 
Darlington's view may only be partially correct; the small sample in the pilot 
were unrepresentative (which will be tested further in the main study); or there 
has been a change in attitude between the Darlington study and the present 
interviews (this seems unlikely, as the majority of the participants have in 
excess of 10 years' service). It seems most likely, however, that Darlington's 
choice of interviewees, which did not include any managerial representatives, 
has produced conclusions which reflects the distinctive view of the union 
activists and ER staff he interviewed. 
6.2.3. Business Factors Driving Militancy 
Darlington posits two elements under this general category: 
" Commercialisation. 
" Monopoly situation. 
The data in this study will be considered against these 2 items. 
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6.2.3.1. Commercialisation 
Darlington cites one of the main reasons for ongoing militancy being the trade 
unions' ideological opposition to privatisation, and resistance to the resultant 
job losses or detriment to terms and conditions. 
London Underground is not itself privatised, although the entire maintenance 
operation has been privatised (the 'PPP') and is now run by Metronet and 
Tube Lines, 2 private sector organisations staffed largely with ex-London 
Transport staff. The organisation is, however, currently subject to significant 
pressures to commercialise, therefore it was felt it was useful to look at wider 
discourses around commercialisation, rather than limit the topic of study to 
privatisation. 
Respondents do raise commercialisation as a issue: 
"But then you also have a genuine aversion with RMT and I think 
ASLEF as well, although ASLEF have adapted better, is to the 
actual involvement of the private sector. 
Now, you know I mean quite clearly as far as RMT are 
concerned, 'private sector bad, public sector good'. Completely 
in their political views around not just the rail industry but 
generally, and that shapes their behaviour. Shapes their 
behaviour in some sort of really quite interesting ways I mean in 
terms of problems now we have a public-private partnership well 
the private part of that RMT will not rest until that in some way or 
other is reversed, pulled back into the public sector. The 
problems that with Railtrack and then with Network Rail and then 
a movement back into Network Rail of rail and maintenance staff 
etc. was a great victory for them. As far as they could see they 
greatly applauded Alistair Darling, you know, the darling of the 
left, who actually you can see it now was returning to 
nationalisation. 
And it's that kind of political view, very extreme, old Labour type 
views. Old Labour type views, verging on sort of extreme 
socialist views. It's never far from the way they'll consider 
particular issues. " [10.1: 140-144] 
And indicate that it is an issue which still influences behaviour: 
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"The days of when we could go back to government and the 
government would give us an increased grant, the days when 
we could do that are gone. So, that to an extent is also where 
the problem is very difficult. Will the trade unions do the trade 
unions really understand that? How do you change 10,20 years 
and behaviours become different. Hang on a minute, that's not 
how this game's supposed to be played, they're supposed to go 
and find more money for us. " [10.1: 26] 
This is part of the wider 'explanations for lack of progress' functionality of 
much of the discourse in this study and links to the 'organisational history' 
repertoire. 
It is also used to justify a particular stance: 
'We have a responsibility to London, we are here to provide a 
public service, not here to pursue the ends of any individual 
union, or any individual manager, or director or MD of this 
organisation. We have to provide services to London and we're 
given a certain amount of money to do that. And that money 
isn't limitless. " [2.1: 86] 
Interestingly, however, LUL is represented by 2 managers as the victim of rail 
privatization, in that it has become the last opportunity for militant trade unions 
to gain political power: 
"... the trade unions have certainly seen their power base to 
some extent eroded in the National Rail network by privatisation, 
by fragmentation of the National Rail network. And I think 
they've kind of looked at London Underground as the last 
opportunity that they have to really exercise political power, 
sometimes with a big 'P', in terms of actually exercising some 
changes in society overall. " [9.2: 24-25] 
"And the difficulty w' dealing with the political ideology, there is 
the agenda. It strikes me as pretty strange that the one 
company you hit the most is London Underground, which is 
really a public enterprise which is as a socialist you aspire to 
anyway. You want it. And yet when I look at the companies 
outside, 50 million pound profits, paying 600 thousand to their 
senior executives, guess what, they hardly get touched, it's me 
that gets it. 'Cause I think they see me, it's really the bit if you 
can get in with 4 day weeks and get it because it's a soft target, 
they can then try and apply that through the rail industry, mind 
207 
there's no doubt in my mind that they want to dominate the 
transport industry, completely. " 
[10: 2: 12] 
There is a sense, however, that commercialisation as an issue is losing 
relevance: 
"Y'know we've kind of done a lot to try and bring 'em in. And I 
think that has succeeded in you know also it's not being stoked 
at the political level as it was during the PPP, but it has done a 
lot to kind of take the strength of feeling out of that. " [9.1: 68] 
This probably reflects the difference in timing between this (2004) and 
Darlington's study (2001). 
6.2.3.2. Monopoly 
The monopoly argument is the converse of the privatisation argument, 
proposing that lack of competition in public sectors has resulted in less 
pressure to reduce jobs than in the private sector. 
Managers were clearly aware of the difference between a private sector 
company, with its exposure to competitive forces, and a public sector 
monopoly. A discursive repertoire on 'market messages' indicated that the 
lack of commercial pressure was problematic in instigating change: 
"... market messages aren't as strong. You know we're not 
going to go bust. Absolute decades since we reduced the 
number of train drivers, let alone moved them around or made 
anybody redundant. " [9.1: 114] 
"So people simply don't believe in that there's a slash-and-burn 
agenda or even a gentle 'people are going to have to face up to 
hard decisions' ... and we're not we're not sort of under 
competition from y'know Paris Metro is kind of moving in on our 
business ... There's no chance of a takeover bid or a competitor 
coming in. So there's no real messages just don't really exist, 
which is it's always been difficult to summon up the energy to 
stand your ground and I think as I say, the environment hasn't 
been conducive towards the long term, long term battleground. " 
[9.1: 18-126] 
"... there are consequences for these behaviours but they don't 
believe that they will be that way in terms of London 
Underground, London Transport, they don't see that they will do 
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anything different there. For them it's never a case of well, if we 
don't do this the factory will close. It will always be there, 
someone will always come along and give them something to 
keep them happy. " [10.1: 102] 
"... a successful business. That's much more apparent in the 
private sector where you can measure that interest and maybe 
it's part of the challenge for us in the public sector where you 
can't measure revenue as an absolute. " [2.1: 26] 
This is linked to two socially shared discourses: the 'organisational history' 
sub-theme (see the last sentence of [10.1: 102] and 'capability', stressing 
inadequacy of management communications (see 9.1's use of the term 
"messages" and 2.1's "challenge for us"). 
No inference can, however, be made from these sections that the unions' 
militancy is a response to being in a monopoly situation, simply that managers 
find it difficult to generate any urgency around change given the lack of 
commercial imperative. 
6.2.4. Conflict Between Unions 
The final factor which Darlington suggests increases militancy is conflict 
between ASLEF and RMT. As indicated above, there is conflicting evidence 
for this in this study. 
6.2.4.1. Membership Profiles 
Darlington characterizes the relationship between the 2 unions as conflictual, 
given that the RMT's broader based membership results in a commensurately 
weaker position vis-ä-vis ASLEF. This was clearly refuted in the managers' 
discourses, which see the RMT as the most powerful union: 
"RMT has I think because of their more generic involvement in 
the rail industry, actually have a power base that extends to for 
us its our station staff, the supervisors on our stations, a 
significant proportion of our train drivers and a very specific 
group in terms of signallers, the people who control services. So 
they have a strong power base in terms of their ability to wield 
industrial muscle on our services and can do so, very often, 
without the need for bringing about an all out strike situation, 
even some attempt to shall we say to have industrial action on 
the part of the signallers can have a damaging impact on our 
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services out of all proportion to the number of staff involved. 
Small number but again very strong. " [10: 46] 
Although problematic in its political orientation and cavalier in its approach: 
"RMT are kind of at a crossroads. Because ... there is a labour 
government, RMT are disaffiliated from the Labour Party, they're 
kind of sitting out there on their own. And you know the risk is 
they become too isolated from the realities of life, and actually 
become a sort of UKIP43 equivalent on the trade union side ... 
and that's probably not a healthy position for them to be in long 
term either. I think unfortunately their leadership, perhaps not all 
of their leadership understands the implications of that, and is 
just doing it 'cause its fun to do it. " [9.2: 200] 
ASLEF are seen as having their own power base: 
"ASLEF is a small trade union but a very powerful one in that it 
has 50,55 percent of our train operators where our industrial 
muscle lies. " [10: 7] 
But are strongly ideologically differentiated from the RMT: 
"ASLEF, although powerful in their own way, do behave in a 
different way. Very procedurally driven, not usually with political 
agendas. RMT is, of course, quite strongly politically driven, 
ASLEF seems to be primarily concerned about the wellbeing of 
their train drivers, and are rather proud of the train driver 
tradition. " [10.1: 13] 
Which demonstrates itself in a different way of doing business: 
" UKIP (UK Independence Party) was a short lived political party who, headed by Robert Kilroy-Silk, attempted to 
contest the 2004 London mayoral election. 
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"... it's (ASLEF) like a masonic lodge rather than a trade union" 
[9.2: 183] 
And a different approach to industrial relations: 
"I believe they (ASLEF) are the union that talk to us most about 
working in partnership and I think as far as they understand it 
they do want to do that. " [10.1: 58] 
However, ASLEF's potential as a partner is qualified by its chaotic leadership 
battles: 
"lt will be slow for them, it will be difficult for them, but as they 
and particularly now post Mick Rix era and they haven't been 
settled down with a new General Secretary so we don't again 
they have their internal difficulties. " [10.1: 58] 
"ASLEF are in crisis. They've had internal punch-ups, 
metaphorically and literally ... They are leaderless in many ways, they are losing ground significantly to the RMT. In terms of 
credibility and membership ... when they count the numbers up, 
surely we'll see that RMT have significantly more train driver 
membership than they used to have. 
[9.6: 52-56] 
"I really think that the leadership mess that ASLEF has got itself 
into the last year has really done huge damage to them and 
probably is something that isn't easy to recover from, I think. 
You know I think they're slightly naive if they think that a new 
general secretary will arrive and will turn the trade union around 
again. It will take a long time to rebuild that. " 
[9.2: 186] 
And its position as a union in decline: 
"But in London Underground, ASLEF probably will die as a trade 
union, maybe 20 years out but the membership will fall as we 
have an ability by technology to have driverless trains. " [10.1: 56] 
I think they I actually think ASLEF are in real danger now of 
losing a lot of members and a lot of credibility. I think a lot of 
younger staff have you know ASLEF have always appealed to 
the traditional senior train operator, train driver, male, white, 
members of staff. " [9.2: 183] 
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One respondent, indeed, goes so far as to suggest ASLEF is likely to be 
subsumed by the RMT: 
"They did have a swing to the left when Mick Rix was elected as 
General Secretary, he did move closer to RMT. There was 
some speculation that the future of ASLEF probably may well lie 
in joining with RMT, being swallowed because with a small 
membership base it is more expensive to belong to ASLEF, they 
don't noticeably do that much better job for members so there 
has been a swing away from ASLEF to RMT. " [10.1: 56] 
One can surmise that this is influenced by current events (as discussed in 
section 6.1.4. ), but it still suggests a significant departure from Darlington. 
To examine this issue, one must look at constructions of power in the data. 
The RMT are seen as a powerful union because of their willingness to use 
industrial action, whereas ASLEF's rather less antagonistic approach results 
in a construction of the union as powerful (they are still able to raise support 
for highly disruptive strikes) but more businesslike and more willing to debate 
issues. This has obvious links to the section on linguistic constructions of 
power (discussed in section 6.3.1.3. ). 
6.2.4.2. Competition for Members 
Accounts clearly indicate conflict between ASLEF and RMT, linked to 
competition for members: 
" ... when the strike was called over the wages, ASLEF crossed the picket line. And took great delight in doing so, 'cause they 
they'd get more members by not going on strike. " [10.2: 60] 
Competition for members, as the above quote suggests, is cited as the factor 
underpinning the inter-union conflict: 
"... there is a real issue there, it all boils down to the fact that 
RMT are competing for members everywhere, all over the place, 
and RMT are kind of like the white shark. In that they will go 
round actually in a very unprincipled way and will pick up you 
know dead and dying pockets of other representation and 
swallow them up, without so much as a second though ... ASLEF actually probably do the same although ... they kind of try and do it in a more upright way. " [9.2: 182-200] 
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" ... something that we also deal with which is the problem of 
competition for members when you've got a multi-union 
environment. And that is always with them, they're always 
concerned as to how ASLEF can poach members from RMT 
and vice versa, and then TSSA how they can get more stations 
staff, operational staff. So it's really quite messy and you always 
know you're in for trouble when elections are coming up. " 
[10.1: 18] 
However, employee relations staff differ in their views of whether the conflict 
between the unions is advantageous to the organisation: [10.1] contradicts 
Darlington in the following quote: 
" ... dealing with 3 trade unions as we do ... can be both a blessing and a curse. The power clearly vies and swings 
between RMT and ASLEF and despite ASLEF being the smaller 
union but with a lot of power with the train drivers, the RMT are 
aggressive, confrontational, adversarial, typical hostage 
bargaining situations, proud of the fact that they can call the as 
they call it "the lads" out any time they want and have proved 
that they can time and time again ... the curse and the benefit of having a multi-union environment, I suppose that's then because 
we don't necessarily end up with facing industrial action or 
difficulties across the piece, with one union, as we have at the 
moment, for example industrial action by RMT members, but 
with ASLEF staff in the main trying to get into work, so we are 
running some services. " [10.1: 12-18] 
The "blessing and curse" theme is picked up by another manager: 
`RMT and TSSA so they would never agree, they would never 
meet beforehand, so they'd never force a management view, 
they were actually giving us opportunities to divide and rule 
again. Which was actually very frustrating. If you wanted to 
divide and rule. But it's frustrating, 'cause we never actually 
knew what we were dealing with. " [9.4: 27] 
Another senior employee relations manager, however, unequivocally sees the 
conflict as problematic for the organisation: 
" ... it's this tit for tat, this if one (union) gets something, the other has to get something more, and it's this escalation 'cause one of 
us any one of these unions can hurt us. " [10.2: 60] 
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" ... it seems to me that every time I sit round that table, every 
union has its own agenda. In other words, although it was a 
joint body, you were negotiating separately within a joint body. 
You had to be conscious of well I'll need to give ASLEF 
something, I need to give RMT something, and this is the way 
we get caught, because what happens is you negotiate 
something for Stations and then ... there's a 
feeling on the 
Railway side that they want these benefits and they want these 
conditions of service, and then it's just ping pong. 
And that's what happens. 'Cause the RMT's now got a foot in 
both (Stations and Trains) so the RMT you get in Stations isn't 
necessarily the same union the same RMT that you're facing 
when it comes to Trains. They play it against each other. The 
animosity between ASLEF and RMT at shop steward level isn't 
as bad as you'd expect. There's a fair amount of co-operation 
down there. But actually at national level, and I'm not talking 
about the Bob Crow's, I'm talking more about the national 
officials ..., there's real aggro. And I'm talking real aggro. To the extent that we were ready to conclude a 35 hour week, 
whereas ASLEF said 'we want to see the figures, we paid for 
this in 1997. We want to see the figures to make sure they pay 
every penny of it. And if they don't, you're in dispute with us'. 
There's a lot of tit for tat. " [10.2: 14-17] 
Although, perhaps reflecting the difference between national and local officials 
articulated above, one of the more junior managers (who deals primarily with 
local officials) sees greater collaboration between the unions when expedient: 
... they were sort of not quite at opposite ends of the table but it was marked last time ... there was remarks about, 'well that 
may be the RMT view but that's not our view'. Although they will 
quite often join up, when they see management are wounded 
they'll go for the kill ... They will work together to achieve their 
aim, when it when it suits them both to do so. " 
[9.3: 204-208] 
Major inter-union divisions in the organisation are also identified between the 
RMT and the TSSA: 
"TSSA I think RMT don't respect them because they think 
they're a bit too weak. There there's no natural allegiance 
between RMT and TSSA or ASLEF and TSSA. " [4.1: 158] 
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" ... it's actually appalling with the way 
RMT and ASLEF behave 
with TSSA. You know for the second largest trade union to be 
treated that way by the other trade unions is really just appalling 
... how that ever gets resolved 
I don't know. " [9.2: 186] 
Interestingly, the antipathy towards the moderate trade union reported by 9.2 
is also articulated by the managers: 
"TSSA is a strange one I mean they are regarded as pariahs or 
as ... scabs. ... 
(senior TSSA official) most upset to be called a 
scab by (RMT representative), which was, I'm sorry to say, quite 
amusing really. " [10.1: 5] 
"(The MD of LUL) probably just sees the TSSA as a bit of a 
joke. " [4.1: 550] 
" .. the difficulty with the TSSA in this organisation is the local 
representatives have always laid themselves open to be a 
laughing stock in this organisation. Set themselves up to be a 
laughing stock and therefore it's just a self-fulfilling prophesy, 
namely that management hasn't had the time for the TSSA 
which is kind of ironic because TSSA should be a big ally. " 
[9.2: 186] 
This discourse, one may surmise, is unhelpful in LUL's industrial relations. 
The TSSA, widely regarded as a 'moderate' trade union, is ideologically the 
most obvious ally to management. However, as these quotes show, they are 
dismissed and marginalized. 
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6.3. Socially Shared Discourses 
Having determined that Darlington's study seems to represent only a partial 
view of the dynamics operating in LUL, and that his choice of research 
subjects has perhaps created a bias in his conclusions, the next consideration 
was to build a more robust model. The next stage of the analysis was to free 
code the interview transcripts, to identify the socially shared discourses 
utilised by managers and trade union representatives. 
As the methodology section indicates, socially shared discourses (and their 
categorization into interpretative repertoires) are fundamental to the study of 
the social construction of reality, as they indicate the major constructs by 
which individuals are characterising their world. 
This coding divided logically into three sections: 
" Views of trade unions (section 6.3.1). 
" View of management (section 6.3.2). 
" Interactions between the industrial relations actors 
(section 6.3.3). 
This section will describe the repertoires and sub-themes used by the 
respondents under these headings. 
6.3.1. Views of Trade Unions 
The NVivo coding for this section is shown in figure 50 below. 
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Figure 50: NVivo Coding for'Views of Trade Unions' Category 
6.3.1.1. Metaphors 
One of the early indications of relations between the managers and the trade 
unions are the range of metaphors used by the managers to describe the 
unionists. The unionists are variously assigned a number of unflattering 
metaphors: weeds, recalcitrant children, crocodiles, sharks. 
The most organic of metaphors was provided by an LUL manager, who likens 
trade unionists to weeds, allowed to gain a foothold in the organisation 
through poor maintenance: 
"One of the sort of the analogies I have that the trade unions are 
a bit sort of like weeds growing in the soil in the cracks in the 
pavings ... and if there wasn't any soil there, you wouldn't have 
any weeds. So if there wasn't a need for them, they wouldn't be 
in the ground, they wouldn't grow ... If you don't do any 
maintenance, you know kind of they'll spread. And that I think 
has happened, and now of course they have their tentacles - 
with this analogy that should be their roots - right throughout the 
organisation. " [9: 4: 12] 
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Linked to a strong discourse (discussed in the next section) which defines 
union maturity in terms of willingness to act in partnership and a focus on 
members' interests (rather than politically motivated), the metaphor of 
recalcitrant children features in managerial discourse: 
"It's like childlike behaviour it's almost like in terms of how they 
actually behave is how you would sometimes see em I don't 
know a rebellious teenager, or worse still a youngster sort of like 
kicking over the traces pushing back on things ... It seems quite 
childlike in the behaviour. It seems like the parent and child sort 
of relationship and how to actually trying to even when we talk 
about'rewarding good behaviour or'doing something about bad 
behaviour, correcting bad behaviour'. All that seems to be 
somehow psychologically in the context of something that 
suggests a lack of maturity. " [10.1: 95-98] 
However, a senior manager uses a much more adversarial metaphor, likening 
the unions to crocodiles and sharks: 
"It's kinda like having two aggressive male crocodiles living in 
the same swamp ... when they kind of tolerate one another, but they'll never accept each other's existence. I think it has been a 
bit like that. " [9.2: 14-18] 
"RMT are competing for members everywhere, all over the 
place, and RMT are kind of like the white shark. In that they will 
go round actually in a very unprincipled way and will pick up er 
you know dead and dying pockets of other representation and 
swallow them up, without so much as a second though. " 
[9.2: 182] 
These metaphors suggest an at best ambivalent relationship between 
managers and unions. However, these unflattering metaphors are juxtaposed 
against discourses which articulate a legitimate role for trade unions; these 
are linked again to the dichotomy between unions which act in the interests of 
their members versus politically motivated trade unions. This will be 
elaborated in the next section. 
6.3.1.2. Motivation 
One of the most interesting areas of the interview analysis is the complex 
interpretative repertoire around militant and moderate trade unions. 
Moderate trade unions and managers developed a clear dichotomy between 
moderate and militant trade unions, with clear clustering of characteristics 
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around each pole. Figure 51 illustrates these terms and attributions, and 
places the trade unions on the continuum (as indicated by the discourse of the 
respondents). 
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Figure 51: Discourses of Militancy and Moderation 
i) Definition of Terms 
The surprising thing is that the terms 'moderate' (9 instances) and 'militant' 
(13 instances) rarely appear in the interviews (3 participants never use either 
term). Where they do appear, they are adopted unquestioningly, as an 
organisational 'truth', with no attempt to deconstruct the terms; they appear to 
be used as a kind of shorthand to describe a particular approach or mindset. 
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Moderation is clearly set up discursively as a contrast to militancy: 
" ... there is a political 
influence within RMT, and it makes Bob 
Crow as an old communist appear quite moderate compared to 
... his Executive 
Council" [10.1: 50] 
".. up until 5 years ago, these were sort of pretty solid, moderate 
real dedicated trade unionists. Those people have all but 
disappeared. But more so on RMT than on ASLEF. But both 
sides changed their changed their changed their role in that area 
to be more I suppose militant, more focused on the political 
agenda, not interested in perhaps the traditional beer and 
sandwiches discussions, which we've been used to as 
management, where you can you know, 'there's a deal here, we 
can work together'. " [9.6: 104] 
The most common use of the terms is to describe inter- and intra- union 
politics (7 instances): 
"MSF went through a similar thing ... It became MSF and TAS 
and TAS was the old craft union and very militant. " [4.1: 356] 
"I think that like some of the other unions who lurched to the left 
5 years ago, and have now come back to being a bit more 
moderate, I think the RMT some of their people may wake up, 
get rid of the General Secretary at the next election, something 
might happen that way ... 
(Being perceived as a successful 
union by members is) the only reason I think they might not lurch 
back to being a bit more moderate whilst they're seen as 
effective. Whilst the tactic they've got doesn't help the rank and 
file of Londoners it has certainly protected their members their 
pay has gone up ... But as far as will they change I think I've just talked myself out of that. They'll become more moderate I don't 
think so. " 
[4.1: 91-103] 
"(ASLEF) have their own militants, don't they. " [10.1: 56] 
"John Leach of the RMT, who is a decent enough guy, and 
obviously beat a couple of the militants in the recent elections for 
their Executive Committee, had just done an agreement on the 
Stations. " [32.1: 142] 
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"I also have a lot of pressure on my back from militants within 
my own organisation. " [32.1: 164] 
3 interviewees make an explicit link between militancy and a left wing political 
orientation: 
"... the Labour Party, the Labour Government is not run by left 
wing militants probably ex-left wing militants, they don't practice 
it anymore. So they're not politically aligned with the RMT's 
ideologies. " [4.1: 214] 
I mean used to have it years ago when Unison was Nalgo or 
part Nalgo, PCS all these predominately clerical, where the vast 
majority of the membership are conservative with a small 'c' 
because of the apathy, lack of interest, opened themselves up to 
take-overs by more militant, left wing dominated people. " 
[32.1: 252] 
"The ballot was swung by ... one person ... who was a 
Scottish 
Labour Party member ... the equivalent of the ... militant sort of Socialist Labour Party in Scotland. " [10.1: 50] 
The remainder of the instances of the terms are linked to value associations: 
non-militancy is linked to collaboration, making a clear link between Kelly's 
"incorporation" and repertoires stressing collaboration and partnership: 
"I've been over to Germany, France and Holland and Sweden, to 
talk to them about this. Yeah, the unions are less militant but 
they're more they're up to their eyes in being collaborative. " 
[4.1: 395] 
Responsible behaviour: 
"(TSSA) do behave very responsibly, because of the fact they're 
a staff association, typically non militant and traditionally 
disappointed that what they see as good behaviour isn't 
rewarded in some way. " [10.1: 18] 
Looking after members' interests rather than pursuing a political agenda: 
" 
... 
in the late 80s ASLEF had some very moderate leaders, 
whom actually were after the betterment of their members, 
interested in the welfare of their members' lives, and it was 
probably right some of the things they did. But the modern 
generation of unions they would say there were soft. They 
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negotiate quite hard with us, they gotta lot out of us, but we got a 
lot out as well. So it's actually getting enough ... of a 
moderation so you can actually sit down and talk. There's too 
much extreme for when I listen to try to talk to the trade unions. " 
[9.4: 170-171] 
"I know that some of the RMT people, there is the political 
agenda and actually you're paying these people to be full time 
political activists, for the RMT. They're not doing what my 
people are doing, which is trying to sort out industrial problems, 
but maybe in one case certain people have appeared on TV on 
picket lines for companies unrelated to LUL. " [26.1: 495] 
And generally'being the good guys': 
"Certainly the RMT seem to have gone a lot quieter. No bad 
column inches, which is good for them. They're seen as being 
much more moderate, they're seen as being almost the good 
guys now, I think. " [9.4: 209] 
Comparing these constructions of the terms to Kelly's model of militancy, one 
can see the correlation between Kelly's 'incorporation' and the repertoires 
stressing collaboration and partnership. However, it is illuminating to look at 
the value judgments associated with these constructions. Whilst 'quiescence' 
(infrequent threat/use of industrial action) and 'accommodation' (moderate 
demands) are linked to themes of mature, responsible behaviour and looking 
after member's interests, there is a strong contrary theme which associates 
power in industrial relations with the ability to marshal and deploy industrial 
muscle (Kelly's "mobilization"). 
This tension is clearly shown in the discourse of the LUL managers. Whilst 
they talk about maturity and responsible behaviour, as indicated at the end of 
section 6.2.4.2., their discourse conveys marked antipathy to moderate trade 
unions and respect for 'industrial muscle', as this section will discuss. 
This link between militancy and power echoes the value judgment embedded 
in Kelly's left wing stance and his claim that union independence relies upon 
the union's ability to mobilise. One would expect managers and moderate 
trade unions to advocate moderation (as the extracts above serve to do); also, 
however, the correlation between strength-militancy and weakness- 
moderation which they make is very strong: 
"(ASLEF) immediately serve me w' 4 ballots, on really issues 
that are very minor, on the basis that 'Well we'll show you we're 
a militant union'. " [10.2: 60] 
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" ... moderates don't tend to stick around very long because the 
moderates tend to be much more participative and wanna work 
with people and by the very definition aren't banging the table 
and demanding more and being more proactive in being less 
aggressive and critical and therefore don't see that as a sign of 
weakness. Whereas actually that strategy may well be 
benefiting to them in the long term. " 
[4.1: 107] 
Several of the managerial respondents saw more moderate trade unions as 
unclear of purpose and, in consequence, difficult with which to deal. 
"ASLEF, yeah. Out of the two RMT are probably easier to deal 
with, you always know where you stand with RMT, you may not 
like what you're standing in, but you know where you stand. " 
[10.1: 1] 
There is also a suggestion of antipathy to moderate trade unionism which 
links to the reviling of the 'tolerance' strategy discussed in the Everest report: 
" 
... there's one style (within TSSA) which is very much 
someone who one style is very much to try and ingratiate 
themselves with management, seen to be trying to take the 
moral high ground, seem to ... almost enjoy bringing things to 
management to management's attention first. So that's one kind 
of style. So that style is a very ingratiating type style. " [4.1: 51, 
my emphasis] 
"(The MD, LUL) probably just sees the TSSA as a bit of a joke. " 
[4.1: 550] 
Militant trade unionism was also seen as highly effective in both furthering the 
interests of union members: 
"... by and large the trade unions have often got things out of 
strikes that made it worthwhile. And that was why the 
membership were kind of happy to go to the barricades without 
really understanding why. " [9.1: 56] 
... if you're a train driver, you'd think that they've (the RMT) done a good job because their pay has gone up so much and 
that the Underground management seem to give into them ... And from a driver - as far as someone who pays a membership 
subscription is concerned are you really going to have too much 
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of a problem with what they've got, 'cause they'd be quite 
pleased. " [4.1: 91] 
and in gaining wider influence in the transport industry (as earlier discussions 
on the impact of privatisation indicate). 
One can argue that this repertoire linking militancy and power, whilst 
dysfunctional in its implicit endorsement of militancy, derives from an 
unquestioned organisational 'truth' which has significant implications for 
industrial relations in LUL. Whilst one manager articulates a preference for 
working with the moderate trade unions, this individual is probably the most 
removed of all the respondents from day to day industrial relations: 
"... we have is an opportunity with the more moderate trade 
unions to go forward. " [2.1: 172] 
However, as indicated above, the dominant organisational shared discourse 
does not support this view; managers actually express an antipathy towards 
working with moderate trade unions. This, one may surmise, creates a 
conceptual constraint on the organisation's ability to manage and moderate 
the militant influence. 
ii) Positioning of the Unions 
The interviewees uniformly and unquestioningly define the poles in figure 5 by 
placing TSSA in the moderate and RMT in the militant category. 
Participants have little difficulty in defining the agenda of the RMT: 
"(The political agenda of the RMT is) anti-capitalist straight down 
the line of 'Socialist Worker', straight down the line of believing 
that everything to do with management is bad because the 
management is the old upper class and the workers are the 
working class and the balance is wrong. " [4.1: 67] 
"I sort of pick up an there is there are extremists there within the 
RMT at fairly high levels, who are little short of being ... 
anarchists. Little short of actually advocating sort of a break 
down of the social order, in order to bring about political change. 
In terms of how and these are people who quite frankly have 
moved into the trade union movement and where they actually 
are to actually bring about such political change. " [10.1: 140] 
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Nor the TSSA, who are regarded with a benevolent distain: 
" ... the TSSA bless them, proud of the 
fact they've not had - on 
London Underground anyway - industrial action since 1926 ... 
they do behave very responsibly, because of the fact they're a 
staff association, typically non militant. " [10.1: 18] 
Interestingly, ASLEF are clearly viewed in the literature (e. g. Darlington, 2001, 
p 6) and by the respondents as a less militant trade union than RMT, but are 
seen as one prepared to undertake militant activities when deemed 
necessary) were not assigned to either category: 
" ... reputationally 
in the organisation they (ASLEF) have they sit 
alongside the RMT being seen as militant, but not who we deal 
with. " [4.1: 119] 
and the ASLEF representative interviewed was careful to construct his actions 
and the actions of his union within a frame which, whilst not labeled as such, 
clearly fulfilled all of the characteristics of a partnership (this is discussed in 
section 6.3.1.3., part iiii). 
There was a clear differentiation between RMT and ASLEF, the latter 
perceived as less militant and more erring towards 'professionalism': 
If ... management, I think traditionally would favour ASLEF because they're the professionals, they're the people who have, 
apart from 1 or 2 disputes, been perhaps less politically 
motivated when it comes to issues. Yes, they go hell for leather 
in getting the most for their members, financially or time off, but 
they haven't used it to use as a political agenda, because Tony 
Blair ... decides to declare war in Iraq, so we'll stop operating a Railway, which often came up with the new RMT member, 
saying this is what we should be doing, there's a bigger social 
context. " [9.6: 60] 
However, as indicated in figure 5, 'professionalism' is not directly linked to the 
terms 'militant' and 'moderate': it is used in relation to ASLEF's history as a 
professional guild, established in reference to unions such as BALPA (British 
Airlines Pilots' Association), rather than any of the other Underground unions. 
"ASLEF, although powerful in their own way, do behave in a 
different way. Very procedurally driven, not usually with political 
agendas - RMT is, of course, quite strongly politically driven, 
ASLEF seems to be primarily concerned about the wellbeing of 
their train drivers, and are rather proud of the train driver 
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tradition. I know that they have always vied with or would see 
themselves as a bit like BALPA, the airline pilots, as a 
professional union with professional people, and that is 
something that has guided the way they behave. " [10.1: 1] 
The last of the major unions, TGWU, are discussed in similar terms to ASLEF 
(oriented towards working with an organisation, but prepared to use militant 
tactics if necessary), but are perceived as more fragmented and ambiguous: 
" ... the T&G is a different organisation depending on where you 
go. There are still pockets of the T&G that I think would still 
make the RMT look like a picnic. And to a certain extent I would 
say politically the T&G's a very ambiguous union at the moment. 
Woodley gives out mixed messages. " [26.1: 48] 
iii) Attribution of Characteristics 
The interpretative repertoire of 'militancy' was linked to a variety of negative 
characteristics: political motivation (at the expense of members' interests), 
illegitimate aims, irresponsibility and immaturity. A contrast is set up between 
'old fashioned' trade unionism (linked to 'honourable' behaviour) and 'canteen 
trade unionism'. 
Both managers and moderate trade unionists linked militancy to politically 
motivation: 
"The RMT will not use the machinery, they will not they will 
ballot, ballot, ballot, because some of their senior officials have a 
political bent and motive for it. " [32.1: 120] 
This political motivation was established as in opposition to acting in the 
interests of the members: 
" ... some of the 
RMT members lost out ... if they'd been clever 
and said, accepted it for ... one group of their staff, surely then that strengthens your argument to get it for the other group of 
staff ... So why do they then do that? I mean I can't understand that as a negotiator. Right? You know you get your foot in the 
door. Instead they're happy to be waving the red flag outside 
the manager's door. When I see as a win-win then to get 
something for them then to improve on and build on in future 
years. " [32.1: 144-148] 
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"You see, I can I feel passionate about what I do. And the 
industry. And I'd rather have a win-win than a lose-lose. Right? 
That's what they (the members) pay me for. " [32.1: 154] 
"At a local level we've got some reps who work very closely with 
managers because they see that's the best way to get the the 
outputs and the best outputs for the people they represent. 
Others are just completely politically motivated and will quite 
often recommend things that are patently not in the best that are 
patently not in the best for the individual concerned. " 
[9.3: 74] 
"The other thing that I have real difficulty in getting my head 
around is the complete split between the local level reps and the 
politically activated reps, the head office reps, just do not meet 
at any point. So for example a lot of the things that at a head 
office level they're aspiring for through the pay deal or whatever, 
when we sort out how we're going to make it work, it will actually 
not be what the rank and file wanted in terms of the way they 
want something delivered. " [9.3: 76] 
This political motivation, to the exclusion of members' interests, was 
constructed as an illegitimate aim: 
"I think again, it's worth differentiating between the kind of ... 
political purpose of the trade union leaders, or at least some of 
them, which is some cases is quite unashamedly about class 
revolution, as opposed to the legitimate, the more legitimate, I 
would argue, employee relations aspiration to improve the lot of 
their members. I think those 2 things are quite different. " 
[9.2: 24-26] 
" ... what I find unhealthy sometimes ... I think there are agendas being pushed for individual purposes and I sometimes feel like 
the staff get squeezed out. And I think that's what goes on, 
quite a lot, in London Underground. I'm not sure that a lot of the 
battles are about staff; I think they're about political positioning 
and in some ways an excuse for a fight, as it were. It's because 
the train drivers in London Underground actually are paid pretty 
well, pretty well. There's no an issue there. So one has to 
wonder why we're here in August of 2004, with a deal the unions 
are happy with, apart from the RMT. Personal agendas going 
on there. " 
[2.1: 22-24] 
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Some trade unionists also articulate the dichotomy between the political and 
members' interests, with this moderate trade unionist seeing the former as a 
necessary evil: 
" ... my job's an industrial one, but by the nature of where I've 
come from and the nature of the contacts I've got, I sometimes 
have got dragged in on the political side. " [26.1: 56] 
Discourses emphasising the irresponsibility and immaturity of militant trade 
unionists supported this view. 
"It's like childlike behaviour it's almost like in terms of how they 
actually behave is how you would sometimes see ... a rebellious teenager, or worse still a youngster sort of like kicking over the 
traces pushing back on things and ... It seems quite childlike in the behaviour. It seems like the parent and child sort of 
relationship and how to actually trying to even when we talk 
about'rewarding good behaviour' or'doing something about bad 
behaviour, correcting bad behaviour. All that seems to be 
somehow psychologically in the context of something that 
suggests a lack of maturity. But I think the lack of maturity as 
well comes in terms of some of the representatives with whom 
we deal now. Now maybe I'm in danger of being around too 
long, it's sort of like the old bobby on the beat used to have more 
cred than shall we say some of the people now, but I seem to 
think back and seem to remember the people with credibility, 
gravitas people with strength, principles, etc. of some of the 
older representatives we've dealt with. 
Now there seems to be there seems to be an almost like a 
gleeful irresponsibility in terms of how the representatives 
behave without much in terms of considering the longer term 
consequences ... there are consequences for these behaviours but they don't believe that they will be that way in terms of 
London Underground, London Transport, they don't see that 
they will do anything different there. For them it's never a case 
of well, if we don't do this the factory will close. It will always be 
there, someone will always come along and give them 
something to keep them happy. It's that lack of maturity that's 
with us now. " [10.1: 7] 
The theme embedded in this paragraph of a contrast between militancy and 
'old fashioned' trade unionism, seen as honourable and legitimate in its aim to 
support its members, is picked up by a number of other respondents. 
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"Certainly in the time I've been in the Underground ... when we had Sectional Councils, which were sort of full time release 
people, I don't recall it being nearly as political. These were 
guys who did medical terminations, discipline, all this kind of 
thing and they took a pride in their job, but they were sensible. " 
[9.3: 70] 
"... up until 5 years ago, these (the Functional representatives) 
were sort of pretty solid, moderate, real dedicated trade 
unionists. Those people have all but disappeared. But more so 
on RMT than on ASLEF. But both sides changed their changed 
their changed their role in that area to be more I suppose 
militant, more focused on the political agenda, not interested in 
perhaps the traditional beer and sandwiches discussions, which 
we've been used to as management, where you can you know, 
'there's a deal here, we can work together'. " [9.6: 102-106] 
"(RMT's) no longer ... like a proud railway trade union when it 
was NUR and I was asking Bob Crow fairly recently in terms of 
what happened to their mural. In terms of a mural stained glass 
when you went to their headquarters there was this big stained 
glass thing it was a whole wall, and there was a whole history of 
NUR for more than 100 years as a trade union I mean it 
probably went back to the Tolpuddle Martyrs and the rest of it on 
that mural. Tremendous pride and ... tremendous socialist 
principles, with that trade union. 
But, of late, one doesn't see quite that that honest railway mans' 
union, there are different factions within the trade union ... 
So 
it's a very difficult trade union to understand as a trade union, 
what it is and I think some of the pride and some of the good 
things about trade unions that NUR represented have probably 
been lost. " [10.1: 48-52] 
This is set up in contrast to 'canteen trade unionism', where the most 
outspoken individuals are the ones who get elected rather than those with the 
most ability: 
"(A TSSA member)'s got this expression, which I think is quite 
good, which is called, 'canteen trade unionism', and what he's 
saying ... is that the guy down the canteen who gives it the most 
mouth, now seems to be the person who's becoming not just 
depot rep not just Company Councillor, but is potentially 
standing for General Secretary and winning. The trouble is, he 
doesn't necessarily understand the real politik of that ... And 
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what (he) is saying is that there's a certain populism that's 
developing. " [26.1: 15-16] 
6.3.1.3 Constructions of Trade Union Power 
There is a further interesting feature which appears very relevant to the 
London Underground industrial relations environment, and has potential 
implications for industrial relations practice in the future: discourses of trade 
union power. 
i) Sources of Power 
Batstone's (1978) four sources of trade union power are substitutability, 
occupancy of a critical position, immediacy and the impact on uncertainty. 
Using this model, one can see that the train driver population place ASLEF 
and RMT in a very powerful position: they ensure that skills are not 
substitutable (train drivers are a scarce resource, due to the long training 
cycle, and picketing deters - but does not always prevent - members of the 
other union from substituting). Picketing also serves to ensure that industrial 
action has an impact on the other (more substitutable) employee group: 
station staff. TSSA, with membership largely in the (very substitutable) 
managerial and administrative grades, do not have the leverage of ASLEF 
and the RMT. 
In terms of criticality Batstone's second source of power, ASLEF again has 
the upper hand, as their core membership of train drivers occupies the most 
critical role in the organization. The RMT, the other union which represents 
train drivers, also represents the signalers (whom, with relatively small 
numbers, can bring the network to an almost immediate halt). Both train 
drivers and signalers occupy critical roles in the organisation, hence give their 
trade unions tremendous leverage. TSSA again represent staff in non-critical 
positions, hence lack leverage. 
Immediacy, Batstone's third source of power, is guaranteed by the nature of 
the business: a train journey is a "perishable product" [10.2: p 2] and 
management can make no forward provision for industrial action. 
Indeed, the only one of Batstone's sources of power which are not held by the 
RMT and ASLEF is creating or management of uncertainty; although 
maintenance staff potentially could yield this power, they are now part of an 
outsourced organisation, which makes coordinated industrial action more 
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difficult (employees are unwilling to lose pay to support members in another 
organisation), although not impossible. 
In summary, the RMT and ASLEF both have very powerful positions within the 
organisation, using Batstone's model. 
One may surmise that, whilst Batstone provides a good analysis of the 
sources of industrial relations power, he omits the willingness to use that 
power and the union's ability to mobilise its members (which suggests that a 
model which combines elements of Batstone and Kelly may be more 
comprehensive). 
ii) Control of and Willingness to Use Power 
Using Batstone's model, the homogeneous nature of ASLEF's membership 
makes them a more powerful trade union than the RMT, as they substantially 
control the train driver resource. This corresponds to Darlington's view of the 
RMT as weakened by its more diverse membership base. However, this is 
not borne out by the accounts in this study: 
"The future is really having a joint trade union body ... I'll never 
get it 'cause ASLEF as a dying union would form a minority in all 
of these, they'd be overruled. " [10.2: 18] 
Respondents cite the influence of new technology (driverless trains) as the 
future source of ASLEF's destruction, whilst implying that the RMT's more 
diverse membership will allow it to survive. Some of the negativity used to 
describe ASLEF's future prospects may be influenced by the leadership 
difficulties in which ASLEF found itself at the time of the study, but it may also 
be about the ability and willingness of the respective trade unions to use the 
power the constitution of their membership gives them. Respondents indicate 
the intense loyalty of ASLEF's members and their ability to mobilise members 
to take industrial action: 
"For ASLEF their strength comes from the fact that their 
membership will follow their advice, leadership's advice come 
what may, there is absolutely no question of an ASLEF member 
being asked to go on strike and not going on strike. It's just not 
heard of, unlike other trade unions in the country. " 
[9.2: 4] 
However, this is a capability which is used circumspectly. Industrial action is 
clearly unpopular with members (due to the loss of wages) and the ASLEF 
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representative indicates the strategy most appropriate to his members is 
negotiation without recourse to industrial action. 
"I knew, if the offer was good enough, above inflation, right? 
Twice the rate of inflation, in fact, no strings, no strike, right? 
That they would vote for it. " [29.1: 330] 
"... if you learn your history and I've seen it at the Post Office, 
Fords, British Leyland, people like the (senior RMT official)'Il 
have you out on strike for 6 weeks, you've lost your mortgage, 
your wife's probably left, the kids are crying 'cause they're 
hungry, and they're saying it's a political victory, they see this is 
us against the employers, brothers, and you go trudging back to 
work, y'know. " [29.1: 126] 
However, there is obviously another dynamic operating with the RMT, where 
political positioning over-rides members' interests, as this manager bemoans: 
"I think again, it's worth differentiating between the kind of 
political purpose of the trade union leaders, or at least some of 
them, which is some cases is quite unashamedly about class 
revolution, as opposed to the legitimate, the more legitimate I 
would argue employee relations aspiration to improve the lot of 
their members. I think those 2 things are quite different. " 
[9.2: 26] 
The continued support of members for the RMT, despite this perception that 
they do not always operate in the interests of members, is a topic of some 
debate between the respondents. A variety of explanations are posited for 
this: peer pressure, bullying/coercion and resource dependency (the 'mafia'). 
These are described under the 'coercion' theme in section 6.2.1.2. None of 
these assertions are particularly flattering to the RMT and serve to strengthen 
the militancy-illegitimacy link. 
iii) Discourses of Power 
Given this analysis of the power dynamics in LUL, how do respondents in this 
study linguistically construct trade union power? The data shows a relatively 
simple duality in linguistic construction, as figure 52 shows. 
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Figure 52: NVivo Coding for Linguistic Constructions of Trade Union Power 
Trade union power in TfL was universally linked by the speakers to industrial 
muscle; eve participant used the phrase "industrial muscle" in the course of 
their interview: 
" ... the 
RMT are aggressive, confrontational, adversarial, typical 
hostage bargaining situations, proud of the fact that they can call 
the as they call it "the lads" out any time they want and have 
proved that they can time and time again. " [10.1: 12] 
"If I use the term (industrial) 'might', the only 'might' to make a 
difference really around here is seen to sit in the RMT. Because 
the RMT have controlled this agenda of constant industrial 
unrest. And I put it akin to Arthur Scargill, it seems to be strike 
strike strike strike I'm afraid and similar things in the 70s, and I 
think that's the card the RMT play. " [2.1: 162] 
This was a construction used to describe industrial relations both inside and 
outside the organisation: 
"I know someone who's a train driver for the Illinois State 
Railway, who merged they merged 'cause it's privately run, and 
... their union's 
just merged with the Teamsters, that do the 
construction, and they're hopeful that's going to give them some 
more industrial muscle because their management, it's the 
Santa Fe Railway, management they don't pay allowances and 
all that sort of stuff, all these contractual arrangements they're to 
go to arbitration, and the unions as they currently are don't tend 
to support them, 'cause they the management says it doesn't 
make any difference to us. So he's quite hopeful that he's going 
to get some more industrial muscle so it makes them actually 
get paid properly. " [4.1: 431] 
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The alternative of partnership was largely dismissed by the participants as 
unacceptable to the unions: 
"I think the partnership model is much more around working 
collaboratively ... I think they've tried to think much more 
progressively, in these terms, as if they don't change with it, 
they'll become obsolete ... they 
just don't wanna accept that. 
They'll hang on to the old industrial muscle. And again if I'm a 
driver I might think that's quite a good thing. " [4.1: 278-282] 
Or by managers: 
" ... for me partnership is also being you want to talk and you 
want to involve them. And at a very local level I can never 
understand why a manager would not see his or her 2 staff 
representatives that they may be dealing with as a fundamental 
part of their management team ... So why wouldn't they why 
wouldn't we consider them to be part of that team, therefore 
communicate with them directly, in the same way we 
communicate with the management. There's something about 
working if you can't work together locally, you know in 
partnership, then you're probably lost anyway ... So for me there's something around those very local behaviours. " 
[10.1: 286-292] 
Partnership as an alternative source 
respondent, who formed the discourse 
unattainable, future state: 
of power was indicated by only one 
as a way of describing a desired, but 
"If I were to respond top of head and think about less about what 
their role is but what I would like their role to be, I would like 
them to play the voice of reason and I would like them to 
demonstrate to our people how working with the business can 
be a win win all around and it isn't just through strife and strike 
that the unions can achieve better terms and conditions for 
employees ... I guess an influencing role. But I'm not sure how 
credible, realistic that is but wouldn't it be nice if we could do 
that. " [2.1: 48-150] 
However, ironically perhaps, the most coherent definition of partnership 
working is offered by the trade unionists: 
"I can understand that partnership as a term is uncomfortable for 
some people, because in some ways, it's not an equal 
relationship. The power dynamics always are, management has 
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got the power, to some extent the trade unions do not, but the 
way to look at it, is - for me, it's putting myself in your shoes, 
you putting yourself in my shoes, and to a certain extent 
understanding that there are different perspectives. And to a 
certain extent Pareto's law, 80 20, I've always said that 80 
percent of the time, you and I will be giving the same advice to 
an individual who comes to you as an HR manager, as I would 
as a trade union official. Do they have a good case, do they not 
have a good case? 
80 percent of the time I would see the interests of us as 
completely the same, i. e. y'know I've always taken the view that 
my job would be all about creating a sustainable job, for my 
member in 5 years time, 10 years time, as it would be getting an 
extra point 5,1 percent on the pay deal this year. But what I 
guess it is, how do we sort of construct joint objectives and 
together look at our roles in terms of social responsibility. 
The other thing is that at the end of the day, this is one of the 
great institutions of London. And it is one of the things that 
keeps London going. And there's probably not anybody in 
Greater London who doesn't have some sort of em stake in the 
Tube actually running quite well. And what I certainly see is part 
of my role as is trying to sustain that and trying to help with that 
rather than let's say the constant confrontational thing. The 
problem is that by the very nature of our relationship there will 
be times when we fall out. " [26.1: 639-643] 
Although the phrase itself is avoided, an ASLEF official provides the best 
definition of partnership (one may, however, surmise on the level of 
impression management driving the articulation of this discourse). 
"I do believe today ... it's no use just going in demanding 
something, or asking for it, you've got to give a business case or 
a good reason why, and y'know things like morale and that are 
not really quantifiable. But if you can put a business case 
together, it gives the management a better argument, especially 
if there's a cost saving on it, and the thing is some managers do 
utilise their representatives and their staff because they have 
y'know when you've got a lot of influx of managers last few 
years, who maybe have an armful of degrees but they've got no 
Railway background, you know, and to actually utilise that 
knowledge and skills. So there is a balance there. " [32.1: 48] 
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iii) Summary 
To summarise, this discussion of constructions of trade union power raises a 
number of points. 
It appears that Batstone's power through control of resources (non- 
substitutable and critical resources which can create an immediate impact 
and/or management or uncertainty) is only part of the story: dilution and 
willingness to use power are also influential. 
The 'competiton for members' theme alludes to the impact of dilution: whilst 
the unions are in competition with one another for members, this allows 
substitutability. Perhaps more influentially, strikes are unpopular with 
members, as the ASLEF representative indicates. Whilst members follow 
strike calls (be that because of the coercive forces mentioned earlier in 
connection with the RMT or dependency on trade unions through their control 
of resources such as rostering, or through loyalty, as cited for ASLEF), there 
is a limit to the ability of a trade union to call out its members. 
The description of ASLEF's strategy offered by the ASLEF representative 
describes the circumspect use of power only in the interests of its members, 
and defines success as winning a good deal without recourse to industrial 
action. The RMT, in contrast, are presented as using power indiscriminately, 
to achieve political goals which are not always in the members' interests. 
Success is defined as being seen to be powerful, as 10.1's comments on 
"bringing the lads out" suggests. 
In this study, the RMT's greater willingness to use industrial muscle than 
ASLEF is equated with perceived power - the RMT is represented as the 
more powerful union. This has significant implications for industrial relations 
practice: because the organization responds to politically motivated and strike 
oriented action, it reinforces its use (the "rewarding bad behaviour" discourse). 
6.3.2. Views of Management 
The NVivo coding for this category is shown in figure 53. 
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Figure 53: NVivo Coding for'View of Management' Category 
Managers create a dualistic view of their role, representing their main focus 
(running the business) as subject to a variety of institutional forces (political 
influence and the media are widely cited) which interfere with their operational 
tasks. This is a functional discourse for managers, in that it can attribute any 
failure in the operation role to the influence of external forces. 
6.3.2.1. Role of Management 
6.3.2.1.1. Operational Considerations ('Running the Business') 
The scale of the business is cited as a difficulty which has a direct bearing on 
managers' ability to develop positive employee relations: 
"I suspect if we were a small private school, for instance, when I 
was governor of that, they didn't have need policies and 
procedures for everything really, but you didn't really need things 
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like attendance policies or working time things, because you 
know there's sort of 8 people, you sorta get on with it ... there 
was a common objective and you don't need to nail all these 
things down. I don't think you can even have that happy state of 
affairs when you've got 3000 train crew, 23,24 depots and 
people are looking over their shoulder and what they're doing 
over here, what they're doing over there. Basically you need 
some kind of consistency, and I dare say you will always have 
some tension around it. It's not always gonna be the happy 
family of everyone on the same side and happy train drivers 
doing 2 or 3 hours extra every day, to get the customer across 
the railways. You are gonna have to lay the rules down. But 
you kinda have to do it with clarity and firmness and honesty, on 
both sides. " [9.1: 158] 
"We've found it very difficult to find mechanisms to well, a private 
sector company would say, 'right, we'll close the doors and we'll 
do a training day or something like that'. You would actually 
close the operation down for a day or something like that or half 
a day, you would have a conference or something. Engineering, 
you can take people off work, you lose your production line, but 
yeah if you have you forecast on what you produce for a day, 
then you've actually just lost your sales. You can't stop the 
Underground for a day. " [9.4: 113] 
This clearly links to Batstone's 'substitutability'. 
6.3.2.1.2. Institutional Forces 
However, the main explanations for lack of progress cite institutional forces, 
specifically political influences and the role of the media. 
i) Political Influence 
Political influence is commonly articulated as a reason for lack of progress. 
Political influence is exerted both by the Government: 
" 
... governments 
have all always given us huge support for 
management's position and have said there is no prospect of 
any more money, that's the final position and they will back us to 
the hilt, even if there is industrial action and ... of course they have never, never, once stuck to their position ... 
And that 
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actually just simply blows management's credibility out of the 
water. " [9.2: 10, his emphasis] 
And by the Mayor of London: 
" ... this time round 
is the first time I've been involved at a more 
senior level and you always think somebody knows what they're 
doing, somebody's got the game plan here and understands 
where it's all coming from ... I mean you and I have been party to the discussions where it's clear that there's sort of 2 sets of 
instructions coming up that are completely, will never come 
together, which makes life interesting if not downright 
impossible. So it can be very very difficult and it's clearly got far 
more difficult with the Mayor and Bob Crow dimension. You 
know, we've never had that before. " [9.3: 272-276] 
"... sort of the pressure of circumstance and history and 
precedent and all of the pressure to not change from Londoners 
kind of make that a very difficult line to follow if you're not master 
of your own destiny. At the end of the day, you're not a private 
company and ... it's your call as managing director of a small 
private company it's your call whether you wanna take the aggro 
or not. You don't you're not really in that situation where you've 
got Ken jumping up and down and telling you how to run your 
business. " [9.1: 114] 
This discourse is socially shared, used by trade unionists as well as 
managers: 
"I think that politicians sometimes make short term decisions, 
which is the long term create bigger problems ... I suspect if Ken Livingstone had his time again, he may not have intervened in 
the way he did 2 years ago ... Because the way he did 2 years 
ago, I think was the catalyst for these problems a week before 
election day ... what he was after was the good headline 2 years 
ago, and I think he got that because generally Joe Public out 
there saw the Mayor sorting out the trade union problem, and 
indeed Joe Public out there has now seen the Mayor taking a 
tough stance against the trade union problem. But there again 
the actual 'sorting' of the trade union problems have probably 
been put back 2 years because of him. " [26.1: 12-20] 
The organisation is seen as at the mercy of an inconsistency in political 
influence, a change of allegiance from the Mayor transitioning this influence 
from constraining to helpful: 
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"Ken is in quite a different place these days. Now nobody would 
have predicted that. But it just goes to show that ... events 
conspire as well, sometimes they work for you. " [2: 217] 
"... the one thing that's been different for me out of this pay 
round, is that a lot of it's been the same, the ducking and diving, 
but the one thing that has been different is that after the election 
Ken came out very clearly and said - 'Bollocks: you're not 
having it' ... 
Now ... Ken's a powerful person in terms of his 
mandate, and what have you. And plainly there was differences 
of opinion of the political and the executive wing of the 
enterprise, if I put it like that, which didn't align until very shortly 
after the election. But when they did align, and it kind of felt like 
we had that session where we came from out of the meeting and 
came down here to wait for instructions and we were waiting for 
... the 
hand of God. I don't know you're probably closer to it 
than me but it sort of felt like the politics and the executive were 
finally sorting themselves out and the next day we did have a 
consistent message. And that has changed the dynamics, 
because we went through the industrial action, what we talked 
about and the way we were talking at the JWP, at Company 
Council last week, you know it's as if it didn't happen. And I 
think that has wrong footed the RMT. They don't quite know 
what to do next. " [9: 34-42] 
This repertoire supports the use of institutional theory as one of the key 
academic bases for this study: the respondent is clearly aware of the 
institutional pressures on the organisation (in this case, political pressure 
exerted by the Mayor of London). His distinction between the "political and 
the executive wing of the enterprise" reflects the tension between these 
elements and the potential constraint this places on the organisation's ability 
to be business like. 
The impact of this scenario on the respondents ranges from bitterness to 
frustration. Managers articulate considerable bitterness: 
" 
... 
it was a very difficult period ... 
(it was) very difficult to be 
continually pounded, but what was the adversary then ... 
TfL 
and the Mayor and the Evening Standard and the MPs, we knew 
we were fighting a battle that we could never actually convince 
people we were gonna do. We thought we were doing the right 
thing, but we knew we didn't have the backing. You knew you 
were a victim. ... 
it was very noticeable when (we were) publicly 
criticised in the (Evening) Standard ... 
There was a whole 
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organisation, from the front line up to the board, who felt they 
were being victimised. " 
[9.4: 103-105] 
And this is a source of frustration for trade unionists: 
"I got frustrated with ... having meeting after meeting where the 
people I'm meeting - and I can make the decision, I have 
authority in that meeting - haven't. " [32.1: 122] 
An interesting corollary to the repertoire of political influence is a theme 
articulated by a number of managers which intimates that it is incumbent upon 
the organisation to take the "high moral ground": 
" (The unions) they've got grapevines and they can also tell lies. 
There's no retribution for the yellow peril which is just blatant lies 
... And we 
have to take the high moral ground and tell the truth. " 
[9.4: 121-125] 
This is linked by respondents to a number of factors. Political influence is 
cited as a further constraint on the organisation's ability to confront the trade 
unions, due to the fact that the organisation's actions reflect on the politicians 
(specifically Ken Livingstone), creating the requirement for high organisational 
standards of behaviour. The Mayor's Office, consequently, actively police the 
Underground's internal and external statements and actions. 
Managers also link this 'high moral ground' discourse to the fact that LUL is a 
public sector company and, in consequence, is required to demonstrate 
higher standards of behaviour than would otherwise be the case ("corporate 
image") and to demonstrate these high standards to staff: 
" ... we always try and behave professionally, whereas tactically 
you wouldn't. So we all try and retain the moral high ground 
because (a) to maintain our corporate image and (b) so our staff 
can see us behaving professionally. " [9.4: 71] 
The suggestion of disadvantage and constraint extends to the constraint on 
the organisation's ability to respond to union propaganda: 
" ... the other thing that really frustrates a lot of our local 
managers, the fact that there are ... 
formally endorsed 
publications by both RMT and ASLEF, at a local level that are 
pretty close to ... libellous. " [9.3: 26] 
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ii) Role of the Media 
A second significant influence is noted by the majority of respondents: the 
media, particularly the Evening Standard newspaper, is portrayed as a 
negative influence both by managers: 
" ... many of these people who come of course and join us have been have been fed through the 'Evening Standard', read the 
news, the Press, the Media. Some of them you know they are 
very well informed when they come in, they've read about it, 
they've seen it on the telly, it's interesting that they still come 
and join the RMT. " [10.1: 202] 
"It's the rhetoric which is actually is as damaging as anything 
else. You can be in negotiations with a left wing trade union and 
that doesn't damage relationships 'cause it's not public. But 
when it's public, it damages everything. It damages the 
company, the staff get laughed at, we get laughed at, the 
Evening Standard go for everybody, the trade unions get blasted 
as well actually it's a no-win, when it gets overtly aggressive. " 
[9.4: 253] 
And trade unionists: 
"Dick Murray of the Evening Standard, he's been around a long 
time, picked up straight away. But he's they're gonna write the 
headline they wanna write, 'LUL cave in again to the unions', 
y'know? ... It's an incestuous relationship with the Evening Standard and the Underground, because London Underground 
depend on them for a lot of publicity, and being commuters, the 
majority of their readership, if the Underground was running 
correctly and right every day, they'd have nothing to report 
(laughs), so everything they do is negative with the 
Underground, it doesn't give the right perception of what the vast 
majority of staff and mangers provide 96 percent of the year, to 
millions of people. [32.1: 166-170] 
" ... the press, Dick Murray or the TV, do not want me to hear, or 
say, 'we're having constructive discussions, and hope to resolve 
the issue'. What they want is the headline of when the strikes's 
gonna be. " [32.1: 188] 
Although one of the unionists does see LUL as partly to blame due to its non- 
management of the media: 
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" ... you used to have press officers that could actually literally 
sit on Dick Murray. And Dick's admitted this to me ... But there 
were certain people that could actually say to Dick, look don't 
give me that story, don't get that story, y'know there's maybe 
something else. And yet what Dick was saying to me was now, 
he doesn't have that sort of relationship with people. " 
[26.1: 443] 
A distinct sub-theme in this area is 'cult of celebrity', which creates a 
discourse of culpability of the media: 
"(Bob Crow) revels, doesn't he, in his militancy, revels in the bad 
the bad boy. He loves his Millwall supporter jerkin and baseball 
cap, he portrays, because he's almost become a hero, a cult 
figure, to all sorts of people, articles in 'The Guardian', 
'Independent on Sunday'. I mean how else if you've got a 
complete ruffian, a complete rascal, do you actually spend have 
'The Independent on Sunday' talking 'A Week in the Life of Bob 
Crow'. 'The Guardian' is I mean as one would expect it, but 
y'know where is this media offensive against RMT, where is all 
this anti-RMT feeling. It doesn't manifest in all of those ways. 
Perhaps there's also something around people actually admire 
all what's the word admire these rebels etc. I dunno. " 
[10.1: 130-132] 
"I've often made the joke of if Bob (Crow) did get ditched at an 
election, he could probably do pantomime ... King Rat, 
like 
Derek Hatton did. I mean you can quite imagine Bob doing that 
in 10 years time ... I think this is interesting about celebrity 
culture; Bob's become a celebrity, Bob's become part of the 
London scene, Bob's become, 'oh it's Bob Crow' ... he takes all the stereotypes, I mean he's a Millwall supporter for God's sake! 
... and 
in fact he's actually used this when they've asked him, 
"oh I'm a Millwall supporter, no one likes us we don't care", and 
it's that sort of belligerence ... yet it he clearly has a following on the Underground. " 
[26.1: 116-120] 
6.3.2.2. Capability 
This discourse is clearly used by respondents to attribute blame to previous 
management regimes: 
" ... back in 20 years ago 30 years ago the organisation wasn't 
well managed and the management had kind of abdicated really 
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and it wasn't particularly focused on employees and I think 
allowed the trade unions to gather and to gather strength. " 
[9.1: 4] 
It contains a strong theme of systemic under-investment: 
" ... if I go back to square 
1, as much as we've under-invested in 
the Underground itself, the bricks and mortar, the trains and the 
rest of it, we've always under-invested in the people. Be it in the 
Underground or both you and I know a lot of the skills sets, 
which are required to do what we're doing now to deal with 
things like change in TfL. They weren't in place. Much of the 
talent we've had to bring in over the last couple of years. " 
[2.1: 62] 
Specifically, respondents refer to under-investment in employee relations: 
"And we've under-invested in my view, in the sort of the support 
and resource we give to the employee relations. Both in 
employee relations professionalism, professionals, but also the 
resources given to managers to deal with these issues. " [9.4: 20] 
and under-investment in staff: 
"... intuitively one has to suspect, that there's been a lack of 
capability ... I think in short it's under-investment in staff and I think the unions have played that off ... So there's a lack of 
capability but it goes back again, you know, to me this is surely 
about capability. It's about the business having strong 
management, strong leadership, strong capability to do the 
things that are right for the business and right for the people and 
I don't think this organisation has had that. " [2.1: 64] 
Like the 'conditioned behaviour' discourse, this discourse is strongly 
articulated in company documentation; 'managerial skills and behaviours' is 
one of the 8 main themes in the Everest report (, 1996, p 6): 
"There is evidence of deficiencies in managerial skills and 
behaviours at all levels. In particular, these appear to be around 
leadership skills: performance and behavioural management, 
cause and effect analysis and communication skills appear to be 
major areas for improvement. These issues seem to form a 
common thread to all the issues examined. The key to success 
is considered to lie in addressing these issues as a priority. " 
(London Underground Limited, 1996, p8) 
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And this argument is also made by one of the managers; 
" ... you 
have to do something that London Underground ... (is) 
pretty bloody awful at, is you have to develop and train your 
managers ... Systematically. 
You have to select them much 
more carefully than has happened in the past and you have to 
make sure they have the skills, competencies, whatever word 
you wanna use, to do the job, and if they don't and they can't 
perform, you have to get rid of 'em ... selection's weak, training 
and development's weak, and measurement of performance, 
and attitude, and behaviour is weak. But apart from that! " 
[9.5: 109-117] 
"Management quality is the key. Because we constantly get sort 
of little local outbursts, through managers, and often trade union 
reps, poor behaviour, poor relationships, then those sprout up ... into something rather more serious ... an intelligent, analytical, 
calm approach, calm and decisive approach by managers ... it 
would never have got anywhere near this situation, they dig their 
heels in and they are guided by a variety of myths, 
misconceptions, misunderstandings, lack of clear leadership 
from above, who sort of panic and do, 'this is all very difficult', 
and then do the wrong things in reaction rather than the right 
things, calming down and managing it in a mature and civilised 
way. And so it all bubbles up and you get all these little bubbles 
after a while and then they boil up into a big dispute, over god 
know what, often pay but they're quite often related factors like 
conditions and so forth. Yeah if you can keep relationships er 
civilised and constructive, constructive at all levels, then you 
won't have this. But it's got to be a consistent, managed thrust, 
led by from the top. " [9.5: 86-88] 
Respondents have an explanation around day to day pressures (mirroring the 
operational pressures discourse) which is articulated in support of this 
argument: 
" ... you spend it fire fighting. You lament `oh we should have done that, we should have put more effort into doing that, we 
should have put more effort into doing so-and-so' (proactively 
supporting managers to improve the industrial relations climate), 
and I suppose yeah, I can be critical of myself for not having 
perhaps done so. " [10: 382] 
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... that was a classic of not managing not managing 
something. Not being entirely clear why we did it, setting it all up 
and not seeing the need to manage it, and so and of course we 
had a reorganisation in the middle which didn't help ... You know we shoot ourselves in the foot by not putting in the proper 
resources into keeping on top of these things. 
Whereas the unions are fantastic, they have their referendums 
and they line up all their ducks in a row and have all their 
arguments and positions and what have you. And we're busy 
doing so many other things that we don't we don't follow it 
through closely enough, so you don't find a lot of the ground has 
already been occupied by the time you come down to start 
planning. " [9: 221-223] 
The main inference, which this series of extracts create, is perpetuation of 
industrial unrest through inadequate management, be that inadequacy due to 
poor management or operational priorities. This is subtly different from 
Darlington's "belligerence" - in the managers' view, it is not antagonism which 
drives the organisation's industrial relations approach, but lack of capability, 
itself a consequence of under-investment. As such, this is a functional 
discourse which externalises causality, and resists an internal attribution of 
causation. 
A final variant on the management capability theme is articulated by one of 
the trade unionists, who relates the management capability issue to the churn 
of staff, using this to support his argument for the centrality of personal 
relationships to industrial relations (and his presentation of himself and his 
union as reasonable and fair): 
"All these managerial changes I do I don't think add up to any 
building of relationships ... they never seem to leave them in a 
position, and I do believe the biggest problem on London 
Underground is this relationship, between managers and staff 
representatives. One, either you get a very qualified 
representative, with an ill informed uneducated I meant in the 
sense of having machinery and agreements etc., or vice versa 
... the number of times I've heard staff representatives, when a 
new manager's come in and said, "well why are you so negative, 
why are you so anti-me? " Oh well, "you've promised everything, 
you've come in, well the last manager who was only here for 3 
months, promised the same". And as I say I do believe that 
people need time to build trust and relationship and that doesn't 
seem to be happening at the moment because of constant 
reorganisation and with the TfL one we've just gone through 
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another one, and it's just that whole structure is wrong. " 
[32.1: 20-28] 
6.3.2.3. Consistency 
The consistency of relationships referred to in the extract above has another 
similar theme: consistency of purpose. 
" ... what we tend to forget is the length of time that it takes er for people to really believe there is a change, as opposed to 
being told there's a change ... it's not that you say nothing can happen for then 3 or 5 years, but you say you need to choose a 
direction and believe in it over the 3 and 5 years, so that it really 
becomes part of the culture. " [9.1: 70] 
"It's that kinda breaking out of that, breaking out of habits, I think 
is hugely difficult. And it kinda takes strength of purpose, and 
commitment for the long term. " [9.1: 162] 
"I certainly do hold up my hands from a management 
perspective and say ... we haven't laid down a strategy for 
where we're trying to take the organisation, you know we've 
been stuck in the PPP debate for 7 years, which actually was 
always an excuse, for not laying down a strategy. It almost 
became a running joke that every year you'd try and have an 
industrial relations strategy someone would say well we're about 
to restructure the company, why don't we wait until we've 
finished. And it was always going to be another year, it was 
always going to be sorted, we'll have a strategy and it'll all be 
finished. We never got there. So I think there's a kind of I think 
from my perspective it's kind of just perpetuating the unhelpful 
relationship that exists. " [9.2: 64] 
One may surmise that this discursive repertoire also functions to 
externally attribute causality, deflecting blame from the current 
management regime. However, one manager does accept 
responsibility: 
" 
... we've always 
backed down, every time we've said, 'no'. For 
years and years we've said, "if you go on strike and it goes 
against your attendance record, then if you happen to trigger a 
trigger, then you'll be into that poor attendance record 
mechanism. And of course we've always backed down again ... there are middle managers ... 
keeping a record of Fred Bloggs' 
internal strike day, making sure he signs this and this, we say, 
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'sorry for this, we can't back you up on it'. So we've given way 
each time. Somebody's picked the thing up and dropped it 
every time. " [9.4: 197] 
6.3.3. Interactions Between the Industrial Relations Actors 
This section will look at two aspects of the interaction between the industrial 
relations actors: conditioned response (predictable patterns of behaviour and 
routines of interaction built up over many years) and conflict (between and 
within the various groups). 
6.3.3.1. Conditioned Response 
The NVivo coding for the 'conditioned response' repertoire is shown in figure 
54. 
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Figure 54: NVivo Coding for 'Conditioned Response' Category 
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Perhaps the most dominant discourse in the entire study concerns 
conditioned behaviour. It uses a Pavlovian metaphor to explain how 
rewarding bad and failing to reward good behaviour has contributed to the 
current industrial relations climate: 
"... by and large the trade unions have often got things out of 
strikes that made it worthwhile. And that was why the 
membership were kind of happy to go to the barricades without 
really understanding why. " [9.1: 56] 
"But I think that the environment is a difficult one, the 
environment is a difficult one, because the trade unions have 
seen how militancy, how confrontation, how adversarial 
behaviour has actually produced results for their members: good 
pay, good conditions ... if you challenge people in terms of 
saying how well they're paid then the trade unions and 
particularly the RMT will say that's because we've pursued the 
policy that we have, that's because we've used the strike 
weapon ... 
but then management has traditionally em bowed to 
the pressures on them. " [10.1: 106] 
" ... if you're a train 
driver, you'd think that they've done a good 
job because their pay has gone up so much and that the 
Underground management seem to give into (the RMT) ... 
And 
from a driver - as far as someone who pays a membership 
subscription is concerned are you really going to have too much 
of a problem with what they've got, 'cause they'd be quite 
pleased. " [4.1: 91] 
"... you'll get the kind of person you've actually bred. They'll 
learn from all of that and the more they will cement those 
behaviours in. " [10.1: 106] 
This is linked with organisational history by a number of speakers: 
"So here we have a tradition, a history, you know it is rooted, 
certainly in the 80s, maybe even in the 70s in terms of trade 
union behaviours. They've grown up, they've developed, 
they've learnt that these behaviours are well rewarded and over 
the last 12 months the game changes, the situation changes, but 
can they? And is it going to have to be pain for that to happen? " 
[10.1: 26] 
This conditioned behaviour discourse is socially shared discourse, also 
appearing in the interviews of senior managers who have little contact with 
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trade unions and in the discourse of trade unionists themselves. The 
discourse of 'rewarding bad behaviour' is used throughout the organisation, by 
all groups: TfL managers [2.1], employee relations managers [10.1], LUL 
operations managers [9.5] and trade unionists [32.1]. Managers use the 
phrase: 
"... the RMT still seen to be rewarded for bad behaviours. " 
[2.1: 144] 
"It's like childlike behaviour it's almost like in terms of how they 
actually behave is how you would sometimes see I don't know a 
rebellious teenager, or worse still a youngster sort of like kicking 
over the traces pushing back on things ... 
It seems quite 
childlike in the behaviour. It seems like the parent and child sort 
of relationship and how to actually trying to even when we talk 
about "rewarding good behaviour" or "doing something about 
bad behaviour, correcting bad behaviour". All that seems to be 
somehow psychologically in the context of something that 
suggests a lack of maturity. " [10.1: 96-98] 
10.1 is particularly interesting in that he explicitly acknowledges the existence 
of a shared repertoire around `rewarding bad behaviour. 
" ... where we are 
in terms of industrial relations, rewarding bad 
behaviour, dodgy deals, undermining your front line 
management by taking decisions outwith agreed procedures. " 
[10.2: 74] 
This 'conditioned response' is set up as an enduring reason for lack of 
progress: 
"From the trade union perspective, 'cause why would you 
(change)? Why would you, if you always got more than inflation 
for pay, if you always get preservation of job numbers, if you 
always get the potential for the increase of your membership, 
because of staff increases all over the place, if you always get 
basically everything you ever ask for, then why would you 
change your philosophy? Why would you suddenly wake up 
and see the light or whatever? Well no you wouldn't. So there's 
no need there's no imperative to change. " [9.2: 72] 
And the aspect of industrial relations with the greatest potential for change: 
"It's just the one over there (the RMT) but it's that one who will 
make everybody else as we've seen with the TSSA start knee 
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jerk reacting, say "hang on a minute, if that's what get's 
rewarded, that's what I'll do", and it can unpick the whole thing. 
Whereas we want the RMT, and more particularly the RMT's 
members to see that the greatest rewards from people who are 
willing to sit round the table and discuss reasonably. It's not to 
say we won't have rows, but discuss reasonably, how we drive 
this forward. " [2.1: 317] 
" 
... the 
basic essence of our strategy needs to be that they are 
rewarded, not the unions per se, but the staff, and the unions 
that represent some of them, should be rewarded for good 
performance and good behaviour and should not be rewarded 
for bad behaviour. Now ... threatening to ballot, balloting and 
striking at the drop of a hat, is bad behaviour. " [9.5: 32] 
The trade unionists also use the same vernacular: 
"If this misbehaviour, childish behaviour is rewarded, like I do 
believe the RMT are sometimes, they'll carry on misbehaving, 
y'know. " [32.1: 2] 
"One ... of my 
frustrations 
... is you've not always used us for the good news stories ... you've always wanted to use Bob Crow rather than Richard Rosser". Because almost, "well we've 
got Bob on our side with this, so it shows it must be right", 
whereas Richard is, "well, yeah, okay". But that gives us a 
double bind, because what you're again doing is you're 
rewarding the militant behaviour. " [26.1: 164] 
The converse, failure to reward good behaviour, is also used: 
" Ex-General Secretary of TSSA. 
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"[TSSA] do behave very responsibly, because of the fact they're 
a staff association, typically non militant and traditionally 
disappointed that what they see as good behaviour isn't 
rewarded in some way. And a concern that that union from that 
trade union and some of its representatives is perhaps they 
need to behave in a way that is more aggressive, more 
confrontational, because it's done more for RMT than it's done 
for TSSA. " [10: 18] 
"... as I said earlier about mischievous children being rewarded, 
I never feel that the management give me and some of my 
colleagues the credit for those industrial relations, in trying to 
develop that win-win and (those) compromises, rather than this 
permanent confrontation they all seem to want to be in. " 
[32.1: 164] 
This `rewarding bad behaviour' theme is construed as having a direct impact 
on behaviour, creating a conditioned response: 
" 
... you see that 
kind of model of (ASLEF) being taken very 
seriously, (RMT) being taken very seriously by acting in a certain 
way, but I'm sure some of that must've rubbed off on me ... our 
value proposition is to provide representation to people. And try 
to do it in a certain style which is not militant. The problem is the 
noise in this organisation is so extreme, that you can't help but 
be forced into certain situations where let's say, the behaviours 
need to be in a slightly different way. " [26.1: 152-154] 
"TSSA do, most times (behave in a sensible way). I think they 
occasionally get carried away or influenced by their colleagues. " 
[9.6: 80] 
"I have a hunch ... that a lot of the other unions are sort of half 
way there, the door's open, we can have that dialogue. It's just 
the one over there (RMT) but it's that one who will make 
everybody else as we've seen with the TSSA start knee jerk 
reacting, say 'hang on a minute, if that's what get's rewarded, 
that's what I'll do', and it can unpick the whole thing. " 
[2.1: 315-317] 
Explicit reference to 'rewarding bad behaviour and its converse are also 
found in company documentation: 
"They (other staff groups, managers and other trade unions) 
also expressed considerable apprehension about: the perceived 
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'special treatment' of train staff ... (and) 'reward for poor behaviour' (striking) whereas other staff and trade unions had 
behaved responsibly. " (London Underground Limited, 1996, 
section 4.3.7) 
This discourse has considerable functionality for the managers: it diverts 
responsibility away from the individuals themselves and explains that the 
situation will take time (and consistency of approach) to address: respondents 
make links to organisational history and the repertoire contains an inference 
that conditioned behaviour has taken some time to build up and, 
consequently, will not be disassembled overnight. Its use by the trade 
unionists is more ambiguous: one may surmise that the metaphor has 
become a Foucauldian 'truth' for the actors within the organisation and is 
being reproduced without great thought. It seems more likely, however, that it 
is used by the other unions to differentiate and criticise the RMT, and an 
element of impression management may also be in operation (which fits with 
the general tone of 32.1's interview). 
As this discourse appeared in every interview, it is interesting to surmise 
about the implications of this socially constructed 'truth' for industrial relations 
practice in LUL. 
6.3.3.2. Conflict 
A Marxist view of industrial relations conflict would see conflict as the natural 
expression of class struggle to challenge enduring inequities, and the 
unitarian perspective would see conflict as dysfunctional and to be eradicated. 
Only the pluralist view could begin to explain the multiplicities of conflict 
described by respondents in this study: inter- and intra-union conflict are more 
readily cited than the predicted conflict between unions and management. 
This section will look at inter- and intra-union conflict before reviewing the 
limited evidence for enduring conflict between unions and managers, 
Darlington's "belligerence". 
i) Inter-Union Conflict 
Accounts of inter-union conflict are commonplace in the discourse of both 
managers and moderate trade unionists. 
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The majority of the references to conflict relate to the antipathy with which the 
militant trade unions (as the term is defined by Kelly) regard their moderate 
colleagues: 
"TSSA I think RMT don't respect them because they think 
they're a bit too weak. There there's no natural allegiance 
between RMT and TSSA or ASLEF and TSSA. " [4.1: 158] 
" ... it's actually appalling with the way RMT and ASLEF behave 
with TSSA. You know for the second largest trade union to be 
treated that way by the other trade unions is really just 
appalling. " [9.2: 195] 
This is widely attributed to competition for members: 
"I wonder how much of that's (conflict) down to the realisation 
that they've got to be a bit more pragmatic in order to stay where 
they are, let alone grow. " [4.1: 182] 
Quotes do, however, suggest a degree of real bitterness between the unions: 
" ... when the strike was called over the wages, ASLEF crossed the picket line. And took great delight in doing so, 'cause they 
they'd get more members by not going on strike. " [10.2: 175] 
" ... there is a real issue there, it all boils down to the fact that RMT are competing for members everywhere, all over the place, 
and RMT are kind of like the white shark. In that they will go 
round actually in a very unprincipled way and will pick up you 
know dead and dying pockets of other representation and 
swallow them up, without so much as a second thought ... ASLEF actually probably do the same although they're they kind 
of try and do it in a more upright way. " [9.2: 182] 
Accounts of the impact of this conflict differ. Employee relations staff tend to 
see this as creating difficulties for the staff trying to manage industrial 
relations: 
"Industrial relations it seems to me that every time I sit round 
that table every union has its own agenda. In other words, 
although it was a joint body, you were negotiating separately 
within a joint body. You had to be conscious of well I'll need to 
give ASLEF something, I need to give RMT something, and this 
is the way we get caught, because what happens is you 
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negotiate something for Stations and then ... there's a 
feeling on 
the railway side that they want these benefits and they want 
these conditions of service, and then it's just ping pong. " 
[10.2: 14] 
"And that's what happens. 'Cause the RMT's now got a foot in 
both (Stations and Trains) so the RMT you get in Stations isn't 
necessarily the same union the same RMT that you're facing 
when it comes to Trains. They play it against each other. The 
animosity between ASLEF and RMT at shop steward level isn't 
as bad as you'd expect. There's a fair amount of co-operation 
down there. But actually at national level, and I'm not talking 
about the Bob Crow's, I'm talking more about the national 
officials, the likes of the Bobby Laws and the Grants of the 
world, there's real aggro. And I'm talking real aggro. To the 
extent that we were ready to conclude a 35 hour week, whereas 
ASLEF said we want to see the figures, we paid for this in 1997. 
We want to see the figures to make sure they pay every penny 
of it. And if they don't, you're in dispute with us. There's a lot of 
tit for tat. " [10.2: 16] 
" ... it's this tit for tat, this if one gets something, the other has to 
get something more, and it's this escalation 'cause one of us any 
one of these unions can hurt us. " [10.2: 166] 
Managers, conversely, see inter-union conflict is seen as having the potential 
to make management of industrial relations issues easier: 
"Inspectors inspect, and say whether it's quality work or not, the 
supervisors manage the gangs; they hate each other. And 
therefore they're represented by 2 different groups who will also 
fight against each other to the detriment of other people. So 
they were divided. So I could actually separate out one the 
supervisors from the actual blue collar representation quite 
easily. Which made it easier to win a long battle. " [9.4: 21] 
"RMT and TSSA so they would never agree, they would never 
meet beforehand, so they'd never force a management view, 
they were actually giving us opportunities to divide and rule 
again. Which was actually very frustrating. If you wanted to 
divide and rule. But it's frustrating, 'cause we never actually 
knew what we were dealing with. " [9.4: 27] 
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Only one of the respondents clearly references collaboration - albeit 
expedient collaboration - between the unions: 
" ... they will quite often 
join up, when they see management are 
wounded they'll go for the kill ... They will work together to 
achieve their aim, when it when it suits them both to do so. " 
[9.3: 204-208] 
ii) Infra-Union Conflict 
Accounts of intra-union conflict are rarer, but occur in the interviews of both of 
the trade unionists. These are unexpected in the light of writers such as Kelly, 
who tend to view unions as relatively heterogeneous units, and Batstone, who 
discusses intra-union conflict only in terms of the difference between local and 
head office officials. 
"... it's very hard to see bad behaviour going on over there (RMT 
and ASLEF), you try to behave quite well, and to a certain extent 
I mean over this pay stuff. I mean I had to fight very hard at my 
reps meeting to get through, what I got through. " 
[26.1: 154] 
"I also have a lot of pressure on my back from militants within 
my own organisation. " [32.1: 164] 
However, one may also surmise again that these extracts are being used 
functionally, as both correspond to a general tendency in these interviews for 
both of the trade union officials to represent themselves as reasonable and 
partnership oriented. It seems reasonable to conclude that the positive 
working relationship between the interviewer and the respondent is influencing 
the trade unionist's presentation of themselves and their role in this respect. 
iii) Conflict Between Trade Unions and Managers 
There is very limited evidence for Darlington's belligerence, although this does 
appear in accounts of retrospective events provided by respondents: 
"I think one of the mistakes we've made in the past, frankly, in 
this organisation is we've had the wrong personalities heading 
up employee relations ... I mean someone who would throw a 
newspaper across the table at a General Secretary of the trade 
unions you think you're kinda on a hiding to nothing. " [9.2: 162] 
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" ... more fundamental than that though was that the adversarial 
relationships that had built up by the union guys and the 
management, in this place was because the managers and 
particularly I'm criticising the top, the directors, didn't understand 
that if you don't treat people with respect, they won't treat you 
with respect. " [9.5: 80] 
And some managers do view their lack of co-operation as a conditioned 
response: 
"I've had some experiences, as, as a kind of a local manager 
you lose faith in human nature because all you see is people 
messing you about. You see the 20 percent of people who're 
taking the - taking the mickey, and not coming in and blah-di- 
blah-di-blah and you become very suspicious, of everybody's 
motives and it does become a sort of powerplay where you don't 
want them to have one over on you ... and it's not just local 
managers I mean it's symptomatic of the whole organisation. " 
[9.1: 14] 
" ... certainly the past HR directors have made half-baked decisions that you kind of think were amazing when you looked 
at them in the cold light of day. .. Of course it ends up the 
operators are the ones with egg on their faces, with their 
management team and ... with the staff generally ... Also on that theme I think in some ways, understandably but - it's not the 
right way to do it - managers at lower levels in the organisation 
have actually reacted, to that type of agreement and that type of 
settlement by kind of digging their feet in on small issues that ... 
should never have feet dug in over ... The company has created the seed bed for managers to do that ... So you get all these local Hitlers, I mean they're I'm generalising 'cause they're not 
all like this, you get these local managers who decided they're 
not going to let something through, almost in terms of revenge 
for what, corporately, has happened to them ... And of course that just breeds a seed bed of discontent, those are the places 
that tend to get perhaps the more extreme trade union 
representatives elected, and then that of course begins to filter 
up through the company and that kind of attitude, that kind of 
relationship between the local manager and the local rep, can 
actually permeate all levels and just kind of bubble up from time 
to time. " [9.2: 80] 
And retaliation as a normal human reaction which managers have to work 
hard to resist: 
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"I think it very much depends on your upbringing because we're 
all products of our upbringing. In some ways I'd like to go and 
fight dirty and win some battles. Everybody is fed up with being 
dragged down by not being able to retaliate. Human nature is to 
retaliate. I mean personally I've done it, as much as I possible 
can, not to retaliate, but I would love to. But then I know I'd ruin 
customer service so I'd lose at the end of the day. " [9.4: 83] 
However, there is more evidence to support managers trying to be 
collaborative: 
" ... we put new framework agreements in place ... that just 
proved that, if you talked to them (the unions) as grown ups, and 
listened to them as grown ups, and negotiated in a fair and 
honest way, you could get what you need. " [9.5: 20-24] 
And articulating a commitment to trade unionism (although this may be used 
to similar purpose as the 'affinity' disclaimer): 
"I perhaps have a sort of more socialist view, I feel there's a very 
important role for trade unions, in any organisation, em but I 
think it's an important role where you've got to actually make 
sure it's representing the workforce, collective bargaining or 
even dealing with some independence - the human behaviour of 
managers isn't sometimes has to have a way of dealing with it. 
Y'know and okay you can have all sorts of grievance policies 
and processes, but the actual behaviour of managers is to club 
together. You probably need some independent redress on 
that. " [9.6: 160] 
"I guess if you start with the fundamental "should we have 
unions, the answer absolutely has to be yes. This is a very 
strong union organisation with a strength in the Underground 
and a strength on the Surface side vis-ä-vis Buses. If you start 
with the fundamental "should we have them? ", my absolute 
response has to be yes, because I think they are a very good 
and a very necessary thing for all staff to be able to rely on and 
to represent their views. And I think I think given the size of this 
organisation in particular, I see it as quite healthy that that be the 
case. " [2.1: 20] 
However, this, in the manner of the appeasement/tolerance strategy reviled in 
the Everest report, is interpreted by some respondents as weakness: 
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" ... sometimes the way senior managers fawn around (ASLEF 
representative) and (RMT representative), and even to a lesser 
extent me, is not really necessary how it should be. " [26.1: 305] 
" ... the LU management their attitude to the unions is that they're a bit scared of them, and tend to give in and therefore 
make rods for their own backs. " [4.1: 125] 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has taken as its basis Darlington's contention that four factors drive 
the continued militancy in London Underground's environment. This study 
has examined whether these factors are referenced in the discourse of a 
group of influential actors (senior managers and trade unionists) in Transport 
for London three years after the Darlington study. 
Discourse analysis, the methodology used in this study, takes as its 
fundamental assumption that actors are constructing their social reality 
through their language, so this has considerable implications for industrial 
relations practice in the organisation. It also suggests that the constructions 
available to individuals will constrain the realities they are able to construct, 
which further emphasises the importance of this area, 
The study has indicated that the actors' discourse in 2004 does utilise 
Darlington's factors, but that their discourse contains as much divergent as 
convergent discourse. Actors' representations are more complex and 
ambiguous than suggested by Darlington's paper, as managers use language 
functionality to justify, explain and socially construct the situation. 
The criticism of over-simplification leveled at Darlington's study is 
supplemented by an analysis of two elements of considerable significance in 
the discourse: socially shared discourses (these discourses are constructive 
of social reality, thus are an important area of study) and linguistic 
constructions of trade union power. Insights into both of these topics were 
provided, and implications for practice indicated. 
7.1. Implications for Academics 
There are a number of implications which can be drawn for industrial relations 
research from this study. Firstly, it can be used to critique some of the 
previous work on industrial relations. Darlington, as the only researcher to 
have previously studied LUL, represents the perspective of two groups (trade 
unionists and employee relations staff) as universal, and this study has 
argued that omission of the influential managerial group was detrimental. 
Conversely, Batstone and Kelly's models provide more comprehensive 
explanations of the topics of power and militancy/moderation, which have 
resonance in the discourse of the managers and trade unionists interviewed. 
260 
The most significant implications for research, however, come potentially from 
the application of a methodology from social psychology to industrial relations 
research, as Edwards (2003b) proposed. This study suggests that discourse 
analysis seems a particularly suitable methodology for researching the 
complex socially constructed phenomena underpinning industrial relations. 
The implications for research outside the area of industrial relations will be 
discussed in the next section. 
This study does, itself, have significant limitations, most notably researcher 
bias, observer effects and the omission of a viewpoint which could, potentially, 
have contradicted many of the conclusions: that of the RMT union officials. 
Further research may also wish to include middle managers and employees. 
7.2. Implications for Practitioners 
The study has built a diagnosis of the LUL environment, which could form the 
basis of an analysis of the forces sustaining the conflictual industrial relations 
environment which exists in LUL, and ultimately be used to start to change the 
organsation. The concept of 'rewarding bad behaviour', specifically, may be 
an interesting concept to address, although the organisation's ability to 
challenge this may ultimately be limited by institutional forces. 
The Ford and Ford concept of 'shifting conversations' may be particularly 
useful in such a change management exercise. However, the most obvious 
'shift of conversation', from adversarial industrial relations to partnership is 
unlikely to be effective without addressing the wider issue of the negative 
perception of 'moderate' trade unions. A possible starting point for this is the 
deconstruction of the terms 'moderate' and 'militant'. 
Irrespective of the methodology used, the concept of the social construction of 
reality through discourse has potential as a change management 
methodology in organizations such as London Underground. 
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8. DISCUSSION 
8.1. Introduction 
This section discusses the linkages of this project to the wider study, and is 
structured around three of the five elements of the contribution to knowledge 
set out in the academic rationale at the beginning of this document: the 
examination of an HR model in a non-SHRM context, neo-institutional theory, 
and the constructivist view of language. This is shown in figure 55. 
Academic Examination of an HR SHRM has been dominated by quantitative, 
Rationale model in a non SHRM positivist research. It has tended to take a 
environment unitarian view of employees, and, in the few 
cases where trade union environments have 
been studied, has cast trade unions as the 
'losers' if SHRM is implemented, or has 
demonised them as a barrier to SHRM 
implementation. 
This project will provide a study of the 
operation of HR as pluralistic employee 
relations, as a potential alternative to the 
SHRM model which dominates most 
research. 
Neo-institutional theory Neo-institutional theory will provide a 
theoretical framework which will support the 
analysis of forces cited by participants as 
inhibitors to change in LUL. 
Constructivist view of This project will examine how industrial 
language relations actors use discourses around trade 
unionism functionally, to explain, for instance, 
a failure to modernise. 
It will also suggest possible alternative 
discourses around partnership which could be 
provided to the organisation and its trade 
unions. 
Figure 55: Academic Rationale for Project One 
8.2. HR Models 
The SHRM literature has come to be dominated by the unitarian positivist 
model epitomized in the large scale, questionnaire based surveys conducted 
by Huselid and Ulrich. This paper argues that this model has limited 
applicability beyond the particular organisational type which hosted the 
majority of SHRM research. The limitations of the SHRM approach include 
the exclusion or marginalization of industrial relations, and this paper has 
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endeavoured to explore the application of HR in a different context: a heavily 
unionized, traditional public sector organisation. 
This paper concluded that, whilst the SHRM approach can be used to 
describe elements of the HR environment which operates in the traditional 
public sector organisation under review, it fails to characterise the HR model, 
and is particularly restricted by its failure to address the challenges of a 
militant trade union environment and a non-compliant employee population. 
The HR model operating in LUL has more in common with the tradition of 
British pluralistic employee relations. Fox defined this model as follows: 
"... the pluralistic British employee relations model which, whilst 
recognising the legitimacy of trade unions, may find that 
relationship conflictual. " (Fox, 1973, p 196) 
Whilst a number of commentators have seen the pluralistic employee relations 
model as precursor of and having been superseded by SHRM (Keenoy, 1999; 
Harley & Hardy, 2004), this study suggests both that adoption of SHRM may 
not have been universal, but also that, in some organisations, it may be 
inappropriate. 
As Guest commented: 
"Given the significant constraints, many UK companies would 
not want to practice human resource management. The 
'professional' personnel management found in many successful 
organizations is one alternative. In many of the more stable 
bureaucratic organizations, policies based on administrative 
efficiency and cost-minimization make sense, while in 
production-driven companies cost-effective support policies may 
be most applicable. " (Guest, 1987, p 518) 
Further projects will explore the concept of different HR models in other 
organisational contexts. Whereas the typical SHRM research project was 
based in an American, non-unionised, professional environment, this study 
will look at HR in a number of different contexts: public sector industrial 
relations in project one, and the American, European and Asian operations of 
a 'modern' financial services company in projects 2 and 3. In this way, the 
different forms HR takes may be related to internal influences (notably the 
organisation's history, or at least the way in which history is constructed by the 
employees) and the external influences upon the organisation. Neo- 
institutional theory will be used to frame up the later, and this will be 
contrasted to the HR strategy suggested by the organisation's business 
context (competition, labour markets, market place etc. ). 
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8.3. Neo-Institutional Theory 
As described in section 3, institutional theory presumes the existence of 
external forces which promote conformity in organizations ("institutional 
isomorphism"). Neo-institutionalism overlays social constructivism on this 
concept, and examines the way in which belief systems about these forces 
are socially constructed. It looks at the impact of these belief systems on the 
operation of an organisation, rather than assuming external forces have a 
direct and inevitable impact on the organisation. 
As such, neo-institutionalism depends upon the adoption of a social 
constructivist view, and is sympathetic to the functional view of language 
espoused by the discourse analysis methodology. 
Neo-institutional theory can be posited as providing a possible explanation for 
the form of HR which operates in LUL. The participants in the study present 
the organisation as subject to a number of institutional forces (i. e. they have 
belief systems around external influences on the organisation), most notably 
the Mayor of London and the media. Whilst these do not fit neatly into Powell 
& DiMaggio's (1991) categorization system, their link to quasi-government 
organisations (the Mayor's office) and public accountability (the media) 
probably have the greatest similarity with Powell & DiMaggio's coercive 
forces. 
One may go further and suggest that the form of HR which is adopted by an 
organisation may be similarly impacted by the belief systems held by staff, 
and their perception of external constraints and enablers. This model goes 
some way to explaining the sustained use of the industrial relations focused 
model of HR in LUL, whilst the trend in other organizations has been to move 
away from this model towards SHRM. If staff believe that they are 
disempowered by institutional forces, they are unlikely to believe they can 
change or evolve the HR model. 
Whilst this study makes no claim to have implications for agency or for action 
(it simply looks at the way in which people construct their social realities), it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that individual's actions are influenced by these 
belief systems, and that the industrial relations impasse in which the 
organisation finds itself is in part sustained by (or at least is justified by) belief 
systems which emphasise the constraining influence of the Mayor and the 
media. 
A further influence may be the lack of mimetic forces in LULL for two reasons: 
large scale use of consultants (a major source of mimetic institutional 
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pressure) was not a feature of the pre-TfL environment. This is further 
compounded by the stability of the employee base, and the lack of new 
entrants to the organisation (at anything other than the most junior level), the 
consequence of which is likely to be a lack of exposure of staff to other 
organisational models, hence a dearth of mimetic institutional pressures. The 
influence of normative institutional pressures is also an interesting topic for 
discussion: whilst levels of CIPD membership are high in LUL, one may 
surmise that the influence of a professional institution for HR which is widely 
held to lack dynamism means that its normative influence on staff in both HR 
and the business supports change resistance rather than towards 
organisational evolution. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to surmise on the impact of the imbalance of 
institutional forces following the TfL merger and the pervasive McKinsey 
project which accompanied it, and the large scale hiring of (primarily private 
sector) senior managers. The study took place at an inflexion point for the 
organisation, when social constructions were being challenged by the new 
regime. This major and concentrated influx of mimetic institutional pressure (a 
10 million pound consultancy project and the hiring of some 200 senior 
managers) cannot be underestimated, given that the organisation had, up 
until this point, been largely protected from such pressure. 
It is unsurprising that the organisation was consequently afflicted by a schism 
between the public sector and the business model (as referred to in chapter 
one), given that they operated with different belief systems which referenced a 
very different set of institutional forces. This is likely to have been further 
exacerbated by the lack of cross-over between these two belief systems: staff 
who had made public sector careers (and had typically been within the LUL 
environment for most of their working lives) were unlikely to have been 
exposed to mimetic forces of the large consultancies and incoming private 
sector managers would have no knowledge (and no comprehension) of the 
coercive forces operating within the British public sector. 
8.4. Constructivist View of Language 
As described above, a neo-institutional perspective implies a social 
constructivist and a functional view of language. 
The approach to language used in this study appears to be particularly 
relevant to the highly politicized environment under review in this study. By its 
implicit assumption that reality is a social construction, a social constructivist 
approach allows a researcher to go beyond the search for a 'true' version of 
events, instead providing a methodology which allows the researcher to 
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deconstruct the articulation of events, constructs and attitudes, and begin to 
expose the belief systems underpinning the statements. 
8.5. Link to Projects 2 and 3 
The above discussion has set the context for the next two projects. Each 
study will conduct an exploration of models of HR in different contexts, 
informed by an analysis of belief systems, as articulated in language, around 
internal forces and external forces. The thesis will attempt to determine 
whether there is a link between the neo-institutional forces which are 
perceived as exerting an influence on an organisation and the form of HR 
which an organisation adopts, whether there is a greater link between HR 
strategy and factors such as labour markets, market place and competition, or 
whether elements of HR strategy are, in fact, contextually neutral. 
Projects two and three will continue to explore contextual models of HR in 
different organisations, and will move towards the development of a 
contextual descriptive research model of HR. 
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APPENDIX 1: PROJECT ONE GUIDE INTERVIEW 
SCHEDULE 
1. Introduction (for managerial personnel) 
Which unions do you typically deal with? 
Can you describe in broad terms the industrial relations environment of 
TfUmode? 
2. Profiles of Individual Trade Unions 
(For managerial personnel, for each major trade union with which they deal - RMT, ASLEF, TSSA, T&G) 
2.1 Trade Union Membership 
What do you see as your (their) target membership? 
How do you (they) recruit for members? 
What is it about you (them) which appeals to them? 
Has your (their) membership changed over time? 
2.2. Trade Union Ideology 
How would you describe the aims of the trade union? 
How do you (they) go about achieving these aims? 
What were the aims of the union when it was set up/why was it set up? 
Have the aims changed over time? 
How does this philosophy show itself? Does it influence the way in which the 
union operates in its dealings with the organisation? 
Can you describe an industrial relations event which characterises your (their) 
union and how you (they) do business? 
How do you feel about this yourself? Is this a philosophy you have some 
sympathy with? 
How do you (they) position yourself (themselves) politically? 
What is your (their) relationship with the TUC? 
What is your (their) relationship with the Government? 
2.3 Relationship with Employers 
How would you describe your (their) relationship with employers? 
Has this relationship changed over time? 
How is this demonstrated in the organisation? 
Power balance/base in the organisation 
Conflict and propensity to create and use conflict 
3. General Questions: Challenges for TU Movement 
What are the major challenges facing the trade union movement today? 
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Are employees looking for something different from your (their) trade union 
now? 
What action are trade unions taking? 
4. General Questions: Influence of other trade union models 
In the last few years, the EU has brought in new employment protection, 
increased legislation, increased support for trade unions. How has this 
impacted on you (them)? 
Has there been any influence on you of partnership/co-determination models? 
There are a number of different definitions of partnership - how would you define it? 
American models of industrial relations are very different - why do you think 
that's the case? 
Do American models have any influence here? 
5. Closing question 
Do you think I've got a good view of your (their) union and what it's about? 
Anything you want to add/anything I haven't covered? 
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APPENDIX 2: PROJECT ONE CODING 
1. Historical background 
(14) IR History (14 5) Curtest situation 
(144) Bob Mason era 
(143)1995-1996 
40, 
(142) Company Plan 
(14 1) PreCompany Pan 
1.1. Pre-Company Plan 
1.2. Company Plan 
1.3.1995-1996 
1.4. From tolerance to belligerence 
1.5. Recent events 
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2. Darlington factors 
.a (1) Darlington Factors (14) Conflict between unions 
(13) Business factors driving militancy (132) Monopoly 
I 
a', 
(12) Managerial contribution to unrest 
(1 1) Collectiv isation of employees 
(131) Commercialisation 
(112) View of employees 
(111)Schism between TU leadership and mgn 
2.1. Collectivisation of employees 
2.1.1. Schism between trade union leadership and members 
2.1.2. View of employees 
2.2. Managerial contribution to unrest 
2.3. Business factors driving militancy 
2.3.1. Commercialisation 
2.3.2. Monopoly position 
2.4. Conflict between unions 
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3. Socially shared discourses 
(11) Yew ft (113) M& 
(111)Mth -pd 
? 
celvmen 8shp 
(11Z)TradeFirmp`w+er 
nvalic 
0 
(1111) Pold cd mcmagn (11 12) Members' 
äteiests (112 1) Irdustnal miede (1122) Pad rnhip 
(11121)Perceived needfaprotection 0 1122)Prdessiaie6sm 
3.1. Views of trade unions 
3.1.1. Motivation - political versus membership 
3.1.1.1. Political motivation 
3.1.1.2. Members' interests 
3.1.1.2.1. Perceived need for protection 
3.1.1.2.2. Professionalism 
3.1.2. Trade union power 
3.1.2.1. Industrial muscle 
3.1.2.2. Partnership 
3.1.3. Metaphors 
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4. Views of management 
(12) Vim of marýagerrýent\ 
(122) Cepel 
(12 1) Roe of managmwt 
(1224)The NwA-eemng Orgar%satan 
(1223) Paar management 
0 
(1222) Undedrw estmert 
is 
(1221) Orisaeaa hstary 
(12 12) RLmirg the bushes 
(1211) Iretituiror forces (12122) Lack of market forces 
(12121)Operalwrel Coretraints 
(12113) Need fahighstandards ý, 
(12112) Role of themeda 
(12111) P dial l t[LOV s 
4.1. Role of management 
4.. 1.1. Institutional forces 
4.1.2. Political influences 
4.1.3. Role of the media 
4.1.4. Need for high standards 
4.1.5. Running the business 
4.1.6. Operational constraints 
4.1.7. Lack of market forces 
4.2. Capability 
4.2.1. Organisational history 
4.2.2. Underinvestment 
4.2.3. Poor management 
4.2.4. The non-learning organisation 
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-0 0 (12 3) Consistency (1232) Of r"ois rps 
(1231) Of purpose 
4.3. Consistency 
4.3.1. Of purpose 
4.3.2. Of relationships 
5. Conditioned response 
(13) Condtiorta 1 tesporis (13 3) Getting what ya7ve bred 
(13 2) TUs' codnionad response (132 4) Adv arsenal ralmons 
(131) M anageta' cmdtio ed response 
(132 3) Appeasement tolerance strategy 2 
(13 22) Failing to reward good behaviour 
(13 21) Rewardng bad beheviar 
(113 13) Lesenass heo 
(13 12) Persecution 
(131 1) Behevioar d TUs 
5.1. Managers' conditioned response 
5.1.1. Behaviour of trade unions 
5.1.2. Persecution 
5.1.3. Learned helplessness 
5.2. Trade unions' conditioned response 
5.2.1. Rewarding bad behaviour 
5.2.2. Failing to reward good behaviour 
5.3. Appeasement tolerance strategy 
5.3.1. Adversarial relations 
5.3.2. `Getting what you've bred' 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at theories of HR, accessing them through the discourse of 
business and HR respondents in a private sector organization. The paper 
explores models of HR in discourse, using a discourse analysis methodology and 
a social constructivist epistemology to create a deeper qualitative analysis than 
would have been possible using more positivist methodologies. 
It explores the concept of HR as 'best fit' and uses Paauwe's (2004) contextually 
based theory of HR as a putative interpretative framework. It also looks at the 
differentiation between espoused and enacted HR. 
The paper concludes that contextually based HR, whilst an interesting descriptive 
framework, appears less deterministic and universalistic than writers such as 
Paauwe suggest. Instead, the contextual factors appear to be less important than 
the influence of the actors in the formulation and deployment of HR strategy. 
Whilst Paauwe's model does accommodate this to a certain extent (through the 
concept of the "dominant coalition"), this paper suggests that the actors in this 
organisation are much less constrained by contextual factors than 'best fit' models 
of HR suggest, and that a model of HR which accords greater significance to the 
role of the actors may be more useful. 
275 
1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR PROJECT 
1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1. Towards a Model of Contextually Based HR 
Project two continues and expands the examination of the influence of context on 
the SHRM model adopted by an organisation. 
Project one suggested that 'best practice' models of HR had limited capability to 
explain the model of HRM developed in a British public sector organisation, and 
looked instead to the 'best fit' model of HR. Project one determined that four 
aspects of context (national culture, ownership model, historical context and 
workforce characteristics) appeared to influence the type of 'best fit' HR strategy 
deployed in London Underground. It also explored RBV and neo-institutional 
theories of SHRM and found that the latter seemed to offer more insights into the 
operation of HR in this type of organisation. 
Project two moves from a British public sector company to its opposite: Thomson 
Financial, a global private sector organization with a radically different origins and 
culture to that of London Underground. Figure 56 compares the four influential 
aspects of context in London Underground and Thomson Financial. 
London Underground Thomson Financial 
National Culture British national culture (specifically European national cultures (middle 
white, working class, male culture of class professionals, largely sales 
trade unions), American management oriented), American/British/Canadian 
management 
Ownership Model Public sector entity (specifically Private sector entity (responsive to 
influenced by political drivers, with an business and market pressures rather 
absence of business pressures) than normative or other political 
forces, demanding and discerning 
customer base with high switching 
cost, competitive marketplace with two 
major players - Reuters and 
Bloomberg - and one agile newcomer 
currently gaining market share - 
FactSet) 
Historical Context Important features include success of Important features include 
trade unions in negotiation at the paternalistic culture of Thomson 
expense of management, failure of Corporation, organization created 
government to support, relationship from 70 plus acquisitions, no strong 
between Ken Livingstone and RMT organizational culture/strong move to 
and LU culturally integrate 
Workforce Characteristics Stable workforce and pattern of long Contrast between stable workforce 
service (new staff bringing new ideas and pattern of long service in acquired 
segregated from 'old guard'), average employees to new management, 
age of white collar workers mid 40s typical age mid 30s to early 40s, from 
onwards, professional qualifications largely entrepreneurial backgrounds. 
from some years ago (e. g. CIPD), 
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degree backgrounds less common. 
Limited use of consultants until large 
scale McKinsey project (again, 
divisive, as new staff brought in to 
implement McKinsey 
recommendations, existing staff 
resistant). 
Figure 56: Comparison of Contextual Influences on TIL and TF 
Project two takes as its working hypothesis that context will influence HR strategy 
in TF, and that 'best fit' will provide a better explanation for HR strategy in TF than 
'best practice'. However, it is predicted that the different array of operant 
contextual factors in the private sector would result in a business and an HR 
strategy driven primarily by RBV factors rather than the neo-institutional forces 
which were the primary determinants of strategy in project one's public sector 
organisation. Competitive pressures, and the concomitant need to extract the 
maximum value from employees, make it more likely that the organization will 
draw upon modern HR technology, embracing best practice, and with a focus on 
organizational capability rather than employee/industrial relations. However, the 
organisation's paternalistic heritage and disparate organizational cultures may 
mean that there is still some reliance on neo-institutional or rule-based forces to 
direct and control employee behaviour, rather than modern approaches such as 
corporate values and leadership competencies. 
Project one identified four categories of context which were potentially influences 
on HR strategy. Project two will systematize this by relating the discussion of 
context to Paauwe's model of contextually based HR as a putative model. 
1.1.2. Methodological and Philosophical Approach 
There are a number of methodological and philosophical commonalities between 
the projects: the discourse analysis methodology, the social constructivist lens, the 
use of institutional, neo-institutional and RBV theories of SHRM, and the 
consistent role and relationship of the researcher to the organization and the 
participants. 
The frameworks of social constructivism and discourse analysis will be carried 
over into project two. Project one suggested that discourse analysis could be an 
illuminating way of accessing people's espoused views about their organization, 
organizational culture and the forces operating upon it, could present multiple and 
(often) contradictory world views whilst avoiding the pressure upon the researcher 
to create a `true' version of events. Maintenance of a social constructivist 
epistemology throughout seems most appropriate to the study of topics such as 
context and culture, both of which have a second order reality, access to which is 
problematic through more positivist research techniques. 
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This will allow the project to examine HR as a social and political process, rather 
than an objectively observable phenomenon. This will allow for a second level of 
analysis to be conducted, which looks at the role of the actors in directing, 
developing and implementing HR strategy. The reasons for the divergence 
between espoused and enacted HR strategy can also be considered using this 
social constructivist lens. 
This will allow the examination of perceived constraints on the implementation of 
the 'best fit' HR strategy. Although an organization may be perfectly aware of 
exactly what it needs to do in order to design and implement a "best fit" HR 
strategy, human and environmental factors may intervene. Relating this to Truss 
& Gratton's (2003) work on "enactment" (quoted in Paauwe, 2004, p 64), project 
two will examine the factors which are perceived as constraints and examine the 
influence are they seen as exerting. 
A final commonality between the projects is the role of the researcher. A unique 
feature of this study is that her relationship to the participants in each study is 
exactly the same. As HR Director of the organization under study, she has the 
same formal relationship with the three groups of participants: service provider and 
senior management colleague to the business managers; colleague or manager of 
the HR participants; subordinate to the senior HR representative. 
In both project one and project two, the researcher is a member of the 
organization under study and brings insights to the research which an 'outsider 
would be unable so to do. However, she also acts in and is acted upon by the 
organization, hence is subject to cultural and contextual biases of which she may 
be unaware or only partly aware. This 'associated and dissociated' role of the 
researcher is common to all of the projects and the implications of this will be 
considered in the linking document. 
1.1.3. Project Participants 
Interview for project two were conducted in late 2006, and involved both HR and 
business people. All of the participants were working for the European or 
American Thomson Financial businesses. 
1.1.4. Research Questions 
The research questions for this project were as follows: 
" What can RBV and neo-institutional theories of SHRM, a social 
constructivist approach and a discourse analysis methodology tell us about 
how HR strategy is created and how HR is enacted? 
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" What influence do different contexts have on the creation of HR strategy 
and the enactment of HR? 
" How do actors' perceptions influence the creation of HR strategy and the 
enactment of HR? 
1.2. Rationale 
The business and academic rationales for this project are shown in figure 57 
below. 
Business Rationale Thomson Financial Is an organisation which is critically dependent upon the quality and the 
output of its employees - it has no significant asset base and its competitive advantage 
depends upon the intellectual property produced by its employees. Despite this, it has an 
HR function which is only beginning to explore SHRM models and which Is routed in 
transactional processing. Exploring how HR can increase its contribution to the 
organisation is the primary business rationale for this project. 
Academic Rationale Examination of an HR model As suggested by the literature review, SHRM has been 
in an organisation transitioning dominated by quantitative, positivist research. Host 
to SHRM organisations for its research have tended to be modern, 
sophisticated organisations where the criticality of well 
motivated, highly skilled employees is recognised and 
systematically developed through a strategic, embedded 
approach to HRM. This project provides an opportunity 
to examine HR in a transitioning organisation, where the 
principles of SHRM are only beginning to be deployed. 
RBV and institutional theory This study will look at the discourse of participants in the 
context of two theoretical frameworks of HRM: resource 
based view and neo-institutional theory. 
Applicability of social This project will continue the theme, established in 
psychological methodologies project one, of using social psychological methodologies 
to ex lore HR issues. 
Constructivist view of This project will examine concepts such as 'strategy' from 
language a constructivist perspective. 
Figure 57. " Business and Academic Rationales for Project Two 
The anticipated output of this project is likely to be recommendations for the 
direction of the HR function in Thomson Financial and suggested approaches to 
communication with and dissemination to key stakeholders. 
1.3. Background 
1.3.1. Organisational Context 
This study will take the premise of contextually based HR (and in particular, 
Paauwe's model) and will examine it against an actual organisation. Thomson 
Financial (TF) is one of four market groups of The Thomson Corporation (TTC), 
and bridges the technology and the financial services industries. It is a $2 billion 
business, employing around 9000 employees worldwide. 
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Whilst TTC is listed on the Canadian stock exchange and is, to all intents and 
purposes, a PLC, the Thomson Family holds some 70% of the shares, through 
their wholly owned Woodbridge company. This creates a unique configuration, 
where the organisation is influenced both by the Thomson Family and the financial 
markets. 
Thomson Financial's core business is the selling of information into Investment 
Management and Investment Banking companies (e. g. Merrill Lynch, HSBC, 
Goldman Sachs) through a sophisticated portal solution. It has a subscription 
business model, with a demanding and discerning customer base with high 
switching costs. Its competitive landscape consists of two major players - Reuters 
and Bloomberg - and a number of agile newcomers (notably FactSet, Royal Blue 
and CaplQ) and niche players who are currently gaining market share. 
TF both generates its own proprietorial content and sells through feeds from third 
parties such as Dow Jones. This study focuses on the European operation, which 
employees some 1500 people and generates around $200 million per year, 
around 17% of the organisation's total revenues. The organisation has consistent 
steady year on year growth of around 6%, but this fails to match the 11-12% 
growth of the Financial Services industry. Given that TF provides subscription 
based desktop products, sales of which are largely determined by the headcount 
of its customers, the current boom in the Financial Services market should have 
facilitated a similar level of growth in IF. 
Culturally, TF is somewhat fragmented. The organisation was put together in the 
mid-90s from around 70 separate acquisitions and, as such, has a number of sub- 
cultures. The company continues to make acquisitions, although the focus has 
switched towards driving organic growth over the last year. The company remains 
highly entrepreneurial and expansion into new products and new geographical 
areas is a high priority. This sits in contrast to the more paternalistic culture of the 
main Thomson Corporation (where the influence of the family is stronger), and 
also with the more stolid culture of the acquisitions, notably the Primark and 
Datastream organizations, from which a large percentage of the employees came. 
There is a contrast between the stable workforce and pattern of long service in 
acquired employees to the new management, who have short service, and are 
aged from mid 30s to early 40s. They typically come from largely entrepreneurial 
backgrounds. 
This fragmentation has been exacerbated by the portfolio approach taken by The 
Thomson Family, who have entered and exited industries on a regular basis and 
have bought and sold companies in accordance with these changes of direction 
for many years. This precluded the development of a strong singular 
organizational culture or a strong emphasis on culturally integration of the 
Thomson companies. This approach has changed slightly in recent years, as the 
280 
appointment of Dick Harrington as CEO of the Thomson Corporation led to more 
commonality of key processes (e. g. talent management), a focus on setting up 
shared back office operations and the establishment of a limited sense of cultural 
identity, but this has been limited in its impact on the cultural fragmentation and 
independent operation of the component businesses (this is suggested by a 
number of the respondents, including NB). 
However, one can gain an impression of the culture from some of the terms used 
by the respondents: 'immature', 'short termist', 'entrepreneurial", 'laddish', 
'informal', 'unstructured'. The following quotes give an idea of the way in which 
participants view the organization. 
"... we have quite an immature employee base from the point of view 
that ... they're quite short termist. " [BB: 7] 
"I've been a little bit shocked by the kind of prevailing laddishness in 
this organisation. " [GT: 9] 
"I think this company has a rather kind of immature attitude" [GT: 16] 
"I think Jim Toffey put it really well, in the management presentation 
that he gave last year ... he said, 'Thomson Financial's like a two billion dollar start up'. " [LJ: 13] 
There are, however, also positive attributes to the culture cited by the 
respondents, around work-life balance, lack of hierarchy and intellectual challenge. 
"... the guaranteed aspect of their salary will be much higher than it 
was (in Banking), on top of which ... they will be getting a better work life balance, on top of which I think ... you could very easily sell a kind of senior management job in a company like this as being 
intellectually more challenging, certainly more diverse, em there will 
be a bigger kind of management context, you know there's not much 
kind of management in Financial Services ... there's probably more 
of the diversity of kind of job, different types of jobs within the 
organisation. So you could come in you know in the sense that I did, 
doing one thing and within a relatively short amount of time do a very 
different job, and you know some years after that do yet another 
one. " [GT: 6] 
"I think that there is much less kind of hierarchy (than in Banking) 
and rightly so. " [GT: 8] 
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"... there are not that many people in this organisation who wield 
much power. I think it's more about influence really. " [GT: 9] 
"(the CEO values people who can have a very super intellectual 
conversation. " [EH: 10] 
The senior managers tend to have a start up experience (all of the European 
management team in 2006 had either set up a business or worked in a start up 
company). The impression created is that of an organization which eschews 
structure in favour of flexibility and an opportunistic approach to business, but one 
which lacks maturity and could benefit from more structure and a more prescriptive 
approach to acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. 
In terms of national origin, TF is equally diverse, but in the European business, the 
American/British management provide a largely European national culture. The 
organization comprises mainly middle class professionals and is largely sales 
rather than product oriented 
Thomson Financial's HR strategy, at first glance, appears to be based on the need 
to recruit and develop high quality, high performing employees who can bring the 
intellectual capital required by the organization to be and remain competitive in a 
challenging marketplace. Compliance and conformity within the employee base is 
seen as less important than the ability to contribute, and although an element of 
the former is driven through the HR policies and practices, the HR strategy is 
moving visibly to a talent management and organization capability agenda. This 
project will conduct a deeper exploration of these issues, examining the contextual 
factors described in the introduction through the discourse of senior members of 
the organization (within and outside the HR function) and their purported impact on 
the emergent HR strategy. The project will explore articulations of "best fit", and 
will look at the reasons respondents proffer in explanation of imperfect fit. 
HR in Thomson Financial Europe is equally something of a schism. In terms of 
HR approach, where it subscribes to TTC level programmes, TF deploys highly 
evolved tools. These cover the areas of performance management, talent 
management and senior leadership development programmes. It also uses a 
number of global systems (e. g. Peoplesoft for HRIS and Taleo for recruitment) 
which are used effectively but are Americo-centric in the way in which they have 
been specified, and to varying degrees lack suitability for the regional offices which 
operate them. However, where HR activities are entirely locally determined (e. g. 
disciplinary process), these are carried out in numerous different ways and 
typically lack rigour. 
In terms of staff, a significant amount of work has been conducted to transition the 
European HR team from a personnel and administrative function into a business 
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partnering orientation. Almost 50% of the staff have been changed within a2 year 
period and an extensive programme of diagnostics and training programmes have 
been initiated to transition the remaining staff into the new model. 
1.3.2. Specific Literature Review 
As previous chapters have indicated, there are a number of limitations within 
existing research on SHRM, notably the general Americo-centricity of the work, 
and the focus on a particular kind of workplace and workforce, namely the high 
performance work team model (which presumes that highly motivated, highly 
compensated employees perform in organisations where the effort and aptitudes 
of the employee can make a considerable difference to organisational 
performance). This led to a unitary view of 'good' HR as the HPWT model, as 
espoused by authors such as Applebaum & Batt (1994). In these models, where 
organisational context is referenced, it is seen as secondary to a single 'best' way 
of doing HR. 
Recognising these limitations in existing research, there have been attempts to 
develop a more contextually based approach to HRM, notably, Beer et al (1984), 
Schuler & Jackson (1987), Hendry & Pettigrew (1990) and Brewster (1993). 
However, Paauwe (2004) is unique in combining these essentially strategy and 
resource based models of the organisation with institutional theory. As he 
indicates: 
"Linking the resource-based view to institutional theory can 
contribute to uniqueness by optimally blending environmental factors 
(which can be both an opportunity and a constraint) with internal 
resources and capabilities. " (Paauwe, 2004, p94) 
This combination created Paauwe's Contextually Based Human Resource Theory, 
which is shown in figure 58. 
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Product/Market/ Efficiency 
Technology Effectiveness 
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3 
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Social/Cultural/ Fairness and 
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(SCL) regard to work; 
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Institutional know-how, and 
mechanisms participation 
The Contextually Based Human Resource Theory (Paauwe, 2004, p 91) 
Figure 58: Paauwe's Contextually Based HR Theory 
As well as the contribution of combining resource-based and institutional theories 
of SHRM, Paauwe's model avoids determinism via the inclusion of the concept of 
the "dominant coalition". The dominant coalition refers to the influential actors 
within the organization (which may comprise, for example, senior managers, trade 
union representatives, middle and junior managers, employees and HR 
representatives) who have the ability to exercise strategic choice within the 
organization. Their interpretation of the contextual factors will define their 
perceived `freedom to operate', which in turn will determine the strategic choices 
they feel able to make. 
The project takes up Paauwe's challenge to use his framework in empirical 
research, using qualitative methodologies as an appropriate route (Paauwe, 2004, 
p95). This project will also consider the nature of Paauwe's model: is it analytical, 
descriptive or heuristic? It seems unlikely that it will be useful as an analytical 
model (it is difficult to see how one could isolate and manipulate parts of the model 
to examine outcomes), but it may be useful as a descriptive or a heuristic model 
(i. e. one which helps researchers formulate questions about the phenomenon). 
Both of these will be considered in project two. 
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2. PURPOSE OF PROJECT 
The purpose of the project was to explore models of HR, with a particular 
concentration on the notion of HR as 'best fit', using discourse analysis to provide 
a richer level of qualitative analysis than would be achieved through use of a more 
positivist methodology. It uses Paauwe's model as an interpretative framework, 
and looks at implementation of HR as well as espoused strategy. 
3. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
No additional definition of terms is deemed necessary. 
4. THEORETICAL POSITIONING 
This paper continued the social constructivist perspective adopted in project one. 
Social constructivism is particularly appropriate to a study of perceptions, opinions 
and views where concepts open to multiple interpretations (such as strategy and 
HRM) are being explored. 
The theoretical bases for this project were two fold: this project continued project 
one's use of neo-institutional theory, but will add to this the concept of resource 
based view. It was envisaged that this combination, taking up Paauwe's 
Contextually Based HR Model, would provide the widest interpretative framework 
for discourses on strategy and HRM. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Overview 
Project two took the four contextual features which emerged as key during project 
one (national culture, ownership model, historical context and workforce 
characteristics), and tested their applicability in a very different organisational 
context. It used Paauwe's model as a framework with which to categorise these 
contextual factors. 
It again used discourse analysis as a methodology for accessing the complex, 
often highly politicized constructs which people use to explain issues of 
organization and behaviour. The interview schedule is attached at appendix one, 
which was piloted and refined before roll out. Discourse analysis is particularly 
pertinent in this context, given Paauwe's critique of existing HRM research, and 
his call for an approach which is less prescriptive: 
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"The use of cross-sectional data collected through pre-formatted 
questionnaires leads to an imposed reality upon the research 
subjects. This ignores the existence of an emergent reality. Once 
we accept the existence of such a reality, the difficulties of the 
previous approaches become apparent and a whole range of new 
issues and conceptual refinements arise. " (Paauwe, 2004, p65) 
Project one took as its interviewees the group of employees most closely 
associated with and impacted by the industrial relations-centric form of HR 
practiced in London Underground. Project two followed this model and 
interviewed the people closest to the form of HR practiced by Thomson Financial: 
senior HR staff in both Europe and the USA, senior European managers and two 
groups of employees (one group long serving, one recently hired). As Thomson 
Financial does not have trade unions, the inclusion of the employees is the closest 
match to the trade unionists interviewed in project one. 
As the national culture element was also deemed to be important, a group of non- 
UK based employees was also interviewed. It is anticipated that the subject group 
will be of a similar size to that of project one (15). A list of the interviewees with 
brief biographical profiles is included in appendix two. 
5.2. Key Steps 
Following on from the previous study, discourse analysis was used to examine 
HRM in action in an actual organisation, to see how closely Paauwe's model 
reflects his aspiration of creating: 
"... a universally applicable model, a way of theorizing that can be 
applied, to every country; a theory that can accommodate the 
enormous variety in HRM policies and practices as well as the 
various contextual factors involved". (Paauwe, 2004, p37) 
This study used Paauwe's framework as a broad taxonomy for the analysis of the 
discourse of two groups of Thomson employees: 
" TF Europe senior management 
" Global Thomson HR staff. 
Interviews were conducted in August and September 2006 in London and New 
York, although one key subject was not interviewed until January 2007. The 
interviews were transcribed and coded into interpretative repertoires using NVivo. 
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The NVivo coding for this project is shown in figure 59 below. 
(1.2.1.2 11.1) Contextual 
factors 
(1 1) Business strategy 
(1.2.1.1) Be51 pradiu 
(1.2.1 2.1) CBHRT (1.2.1.2.1.2) Dominant 
(Paawe) coaldion 
(1) Linkage between 
business and HR 
(1.2 1.2 2.1) Influence 
of management 
1) Espoused HR (12.1.2 2) Non"Pasuwe (strategy (1.2.1.2) Best fit factor (1.2.12 2.2) Impact of 
change 
(1.2 21.1 
Orysnuational (12 12 2 3) Influence 
(1.2.2 1) Discourse of conetrunls Lof unplanned activities 
constraints 
(1.2.2.1.2) Professional 
constraints 
(7.2.2) Enacted HR (1.2 2.2) Static versus 
dynamic models 
(1.2 2 3.1) Implications 
for HR 
(1.2 2.3) Impf"Jons 
(1.2 2.3 2) Perceptions 
of HR 
Figure 59: NVivo Coding for Project Two 
5.3. Basis for Establishing Rigour 
5.3.1. Validation 
As indicated for project one, validation of a discourse analysis study is handled in 
a very different way to validation of more positivistic methodologies (where a range 
of statistical tools may be used for validation purposes). The transparent 
presentation of the data and the analytic process acknowledges that the 
researcher is producing one of a number of possible competing interpretations, 
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and the reader is invited to critique the researcher's coding and proffer their own. 
There is no attempt to produce one "true" representation of events, attitudes or 
internal states from the discourse data. Validation, consequently, in discourse 
analysis, is embedded in the transparency of the process and in the critique of the 
reader. 
5.3.2. Researcher Bias and the Role of the Observer 
It is relevant to discuss both researcher bias and the role of the observer. As this 
is a discourse analysis based study, the biases of the researcher and the 
perceptions of the participants in respect of the researcher will influence both the 
data and the analysis. 
These comments are made to allow the reader to judge the validity of the data 
collected and the analysis produced. 
5.3.2.1. Researcher Bias 
To firstly discuss researcher bias, the researcher was a senior HR professional 
who has worked in both SHRM and traditional environments, and in Europe, the 
USA and the Far East as well as the UK. 
Her knowledge of SHRM models and her previous role in a `pure' SHRM 
environment may have created a source of bias, as may her responsibility for 
driving SHRM into Thomson Financial. 
The researcher has a critical view on the contribution of professional HR 
institutions (SHRM and CIPD), which may also have influenced her questioning 
and her interpretation. 
A further source of bias may arise from her academic background in social 
psychology, social constructivism and discourse analysis, which is likely to have 
predisposed her to a critique of positivist approaches in the area of management 
research. 
5.3.2.2. The Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher was likely to have influenced the data produced in a 
number of ways. At the time of the study, the researcher was a senior manager of 
the organisation under study, which has the potential to create socially desirable 
responses and impression management in participants. 
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The responsibility held by the researcher for HR in the organisation at the time of 
the project may also have limited the criticism offered by the participants of HR 
and HR strategy. 
5.3.3. Other Limitations 
This study may also have been limited by its small number of interviewees, which 
places restrictions on the generalisability of the conclusions drawn. This was, 
however, mitigated to a certain extent, as the key players in the European 
management team and in the global HR team were interviewed. 
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6. RESULTS 
The interview schedule (shown in appendix one) was designed in order to explore 
the link between business and HR strategy, and to examine the factors which 
could potentially influence the form of HR adopted by the organization. The study 
also aimed to test Paauwe's universalistic model, which purports that a 
combination of resource based and institutional factors will explain the form an HR 
strategy will take in a real organization. Although it did not explicitly set out to 
explore espoused HR strategy and enacted HR, this theme emerged strongly 
through the discourse. 
As well as looking at discourse around business strategy, HR strategy and the role 
of HR, this study examined accounts of contextual factors proffered by 
participants, using Paauwe's categories: 
" Product/market/technology dimension (competitive mechanisms) 
" Organisation/administration/cultural heritage 
" Social/cultural/legal dimension (institutional mechanisms). 
The assumption of a social constructivist approach and the use of discourse 
analysis as a methodology revealed a level of ambiguity and complexity which 
Paauwe's model does not accommodate. 
This discussion of the results focuses on a number of questions (the number in 
brackets refers to the relevant section of this report). 
" How do participants describe business strategy in TF? (6.1) 
" How do participants describe HR in TF? (6.2) 
" What is the perceived role of HR in Thomson Financial? (6.2.1) 
" Do participants use 'best practice' or 'best fit' models of HR? (6.2.2) 
" Is there an HR strategy? (6.2.3) Do they see the need to have a 'fit' 
between business strategy and HR strategy? What is the perceived 'fit' 
between HR and business strategy in TF? 
" If 'best fit', what are the contextual factors which influence that 'best fit'. Do 
participants reference the factors in Paauwe's model and does Paauwe's 
CBHRT provide a useful framework for categorizing their responses? 
(6.3.1) 
" The influence of the dominant coalition. Paauwe's model infers that, in the 
absence of strong contextual drivers, the dominant coalition becomes 
fundamentally important in determining the HR strategy (6.3.3). 
" Is there agreement about the membership of the dominant coalition? 
(6.3.2.1) 
" How does the dominant coalition influence HR? (6.2.3.2) 
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" How consistent is the dominant coalition in the direction it sets (6.3.2.3) 
" In the absence of a strong contextual business drivers, or clear and 
consistent direction from the dominant coalition, Paauwe's model does not 
predict an outcome (6.3.3). What drives business and HR strategy in TF in 
this situation? Whims of CEO and most senior management? (6.3.2) 
" What influence does implementation (or lack of) of strategy have? (6.4) 
" What implications does the perceived lack of alignment between HR and 
business strategies have on how HR is perceived? (6.5) 
To answer these questions, it is sensible to look firstly at constructions of business 
strategy and constructions of HR in Thomson Financial. Consistent with the 
approach taken in project one, the discourse analysis methodology involves 
selection and coding of extracts to inform a narrative developed by the researcher. 
As indicated in the methodology section of this thesis, this is one of a number of 
possible interpretations of the data, and is likely to be influenced by the 
researcher's conscious and sub-conscious biases. 
6.1. Constructions of Business Strategy 
Whereas emergent and logically incremental models of strategy suggest that a 
business will always have a strategy towards which it is working, even if that 
strategy changes over time or is less than clearly perceived by the players, a clear 
theme in the TF discourse was that of a lack of strategy. 
"I still think ... we lack, I think to the point of being honest, we still lack a bit of strategic clarity. " [NB: 10] 
"I'm Head of Strategy. If you sat me dc 
strategy? ", I'd really struggle to tell you, 
else ... And I see the same thing when 
what is our strategy, he talks about this 
never says this is why is, it's because o 
(the President)'s documents you don't se 
we know that we haven't got a strategy 
we're doing with - why we're doing it ar 
going to take us. " [EH: 22] 
wn and said "what is your 
;o yeah, god help anyone 
someone asks (the CEO) 
is what we're doing. He 
it strategy is this. And in 
3 that either. I don't think 
... we're confusing what d where we're hoping it's 
Going further, participants represent the strategy at a more micro level as actually 
contradictory. 
" ... as a company we haven't figured out exactly what we're trying to do ... taking desktop revenue of existing customers and converting it into Feeds revenue ... is in direct contradiction to trying to create 
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more desktops ... I think that's ... set up a kind of contradiction. " [JR: 3] 
Or, at best, riven by tensions. 
"... what is our strategy? Our strategy is we want to be in ... businesses that have certain characteristics of very good cash flow, 
predictability, preferably subscription based, high margin, and 
reasonably good growth prospects. But the question is always what, 
can you get all of those, because very often those conflict. Em very 
often high margin good cash flow businesses are almost by definition 
not high growth. " [NB: 9] 
Organisational immaturity is cited as a reason why business strategy is not clearly 
defined. 
"I've been doing em some of the orientation presentations ... that's 
my opportunity to explain to people ... where we are! That we're in 
adolescence at best, em and one of the metaphors that I use is that 
you know if you look at our products right now there's this great 
gooey front end that looks slick ... and seems integrated ... then in the back end you kind of lift the cover and it's spaghetti on the back 
end's linking everything together. " [MW: 2] 
The lack of clear strategy is seen as perpetrated by a lack of strong co-ordinating 
mechanisms. This respondent offers a number of potential co-ordinating 
mechanisms, including strong managers supporting a defined culture, and a 
values, process or results focus. However, she goes on to reject each of these in 
the context of Thomson Financial. 
"... management culture ... works absolutely fine when you have a 
group of managers who are strong, who are consistent, and who are 
... reflecting a ... strong culture that the Corporation has ... You can always make different decisions in a specific situation from the ones 
that you make you know in France than you make in other places, 
but you let the same underlying set of values guide these decisions. 
Now because we don't have an underlying set of values as a 
company, we have a set of processes that don't actually instruct you 
very much, so we use the stick approach much much more than we 
use the carrot approach, which is you know we will set the 
boundaries, how much discretion you've got to be this small, 
because we don't really trust you to go outside them so we're gonna 
be very process led. So we are so we are very we restrict people's 
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behaviour by trying to look at the processes and trying to you know 
make decisions keep within a small guidelines. 
Em whereas other organisations can be very much values led and 
they decide you know we tell you what's important and every 
individual makes their own decisions but you know if you fall out of 
line with those values we'll come down hard on you. Em we don't do 
that ... we don't have a shared set of values ... that are meaningful 
... we have very different sets of values 
in different parts of the 
organisation, and I think also we've got the other way that companies 
sometimes run themselves is they can be very results led, very 
incentives let, so they say don't really care how you get anything 
done, but you are completely responsibility for the profitability of your 
business unit or your product line or whatever, and if you hit 
profitability you do whatever you like. Which we also don't do that 
because we don't trust ourselves to be able to actually determine 
profitability etcetera so we don't cascade decision making down so 
we actually try and restrict them through process. 
So HR sets processes but ... there are a lot of times when we 
have 
to move outside of those processes ... and that first 
decision's totally 
made by business unit heads whether that's the geographic head or 
whether it's the functional unit head. 
... because of the kind of ... cost infrastructure that we've got, as an 
organisation, you have to be somewhat of a results led organisation 
... someone like McKinsey, as my former employer, who is 100 
percent values led organisation ... But that's because it relies upon its profitability relies on many many individuals all making consistent 
decisions in very individual situations with clients. So we do that to 
some degree, we rely on a lot of individuals making the right 
decisions. But we also rely on em we also have a huge fixed cost 
base, that we need to have the best use of our resources because 
we've got we're such a ... scaleable kind of business, that em I think 
we should be more results oriented. " [JR: 8/9] 
The result of the lack of strategic clarity is that TF is perceived as an organization 
which is driven by the peccadilloes of its senior managers. 
"I think there's a lot of dynamism but I think it's around interesting 
things, it's not necessarily systematic. I don't know if I do see 
commercialism so much, I mean I've just seen .. (the) sign off 
(of) a 
business case ... when everyone's telling him 
(the CEO) it's not 
going to make any difference. He just decided he wants it ... we 
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gaily ignore commercial sort of realities because we want to ... play 
with new toys, it's fun, it's cool. " [EH: 12] 
"Back to 'we're going to be a leading provider ... But what on earth does that mean? ... There's nothing about what we're 
doing, says to 
me we're doing that to become a leading provider, or that will take us 
to be any kind of leading provider, so - ... it's kind of the 
Balkans. In 
the absence of a big guiding principle or unifying force, it's kind of 
survival of the fittest and the strongest atmosphere and the strongest 
culture comes from the strongest person in that particular area. " 
[EH: 22] 
Although one respondent sees this as changing. 
"... it's been left to largely to em senior executives in the past, and I 
think this has changed, em running businesses to go out and find 
companies to buy and justify the acquisition of those companies ... I 
guess you could say there are more checks and balances now. And 
less susceptibility for a very powerful business manager to sort of 
push through a pet project which maybe looked looked okay 
financially, but actually em qualitatively, never really stacked up. " 
[NB: 11] 
6.2. Constructions of HR 
6.2.1. Views of the Role of HR 
6.2.1.1. Transactional Versus Strategic 
Two strong interpretative repertoires are used to describe HR throughout the 
interviews: HR as transactional service and HR as strategic. A hierarchy is set up 
between the two: strategy is presented as superior to tactical, as the following 
quotes imply. 
"If I want to carry on in this job just doing tactical stuff and you know 
get my 4 percent pay rise each year and my 8 percent bonus or 
whatever it is, I could do that but actually that doesn't help me in the 
long term it doesn't help me from my development point of view and 
actually you know if I want to be getting the bigger pay rises and the 
bigger bonuses, I can do that if I deliver really value adding pieces of 
work. But that's a challenge for me. " [BB: 16] 
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"If we demonstrate our strategic worth then that's worth far more 
than you know the industrial roadsweeping as I refer to it. " [BB: 3/4] 
The transactional and strategic repertoires construct these concepts in two 
distinctive ways: two uniquely different states, or as two poles on a continuum. 
Business participants tend to use the former, and HR the latter. One can surmise 
that the 'continuum' construction is a more functional repertoire for HR people, as 
it suggests a developmental path along which HR as a function can move. 
Many management participants referenced HR's transactional role. 
"I'd reach out to HR when I needed a specific role filling. I haven't 
EVER I have to say really involved HR in any of the strategic projects 
I've been doing ... I guess it's a two way thing: I've never reached out 
and nobody's ever reached back to me. It hasn't been a factor really 
and maybe that in itself is a sort of conclusion. " [EH: 2] 
" ... my personal experience in my job of the 
HR function at the 
moment really is the stuff that comes down ... and it's just like all the 
reminders you haven't done the PMAT, you haven't done the 
development plan, but I feel very little em incentivised to do any of 
these things because they're never used ... I don't see 
kind of the 
very high level strategic HR function as really adding any value to me 
personally in my job at all. It's this burden on my time, 
unfortunately. " [EH: 14] 
This is seen as dictatorial and non-value add. 
"The number of emails that will come out of the HR department with 
... 'managers must do x, y, z by this date', is incredible. 
I mean 
they're actually now dictating more what happens in the organisation 
than almost anybody else. You know, 'managers must'. Almost 
every HR thing will have something like that in. " [DHT: 2] 
And one participant goes further, suggesting that HR is being prevented from 
taking a business partner role by its adherence to its transactional (this participant 
refers to it as "policing") role. 
" ... the biggest disappointment for me that 
HR really hasn't kind of 
stepped up to the mark in terms of dealing with our particular 
corporate strategy, which is to create a global business ... 
in the 
States I think that that would be seen as compromising their policing 
role ... having a dotted line into the business. I think there's an issue 
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really which resides almost entirely in the States, in their attitude 
towards the HR function and the staff that they deal with. " [DHT: 1] 
" ... that sort of attitude informs the whole relationship between HR 
and the businesses in the States, where they're actually 
disintermediating the management, and going directly to the staff to 
deal with things ... the HR function has a believes it has ... a policing 
role" [DHT: 2] 
Transactional HR, hence, is equated to non-value added "box ticking", in this 
participant's parlance. Transactional HR, hence, is differentiated from strategic, 
but the former is seen as detrimentally affecting HR's reputation with managers. 
"... the States is a huge, huge operation, and em its basically a 
bunch of managers getting through the HR, crap, as fast as possible, 
ticking the boxes, and then getting on with their proper jobs. How 
stupid is that? " [DHT: 4] 
The following respondent describes an inherent tension between the need to 
create HR process in an organization which reviles bureaucracy. 
"TF was so desperate to fight to not become a large organisation, em 
there was a lot of resistance around anything that might look a bit 
like bureaucracy, or anything that might stem flexibility ... I think we 
still have a lot of that culture ... there is still em resistant to becoming 
what is seen as ... the traits of a slow moving organisation. 
... and if you try to put something in that just does not sit with the 
culture, it's not going to succeed. " [AB: 12/13] 
The inference is that, in an organization where bureaucracy is disdained, 
transactional HR is consequently devalued. 
Where the transactional and strategic are presented as mutually exclusive, rather 
than poles on a continuum, this leads logically to discussion around the difficulty in 
operating in both the transactional and the strategic spaces. This constrains HR, 
in the language of the business participants being interviewed, to an essentially 
transactional role. 
"I think it's difficult for one person to span all of those different parts. 
You've got people who are happy filling in boxes and ticking all the 
doing some of the more basic stuff, they may not be happy at the 
other end, coming up with some of the bigger picture ideas. " [LJ: 3] 
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The corollary of this is that success in the transactional space makes it difficult for 
HR staff to be perceived as strategists, as this business respondent indicates. 
"I think it's very hard for people to shift roles from administrative to 
strategic without people identifying them one way or another. The 
tendency is to identify them with the lesser role. Because that's 
probably what they have to do more often. " [DH: 10] 
This is also echoed by this HR respondent. 
" ... my clients have you know they have certain expectations of me in that regard. My reputation within Thomson Financial is built upon 
successes at a tactical level. " [66: 16] 
The alternative construction of transactional and strategic as points on a 
continuum is primarily used by HR participants. Senior HR staff indicate that the 
function is transitioning from transactional to strategic, suggesting that they see a 
continuum between the two poles. For this respondent, the key to strategic HR is 
the outsourcing of the transactional elements. 
'Well of course there's a clear HR strategy ... clearly there is there are aspirational aspects to what we are doing and there are some 
real roadblocks in terms of just the day to day realities of delivering 
on HR in this company at the moment ... but ... our overall HR strategy is very much aligned in terms of you know outsourcing em a 
lot of the transactional elements of HR in order for our HR team to 
become more strategic in nature, more focused on performance of 
our workforce to support the overall business objectives. " [SD: 2] 
" ... I think the aspiration of the strategy is there. I that we've got 
more work to do to get complete understanding and buy in of our 
strategy and the importance of the various strands of that, across the 
entire business leadership ... I think part of that comes through 
communication, part of it comes through execution. At the same 
time as we em really get better at operationalising the outsourced 
pieces so that the TF team can really focus on these more strategic 
objectives. " [SD: 2] 
More junior HR participants, however, see the constraints as more enduring. They 
see the ability to move to the strategic as limited by need to focus on the 
transactional, and managing outsourced transactional services neither frees up 
resources nor enhances HR's reputation with the business. 
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" ... there's things in HR that have to get done, like the must dos, that 
might not be ... where you add strategic value, but they have to get done, and they take up time and they take up resources ... There's the things that we should be focusing on, so the business value add, 
you know and I think it's really sort of a time and resource issue too. 
So we spend a lot of time, primarily because of HRT, doing things 
that we either haven't done in the past or haven't had to do in a long 
time, making sure someone's payroll got paid right, you know, which 
takes away from us playing this other role. So I think it's probably 
time and resource. " [DH: 9] 
" ... it is contradictory ... from an HR perspective, you're asking for the same people to improve the operational efficiency and I think to 
the detriment of where we're going from a business strategy. " [MW: 3] 
This is referenced in a slightly different context by another of the HR practitioners, 
who sees HR as constrained by the management expectation that HR will handle 
'difficult' issues. 
" ... are we operating at 100 percent in support of the business 
strategy? I think we're trying to. Em I think a lot a lot of progress is 
being made. I think we still get we still get caught up in that the 
business wants us to do one thing ... whereas if you really want to focus on being that support to business strategy ... you need to get the business to understand that you've got to pull away from that role 
and operate in a different space. And I think we're making that 
transition. 
... it's kind of the time that gets taken up sorting out what would what 
should be ... straightforward issues ... the business appears to want to have an HR referee, that distracts our current function from being 
able to focus on the things that would aligned better to meeting the 
business strategy. So an example of that is ... you get an employee who is ... unhappy with ratings, rather than talking to their manager 
about that, they're using HR to channel those conversations and the 
expectation is the manager comes to HR to say, 'can you sort this for 
us'. Whereas actually there's a responsibility on the managers to 
support to sort that stuff out. 
... historically that's what HR have done. Now whether that's historically in TF or that's historically in the marketplace HR have 
been seen to be the department that will help, and that help is 
around 'I don't want to handle a difficult situation, I'll get HR to do it. 
I don't want to do this, I'll get HR to do it'. Em and I'm guessing kind 
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of it's what was built in, what was the expectation, is the piece we 
need to re-educate around. " [AB: 3] 
This view of the constraints of tactical work on the ability to be strategic is echoed 
by a business participant, who interestingly prioritises the transactional over the 
strategic support, as the italicized section indicates. 
"I think there are lots of different elements that you need your HR to 
address ... I think it works on various different levels. First of all there's your basic admin stuff, so people coming on board, have all 
the right paperwork when they arrive, have all the right numbers for 
the right systems ... you know so all that basic stuff. That's the first 
part. I think the second part is more on your day to day areas of er 
- day to day recruitment, how effectively are we recruiting so that we 
can fill matching the role with the best person. Which I think is 
crucial for any organisation. I also find it interesting for day to day 
man management issues. So if we're having I don't know a wobbly 
between ... two people in the organisation or we have a performance 
problems with this individual, it would be good to have HR as a really 
effective sounding board, because it could be that you're just not 
managing them correctly ... 
And then also I think that where HR can also be effective but I think 
it's ... the nice to have rather than the must have, is just as a general 
sounding board about how you're managing in our business. Now 
that's more a kind of a coach stroke business strategy type of role... 
... if HR can fill the roles of being an effective business manager 
sounding board ... and looking at how the basic processes and 
systems fit together, and how the people are in general, that's really 
effective. But ... there's a lot of day to day stuff. That you have to do. We have to have support from that point of view. In an ideal 
world I'd love to have more of a high level strategic input as well. " 
[LJ: 2/3, my emphasis] 
A clear hierarchy emerges between transactional and strategic: the transactional 
foundation must be carried out successfully before strategic space can be entered. 
However, the tools for making that transition are seen as being under the control 
of HR. 
"I think there's a need for both roles [strategic and transactional], still, 
because ... in order for them to be good managers, in order for them to make sure that their employees are benefiting from the security, 
the knowledge that they're gonna be paid on the right day, and ... 
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they're gonna have the tools to do their job, there are certain 
amounts of transactional stuff that has to take place. 
... we need to build credibility. But equally 
I think em what we do is 
we build ways of making those managers more self sufficient. So 
the transactional piece is to find other ways of solving those pieces, 
and then can see that HR can then start to help them focus in on the 
motivation, the engagement of their employees, as opposed to some 
of the more admin focused. " [AB: 7] 
6.2.1.2. HR as Business Partner 
This repertoire was used by participants, but largely to frame a contrast to the 
tactical role. Few participants articulated a role for HR which linked directly to the 
business, but the following quote is an exception. 
"I think one of the benefits HR could potentially bring to the table is 
helping people think of what the ramifications are from a people 
perspective, from a business perspective, about some of the 
decisions that are made. " [MW: 6] 
This echoes LJ's desire for an HR 'sounding board' referenced in the 
previous section. However, this participant goes on to qualify the nature of 
the support, referencing enforcing legal boundaries and being a 
'conscience'. 
"I think we have a certain obligation to remind people what the legal 
boundaries are, because they look to us for that perspective. " [MW: 6] 
"I do think HR has a conscience from that perspective, in 
understanding alright if we're continuing to invest in growth without 
em laying a foundation, it's kinda like an architect building a building. 
I just want you to know that in 20 years it might crack'. " [MW: 6] 
Even when talking about business partnering, hence, the HR 
representatives appear to be self-limiting, restricting themselves to 
conventional HR areas of input, rather than operating as the `sounding 
board' requested by the business. 
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6.2.1.3. Contradictions in the HR Role 
A variant on the continuum repertoire is an awareness of the contradiction 
between the various roles HR staff are expected to play, from employee advocate 
to business partner. 
"... my experience in France is that the HR people in the offices, the 
business partners in the office, act quite differently ... And I think the 
people in the offices tend to be, and I don't know if this is history or 
whatever, but they tend to be real office advocates as opposed to 
being ... corporate advocates. Whereas the business partners are 
much more a centralised are much more looking for a set of sort of 
consistent outcomes across the organisation ... almost all have gone native, I think. Which in some sense ... there's benefits to that ... But then again, it's you know, they are still in contradiction to the rest of 
the team. " [JR: 10] 
This echoes U's quote reproduced earlier [LJ: 3], which infers that HR staff need 
to choose the role they play; this implies that it is not possible for HR to be 
concurrently both strategic and tactical. 
A stronger version of this is articulated by one of the business interviewees, who 
sees the two roles of HR as inimical. 
"I think it goes back to the notion that HR in the States has a sees 
itself as a dual function. It can't really work out what its primary 
function is. It is both a policing operation, it polices the managers to 
make sure that they do things, so it's always viewed with a certain 
amount of tolerant hostility by the managers, em and its other side is 
business support, because they're presumably dealing with quite a 
lot of people individually, they have no knowledge of the businesses 
they're supporting. The one thing they're actually quite valuable 
they're supposed to be quite valuable in doing, which is supporting, 
they can't do properly because they don't know the businesses well 
enough. " [DHT: 7] 
This has significant implications for the function's desire for a strategic role. If 
business participants see transactional HR and strategic HR as inimical, and that 
to fulfil the transactional role is seen as the primary requirement, it will not be 
possible for HR to be truly seen as a strategic player by the business. This 
linguistic construction of the role and function of HR, hence, limits HR to the 
tactical space. 
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Whereas HR may use its influence within the dominant coalition to enact a 
strategic role, this suggests that a transition to strategy which is endorsed by the 
business is still a long way away. 
6.2.2. `Best Practice' versus `Best Fit' Models of HR Strategy 
Only one participant provided any support for a conceptual 'best practice' model of 
HR. 
"I'm sure that there is an HR strategy, em I'm not sure how kind of 
closely correlated it is to our particular strategy versus a more kind of 
generic HR strategy from a company of this size or in this sector. " 
[GT: 1 ] 
But this is quickly qualified, and the 'best practice' argument is linked with an 
organizational maturity repertoire, suggesting that there is a level of 'basic' HR 
practice which every organization should have. 
"I see those (HR activities) as more in a sense more generic things, 
but I don't mean to kind of diminish them in any sense, because I 
think that they are all kind of critical things which any successful 
organisation ought to be thinking of doing on a daily basis ... focus on the sales force is very correlated to em to our strategy. I think for 
the others they are you know they are more generic. But as I said ... they should lend themselves to any corporate strategy, I'm not sure 
that ... their raison d'etre is to serve ours exclusively. " [GT: 1] 
His later discourse provided stronger support for a 'best fit' model, where the need 
for different types of HR for different businesses is clearly articulated. 
I think a lot of what ... HR is doing is ... the right thing, but I think like many aspects of this company, it is done in a more kind of 
process driven manner than it probably could do ... When I compare that to Banking, HR in a sense had a much more kind of limited kind 
of remit, but I think I felt - that they - but I think I felt that they ... 
played a bigger role... I think the HR function in this organisation 
probably suffers slightly from being given a wider remit than it that it 
ought to have ... the HR function in Banking ... was more limited, but in being more limited, it probably achieved its objectives more 
completely. And may have been given more credit for achieving 
them. " [GT: 14/15] 
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The `best fit' model is clearly articulated by an HR respondent (who herself 
references organizational design concepts in support of her argument). 
"... [the type of HR strategy an organisation adopts] it's really driven 
by organisational lifecycle ... there isn't a one size fits all, that that idealistic sort of state or that one perfect model.... It's aspirational 
but that also assumes that your company or your organisation is at 
prime and operating you know in em in a perfect state as well. 
Right? That you already are high performing, you're hitting targets 
all the time, the structure is right, em processes are right, whatnot, 
em where there's not that many companies that are in that exact 
position, right? (slight laugh) Yeah so if you think yes, if we were 
were aspiring to be that company, then you'd say my HR 
organisation aspires to be that as well, but in the interim while we're 
trying to move there, the HR organisation needs to reflect what 
actually goes on in the business. 
So for example in ... start up companies, right, it's gonna require the HR organisation to focus on certain things. Recruiting is gonna be 
key, right, training and development, maybe not so important. ... Not 
necessary. So ... I think the organisational lifecycle is important as 
companies grow and you know you're needing to have more defined 
roles and responsibilities ... and you're trying to put in process ... Maybe as it gets older, and you start on the bureaucratic side, when 
you're trying to move an organisation back and breathe some life into 
it, and innovation, then maybe there is some there are training and 
development needs, right, or an emphasis on the HR organisation 
driving some of the cultural values through the business. So I can to 
me, where the company is in its organisational lifecycle is probably 
one of the key drivers. " [DDV: 1] 
This is supported by reference to HR in other organizations. 
" ... it was a different phase in Reuters ... Reuters was then was a hundred years old and doing business for a hundred years and was 
pretty much doing the same business, and was actually going into 
into decline ... to summarise I think it probably worked reasonably 
okay in terms of the basics, but I don't think they [HR] added a huge 
amount of value. " [LJ: 12/13] 
" 
... in RAW ... we were a small start up, and ... at the 
beginning our 
main aim was to grow ... so the HR person at that time, her main aim 
was just to get people on board ... 
There was alignment certainly in 
the role and the aims of the company. " [LJ: 8/9] 
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The data includes clear commentary that the form of HR is dictated by the 
business. 
"I suppose the business owns HR, I think that we can influence 
what's em what their expectations are of us, in terms of you know 
demonstrating to them ... what we can provide and 
how we can add 
value ... but you know ultimately we are a service organisation so we 
are the business's HR department. " [BB: 314] 
" ... the HR organisation needs to reflect what actually goes on 
in 
the business. " [DDV: 1] 
"... the business has made a decision as to where, what role and 
where it wants HR to be, and ... it's convinced HR to play 
in that 
space, and we need to convince the management group that we play 
in that space. " [AB: 4/5] 
Two of the senior HR representatives indicated that it is a responsibility in an HR 
role to adapt to whatever business environment they find themselves in. 
"I think the style of leadership determines what credible HR is. And 
so you have to adapt to some degree to what that style is to be 
successful and survive in the organisation. " [MW: 9] 
" ... maybe it's really we're understanding what the organisation 
needs, during where they are in their evolution, and then coming in 
and playing that role. Being able to sort of be a chameleon and 
changing your roles as the organisation sort of gets more 
sophisticated or changes, right? " [DH: 2/3] 
The other participants clearly saw that there was a need for an HR strategy which 
complimented the business strategy. 
"I do think that HR does need to blend to the culture in order to be 
successful. Em -I think we came with our entire strategy towards fix 
fix fix fix fix and they were grow grow grow grow grow, we would be 
in trouble. " [MW: 5] 
6.2.3. Is There An HR Strategy? 
Although the 'best fit' model dominated the discourse, the business and the HR 
participants differed in their view as to the existence of an HR strategy. 
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Business participants were less likely to articulate that there was an HR strategy. 
"... (if I was in HR) the single biggest thing I would do ... (is to) match the HR strategy with you know with the strategy of the company. " 
[GT: 5] 
One of the management participants did attempt to define the strategy. 
" ... we seem to be adopting a fairly kind of low cost HR strategy, 
and be quite focused on getting good value people not necessarily 
the best people for any role, but a perfectly fine person at a good 
price. And then overlaying on top of that, then developing those 
people with kind of objectives, performance, coaching, stuff like that, 
courses. Em -I don't know to what extent - that - works. Would I 
say anything about that what our people strategy is? " [EH: 1] 
However, her next comment, about individual managers having their own 'people' 
strategies, suggests that any HR strategy is less than consistently deployed. 
" ... different ... parts of the organisation seem to take quite individualistic approaches to how they want to manage their people 
strategy rather than their HR strategy specifically, so ... (the CEO) from my point of view seems to be trying to move the kind of median 
up in the roles that report directly to him, and get some sort of real 
stars in. I'd tell you now that we seem to be doing slightly the 
opposite in GSMS, for example, where we're still very focused on the 
value end of the scale, and getting people in relatively cheaply and 
there not being such a willingness to sort of pay up for superior 
people. " [EH: 11 
The implication drawn by the participants is that a clear business strategy is a 
necessary pre-condition for the development of a clear HR strategy. 
"... here, in the UK, you know, where it it's it looks and feels much 
more like an integrated business, and an integrated HR strategy 
therefore. " [NB: 2] 
And the corollary of this is that, given an environment with an unclear or absent 
business strategy (the view of TF articulated by the majority of the participants), it 
is not possible for HR to be closely aligned with the business. 
" ... we always say we want to be the strategic partner for our clients 
... I think ... we have really no idea what we mean when we say that 
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... if it's not happening in Sales that would be the 
first place you'd 
expect to see it. I mean HR sort of no denigration intended would 
probably be sort of after Sales in that cascading of the message ... Sort of on the receiving end but it hasn't got anywhere has it. It's not 
that it hasn't got to HR it's that it hasn't got anywhere, either. " 
[EH: 3/4] 
I don't think there's any organisational alignment and I don't think 
there's any HR strategy (laughs), really. I mean I think HR is doing 
its best to do the business as usual, around what's going on in the 
organisation which is probably because the organisation is 
dysfunctional takes up 100 percent of the time. If the organisation 
were a bit more functional there would be a bit more space for you to 
do the other stuff. " [EH: 22] 
As the researcher was also the HR Director, this may have been an attempt to 
avoid criticism of the researcher and her department, hence may be coloured by 
observer bias. 
Conversely, however, the HR teams, particularly in Europe, were clear about the 
existence of a strategy and its key elements. 
"I think that ... the work that we have done in reorganising our department is very much geared towards supporting those strategic 
(business) priorities ... particularly some of the stuff around you know redefining our international remit ... that will help certainly 
in 
terms of driving international growth and introduction of the new 
technologies that can all be built in around that. " [BB: 1] 
Even if that strategy was in development, rather than fully realized: 
"I think this organisation should be thankful that we have an HR 
strategy, I don't know if we had one in the past in Europe but at least 
we've got something to go by, and I think we'll start to develop this 
over the next couple of years and it's gonna look better. " [CD: 8] 
"... we're still very tactically minded and we were back then but at 
least you know now there is a recognition em that that we're 
swamped with tactical stuff and you know we are looking at ways in 
which we can address that. You know if at the moment we're not the 
strategic business partners that we would like to be at least there is a 
recognition of that and I think that's quite important ... I think for the first time I've had people explaining to me exactly what they see my 
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role doing ... So it's actually ... a complete mindset shift from where 
we were before. " [BB: 2] 
One of the HR participants was very clear about the strategic direction of HR and 
the link to the business. 
" ... we are a kind of high end knowledge worker type organisation ... 
espousing a high performance, high commitment, high engagement 
kind of philosophy ... clearly our strategy as an organisation is to 
move increasingly towards what you might call high end information 
solutions. For our products to be an integrated part of our 
customers' workflow. That in turn implies an ever increasing 
knowledge worker employee engaged kind of philosophy. " [NB: 1/2] 
" ... the high performance, high engagement model ... from that flows the strategy ... that we have, of trying to engage people as 
much as we can, reward high performance, penalise poor 
performance, we're non-unionised, essentially, certainly in the US. 
And we fit therefore that sort of hi-tech model" [NB: 1/2] 
But he sees its implementation as constrained by organizational considerations. 
" ... but I think the reality on the ground and this comes back to our 
structure is that we are still very much in the process of absorbing 
lots of different companies. And this decentralisation through 
acquisition in a sense keeps coming back to haunt us. " [NB: 1] 
This view of the limiting factor of the portfolio approach on HR evolution is also 
echoed by this participant. 
u.. when I really think back to some of the times, the resistance of 
even getting these 13 different businesses as they were then, into a 
vertical customer segments ... all of these things were the ongoing battles of trying to bring what was a highly entrepreneurial run set of 
mini businesses into one organisation ... just all around the different things that we got involved in, in trying to make that transition. But I 
think while we were focusing on all of those things, maybe ... some 
of the progress that HR was making outside in the marketplace was 
lost. " [AB: 12] 
Although the business rationale for doing this is clear, the inference is that HR's 
ability to respond to this situation is limited. 
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"... we're not doing anything " ... For perfectly good reasons. Because we've inherited all these companies, they do different 
things, em if we harmonise we'd almost certainly be harmonising up. 
... The market that we're in doesn't require us to do any more, why 
should we take the extra cost? ... Plus the fact that it has to be said, 
as an organisation, em we're still in the process of really trying to 
decide what we want to keep in the portfolio. We're now going 
through this phase of weeding out things that we think don't fit, even 
though in some cases we only bought them a relatively short time 
ago. " [NB: 4/5] 
'Where I think we fit (the HPWT model) less well is because we are 
a federation of mainly small and medium sized organisations that 
we've acquired over the last ten to fifteen years ... if you look at the 
companies that comprise the group at the company level, they 
actually operate much more like small and medium sized 
organisations, even in the US, than they do a fully integrated, IBM, 
Dell, you know HP type model. " [NB: 2] 
HR's ability to be strategic is seen as determined (or at least influenced) by the 
need to respond to specific organizational events. Again, this positions the 
business as the prime determinant of HR rather than HR being able to define its 
own destiny. 
"So if you if you take the example of ... two big businesses ... coming in, trying to build one business out of that, we from an HR point of 
view were putting structures and strategies together, that dealt with 
the fact that these two businesses had come together ... I think 
maybe the ... main difference in style was that we were in situations that we were working out strategies to get out of or to deal with or 
cope with .... (with the Primark acquisition) we had suddenly grown in 
size, that we were in a downturn in the economy, we were for the 
first time ever, facing ... some pretty flat looking figures. 
... it took a long time to really settle down, to become the optimal 
number in headcount, to actually integrate these two businesses in a 
way that we were gonna be successful, and a lot of our energies and 
efforts were tied up in doing that. We went through three major RFT 
programmes when we were getting rid of two hundred plus 
employees each year. The issues that go around with that, the 
security, the just y'know the lack of engagement, the morale, 
everything that goes around with that was being dealt with as well. 
So I think now, or certainly two years ago we were in a good place 
that we had established ourselves as one business, em the market 
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was starting to pick up, we were in a good position to actually start 
doing some proactive ... stuff, as opposed to dealing with the 
aftermath of the acquisition. 
If you go pre-Primark, I think we were just in the wrong ... HR was 
still in that vein of trying to be a very excellent ... transactional 
service ... So at that point we were doing very well, at our transactional piece and that's what we were meant to be doing and 
that's where the HR place in the organisation was. We went through 
the transition over three or four years when the outside world was 
moving HR into a strategic place, us as an organisation were 
struggling to come to terms with the size and the complexity of the 
business. 
We've come' through that, and I think now are looking at ways of 
becoming that better, stronger organisation, and we've got time for 
functions such as ourselves to be more proactive around how we 
ensure the business is gonna make the most of the place it's in. " 
[AB: 8/9] 
The disparity noted in this section between the business and the HR view of HR 
strategy may be due to the transitioning nature of the business and the stage of 
evolution (the HR strategy is in the process of implementation rather than fully 
realized), as this HR respondent indicates: 
" ... at least you 
know we now have a leadership team in place that 
is saying that ... our priorities need to be more strategic in nature ... whilst you can talk about something being strategic, when you 
actually have somebody showing you what that is, then that's very 
different ... Whereas you know now having seen the (new HR 
strategy) ... even if I'm not doing the strategic stuff at the moment, I know what it is and I know what you would like me to be doing. " 
[BB: 3] 
A second reason may be the different levels of visibility inside HR and to 
customers, but irrespective of the reason this poses an interesting communication 
challenge for HR going forward. 
However, it must be said that the view of HR as transitioning is a more functional 
representation for HR people who are seeking a more central and strategic role for 
HR, hence its wider usage in the HR population is to be expected. 
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6.3. Factors Influencing HR Strategy 
Despite differing views on the existence of an HR strategy, the previous section 
indicated that a 'best fit' view of HR dominated participants' discourse. Taking this 
model of HR, the next area to explore is the contextual factors which might be 
influential in determining the 'best fit' HR strategy. 
Given the multiple views of both business and HR strategy, the applicability of any 
`universal' theory is likely to be limited, but it is still useful to examine the factors 
which participants reference as influential in the formatting of HR strategy. 
This analysis will be structured around two aspects of Paauwe's work, the 
contextually based human resource theory model shown in figure 58, and the 
concept of the dominant coalition. 
6.3.1. The Contextually Based Human Resource Theory Model 
This section will look at the three dimensions of Paauwe's model in turn: 
competitive mechanisms, configuration factors and institutional mechanisms. 
6.3.1.1. Product/market/technology dimension (competitive 
mechanisms) 
Competitive mechanisms comprise Paauwe's first dimension, which covers 
contextual factors under the headings of product, market and technology. It would 
be reasonable to surmise that, in a highly commercial business, these factors 
would be major drivers of the business and HR strategies. However, surprisingly, 
these factors are not seen by participants in this project as significant drivers of the 
HR approach adopted. The interview schedule explicitly asked participants 
whether factors within this dimension influenced HR, but the answer was routinely 
negative. 
"I don't see that there's really anything in the market that could ... 
constrain a strategy in any way. " [GT: 10] 
Only one participant suggested an alternative view. 
"I actually think that to a large extent HR strategy is a function of the 
organisation structure. And, which in turn relates to how we view our 
corporate strategy and the market place that we're in ... the market that we're in is a predominant factor. " [NB: 1/2] 
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However, immediately, he presents this as a difficulty for the HR function. 
"So if you start off with the fundamental ... which is that we're trying to address a number of different information markets, and we're 
organised into these vertical groupings, with the four market groups. 
And, we have as most organisations do therefore a significant 
tension between the market facing structure, the line of business, 
and - which is vertical, and geography, which is which is em 
horizontal. " [NB: 1] 
6.3.1.2. Organisation/Administration/Cultural Heritage (Configuration) 
Paauwe also saw HR as influenced by configuration factors: the organisational, 
administrative and cultural heritage of the host organisation. This includes (but is 
not limited to) the heritage of the HR function itself. 
Thomson Financial is characterised by participants as entrepreneurial and 
immature. 
"I think Jim Toffey put it really well, in the management presentation 
that he gave last year ... he said, 'Thomson Financial's like a two billion dollar start up' ... And I think that's a lot of that ... in that you have an organisation which is basically lots of little organisations put 
together ... You do seem to have this sense of okay, we've been 
stuck together, we've got all this stuff to do in the background, but we 
are still carrying on, we can see where we want to get to. We want 
to be the Toyota of the financial services industry. But I still think 
that we have this kind of start up mentality at the back end, that 
you've gotta get over. " [LJ: 13/14] 
This is seen as having a significant impact on HR's ability to 'get its act together 
as a quote reproduced earlier suggests. 
"... a lot of organisations that had been that size or for a longer time 
had already got all of the processes and the procedures, and y'know 
they'd got job evaluation, they had structure, they had salary bands, 
they had all the kind of bits and pieces that come with the way that 
you run a large organisation. And TF was so desperate to fight to 
not become a large organisation, em there was a lot of resistance 
around anything that might look a bit like bureaucracy, or em 
anything that might stem flexibility. " [AB: 12] 
The-heritage of the organisation, its origins in multiple acquisitions, is however 
seen as a significant influence and constraint on HR's ability to be truly strategic. 
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... we've got this sort of overarching HR strategy of of trying to look 
and feel like a high performance, high engagement organisation, and 
you know to a large extent I think that is an appropriate model. But 
we've also got all this organisational internal complexity as a result of 
our structure and our history, which ... makes it quite difficult for us to achieve, that aim. " [NB: 5] 
Although one of the participants represents this as a factor now diminishing in 
importance. 
"Certainly our culture has been very disparate. You know we've 
come together from I guess it's well over fifty acquisitions now, and 
em it's a culture that is moving and developing very fast ... I think in terms of the way in which HR runs, actually my predecessor more or 
less shook that out. Em, so did create common HR practice, 
common approach and a single HR team ... I think the pockets still 
exist in the business but they are diminishing, but I think the HR 
culture had actually already been shaken up quite considerably 
before I took over, and I've never felt that I'm operating in an HR 
team that is still em fractional or not operating as a single, one TF 
approach. " [SD: 7] 
Experience, however, in terms of prior critical events, is seen as still influential, as 
this quote (part of which was reproduced earlier) suggests. 
" ... we seem to be adopting a fairly kind of low cost HR strategy, 
and be quite focused on getting good value people not necessarily 
the best people for any role ... And I wonder if that goes back to sort 
of the legacy issues we had with some very long tenured expensive 
people, and em managers being concerned about building up 
another rump of people like that. " [EH: 1] 
These factors are referenced by participants, but expressed as constraints on the 
HR function's ability to strategically support the business. 
6.3.1.3. Social/Cultural/Legal Dimension (Institutional Mechanisms) 
Paauwe's third dimension considers how institutional mechanisms may drive the 
HR strategy. He sees normative factors as potentially influential contextual factors, 
which includes professional institutions, consultants and hiring employees from the 
industry. 
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i) Social 
The project provides little evidence to support the influence of institutional 
mechanisms. The influence of normative is viewed as limited, and if anything 
serving to perpetuate transactional form of HR rather than strategic, as the 
following comments on the role of the professional institutions (the CIPD in the UK 
and SHRM in the USA) indicate. 
"I don't know SHRM well, obviously I'm at a disadvantage because 
you know I'm still relatively new into this field, but I haven't been 
impressed by SHRM in particular. " [SD: 6] 
"I don't see (the CIPD's) influence at all. Em, I think there is some 
research materials out there but ... it's a very low played, low key 
role ... certainly I've never seen the IPD as being a strong influence 
on the way that ... I do things or the way I've seen things being done. It's kind of there in the background supporting what people want to 
do but it's more of a reflection to me I find it quite ... reactive. It reflects and tells other people what other people are doing, it doesn't 
lead the way. " [AB: 13/14] 
"I am so not into them (HR institutions). I am not a networker ... SHRM and NIRA and all those I take with a grain of salt. I think that 
they can come and you know they have some good ideas and some 
of that but it's like that consultant you don't know until you live it. So 
... I don't pay a lot of attention to it. " [DH: 7] 
Influence of consultants is also seen as minimal. 
"I think that we will use consultants to generate ideas or 
understanding about an approach or a discipline, em so Parthenon 
did a huge amount of our early work on customer segmentation and 
needs analysis. We've now learnt to do that ourselves ... we will 
spend the next year learning how to take a more rigorous approach 
to innovation. And I'm quite convinced we will then go off and do it 
ourselves ... We do it ourselves, and ... we're not going to learn 
anything new from Parthenon now, we've sucked them dry. " [SD: 7] 
Although mimicking moves by competitors and hiring from competitors is a 
conscious strategy. 
"I think a smart move that (the President) made early on was `okay, 
I've got these ... thirty plus assets, all operating as independent 
entities, if I want to be one of the big three, what have I got to start 
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behaving like? ' And she made some key hires from people who had 
worked in others of the big three. Em, now an interesting I think that 
worked very well at the time, but now we need people coming in 
from, different types of organisation. " [SD: 10] 
One way in which normative influences are brought into an organisation is through 
new recruits, who bring in best practice and other organisations' models into the 
company. Whereas hiring from other companies is referenced for the business, 
this respondent attributes a lack of HR progress to the lack of "new blood" in HR. 
'We had a very stable HR department through that period of time ... 
we had very little natural wastage and we had we had ... practically 
... no recruitment, so we went through a period of being very stable 
... in headcount or just people and styles. Em, I think what is interesting what has been interesting for me in the last 18 months ... is that the influx of new blood into HR has brought an awareness that 
maybe TF has taken longer too long to get through that get used to 
the idea that this is a big organisation and therefore it needs 
processes and policies and ... some of the stuff that comes with being a big company. 
I think while we were focusing on all of those (business integration) 
things, em, maybe some of the em some of the progress that HR 
was making outside in the marketplace was was lost ... Because a lot of organisations that had been that size or for a longer time had 
already got all of the processes and the procedures, and y'know 
they'd got job evaluation, they had structure, they had salary bands, 
they had all the kind of bits and pieces that come with the way that 
you run a large organisation. " [AB: 12] 
ii) Cultural 
Culture is seen as an influential factor in terms of HR strategy, particularly in terms 
of the organisation's entrepreneurial, non-process centric approach. 
"I think that's indicative of how our business is run, but there always 
needs to be something new, better, em and there's not a whole lot of 
satisfaction derived from operationalising and fixing some of the 
things that are problems for us. " [MW: 3] 
"Em, I think it's a really delicate balance to be had, in growing TF, 
developing TF, em between implementing the right level of process 
and discipline to allow consistency, that we need on the scale of the 
organisation we're now running, eight and a half well nine thousand 
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people, em two billion dollars, and not wanting to kill that very 
important entrepreneurial em performance driven organisation that 
em you know has made so much of our success, reality. Em, so I 
think we will just have to be very light touch, to get that kind of em to 
keep that kind of balance, You know what level of process is good 
process. There are those in the organisation that would say any 
process is bad. Well that's just patently not true. Em and people 
need to mature a little bit to understand that great process can 
actually cut costs, improve quality, time to market, and is not a em 
killer of entrepreneurial spirit or innovation ... I certainly don't think I 
see always the level of flexibility in HR that I would like to see, em 
and hence I think there are too many times when the business 
experiences HR as heavy handed, when in fact we're not intending 
to be. " [SD: 7/8] 
Participants were explicitly asked whether national heritage was an influential 
factor on the nature of HR strategy in the organisation. However, there was no 
strongly articulated view of the organisation as having characteristics determined 
by its national background: 
"... in Europe ... I see this as quite an English way of doing things. And I think that the culture here is sufficiently different from the US 
because I do think the New York office is a very em a very standard 
US kind of company it takes a very standard US approach to the way 
that they think about the company. Em quite production line kind of 
focused, it's very you know - em - very much a US manufacturing 
company mentality. Em and I think ... we see ourselves as being 
something different from that, em but I think probably the whole 
European organisation's pretty UK centric. " [JR: 14] 
iii) Legal 
Very little reference is made to legal influences on HR. This is only referenced by 
two of the HR participants, the first of whom is the employee relations manager 
(who would obviously have the greatest interaction with legal principles). 
"(Legal considerations are) probably the single biggest external 
factor on what I do day to day. Em you know it really goes without 
saying but I have to be completely up to date about you know what is 
the the timetable, what's coming out of statute, what's happening in 
the tribunal, you know you just have to have your finger on the 
pulse. " [BB: 12] 
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"I think we have a certain obligation to remind people what the legal 
boundaries are, because they look to us for that perspective. " [MW: 61 
One would perhaps have also expected reference to legislation impacting the 
business (e. g. anti-trust legislation), but none of the other participants referenced 
legal influences or considerations. 
6.3.2. The Impact of the `Dominant Coalition' 
The analysis in the above section suggests that participants do not see contextual 
factors as a significant influence on HR strategy. Paauwe's model suggests that, 
given an absence of strong contextual drivers, the "dominant coalition" (Paauwe, 
2004, p92) will have considerable leeway to shape the HR strategy in the way that 
they deem most appropriate. 
Paauwe's "dominant coalition" is a group of actors, including senior management, 
middle and junior management teams, employee representatives and HR 
management. The dominant coalition, according to Paauwe, "is involved in 
shaping and selecting HRM policies and practices" (Paauwe, 2004, p92) and "is 
challenged to enable HRM to make a genuine contribution to sustainable 
competitive advantage. " (Paauwe, 2004, p92) 
The next question which this project addressed was that of whom do the 
participants in the TF study see as the dominant coalition, and what influence do 
they see those actors having on HR? 
6.3.2.1. Membership of the Dominant Coalition 
Participants had a fairly consistent view of the membership of the dominant 
coalition. The HR director and senior business management team were seen as 
the key drivers, with the parent company (the Thomson Corporation) referenced 
as a secondary influence. Perhaps surprisingly, the Thomson Family were not 
seen as part of nor significantly influencing the dominant coalition. 
"... the very low key approach which our main family shareholder 
takes. " [GT: 3/4] 
All of the participants saw the HR director as the leading determinant of HR 
strategy (although again there could be an element of researcher bias here, given 
that the participants were aware that they were talking to the HR director). The 
HR director is seen as the major driver of HR, either alone: 
316 
"I'd say you design HR. " [JR: 7] 
" ... the people that I'm aware of (who do HR strategy) are you, most directly ... I mean I think you are you personally are present at all ... the senior business fora ... you are expected and required and inclined to do your job in such a way as it is kind of ... matching the 
strategy of the company. " [GT: 6/7] 
Or in conjunction with the President: 
"Some of the decision maker is the ... HR director. The other piece in that ... (the President) is making some decisions as to where he 
wants to see the direction of HR going, advised by the HR director. " 
[AB: 5] 
With the senior business management team as important stakeholders. 
"... the management team are important stakeholders. " [JR: 7] 
A third group - the employees - is added by one of the HR respondents, although 
the inference is that their influence is via their constraining behaviours rather than 
by their positional power. 
"I think at the moment we have a fairly strong voice in ... our 
employees, who are ... controlling the direction of HR by the way the 
way they're interacting with HR. And that's quite powerful. Em 
they're quite a powerful influence. " [AB: 5] 
Finally, it would be reasonable to suggest that participants may reference the 
influence of the Thomson family, who own 78% of the company. This creates a 
unique semi-private structure, where shareholder pressures still exist, but the 
family majority shareholding allows for market rationalities to be mitigated. This is 
a limitation of the Paauwe model: the latter is oriented towards more traditionally 
market driven publicly listed companies, and the expectation is that one would 
expect the model to be less applicable to private/semi-private companies. 
However, where it is mentioned in the discourse, the Thomson family ownership 
structure is seen as having little influence. 
"Does the fact that we're owned by the family make any difference to 
the way we do things? ... I don't feel any em strength of presence of 
or power of the family influencing in the way things are done within 
Thomson Corporation ... and certainly don't see any of that filtering directly filtering down to Thomson Financial ... the fact that they own 
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78 percent or whatever the percentage is at the moment ... I don't feel that power it's been exerted at all. 
I think it's such a huge organisation and there are only you know 
there are only sort of three probably at best family members actually 
involved in anything to do with running the running the organisation, 
so it doesn't feel like a family organisation any more. " [AB: 14/15] 
6.3.2.2. How Does the Dominant Coalition Influence HR 
The style, credibility and focus of the HR director is represented by influential by 
respondents. 
" ... the leadership style that I'm seeing now (in HR) is about building 
credibility ... within the business. It's about building relationships 
with the peers and the senior leaders in the organisation. Em - it's 
about being creative, it's about being innovative, it's about having 
vision and ... being proactive in in the approach to HR. What I think I 
saw before (with the previous HR director) was more focused on the 
department em than necessarily building his credibility in that in that 
peer group. Em his leadership style I think was probably more 
reactive, so em we had situations that we had to deal with ... I think the difference between what I saw what I see now and what I saw 
then was reactivity and proactivity. " [AB: 8/9] 
Although respondents see the significant, if not a deterministic, influence on HR is 
the style of the management team. 
"It (the alignment between HR and the corporate strategy) largely 
has to do with leadership, that's, stating the obvious ... I've seen three different views on how HR is valued and where they belong 
and they tie to the strategy, and that probably even has more to do 
with the head of the organisation and who they bring in, so ... (An 
ex-President) probably wasn't the strongest leader and didn't know 
how to not how to use HR and how to bring them into an 
organisation, hired someone who had the breadth and depth of HR 
em that was really impressive but lacked interpersonal skills, and so 
he was not able to align that ExCom team to HR. So I think a lot of 
HR strategy and its value in the organisation has to do with 
leadership at the top, for both ExCom level and the HR person and 
then it goes down. " [DH: 1] 
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"The thing with the management team is that ... they tend to be very 
reactionary and often moved by individual situations ... it's quite a demanding and a not very understanding audience ... one of the ... things with HR, it's like any anything's that's primarily a kind of 
process related, which is it takes a while to see the results and it 
takes a while to build up a series of good results that kind of negates 
any previous bad results. " [JR: 7/8] 
Even when the management team is viewed as supportive, a further element of 
the dominant coalition, the parent organization, is cited as a strong influence. 
"I think we are extremely fortunate to have a leader who is very 
people focused. Very people focused. And therefore ... 
understands the role and importance of a good HR support team. 
Em, however, em, there is you know quite a number of challenges in 
being pulled between TF ExCom and TOC ... There are the 
potentials for derailers there ... I think that at a TTC level ... there 
is 
a philosophical and em strategic ... belief and understanding of the importance of HR and the focus on people across TTC, but I think 
they've put most of that emphasis into systems and processes ... 
And are not yet seeing ... a total picture. " [SD: 314] 
'When you have more freedom to create an HR organisation and 
strategy as an independent, you know organisation or market group, 
versus under a corporate umbrella, where you lose some of your 
flexibility. " [DH: 1] 
"I think that's where the Corporation, versus being an independent, 
really becomes a conflict, right? Corporate says this, you lose a lot 
of your flexibility, to do what you think is right for the organisation, 
and I think that that's where HR can really get tripped up. " [DH: 3] 
Of the elements of the dominant coalition, the parent company is clearly seen as a 
constraining influence which prevents HR from achieving the business fit which it 
could otherwise attain. 
There is a sentiment expressed that the parent company will continue to impose 
its view, even when it has been proven wrong. 
"I think if we were honest, we're not going to receive half the benefits 
that we thought we would get out of HRT (HR outsourcing 
programme) in general. We're not the cost savings ... we don't have the headcount reduction, we've lost a lot of institutional knowledge, 
em I think that the Corporation needs to save face, there's no way 
319 
we're going to pull out of a Hewitt arrangement, and there are 
probably some things that make sense, is to you know invest in 
Hewitt with outsourcing our service where we can't add value, but 
they need to get it right. How I think it's gonna pan out? I think it 
depends on how honest people will be, in terms of what's been 
successful and what have been failures, and not be afraid to go back 
and undo things that we thought might have been directionally right. " 
[DH: 3/4] 
And the responsibility of HR in this context is to act as an advocate for its 
business. 
"I think you just have to sort of fight for what you think is right, not be 
afraid of what the ramifications will be and then just modify what you 
end up having to live with. " [DH: 5] 
Whilst it is not unusual for individuals to rail against the parent company's 
influence, what is perhaps more surprising is that no reference is made to other 
governance structures (e. g. compensation committees, corporate social 
responsibility functions, diversity groups). Whilst all of these exist at the Thomson 
Corporation level, they are not deemed worthy of mention by the participants in 
this study as influences on Thomson Financial. This adds to the impression that 
this is a hyper-flexible, potentially ill-disciplined organization. 
6.3.2.3. Inconsistency Within the Dominant Coalition 
The elements of the dominant coalition (the HR director, the CEO, the 
management team and the employees) are seen as inconsistent in their direction. 
This is used functionally to justify HR's failure to maintain a consistent 'best fit' with 
business strategy. 
" ... that to me is the battle. We need to get to the point ... where 
one group decides. And that's that's either [the CEO's) or it's the HR 
Director, whoever's ... actually making the decisions out of that 
combination of people. And we need to get to the point where the 
management of our organisation agree that that is the direction that 
HR should be going in, and that's the role HR are playing. " [AB: 4] 
The management team, furthermore, is seen as inconsistent in its approach and 
driven by individual agendas. This is represented as a further constraint on HR's 
ability to be strategic. 
"... we just don't have consistency among our management team. 
And we probably do in some ways and in some places, but there's ... 
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a number of levels of inconsistency within our kind of core sort of 
decision makers in the business that means that even if you had you 
know whatever HR processes you've got, your primary decision 
makers are not all in line with each another anyway, so maybe 
there's an HR sort of strategy around the support of that 
management team as a management team, but that's a very tricky 
thing, because if the support of the management team is yourself, 
you know, working with all the individuals in that management team, 
and yet becomes you know individual strategies for individual people 
and there's not really a guiding force across you know working 
across that sort of management level. " [JR: 16] 
In the absence of a coherent direction from the dominant coalition, the 
personalities in the business and their receptivity to HR are represented as 
influences on the level of sophistication an HR function can attain (this ties to the 
earlier'best fit, HR led by the business' theme). 
"... it's still quite a personal organisation ... people and personalities 
are big drivers of how things get done. " [JR: 17] 
"... if for example (a senior client) came back to me one day or (the 
CEO) went to you and said, 'Look, you know that deck that you 
presented to me on employee engagement or diversity or whatever it 
may have been, that's lovely you know and I appreciate the work you 
did, but actually I'd just kind of like you to be an employee welfare 
officer, then that is what we'd end up doing, I believe. You know, I 
mean I think that we can demonstrate our value in what we're doing 
but ultimately we need to deliver what the business wants us to 
deliver, not what we think the business wants us to deliver. 
... I think that we all have quite a good sense for who are the clients that we can influence. You there's no doubt that there are ... certain business heads within this organisation that are very receptive to 
new ideas from HR and you know whatever input we can give them, 
there are other business heads who ... don't appear interested in the input that HR can provide. And there are some other senior 
managers again who ... for whatever reason ... I don't know whether they're not interested or they're not capable of seeing the value, or 
whatever it is. But they have a completely different idea of what 
we're there for. 
Em I think that we have a bit of a challenge in this environment 
because ... I view TF Europe as a sales organisation, and everything is geared towards that. And some of the personalities we have 
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within Sales are, you know in my mind, they appear to be quite short 
term in their views and that's not conducive to strategic input from 
HR ... that's not true of everybody and I think actually that at the 
very top of this organisation we think very very long term ... but I think that you know lower down that some of the personalities can be 
quite em it can be quite challenging to get them to think on a 
strategic level. 
... I spent 2 years working with 
(a senior client) and within the first 6 
months it became quite apparent to me that you know he didn't really 
see HR as being a function that can add strategic value, he wanted 
me to do the roadsweeping. And that's fine ... However, you look at 
some of the other business areas and (a second client) has been 
very much more receptive and he's actually tried to encourage me to 
get involved in even more stuff that I haven't had the bandwidth to be 
involved in. ... 
(he's) been very very accommodating in terms of 
trying to get HR involved and bring out new stuff for him. So ... it 
really depends on what the individual client is looking for. So em you 
know with (a senior client) for example it's manifested itself in terms 
of doing very particular tactical work, whereas with (a second client) 
... I feel as if my work with him has been on more of a sort of a business partner footing and it's much more of ... a progressive 
relationship than perhaps has been the case with other HR people. " 
[BB: 4/5] 
To summarise this section, this raises the question of, in the absence of strong 
contextual factors, and driven by an inconsistent and internally contradictory 
dominant coalition, what remains to drive business and HR strategy in TF? The 
participants in this project view the whims as senior management as a major driver 
of business strategy. 
This is represented by HR staff as a constraint. Where the business strategy is 
subject to the peccadilloes of senior managers, rather than based in sound 
analysis of the competitive opportunity, participants use this to support the defence 
that there is little prospect of an appropriate HR strategy being deployed. Again, 
taking a functional view of language, this is a very useful stance for HR to take, as 
it explains the lack of fit between business and HR strategy through reference to 
an unclear business strategy and inconsistent management direction, deflecting 
any potential blame attribution towards HR. 
322 
6.3.3. An Evaluation of Paauwe's Model 
Prima facie, this study appears to offer little direct support for Paauwe's model, in 
that it appears to suggest that neither contextual factors nor the dominant coalition 
are strong influences on the HR strategy adopted by Thomson Financial. 
Whereas all of Paauwe's factors are referenced, none of the participants 
indicated that they viewed them as a strong influence: contextual factors were 
seen as diverse, inconsistent or merely unimportant. The dominant coalition, 
however, was seen as internally contradictory, but, conversely, the dominant 
coalition was also perceived as powerful, suggesting that their influence served to 
factionalise and fragment the strategy, creating inconsistency in direction 
However, one could also interpret this in another way, which offers more support 
to Paauwe. In the absence of strong contextual factors and with a lack of 
consistent direction from the dominant coalition in Thomson Financial, the enacted 
business operation (rather than the espoused strategy) is unclear. If one 
presumes a 'best fit' model, a logical corollary of unclear business strategy 
becomes unclear HR strategy. 
The determining factor on both business and HR strategy, in the absence of strong 
contextual or dominant coalition drivers, becomes the peccadilloes of the most 
senior managers. A strong theme, hence, is the overriding (and sometimes 
irrational) influence of the CEO. This is consistent with respondent's discourse. 
However, this still leaves us with three problems with Paauwe: the difference 
between espoused strategy and enacted HR (a theory which can more adequately 
explain the reasons for the difference between the two is advanced in the next 
section, the'discourse of constraints'), an emergent model of strategy and the idea 
of change. 
The first difficulty for Paauwe's model is the difference between the definition of a 
'best fit' HR strategy ('espoused' strategy) and the reality of implementation 
('enacted' HR in use). This is a clear theme in the discourse, and cannot be 
explained by Paauwe's model. 
°... our internal structure and our history, is also a very important 
factor. Which to an extent I think runs counter to what we what we 
would ideally like to be. So I think we're to an extent still a bit of a 
em a sort of schizophrenic organisation, in that we have this vision of 
ourselves, certainly in the States, that doesn't necessarily 
correspond to the reality on the ground. " [NB: 2] 
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Secondly, there are also inferences that HR strategy may be more emergent than 
Paauwe's model suggests. 
"I think there's also quite a strong case for saying that perhaps 
almost unwittingly, em, Symphony (the outsourcing project) has 
taken us quite a long way down the path that we wanted to go, but 
perhaps wouldn't have done, if we'd not actually thought of the 
outsourcing route. " [NB: 6, my emphasis] 
"Total, total serendipity. Totally unplanned. And I have to say an 
awful lot of what you know happens in Thomson, is pretty much like 
that. " [NB: 8] 
Change is probably the most difficult element for Paauwe's model to explain. Like 
the difference between RBV type core competency approaches and the recent 
dynamic capability work, it infers that HR's role is to develop and deploy strategy 
in a static environment. As this participant indicates, changes in business 
direction have a clear impact on HR. 
"... going back into the Nineties, before Dick Harrington took over as 
CEO ... there was a really strong view, coming 
from the top, that we 
didn't want to harmonise, and integrate. We had bought these 
assets, and that a large proportion of the value of the assets resided 
in them staying relatively independent and decentralised. And you 
know there was this feeling that if you if you tampered too much, the 
value that we'd bought that we'd paid usually a lot of money for, 
would evaporate. So we went through this significant shift, when 
Dick took over, of moving away from that philosophy, of saying ... the name of the game is to preserve that value, but at the same time 
get much more in terms of leverage and cost saving, from greater 
integration. So that was a significant shift and obviously we're going 
much further down that route now (in HR) ... and all these areas 
we've hitherto resisted bringing together. So again you know that's 
gonna significantly change that in the character - of the 
organisation. " [NB: 6/7] 
6.4. Implementation - the Discourse of Constraints 
The extracts selected thus far have concentrated on conceptual views of the HR 
strategy and 'fit'. This section will look at representations of the enacted HR 
strategy. This elaborates further the discussion on Paauwe's framework, by 
looking at factors influencing enacted HR in use, rather than a conceptual 
discussion of the espoused strategy. 
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Paauwe's conceptual model does not consider the implementation of HR strategy, 
and this project provided an opportunity to consider some of the constraints and 
limitations on the enactment of HR within an organisation. 
Although no question in the interview specifically addressed implementation 
issues, unexpectedly, a strong theme around constraints on the achievement of 
best fit emerges from the data. 
In the absence of seeing a strong link from business strategy to HR strategy, 
participants couched their discuss of HR with an elaborate set of constraints which 
were posited as preventing HR from creating a better fit with business strategy. 
This is interesting, as it contains the implicit assumption that there actually is a 
'best fit' HR strategy for a particular business, but that situational factors prevent it 
from being implemented. 
As a caveat, it is interesting to speculate how far this could be an effect of 
researcher bias, as one can surmise that participants were unwilling to criticize the 
researcher, given her position as the organisation's HR Director. However, the 
fact that constraints are referenced by every participant suggests that this is 
generated by a widely held perception of the organization as sub-optimal, rather 
than an attempt at impression management. 
These constraints can be divided broadly into 'organisational' factors and what 
may loosely be termed 'professional' factors. Organisational factors include lack 
of investment in employees, management capability and style, and perceptions 
and expectations of HR. 'Professional' factors include the 
transactional/administrative heritage of HR (and the necessity to complete 
transactional processes) and issues of resource availability and quality. 
Although it may be able to categorise some of 
'configuration' element of Paauwe's model, his model 
and does not acknowledge the existence of factors 
ability to achieve best fit. Consequently, it has 
constraints as a separate category. 
6.4.1. Organisational Constraints 
these factors within the 
is couched in positive terms 
which potentially limit the 
been decided to analyse 
Organizational factors include lack of investment in employees, management 
capability and style, and perceptions and expectations of HR. 
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6.4.1.1. Lack of Investment in Employees 
Lack of investment in people is posited as an organizational constraint as the 
following two quotes suggest (EH: 1 was reproduced earlier). 
" ... we seem to be adopting a fairly kind of low cost HR strategy, 
and be quite focused on getting good value people not necessarily 
the best people for any role, but a perfectly fine person at a good 
price. ... in GSMS, 
for example, where we're still very focused on 
the value end of the scale, and getting people in relatively cheaply 
and there not being such a willingness to sort of pay up for superior 
people" [EH: 1] 
"One of the challenges that I take a look at is that em from a 
business strategy perspective I feel like we're aimed towards we say 
we're aimed towards growth ... we want to retain the best talent, we 
want to develop peoples' careers, but we're begging for money in 
order in which to do it ... So, when I look at our business strategy I look at ... improving sales, organic growth, opportunities outside the 
market, and then there's this other component of improving 
efficiencies, retaining employees that in some ways the two are 
really struggling for priorities. " [MW: 1/2] 
These quotes give an interesting insight into organizational values and 
organizational culture: they suggest that a general management philosophy in 
Thomson Financial may be average people at an average price, which is far 
removed from the organisation's espoused 'best talent' philosophy. Lack of 
investment in employees leads to a theme expressing a lack of investment in HR. 
"I think we ought to be investing at a senior level we ought to be 
investing in HR as much ... as we can really. Probably more than 
more than we do. 
If you look at how you know how polished the HR function is in 
certain other institutions ... a higher level investment, let alone I 
mean you know the large kind of corporates, you know at these kind 
of management programmes and graduate programmes stuff. I'm 
frankly quite surprised that we don't do any of that. 
... And just as I think this company has a rather 
kind of immature 
attitude towards kind of elements of corporate identity, I think that 
feeds into the into the HR strategy, so we don't really have a 
graduate kind of recruitment programme, we don't really have a 
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profile on campus, we don't have any of that. You know, Bloomberg 
does, Reuters does. Why why ever are we not doing that? 
... But that also seems to kind of inform a certain 
kind of reluctance 
to really invest in ... a more blue chip recruitment strategy. 
So I think 
you're being hamstrung in your ability to do that. While I think 
probably while I think you're probably being encouraged ... to do 
some of these kind of consulting type projects, which I think which ... 
will never be a substitute for - for the other things ... which you're 
not being encouraged or not being given the funding to pursue. " 
[GT: 16] 
" ... it will be quite difficult to realise a truly strategic function within 
an organisation like Thomson Financial just because you know we 
have budgetary constraints. " [BB: 5] 
6.4.1.2. Management Capability/Style 
Following on from the 'lack of investment in employees' theme, management 
capability is articulated as an HR constraint. 
" ... line management is not happening particularly well, em that 
creates more tactical work for us to do ... We end up doing a lot of 
work that in an ideal world em line managers would do ... And again 
we would have so much more bandwidth ... Although that's not 
unique to this organisation at all. " [BB: 7/8] 
"... it's not easy because you've got very - very - steady state people 
at the top of the organisation. Although I'm aware they don't 
necessarily act as barriers it's through absence. They're not 
stopping anything happening but they're certainly not helping 
anything happening either ... Questions of the leader in that function. " [EH: 5] 
AB's comment takes this in a slightly different direction, and indicates that there is 
an expectation in managers that HR will deal with difficult issues, which constrains 
HR's ability to move out of transactional work. 
" ... the profile of our company is that we allow young, inexperienced 
managers to manage, and I think that brings ... has an 
impact on the 
way HR happens. If you were within an organisation where you had 
experienced managers who were happy about managing and took 
the responsibility of managing seriously, then I think ... the role that 
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HR would play would be very different ... it makes HR a lot more involved in the day to day running of those managerial employee 
relationships. Em so again it gives that tug on HR playing a part in 
the transactional place, the inexperience of the lower level managers 
and the inexperience of some of the senior level managers (laughs) 
... means that there is a lot of there is still too much ... sweeping up the mess as opposed to the proactivity of focusing on where the 
business is trying to go. " [AB: 15] 
However, she goes on to indicate that this re-education is under the control of HR. 
"Em and I'm guessing ... it's what was built in, what was the 
expectation, is the piece we need to re-educate around ... It's also 
about giving them (managers) the tools, education and options so 
that they know where else to go. So it's not just saying 'we're not 
doing that anymore ... we're doing something else, we don't do it. It's ... part of that transition and overcoming the barriers to that transition, for me is about teaching them where they go instead ... teaching them how they can be self-sufficient. Providing them with 
the tools that enable them to be better managers, and therefore 
enable them to have and deal with some of the conversations. And 
some of it is about looking at what can be done, in different ways ... Going to HR systems, using those, using the intranet, em the self- 
service kind of stuff, having going to having an outsourced provider, 
possibly for some of the bits and pieces. " [AB: 3/4] 
Management style is also presented as a determinant of the type of HR an 
organization has. 
°I think the style of leadership determines what credible HR is. And 
so you have to adapt to some degree to what that style is to be 
successful and survive in the organisation. " [MW: 9] 
"... the business has made a decision as to where, what role and 
where it wants HR to be, and it needs to it it's convinced HR to play 
in that space, and we need to convince the management group that 
we play in that space. " [AB: 5] 
6.4.1.3. Perceptions and Expectations of HR 
Low expectations are seen as another constraint on HR. 
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"That's a really interesting point that I hadn't thought about, which is 
you can be marginal on strategy because my expectation is you're 
below that, so if you even deliver at that level, it's fine. " [DH: 1 1] 
This is compounded by a difficulty in demonstrating causality in HR. 
" ... it would stand to reason that if you have a support function that 
enables us to you know retain our best sales people, reward them 
properly, you know develop them properly, keep them happy and 
motivated, that that would feed into the business success ... but it's kind of it's ... one of those investments that you know it's not easy to link sales success to a support function ... If he (the CEO) sat down 
and he saw that our sales people have not left the company and in 
fact our sales figures had gone up significantly as a result, could he 
draw an explicit link between that and HR strategy? I don't know. 
Em you know there could be any number of different factors that 
might have precipitated that, I don't know. " [BB: 617] 
There is also an issue in terms of the long time period required to demonstrate 
credibility in HR, as referenced by both business and HR respondents. 
"... with HR, it's like any anything's that's primarily a kind of process 
related, which is it takes a while to see the results and it takes a 
while to build up a series of good results that kind of negates any 
previous bad results. " [JR: 7/8] 
"I think the pace of things is probably slower, because it's over time 
that they (the management) see the added value. And it's over time 
that they realise that this is actually better for them than what they 
were previously getting or they were previously asking and 
expecting. Em so the impact of that is that it takes longer to get to 
where - we're trying to get to. " [AB: 4/5] 
6.3.1.4. Organisational Maturity 
The stage of evolution which the business has attained is seen as determining and 
limiting HR. 
°... (HR's) trying to do the end bit of the game, it's trying to do talent 
management, developmental things, really huge PMAT processes 
and ... we're not ready for them ... they don't add value to an 
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organisation that hasn't done the first step and we haven't done the 
first step yet. " [EH: 20] 
"I think it would be difficult to have a really superlative HR 
organisation in a kind of a non-superlative non-superlative 
organisation, frankly. I think that there has to be there has to be a 
commitment at the level above you ... to really invest 
in people, in 
the environment, and if that isn't there, I think you know you will 
always be more constrained than you would like in your ability to kind 
of execute a really kind of first rate HR strategy. " [GT: 7] 
" ... that one perfect model [of HR].... It's aspirational but that also 
assumes that your company or your organisation is at prime and 
operating you know in em in a perfect state as well. Right? That you 
already are high performing, you're hitting targets all the time, the 
structure is right, processes are right, whatnot, where there's not that 
many companies that are in that exact position, right? (slight laugh) 
... If we were aspiring to 
be that company, then you'd say my HR 
organisation aspires to be that as well, but in the interim while we're 
trying to move there, the HR organisation needs to reflect what 
actually goes on in the business. " [DDV: 1] 
" ... because there is so much that you can do with HR but 
it also 
depends on ... where you are in the organisational evolution and 
in 
this organisation it is still restructuring at the back end, we have so 
many processes that are all in the process of being fixed. It's quite a 
tough one I think to have your ideal HR partnership when there is so 
much else that still needs done elsewhere in the organisation. But in 
an ideal world yep, fantastic to have a more proactive involvement, 
certainly. " [LJ: 11] 
The 'best practice' model is echoed here, to support a commentary that the 
service provided by the TF HR team is generic, but that that is appropriate and 
necessary, given the organisation's state of evolution. 
"I think a lot of what you do ... may be generic but is very relevant to this organisation ... _I 
don't think you necessarily have to ... do things 
which are ... utterly aligned to Thomson ... 
in order to play your role 
in kind of driving the company, I think every company ought to have 
you know a strong level of employee engagement and I think that is 
especially true for us, so the right thing to focus on. And indeed 
because I think we're starting from a lower ... benchmark I would say that that is in line with the corporate strategy ... I think that again is 
something every organisation should be doing and something I see 
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us doing. I see you know the level of the sales force being raised, so 
again, right generically and right for us. " [GT: 13] 
6.4.1.5. Best Fit in the Heterogeneous Organisation 
Rather than finding a strong contextual driver for HR strategy in culture, the 
influence of national heritage is articulated in a rather different way. The 
pragmatic need for an HR strategy to serve the largest part of the organization, 
and the subsequent lack of customization of elements for smaller regions or 
smaller business units is clearly articulated by this participant. 
"... because we're so heavily focused on the US, clearly our HR 
strategy has been and probably will continue to be, focused very 
much on North America, and how they perceive the HR strategy 
should flow from what we're trying to do in terms of the business 
objectives, the market groups, and transformation of that structure er 
into a more co-ordinated and ... centralised ... approach. So 
everything that we've been doing ... has really been, I would say 
conditioned by that sort of very US centric approach. And I think we 
have to recognise that that's inevitable, given that eighty percent of 
our market is in the US and something like seventy percent of the 
employees are in the US as well. " [NB: 1] 
U... once you get outside the US, then that's that really sharp 
distinction between as I say the fully harmonised, fully integrated hi- 
tech high performance type strategy, and what we actually have in 
reality, which is ... a very large number of small groups of employees dotted around the world, spread over forty or more countries, em is 
em much more the reality that we have to deal with. And all of the 
complexities of trying to make those employees, feel part of, that 
high performance em high engagement culture. " [NB: 2] 
'With Thomson you've always got this thing that there's quite a big 
core, em and then you've got things around the edge, and it's the 
things around the edge that come and go. And where maybe your 
HR strategy is less appropriate. 
Em, but I think the kind of central thrust of what we're doing is 
entirely appropriate to the market that we're in. In the US. As I say 
where I think you start to perhaps raise some awkward questions is, 
how you implement that strategy internationally, where you have no 
critical mass. " [NB: 13] 
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The implications of this are interesting: centrally driven practices, which fit the 
largest segments of the organization, are articulated as a constraint on the 
implementation of an ideal 'best fit' HR strategy in smaller areas of the business. 
This was also referenced by DH in her comment about the constraints placed by 
HR outsourcing on the HR business partners' ability to deliver solutions matched 
to their business's strategies. 
This suggests an issue with Paauwe's model - the difference between analyzing 
the context to determine the best fit strategy ('espoused' strategy) may be very 
different from what it is feasible to put into place ('enacted' HR), as this participant 
goes on to say. 
"I think you have some natural constraints, on what you can do, and 
that's where in a sense the sort of pragmatism comes into play of 
saying well we can use some elements of what we're doing in the 
States, but not others. " [NB: 13] 
"So I think you very much have to try and use what you can, and em 
you know make the best of the resources that are available ... in 
other areas it's very much what you can do realistically, as opposed 
to what you'd ideally like to do ... So I think you're always gonna get that combination of ... the big picture strategy, what we the 
kind of 
organisation we'd like to be, as opposed to what realistically we can 
be. Because I there's always been this quite high level of 
pragmatism that's marked the whole management approach 
traditionally. At Thomson. " [NB: 14] 
6.4.2. Professional Constraints 
'Professional' factors include the transactional/administrative heritage of HR (and 
the necessity to complete transactional processes) and issues of resource 
availability and quality. 
6.4.2.1. Transactional/Administrative Heritage 
The need to build credibility in transactional HR is referenced by a number of 
participants. 
°... on balance I think ... we've got the support, and we will 
just need 
to deliver business benefit in an incremental ongoing way over that, 
you know it's not going to be nothing, nothing, nothing, fantastic, it's 
going to be small projects delivered right the way through that time 
phase which will create pockets of business benefit ... there are 
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other aspects of em business benefit delivery which you know I hope 
will begin to show up in different parts, whether that's fixing the 
recruiting models, or some of the system delivery that we're going to 
get over the next year or so. So ... it's not gonna feel like holistic 
success, for twelve to twenty four months, but em it will feel like 
some individual improvements, which eventually will add up to 
holistic success. " [SD: 3] 
HR appears to be caught on the horns of a dilemma in TF. Whilst the organization 
does not value transactional process, seamless delivery of transactional process is 
seen as an essential part of the role by HR. 
" ... in theory and concept, the idea of outsourcing the HR function has worked. The challenge is ... that embedded in the nuts and bolts and food and shelter piece are significant parts of our brand 
and our strategy. So you take recruiting ... It's really important though, to have someone who's presentable, who represents the 
organisation, and when you outsource some of those things, you 
lose that. " [MW: 10] 
Despite the fact that the workload involved in transactional process precludes a 
focus on the strategic. 
"I'm executing, executing, executing, executing ... I am arguably not 
acting as a leader in the specialty areas that I'm leading right now 
because I'm an executer ... because there's no one else (laughs) ... Because if I let that drop, then my credibility goes out of the window, 
because I'm not taking care of peoples' basic needs. " [MW: 8/9] 
Expertise in transactional HR is perceived as giving 'permission' for HR to play in 
the strategic space. 
"(Until) you've proven your value, and we talk about this with my 
team all the time, which is you're not going to put the word 'Strategic' 
HR Business Partner in front of your title, because you can't demand 
strategy, you know being perceived as strategic. You've gotta earn 
that. Right? And so I think I might go back to a Bob Bogart who was 
able who had the breadth and depth but who was also able to build 
the relationships. And so he would come up with HR strategy and 
HR direction that he would sell to ExCom, but they were much more 
receptive to it because they valued Bob. And that what he was 
delivering made sense, and he was proven right. If you get one 
success under you, the organisation sees the value, and then they 
start to really go to you for what your level of expertise is. " [DH: 2] 
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The difficulties of rebranding are clearly articulated by the HR respondents, who 
again see the business as critical to the 'permissioning' of the HR function to 
become strategic. 
" ... the transactional stuff you know if you do it 100 percent right 
you've only broken even ... So you know we've gotta get that done 
... If I had to predict whether we're gonna successfully relaunch 
ourselves as a strategic function, I think it's gonna require a lot of 
hard work. I don't think it's a shoo in at all. And ... we may fall on 
our faces. But hopefully that won't be for want of trying. I think it's 
gonna need some early successes and I think it's gonna need some 
key business leaders to buy into what we're trying to do as well ... So - I'm optimistic. " [BB: 14] 
Given this perspective, a lack of interest/buy in from executive management could 
derail HR. 
"... lack of buy in from ExCom to the strategic work and support that 
HR should and could be, could be a derailer. They could suddenly 
say, 'You know what, this sucks ... Let's go back and you know 
really rethink this'. " [SD: 3] 
Although one senior HR representative sees the HR function as the driver of a 
more strategic approach. 
"I hate to think that businesses wouldn't let them in ... if they prove they added value. So I think it's the small successes, in any 
organisation ... If you can get the right people, who're willing to take the risk, and shake up the organisation by doing things that maybe 
haven't been done there before, from an HR perspective. They don't 
let you in, I don't wanna be there. So ... I think it's more the onus is 
on the HR organisation to get the keys, than it is to have someone to 
open the door. " [DH: 8] 
6.4.2.2. Resource Availability/Quality 
Resource availability is seen as a constraint on HR's ability to be strategic. 
"I'd be interested in hearing ... whether you think in HR with the 
resources you've got whether you can get to a state where you have 
got kind of the backlog out of the way and you are able to be kind of 
more proactive. " [EH: 4] 
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" ... our management development programme 
is not the best in the 
world and again that comes back to the fact that we have one L&D 
specialist, we have very limited resources you know in terms of what 
we can sandwich together to do externally. " [BB: 7] 
"I don't think enough people if they feel unhappy in their roles 
necessarily feel they can go to HR and talk ... that's also a 
potentially effective role. But that comes down to resources, I mean 
how much can you do for the business at the end of the day? " [LJ: 5] 
" ... a lot of the functional areas ... whether it's be HR, IT, Marketing, Ichase, ninety five percent of the time, rather than being chased. It's 
always that you have to go and ask because I think there are a lot of 
areas that don't have often don't have the sufficient resources. " 
[LJ: 7] 
Finally, quality of HR resource is cited as a major constraint on the function's 
ability to play a strategic role (this links to the repertoire of antipathy towards HR 
discussed below). 
"I think our major issue is that not enough of our HRBPs and yes, 
and senior HRBPs are actually business focused enough ... And 
while we've had some issues with standards of delivery, because of 
the transactional issues, I think the major issue is that our HRBPs 
are not yet capable of operating as true business partners. And I 
see too many instances of not thinking things through, sort of 
executing on a process without thinking, 'well how does this really 
impact the business? ' Or helping to really diagnose the business 
issue.. " [SD: 4] 
This leads into a theme about the dearth of talent in the HR profession in general. 
" ... even 
if we look at our organisation to see how ... successful 
we'll be from an HR perspective over the course of the next couple of 
years, I think we'll be somewhat limited by the resources that we 
have. " [DH: 6] 
"I did my CIPD four or five years ago now at a so called Centre of 
Excellence, I don't know what quite marked it out as that, but anyway 
... when I looked around the room at the people that were taking the 
qualification with me ... they weren't the type of people that you think 
are really going to drive the profession forward and ... have a seat at the top table. " [BB: 11] 
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The dearth of talent leads existing HR staff to feel that they are overworked and 
have to work on too many different projects. 
"There's also a thing about what do you want me to concentrate on. 
I've got talent management, I've got career development, I've got 
management training, I've got - what else have I got? - I've got 
performance management. Tell me what you want and I'll deliver on 
it. I can't do it all. You can have chocolate or vanilla. You can't 
have both. I don't do swirls! " [MW: 12] 
These constraints are used to explain inconsistency in HR support. 
" ... a lot of the HR work tends to be quite a top down led ... I'm not 
sure that I see so much that the HR team are brought into thing by 
individuals ... who feel that they want to think about career development, or they want to think about performance management 
of one of their direct reports ... I think people are quite passive, 
actually. A lot of people are quite passive about HR issues ... And they tend to deal with issues when we deal with them from a 
management point of view ... They don't seem to feel that they have the reason to do anything about it. Em so I don't think that I just 
don't think we have ... an active HR vent in our organisation, actually 
... All individuals are very active on some things like recruitment and 
replacement, everybody will get very exercised about, but when it 
comes to the more proactive side, it tends to be, 'right, PMAT has to 
be done', therefore we'll all do our reviews, and I do think there's lots 
and lots of exceptions to that, of individuals who're very actively 
managing their teams and getting HR support to achieve their 
objectives in their you know little parts of the organisation, but overall 
... that culture's not from the top down. " [JR: 1 1] 
6.5. Implications for HR 
This leads to an important question for the HR profession: what implications does 
the articulated lack of strategic alignment have on how HR perceived? 
Discourse analysis allows a researcher to look at linguistic constructions in terms 
of the value which participants associate with a particular topic. In the context of 
an organization which sees no strong link between HR and business strategy, it is 
interesting to look at the value attributed to HR. 
In this project, antipathy towards HR emerges as a strong theme, articulated by 
both business and HR communities. This is shown as antipathy towards the 
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profession (perhaps linked to the earlier lack of value attributed to the HR 
professional institutions). 
"I do feel a little bit as if the business partnering thing is the latest 
fad. Em you know we've we underwent a significant rebranding 
exercise in the 90s to call ourselves Human Resources from 
Personnel and now we're rebranding ourselves as business 
partnering and ... I feel a little bit as if as if HR needs as a function to 
get over itself a bit ... I think we are a particularly precious function in terms of our own perception of our self Worth" [BB: 9] 
This is also expressed as an antipathy towards other HR staff. 
"I'd rather (my son) come to me and say "Mom I want to be a 
ballerina" than an HR professional (laughs). I'd buy him a tutu like 
that! (laughs). I think that there are very few really really really good 
HR professionals. Which is so disappointing, I think that there are - 
more good transactional HR people, I think there are people who can 
do process and things like that, but you know. " [DH: 5] 
This repertoire also appears linked to the tactical-strategic repertoires. 
" ... transactional stuff should be done seamlessly if you're really 
gonna get you know any sort of invitation to do the strategy stuff. 
But I think that's a really interesting point that I hadn't thought about, 
which is you can be marginal on strategy because my expectation is 
you're below that, so if you even deliver at that level, it's fine. " 
[DH: 11] 
And is seen as a consequence of the inability of the function to deal in absolutes. 
" .... the other thing that's a difficulty is that it's incredibly subjective. You've got three different HR people, you can get three different 
views of the same person. " [LJ: 5] 
In a mirror of the debates about the relative value of qualitative and quantitative 
research, HR's inability to demonstrate causality between its activities and value 
add to the business is seen as problematic. 
"... it's not easy to link sales success to a support function so you 
know could [the CEO] sit down at the end of the year and say "wow, 
we haven't lost any sales people this year except the ones that were 
either you know 'did not meet' or'met minimum' in their appraisal". If 
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he sat down and he saw that, that our sales people have not left the 
company and in fact our sales figures had gone up significantly as a 
result, could he draw an explicit link between that and and HR 
strategy? I don't know. Em you know there could be any number of 
different factors that might have precipitated that, I don't know. [BB: 7] 
However, the tactical repertoire is linked to a much more pejorative discourse by 
one of the business participants, who makes repeated references to the policing 
role of HR and the fixation with non-value added bureaucracy. 
"HR in the States has a sees itself as ... a policing operation, it 
polices the managers to make sure that they do things, so it's always 
viewed with a certain amount of tolerant hostility by the managers. " 
[DHT: 7] 
" ... your HR generalist, or whatever they they don't call them that, HR policeman or traffic warden or whatever. " [DHT: 15] 
" ... if you did a survey on the relevance of HR in the States, it would just be seen as completely and utterly irrelevant. " [DHT: 26] 
The language throughout the interview used to describe HR policies and activities 
is pejorative. 
"... there's this whole imposition of a sort of a banding and kind of 
fitting people into bands" [DT: 12, my emphasis] 
This individual describes his relationship with HR as highly adversarial rather than 
merely antipathetic. 
"Em I was actually fighting against HR, I wasn't telling them things, 
because I knew it was some god awful process that I hadn't gone 
through that was gonna ... hold the whole thing up for six months ... you find yourself hiding things from ... HR in the States, and it's very 
sad ... You don't see them as business partners and they certainly do not see you as the business they're partnering with. They 
actually see the management as the enemy. " [DHT: 18/19] 
It is interesting to note that this participant draws a strong distinction between the 
European and the US HR functions, perhaps as a result of researcher bias. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Project two built upon the exploration of 'best practice' and 'best fit' models of 
SHRM commenced in project one. It used an identical methodological and 
theoretical basis to project one (discourse analysis and social constructivism), and 
considered the same neo-institutional and RBV theories of SHRM, although 
project two differed from project one in that it hypothesized that the latter would be 
more descriptive in a private sector company. 
There were three research questions for this project: 
What can RBV and neo-institutional theories of SHRM, a social 
constructivist approach and a discourse analysis methodology tell us about 
how HR strategy is created and how HR is enacted? 
What influence do different contexts have on the creation of HR strategy 
and the enactment of HR? 
How do actors' perceptions influence on the creation of HR strategy and the 
enactment of HR? 
This concluding section will look at each of these questions in turn. 
7.1. Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
The first research question was 'What can RBV and neo-institutional theories of 
SHRM, a social constructivist approach and a discourse analysis methodology tell 
us about how HR strategy is created and how HR is enacted? ' 
The starting premise of project two was that, whilst 
appeared to exert a more profound influence on HR 
project one's public sector organisation, RBV would 
private sector company. 
neo-institutional forces had 
strategy and HR in use in 
prove more descriptive in a 
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However, the use of a social constructivist approach and a discourse analysis 
methodology provided a deeper level of analysis than would have been possible 
using more positivistic methodologies, and indicated that the situation was much 
more ambiguous than this simple assumption about RBV would suppose. 
Contrary to expectations, RBV appeared to offer little explanation for the picture of 
the business emerging in participants' discourse. The market was not seen as a 
significant driver of strategy45, and no reference to competitive forces was made. 
There was no discussion around core capabilities, customers or competitors, as 
strategy was seen as non existent46 or internally contradictory4 . Whilst 
participants use the language of RBV (resources, constraints, competitive forces), 
particularly in the 'theory of constraints' elements used to explain why HR is sub- 
optimal in matching business requirements, this does not appear to carry through 
into their conceptualizations of the forces driving the organisation. 
This perceived lack of strong contextual drivers is consistent with a dominant 
discourse around the absence of a coherent business strategy, for which a variety 
of reasons are posited. Although one participant proposed a lack of overarching 
guiding principles (e. g. a focus on results, values or processes), organizational 
immaturity was a more commonly cited reason for lack of strategy. This is 
compounded by a view that the senior management team (the 'dominant coalition') 
are perceived as inconsistent in approach48. 
In the absence of strong contextual drivers of strategy and with an unaligned 
dominant coalition, the organisation is seen as subject to the whims and 
peccadilloes of its senior management, specifically the CEO. 
In summary, the main business drivers cited appear to be politically generated 
rather than business driven, suggesting a far higher alignment with project one's 
public sector organisation than anticipated. This provides interesting support to 
the basic contention of social constructivism and its inference that business and 
HR strategy are socially constructed second order realities, rather than existing as 
an externally verifiable first order reality. 
45 c. f. GT: 10, page 29. 
46 c. f. EH: 22, page 15. "c. f. NB: 9, page 15; JR: 3, page 15. 49 c. f. section 6.3.2.3. 
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This implies, therefore, that a social constructivist approach to SHRM may be as, if 
not more, useful than more positivist approaches in explaining the way in which TF 
develops and deploys HR strategy and HR in use. 
7.2. Influence of Different Contexts 
This leads to the second research question: 'What influence do different contexts 
have on the creation of HR strategy and the enactment of HR? ' The project used 
Paauwe's Contextually Based HR Theory (CBHRT) as a descriptive framework to 
look at potential categories of contextual drivers of HR strategy. 
Using Paauwe's model as a descriptive framework provides a partial explanation 
for the lack of articulated business strategy, although the study identified that 
participants' representations of contextual factors was much more complex and 
ambiguous than Paauwe's model would suggest. Participants' responses indicate 
that the organization does not appear to face strong competitive pressures, but 
neither is it the product of strong institutional forces. The organisation's 
configuration is also not seen as a major driving force, given the genesis of the 
organisation in multiple acquisitions. 
From an academic point of view, this study suggests that Paauwe's model does 
provides a more thorough explanation of the data than using RBV or institutional 
theory/neo-institutional theory alone, but it is still far from providing the 
universalistic theory Paauwe is proposing. The concept of 'dominant coalition' is, 
however, extremely useful in interpreting the data. 
In the absence of strong competitive, configuration or institutional forces, the 
influence of dominant coalition becomes very important. This is highly consistent 
with the views of the participants in this study. However, although membership of 
the dominant coalition was largely agreed between the participants, the dominant 
coalition was seen as fragmented and internally contradictory. This left a single 
articulated driver of business strategy: the individual personalities, preferences 
and interests of the members of the dominant coalition, particularly the whims of 
the CEO. This creates an image of an organization driven not by RBV factors, as 
expected, but one directed by political interests. This consequently has more in 
common with London Underground's politicised decision making processes than 
expected, although LU's influencers were institutional in nature (the Government, 
institutions and politicians were seen as major shapers of HR) and TF's are bound 
in internal politics rather than external institutional forces. 
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7.3. Actors' Perceptions 
The final research question was `How do actors' perceptions influence on the 
creation of HR strategy and the enactment of HR? ' The discourse analysis 
methodology and social constructivist approach allow for a different level of 
analysis to more positivist techniques, in that they allow access (albeit in a 
qualified sense, given the role of the researcher in both influencing and creating a 
narrative around the data produced. 
This section will consider two elements: firstly, how do actors' perceptions 
influence HR strategy and, secondly, how do they influence HR in use. 
7.3.1. HR Strategy 
HR, as well as business, participants represented the HR role as internally 
contradictory. 
The transactional to strategic continuum was widely used by both business and 
HR to differentiate different approaches to HR; whilst participants attributed 
differential value to the two, there was a recognition that HR was required to do 
both, well. HR in TF was seen as preoccupied with the transactional. The 
function's ability to contribute strategically was seen as limited by the need to 
manage the transactional, although HR participants expressed optimism that the 
transition to strategic was underway. 
The theme of the necessity of adjustment to leadership style was posited as a 
source of another contradiction, where particular units or geographies had unique 
cultures. The emergence of HR representatives who operated as employee 
advocates for their individual areas, rather than driving a strategic agenda, was 
also articulated as a contradiction within the HR role. 
So what implications does this have for HR? 
Specifically, it appears that HR participants view the ability of the HR strategy to 
respond to the contextual factors as filtered by two elements: the unclear business 
strategy and the presence of constraints (organizational, environmental and 
personal). 
To look at the impact of the unclear business strategy first, the lack of a clear 
business strategy poses an immediate problem for a 'best fit' model of HR. How 
can one 'best fit' one's HR strategy when the business strategy to which one is 
aligning HR is unclear. 
342 
Participants (particularly but not exclusively those from HR) saw that there was a 
need for alignment between the HR strategy and the business strategy. HR was 
generally seen as dependent on the business, and that the business dictates the 
type and style of HR and HR's ability to influence this is limited. 
The business participants' experience of HR varied, ranging from a perception that 
there was no HR strategy, to a view that the strategy focused on introducing 
generic good practice (an interesting reference to the 'one best fit' model), to a 
perspective that there was an HR strategy, but that it was inconsistently applied. 
Participants drew the conclusion that, given a view of an HR function which is 
dependent upon and led by the business, an unclear business strategy will mean 
that the HR strategy will be unfocused or will concentrate on the transactional. 
Furthermore, given that it was seen as necessary that HR was aligned to the style 
and preferences of the leadership, inconsistency in the dominant coalition or an 
organizational direction determined by the peccadilloes of an individual was 
presented as a further limiting factor on HR's ability to align with business strategy. 
There was a marked difference between the view of HR strategy held by the HR 
team (who saw that there was a clear strategy, albeit one which was in 
implementation, rather than fully realized) and the business participants, which 
suggests a different level of visibility and the need for a deeper business 
communications approach. 
7.3.2. HR in Use 
The implications of this for HR in use are potentially very significant. A review of 
actors' perceptions indicate that there is a discrepancy between the role of HR as 
seen by the business and the role to which HR aspires. Business respondents 
discuss HR in largely tactical terms, whereas practitioners articulate a strategic 
role for HR. A further nuance is that business people are inclined to use a 
discourse which presents strategy and tactics as inimical, whereas HR 
practitioners see the two as poles on a continuum, along which HR can move. 
This disconnect is more than semantics: it has significant implications for the role 
HR is allowed to play in the business (given the "business leads HR" repertoire). 
Extrapolating this outwards, controversially this suggests that HR may be better 
served by delivering on the business's expectations (an excellent tactical service) 
and concentrating on implementing best practice in high value add HR processes 
(e. g. talent management, performance management), rather than aiming for best 
fit. The latter may be, at best, a matter of interpretation (of business, contextual 
and political drivers) and, at worst, a constantly moving target in a business 
undergoing rapid change. 
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Secondly, much of the interview time was spent discussing detailed 
rationalizations of why best fit was not possible in the organization under study, 
due to the presence of constraints (organizational, environmental and personal). 
This suggests that the 'best fit' model may be valid, but that environmental, 
organizational and personal factors intervene to constrain the level of fit possible. 
These constraints can be divided broadly into organizational factors (which could 
conceivably be fitted into the 'configuration' element of Paauwe's model) and what 
may loosely be termed 'professional' factors. Organizational factors include 
perceptions and expectations of HR and the necessary completion of transactional 
processes, whereas 'professional' factors include issues of resource availability 
and quality. 
A clear conclusion of this study is the need to address implementation concerns. 
Whilst the academic community debate the conditions of strategy formulation, this 
study suggests that the practitioner community may need more consideration of 
implementation issues and the type of constraints which create barriers to the 
enactment of HR. 
It is interesting to surmise on how self-limiting this discourse is for HR 
practitioners. Whilst it is clearly a functional discourse for HR practitioners to 
attribute the reason for the perceived failure of HR to deliver to its business, it may 
also serve to excuse a failure to address fundamental issues such as HR 
knowledge of the business and the failure to adopt a business partnering 
approach. 
8. IMPLICATIONS 
This study has interesting implications from both a business and an academic 
perspective. 
8.1. Business Implications 
The inference of the data is that the more clearly a business strategy is articulated, 
the more likely it is that an HR strategy will be developed which complements it 
and adds business value. Conversely, poorly articulated or contradictory business 
strategies can result in confused and unfocused HR practices and, perhaps, a 
reversion to the comfort of a tactical role. 
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Given that there is validity to the best fit model, Paauwe's model implies that there 
is potential benefit to an analysis of contextual factors as well as business strategy 
when determining HR strategy. Theoretically, an analysis of context could produce 
a valid HR strategy which is 'best fitted', even when the business has not clearly 
articulated its strategy. 
However, that does not seem to be the case in this study. Although some 
contextual drivers are cited, their influence is seen as limited, in comparison to the 
influence of the organizational actors. 
This creates a conundrum for HR. Do they follow the behests of the organizational 
actors, or do they attempt to use a Paauwe type model to diagnose the context 
and develop their own conceptualization of what the business 'needs'? Is there a 
super-ordinate role which HR could play which challenges the actors' perceptions 
and creates a strategy more objectively linked to the business's context (although 
this linkage, crucially, will also be influenced by the perceptions of the HR actors), 
or is their job to transact the strategy as articulated by the actors, whether or not 
that is distorted by political influences? 
8.2. Academic Implications 
From an academic point of view, there are four possible implications of this study. 
Firstly, contrasting the data in project one and project two in the light of Paauwe's 
model suggests that a model which incorporates both resource based and 
institutional mechanisms is superior to one which uses only one or the other. 
However, this project suggests that Paauwe's model is less deterministic and less 
universalistic than he proposes. Although it has limited use as an analytical 
framework, Paauwe's model may have value as a descriptive framework. 
Secondly, Paauwe gives equal weight to each of the elements in his model, which 
fails to recognize that the relative strength of these mechanisms may vary 
dramatically, given the organizational type, structure, history and priorities. When 
determining 'best fit', it may be as - if not more - important to look at the political 
environment and influences as well as contextual factors. This project infers that 
an extension of the concept of 'best fit' is required: to achieve 'best fit', it seems 
apparent that HR strategy may have to 'fit' the political as well as business 
environment. 
Thirdly, Paauwe's theoretical model fails to acknowledge the issue of HR in use. 
Operationalisation of HR strategy (even where the business strategy and 
contextual analysis has allowed it to have a high degree of best fit) is subject to a 
series of constraints (notably perceptions and expectations of HR, issues of 
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resource availability and quality and the necessary completion of transactional 
processes). These can considerably impact the ability to build and (perhaps more 
pertinently) implement an HR strategy which achieves best fit. This data suggests 
an expansion of Paauwe's model is necessary, which provides for analysis of 
constraints and an articulation of the HR strategy which analyses, recognizes and 
addresses these constraints. 
Finally, the 'best fit' model of HR assumes a relatively stable environment: HR 
activities tend to be relatively long term in nature, and project results (e. g. the 
introduction of a new performance management system) may not be seen in 
months, if not years. In environments of rapid change and emergent strategy, 
there is a suggestion in the discourse of several participants in project two that it 
may not be possible to 'strategically fit' an HR strategy where business strategy is 
changing rapidly. 
In this case, where the need is for organizational agility, how is HR to respond? 
Does this signal the death knell for'best fit' (is it impossible to develop HR strategy 
when the environment is unclear or constantly changing) or is this another kind of 
'best fit', where HR activities, policies and practices are aimed at increasing the 
organisation's dynamic capability (i. e. an HR strategy the aim of which is to bring 
in, develop, motivate and reward employees with flexible skill sets and high 
tolerance of ambiguity)? Or, looking at some of the general management 
philosophies articulated by participants in this study, does HR have a more pivotal 
role, which is around managing symbolic meaning for the organization? 
These ideas will be carried over into project three, which will explore SHRM in an 
environment of dynamic change. 
8.3. Further Research 
This project has suggested that further research in this area would be beneficial, 
with a view to developing a model of `best fit' HR which addresses the areas noted 
in the section above. 
Firstly, as 'best fit' HR assumes an essentially static environment, there is a need 
to look at the concept of SHRM in an environment of dynamic change. This will be 
a primary consideration of project 3. 
Secondly, project 2 has indicated that it is necessary to develop a model of HR 
which incorporates an analysis of political as well as business drivers and 
addresses the implementation as well as development of strategy. Strategy 
formulation is not as contextually driven as 'best fit' and contextually based 
theories of HR would suppose. Instead, the influence of the 'dominant coalition' - 
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the influential organisational actors - seemed profoundly more impactful than 
contextual drivers. Project 3 will provide a further review of the strategy 
formulation process, looking specifically at strategy as an iterative, negotiated 
process. 
Furthermore, drawing conclusions about the universality of the pre-eminence of 
the actors over contextual factors on the basis of project two's single study is not 
possible. Further research should look at different types of organization to see 
whether this is a manifestation of a wider phenomenon, or whether it is a situation 
unique to the Thomson organisation. This will be explored in the Linking 
Document, applying the model developed in project two (and refined in project 
three) to the data generated in project one. As London Underground, the host for 
project one, was an organisation at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
Thomson Financial (public sector, long history, large non-professional workforce, 
unionised etc. ) it was considered that this would be a reasonable test of the 
generalisability of the model, although further research would still be required. 
Finally, further research should consider the issue of HR in user. Project three will 
look at strategy implementation as well as strategy formulation, building on the 
'theory of constraints' developed in project two. 
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APPENDIX ONE: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Would you say that there is an HR strategy for TF? 
" If yes, can you describe it? 
" If no, what are the main features of HR in TF? 
Does/how does the HR strategy relate to the organisation's strategy? 
I'd like your views on the stakeholders who you think have an input into HR in TF. 
Who do you think determines the approach to HR in TF? (Board, management 
team, HR itself, line management, employees? ) 
Are there any constraints on the stakeholders to put in place what they want? 
(legislation, employee resistance, resource constraints) 
Do you think there's anything about the context in which TF operates that 
influences HR? 
I'd like you to think about internal factors first: 
" Culture/values 
" Structure 
" Leadership 
" Type of employees (middle class professionals, largely sales oriented, 
compliant/non-compliant, long/short service) 
" Type of products/technology 
" Company background (ownership structure, Canadian company, New York 
head office, lots of British senior management, age of company). 
" Company history, including critical events (mergers, acquisitions, 
takeovers). 
Do you think that there are external factors which influence the type of HR which 
TF has in place? 
" Market/competitive environment 
" Nature of the client base 
" PESTLE or SWOT factors 
" Institutional factors 
" What other organizations in the industry are doing 
" Consultants 
" Professional institutes (e. g. CIPD, CIMA) 
" Political and regulatory forces 
" Legislation 
" Rules 
" Procedures. 
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How do you see HR changing in the future (best practice, external hires bringing 
different views, use of consultants). 
Do you think HR has changed over time in TF? 
" If yes, why do you think it has changed? (responding to the business, HR 
as a profession changing, peccadilloes of different HR people and different 
managing directors? ) 
" If no, why do you think it has not changed? 
What happened to HR and the HR approach in major acquisitions like 
DataStream, Primark and RAW? 
" Did it change when Thomson took over? 
" The organization doesn't seem to have gone for a strong cultural integration 
in the way many companies do - do you think this was deliberate? 
Do you think TTC has a big influence on HR in TF Europe? 
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APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEWEE LIST 
Name Title HR/ Business Length of Nationality Interview 
Business Unit Service Date 
Sarah Dunn EVP, HR HR TF Global Short British 06/09/06 
Nigel VP, International HR TTC Long British 16/08/06 
Brockmann HR 
Elly Hardwick Head of Strategy Business TF Short British 03/08/06 
Europe 
Conrad Senior Business HR TF Short Indian 01/08/06 
D'Mello Partner, HR Europe 
Hywel CFO Business TF Medium British 08/08/06 
Thomas Europe 
and Asia 
Bob Boot Employee HR TF Medium British 04/08/06 
Relations Europe 
Manager, HR 
Jessica COO, GSMS Business TF Short Australian 04/08/06 
Randall Europe 
Deb DeVerna VP, HR TTC Medium American 09/08/06 
Organisational 
Development, HR 
David Hurst MD, Print Business TF Global Medium British 08/08/06 
Publishing 
Gus Head of Business Business TF Short Belgian 07/08/06 
Tugendhat Development Europe 
Dawn Hirsch VP, HR HR TF North Medium American 10/08/06 
America 
Megan Director, Talent HR TF North Short American 06/09/06 
Wozniak Management, HR America 
Simonne VP, HR HR TF Asia Medium Canadian 06/09/06 
LeBlanc 
Linda MD, Corporate Business TF Short British 11/09/06 
Jackson Europe 
Anna Billings Head of HR HR TF Long British 30/01/07 
Operations Europe 
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ABSTRACT 
Project three continued the exploration of HR strategy formulation and deployment 
from, a social constructivist perspective. It developed a new model of HR which 
was consistent with an emergent and negotiated view of strategy, arguing that this 
is more appropriate than a view of strategy formulation as a singular, linear event, 
given i) the environment of dynamic change in which modern businesses typically 
operate and ii) the accounts of strategy formulation and implementation offered by 
respondents. The project also drew upon work on organisational agility and 
dynamic capabilities to characterise the challenge faced by modern organisations. 
Moving from models of HR and HR strategy which assumed a definitive and 
relatively enduring first order reality, this study advanced the idea of HR as a 
social construction, the product of organisational negotiations and re-negotiations. 
The project used discourse analysis to access the second order reality of 
respondents' perceptions of the factors influencing HR and HR strategy, taking the 
view that strategy was a negotiated and iterative process. 
The project advanced a new descriptive research model for HR strategy 
formulation and deployment which comprised three phases: broad strategy 
formulation, the 'intended' HR strategy and the 'realised' HR approach. However, 
instead of viewing these as objective first order realities, this project examined 
these as social processes, the product of perceptions and negotiation, and looked 
at the 'second order' reality of these elements and the linkages between them. 
The project concluded that this model provided a deeper description of the 
functioning of HR in Thomson Financial, and proposed a new model of HR which 
has greater ability to create and support inherently agile organisations. This 
project begins to redefine the HR role in the light of this model and to identify the 
new skills required by HR practitioners in this model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Under the general tenet of examining HR strategy formulation and deployment 
from a social constructivist perspective, project three extends the work which 
commenced in project two. Whilst project two, taking Paauwe's (2004) theory of 
contextually based HR as a starting point, indicated that an analysis of the 
contextual factors underlying HR strategy was interesting and the concept of the 
"dominant coalition" (Paauwe. 2004, p92) was potentially useful, it suggested that 
these are merely the starting point for HR strategy development. Strategy 
development, it appears from project two, is a much more complex and iterative 
process than the linear and predictive process presented in 'best fit' models of HR 
such as that presented by Paauwe. 
1.1. Limitations of Contextually Based Theories of HR 
Project two looked at the potential influence of contextual factors on the HR 
strategy selected by an organisation, using discourse analysis to access the views 
and perceptions (the 'second order reality') of HR practitioners and business 
representatives. It identified four issues with the general concepts of 'best fit' and 
contextually based HR: 
" The assumption of a direct and clear link between the business and HR 
strategies, and the related emphasis on business drivers fails to recognise 
the complex interplay of business, contextual and political drivers which 
respondents see as influencing HR strategy 
" The concept of "strategy' itself appears to be problematic and open to a 
variety of interpretations. 
" The presumption of a relatively static environment 
" The concentration on the development of strategy and the failure to 
recognise the challenges of implementation 
To examine these point by point, firstly, in the discourse of the HR and business 
respondents who were interviewed, there was little evidence to support clearly 
articulated business and HR strategies and clear linkage between the two. 
Instead, respondents articulated a view of HR strategy which was more 
fragmentary and less coherent than 'best fit' models of HR would suggest, and 
which was less driven by contextual factors than such deterministic models would 
imply. 
The impact of contextual factors was seen by project two's respondents as limited. 
Project two indicated that analyses of context were drawn upon by respondents 
functionally, to support their arguments, viewpoints and negotiations. Although it 
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could potentially be useful as a diagnostic in the initial stages of strategy 
formulation, project two suggested that a contextually based approach to HR 
should not be seen as deterministic. 
The whims of management (Paauwe's "dominant coalition") were seen as a more 
significant influence on the final shape of the HR strategy than contextual factors. 
In this, there was a resonance with project one, where management of 
stakeholders (politicians, trade unions) and institutional forces emerged as 
stronger influences than contextual factors shaping a 'best fit'. Whilst Paauwe's 
model usefully accommodated the concept of the influence of the organisational 
actors, he did not go on to consider the impact of a dominant coalition which is 
fragmentary and internally contradictory. Respondents represented an HR strategy 
as the product of a complex and often contradictory mix of business, contextual 
and political influences, where HR strategy is an obfuscated, multi-faceted 
construct which has no 'first order reality', but is a matter of interpretation and 
negotiation within the organisation. 
Secondly, this project will also look at the use of the term 'strategy' and the 
definitions of the term offered. Project two suggested that the term strategy was, 
itself, problematic: individuals had difficulty articulating the business strategy, 
seeing it as politically driven, obfuscated or incoherent. This suggested that a 
deeper deconstruction of the term and the way in which it was used in the 
discourse of the participants may also be useful. 
Turning to the third point, project two also hinted at another problem with 
contextually based theories of HR: they depict a static view of the organisation, 
HR and the linkages between the two. This creates a further problem for 
contextually based theories of HR; as the closing sections of project two indicate, 
respondents see change as a significant factor with which HR has to deal in the 
target organisation. 
Finally, 'best fit' models of HR fail to consider implementation issues. The view of 
HR strategy articulated by project two's respondents was described as a theory of 
constraints: the respondents' dominant view is that, although an ideal (or certainly 
closer to ideal) HR approach for the business could exist (in Johnson & Scholes' 
terminology, "intended strategy": Johnson & Scholes, 1993, p28), the 
operationalisation of that strategy ("realised" HR: Johnson & Scholes, 1993, p28) 
was limited by the resources of and constraints placed upon the HR function (e. g. 
lack of HR capability, desire of the business to accept HR as a business partner). 
This was described by the 'theory of constraints' repertoire in the participants' 
discourse in project two. 
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It became apparent in project two that any model of strategic HR would have to 
address the gap between intended strategy and realised HR, and would have to 
include a consideration of constraints. 
1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Perspective 
It will utilise the same theoretical perspective (social constructivism) and research 
methodology (discourse analysis) as projects one and two. In the earlier projects, 
this approach allowed a deeper insight into the influence of the actors in strategy 
formulation and implementation, presenting a view of organisational activities as 
an interplay between first order reality (objectively verifiable features of the 
environment) and second order reality (the actors' perceptions and interpretations 
of the first order reality). 
1.3. Requirements for a New Model of HR 
In summary, project three will endeavour to address the limitations of best fit and 
contextually based theories of HR, specifically around the four points raised in 
section 1.1. These were the assumption of a deterministic model of strategy, 
definitional problems with the term 'strategy', the presumption of a relatively static 
environment and a lack of attention to implementation issues 
A specific literature review will be created to provide an additional academic 
framework around definitions of strategy (section 3.1. ) and the building of inherent 
change resilience in organisations (section 3.2. ). 
The project will utilise Tyson's (1997) distinction between 'strategy as an objective' 
and 'strategy as a process' (reviewed in section 3.1. ) as a way of addressing 
points one and two: a deterministic model of strategy and problems of definition 
around the term itself. The project will take a view of strategy which is processual, 
seeing strategy as an iterative and emergent product of the perceptions and 
negotiations of the organisational actors. This will address the issue (raised with 
best fit and contextually based HR theories) of the assumed deterministic link 
between the business and HR strategies, as well as offer a resolution to the 
problematic and conflicting definitions of strategy offered in the literature. This will 
also allow strategy to be seen as an interplay between business, contextual and 
political drivers, and so build a theory of strategy formulation which seems more 
reflective of the accounts of strategy formulation offered by respondents in 
discourse. 
Secondly, reviews of contextually based approaches to HR indicate that the 
presumption of a relatively static environment is also problematic, given the rate, 
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pace and discontinuous nature of change in modern business environments. This 
project will reference recent work on organisational agility and dynamic capabilities 
as a potential framework, and will use these to inform how an organisation which 
regards itself as having a core expertise in change builds change capability and 
resilience in its organisation. 
The final issue raised with contextually based theories of HR is that they have 
concentrated on strategy formulation, and have not considered the challenges of 
implementation. This project will look at the difference between intended HR 
strategy and the realised HR approach, and will examine accounts of the 
mediating factors which are used to explain this gap. As such, this project will be 
divided into two sections: strategy formulation and strategy implementation. 
1.4. Towards a New Model of HR 
The outcome of project three will be the creation of a new model of HR strategy 
formulation and implementation, incorporating the following elements. 
1. A new model of HR strategy formulation 
" Sees strategy as an iterative, emergent and negotiated process 
" Incorporates the influence of political forces 
" Accommodates the impact of change 
2. A new model of HR strategy implementation 
" Draws a distinction between the intended HR strategy (formulation) 
and the realised HR approach (implementation) 
" Considers factors which mediate between the intended HR strategy 
and the realised HR approach. 
The project will attempt to develop an overall model of HR strategy development 
and implementation which incorporates all of these elements and will test out 
whether this is supported by the discourse. It will also discuss the impact of 
change as a multi-faceted influence on HR strategy and formulation. 
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2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions for project three, hence, are as follows. 
" What can a social constructivist approach and a discourse methodology tell 
us about the formulation of HR strategy? 
" What can a social constructivist approach and a discourse methodology tell 
us about the implementation of HR strategy? 
" Can a new model of HR strategy formulation and implementation be 
developed which can provide a better explanation for the operation of HR in 
an organisation than 'best fit' or contextually based theories of HR? 
" How can change best be reflected in a model of HR strategy formulation 
and implementation? 
3. SPECIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two specific bodies of literature were additionally reviewed for project three: 
discussions around the meaning of the term 'strategy' in the context of HRM 
(section 3.1. ), and a specific sub-segment of the change literature, the work on 
dynamic capabilities and organisational agility (sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
respectively). Section 3.3. will conclude by drawing the two bodies of literature 
together and creating a theoretical basis for project three. 
3.1. A Deconstruction of the Term `Strategy' in the Context 
of HRM 
There is no intention in this project to produce a detailed review of the strategy 
literature, as this has been covered in numerous HR and business texts (the 
interested reader is referred to the work of Gerry Johnson (e. g. Johnson & 
Scholes, 1993), as well as the individual authors referenced below). However, it is 
perhaps worthwhile to outline some of the key concepts which are of relevance to 
this study. 
To provide a definition of strategy seems a deceptively simple exercise, as the 
following, provided by Johnson & Scholes, suggests. 
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"Strategy is the direction and scope of an organisation over the long 
term: ideally, which matches its resources to its changing 
environment, and in particular its market, customers or clients so as 
to meet stakeholder expectations. " (Johnson & Scholes, 1993, p10) 
However, the concept is not as easily captured as this attractively simple definition 
suggests, as there are fundamental divisions in the strategy literature as to what, 
exactly, strategy is or could be. 
This section will look at three dichotomies in the way in which the concept of 
'strategy' is defined: 
" Strategy as objective versus strategy as process 
" Intended strategy versus realised 
" Levels of strategy. 
It will conclude by looking at the implications of these dichotomies on the 
'meaning' of the term strategy and will then look at the implications for HR. 
3.1.1. Strategy as Objective Versus Strategy as Process 
There have been a number of attempts to categorise the various schools of 
thought on strategy, for instance Whittington (1993, quoted in Armstrong & Baron, 
2002, p37) developed a typology running from 'classical' (strategy as an explicit 
objective) via evolutionary (natural selection, driven by market forces, determines 
which strategies will be successful) to 'processual' (Mintzberg's view of strategy as 
an incremental, negotiated process) to systemic (strategy shaped by the social 
system in which it operates). 
Tyson (1997) takes two of these categories as the basis of his discussion of the 
definition of the term 'strategy': strategy as an objective (Whittington's 'classical' 
approach) and strategy as a process (Whittington's 'processual' approach): 
"The concept of 'strategy' as applied to managerial intentions may be 
interpreted either in terms of organisational objectives or aims, which 
seek to gain a competitive advantage for an organisation, or as a 
process by which managerial actions can be combined to pursue 
important organisational aims. " (Tyson, 1997, p277) 
Taking 'strategy as objective' first, the key writings in this category can be further 
sub-divided, according to whether the focus is external or internal. 'Positioning 
models' are externally focused and tend to focus on matching the firm's strategies 
to the threats and opportunities in the external environment, and include Miles & 
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Snow's (1984) work on organisational strategies. 'Resource based view' (RBV) 
models of strategy are internally focused and concentrate on the differentiation of 
the firm through the internal resources it possesses and the effective deployment 
of these resources. Key research in this area includes core competency 
approaches, such as that by Prahalad & Hamel (1980) and Barney (1991). A 
number of authors have attempted to pull these 'internal' and 'external' views of 
influences on strategy together, notably Porter's (1980,1985) work on competitive 
analysis, who is arguably the most seminal of the 'strategy as objective' 
practitioners. 
These analytical models represent strategy as an objective. Organisational 
strategy is viewed as formulaic and deterministic, where the correct diagnosis of 
the external environment and internal capabilities, the selection of the appropriate 
strategy and the rigorous implementation of that strategy are the key determinants 
of organisational success. Strategy as objective, in summary, sees strategy as 
quantifiable, logical and rational. 
There are, however, a set of problems associated with this "classical" approach. 
They tend to be overly deterministic, preclude responsiveness to change and have 
little concern for the 'people element' or, indeed, for implementation considerations 
(resource constraints, for instance, have a fundamental impact on a company's 
ability to realise its strategy). There is also an argument, made by Boxall & Purcell 
(1993, p28), that whilst long term planning was applicable to monolithic companies 
(such as Philips, GE and Ford) in the 1960s, and may still be necessary where 
formal planning is a requirement (e. g. public sector environments, highly regulated 
environments such as construction), the escalating pace of change from the 1990s 
onwards suggests that long term planning may be both a wasted endeavour, and 
actually may constrain the organisation to a course of action which becomes 
inappropriate. 
This leads us to Tyson's second definition of strategy - 'strategy as process' - 
which is much less deterministic. Mintzberg has been one of the main opponents 
to the efficacy of long term formal strategic planning, his longitudinal studies (e. g. 
Mintzberg, 1978) indicating that incremental change was far more common than 
transformational change. He advanced the idea of 'quantum loops' (Armstrong & 
Baron, 2003, p35) to describe the intermittent nature of strategy reorientation 
within organisations, as Johnson & Scholes note in their review of Mintzberg. 
"... typically, organisations changed incrementally, during which 
times strategies formed gradually; or through piecemeal change, 
during which times some strategies changed and others remained 
constant. " (Johnson & Scholes, 1993, p35) 
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Mintzberg's work defines strategy as a process rather than an objective, and 
conveys the idea that strategy emerges over a period of time, the result of many 
small changes and directional moves over time, some of which may result from 
formal planning exercises and articulated senior management decisions, but some 
of which may be the result of tactical actions and moves which were seemingly 
insignificant at the time. This view also sees strategy formation as an iterative 
process, where actions provide feedback which can then be used to redirect or 
reorient the strategy. As Armstrong and Baron neatly put it: 
"First we think, then we act; we formulate, then we implement. But 
we also 'act in order to think'. " (Armstrong & Baron, 2002, p35) 
Extrapolating from this, it may only be possible to determine organisational 
strategy retrospectively; what Mintzberg (1978) called "emergent" strategy. 
The term 'emergent' implies that strategy will be a matter of interpretation and 
negotiation, which immediately makes the construct amenable to a social 
constructivist analysis. Likewise, the activities which lead towards or 
retrospectively define the 'emergent' strategy are likely to be driven by political as 
well as business forces, allowing for an analysis of, for instance, neo-institutional 
influences to be made, as well as a consideration of issues of power and 
influence. These views, of the retrospective nature of strategy and the influence of 
the actors, are both endorsed by Goold & Campbell (1986) in the following quote. 
"Informed understandings work alongside more formal processes 
and analyses. The headquarters agenda becomes entwined with the 
business unit agenda, and both are interpreted in the light of 
personal interests. The sequence of events from decision to action 
can often be reversed, so that 'decisions' get made retrospectively to 
justify actions that have already taken place. " (Goold & Campbell, 
1986, quoted in Armstrong & Baron, 2002, p36-7) 
The concept of strategy as process perhaps reaches its most adaptive form in the 
concept of logical incrementalism. This was advanced by Quinn (1980), and is 
described by Johnson & Scholes as follows: 
... managers have a view of where they want the organisation to be in years to come, but try to move towards this position in an 
evolutionary way. They do this not only by attempting to ensure the 
success and development of a strong, secure but flexible core 
business, but also by continually experimenting with 'side bet' 
ventures. " (Johnson & Scholes, 1993, p44) 
The logical incrementalist perspective, hence, sees strategy development as an 
iterative process of environmental scanning, testing and adaptation: 
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"... strategy is seen to be worked through in action. " (Johnson & 
Scholes, 1993, p44) 
In an environment of uncertainty, or continual or unpredictable change, the idea of 
a logically incremental approach appears to have intrinsic merit. 
The concept of logical incrementalism links to Simon's classic 1947 work on 
'bounded rationality'. Simon theorised that the efficiency of human cognition was 
subject to 'bounded rationality', i. e. people can only make judgements and 
decisions on the basis of the information that they know, and can only consider a 
finite number of variables in any one scenario. Logical incrementalism allows 
managers to make satisfactory decisions in the light of the information available 
and their cognitive processing capability and move forward, knowing that they are 
not committing irredeemably to a course of action and that their decisions can be 
reviewed and tweaked as new information becomes available, or the importance 
of previously overlooked information becomes clear. 
It is important to note that planned and emergent approaches to strategy are not 
inimical. As Johnson & Scholes suggest: 
"... despite the existence of a stated, intended strategy which 
appears to have come about through a planning mechanism, 
strategy development may still be of an emergent nature. ... the 
planning process may perform the role of monitoring the progress or 
efficiency of an emergent strategy. " (Johnson & Scholes, 1993, p39) 
This interplay is likely to mean that strategy formulation is a political as well as an 
analytical exercise, moving towards the research agenda articulated by Tyson. 
"... strategy formation as an interpersonal process with outcomes 
which are not only consensual about the organisation's formal 
intentions but also are an expression of the way the intentions will be 
carried out. " ( Tyson, 1997, p280) 
If one assumes that strategy formulation is a political process, it becomes 
important to look at the perceptual filters which operate to mediate between first 
and second order reality. This project will consider this only obliquely, but 
suggests that a useful starting off point for this could be two papers published in 
McKinsey Quarterly (Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 and Roxburgh, 2003) , which 
look at 
sources of perceptual bias ("distortions": Lovallo & Sibony, 2006; Roxburgh, 2003) 
and the influence of political factors on business decision making ("deceptions": 
Lovallo & Sibony, 2006). 
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The McKinsey papers indicated a number of potential perceptual biases which 
may influence decision making which they call "distortions" (Lovallo & Sibony, 
2006, p19). As Lovallo & Sibony (2006, p20) comment, "errors in strategic 
decision making can arise from the cognitive biases we all have as human 
beings". Their "distortions" are listed in figure 60. 
Perpetual Filter Description Reference 
Over confidence Overconfidence, in one's own abilities and/or in Lovallo & Sibony, 2006; 
the brain's ability to accurately estimate Roxburgh, 2003 
Over optimism High expectations of the unknown not or only Lovallo & Sibony, 2006, 
minimally supported by evidence Roxburgh, 2003 
Loss aversion Inaction despite the acceptability of risks faced Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 
Mental accounting "The inclination to categorise and treat money Roxburgh, 2003 
differently depending on where it comes from, 
where it is kept, and how it is spent"( Thaler, 
quoted in Roxburgh, 2003, p30), i. e. the 
differential treatment of cash or spending 
according to how it is classified 
Status quo bias Reluctance to make changes and the tendency Roxburgh, 2003 
to leave things as they are 
Anchoring The tendency to 'anchor decisions on a Roxburgh, 2003 
particular piece of information, showing bias 
towards or relying too heavily upon that piece of 
information when making decisions 
The sunk cost "Throwing good money after bad", i. e. Roxburgh, 2003 
effect continuing with over-spent projects even when 
the original cost-benefit analysis no longer holds 
true 
The herding instinct The tendency to adopt behaviour and opinions Roxburgh, 2003 
which are consistent with those of others 
Misestimating People tend to over-estimate the amount of Roxburgh, 2003 
future hedonic pleasure or pain a change in circumstances will 
states create for them, which tends towards inertia 
where negative consequences are anticipated 
or over-optimism where positive consequences 
are anticipated 
False consensus False consensus can be demonstrated in three Roxburgh, 2003 
ways: confirmation bias ("the tendency to seek 
out opinions and facts that support our own 
beliefs and hypotheses". Roxburgh, 2003, p37), 
selective recall ("the habit of remembering only 
facts and experiences that reinforce our 
assumptions"; Roxburgh, 2003, p37) and biased 
evaluation ("the quick acceptance of evidence 
that supports our hypotheses, whereas 
contradictory evidence is subjected to rigorous 
evaluation and almost certain rejection" 
(Roxburgh, 2003, p37) 
Figure 60: McKinsey's Perceptual Filters 
The McKinsey papers also allude to a negotiated model of decision making, by 
making reference to a number of "deceptions" (Roxburgh, 2003, p37) perpetrated 
by the actors in an organisation. Lovallo & Sibony point out that "the strategic 
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decisions that companies make result from interactions amongst their executives" 
(Lovallo & Sibony, 2006, p22), which leaves them open to conflicts of interest 
between the interests of the "agents" (i. e. the employees) and the "principle" (i. e. 
the organisation). These are shown in figure 61. 
Deceptions Description Reference 
Principal-agent When the incentives of employees are Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 
Problem misaligned with the interests of the organisation, 
the employee is motivated to act in his/her own 
interests, rather than in the interests of the 
organisation. This can take the form of 
intentional deceptions - misrepresenting, 
omitting or making up information - which can 
magnify unintentional distortions created by 
perceptual biases. 
Misalignment of A significant potential misalignment of interests Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 
Time Horizons between employees and the organisation arises 
due to different timelines. Managers are often 
incentivised by compensation and promotion 
structures to take decisions which have a short 
term pay off, and which may not be in the longer 
term interests of the organisation. Whether 
deceptions are intentional or not, managers may 
be incentivised to prioritise only projects which 
have a short term payback, i. e. a payback the 
timescale of which corresponds to the 
manners timeline. 
Omission Bias Organisations and individuals may have Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 
different risk profiles. Managers may be risk 
averse, even in the face of risks which are 
wholly acceptable, because they worry about 
the impact of a failure on their reputation and 
career prospects: it is a magnification of the 
'loss aversion' distortion. 
This'omission bias' creates an inertia which 
may disproportionately favour results created by 
inaction rather than action. 
Champion Bias In most organisational situations, subordinate Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 
employees are likely to know more about an 
issue than their manager. Management 
decision making, thus, is based as much on the 
perception of the employee putting forward the 
case as the merits of the business case: 
champion bias'. This increases the potential 
opportunity for deception or distortions to enter 
the decision making process. 
Sunflower 'Sunflower management' refers to the tendency Lovallo & Sibony, 2006 
Management of people within organisations to align 
themselves with the leader's viewpoint, be that 
real or assumed viewpoint. This can mean that 
employees do not articulate their true views and 
opinions, and can be biased in their contribution 
to the decision making rocess. 
Figure 61: McKinsey's Deceptions" 
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This project will reference the McKinsey work, but* in a rather different way from 
that which was intended by the authors. Instead of assuming that these 
perceptual filters and distortions have an objectively verifiable first order reality, 
this paper will, instead, look at how perceptual filters, biases and distortions are 
referenced by respondents to debunk positions held by other actors and, by so 
doing, how they attempt to privilege their own positions. 
3.1.2. Intended Strategy and Realised Approach 
The second distinctions to be drawn in terms of the concept of 'strategy' is 
between intended strategy and realised approach. 
Johnson & Scholes (1993, p38) also provide another useful distinction in their 
work on strategy: that between the intended strategy and the realised approach. 
Even where a strategy is planned, partly or wholly, it may not be put into practice: 
capability, culture, politics and strategic drift are all reasons why the articulated, 
'intended' strategy may not be realised in practice. 
Although some influential authors have written on this topic (e. g. Purcell, 2001; 
Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1999), implementation of strategy has not been a major focus 
of the strategy literature, although it is obviously a critical determinant of 
organisational success. 
3.1.3. Levels of Strategy 
A final element of the strategy literature which it is relevant to reference here is the 
debate concerning levels of strategy in the organisation. Johnson & Scholes 
distinguish three levels of strategy within an organisation: 
corporate strategy (involving decisions about the organisation as a whole) 
competitive/business strategy (in which markets should the organisation 
compete, and how) 
operational strategies (how do the different functions - e. g. HR, Finance, IT, 
R&D - contribute to the corporate and business strategies). 
Whereas this levelling approach has been seen as relegating HR to 'third order' 
strategy (Purcell & Ahlestrand, 1984; Purcell, 1995), as Tyson (1997) points out, 
the reality is likely to be much more complex and ambiguous than this dismissal of 
HR suggests. 
".., the complexities of organisational structures and the varying roles 
of head offices, divisional and regional offices prevent us from 
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generalising even about the distinction normally drawn between 
corporate and business strategies, and the part functional strategies 
play in the development of 'business strategies' as a whole. " (Tyson, 
1997, p279) 
Perhaps more interestingly, both Johnson & Scholes' and Purcell's models of 
levels of strategy have an implied value system, in which HR (and indeed all other 
functional departments) is seen as subservient to a corporate and a business 
strategy, rather than interacting with and supporting the development of the same. 
3.1.4. Implications for HR 
The definition of 'strategy as objective' implies a clear and articulated business 
strategy to which an HR strategy can be dovetailed: a 'best fit' model of HR. 
Where a resource based approach is taken, HR's job logically becomes one of 
attracting, retaining, building and managing the core capabilities defined as 
strategically important to the business. 
A number of writers have developed HRM models from business strategy models, 
creating the clear link between business and HR strategies. Ackermann (1986) 
attempted to draw correlations between Miles & Snow's framework and HR 
policies. Jackson, Schuler & Rivero (1989) examined the impact of organisational 
lifecycle on HR practices, and, probably most influentially, Schuler & Jackson 
(1987)'s work linked Porter's typology of competitive strategies to HRM. Schuler & 
Jackson's 1987 model started with the selected Porterian strategy (cost 
leadership, differentiation or focus) and moved to HR outcomes (alignment of 
employee behaviour with company goals) via a definition of required employee 
behaviours (e. g. cost leadership could imply a concern for quality, process and 
costs), reinforced by supportive HR practices (e. g. appropriate strategies for 
recruitment, performance management, development). 
The contribution of HR to organisational success can be inferred by reference to 
business metrics, although the difficulties in demonstrating clear linkage between 
business results and HR initiatives mean that categoric attribution of causality is 
often questionable. Boxall & Purcell (2003, pp 242-245), for instance, make an 
interesting (if highly caveated) attempt to use a Kaplan & Norton balanced 
scorecard approach to link HR contribution to business metrics. 
This definition of 'strategy as objective' offers a seductive simplicity and the 
possibility of attainment of the link to strategy so coveted by the HR profession. 
However, if one looks at the definition of 'strategy as process', the linkage 
becomes much more opaque. HR struggles to align itself with a constantly shifting 
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or un-articulated strategy, exacerbated by the longer term nature of many of HR's 
activities (development, OD and employee engagement activities, for instance, 
tend to have long payback periods). Viewed through this lens, HR has a range of 
choices, including: 
To revert to purely tactical actions and eschew strategy. 
To revert to a 'best practice' model. 
To develop a logically incremental or emergent approach to HR strategy 
development 
o This has been proposed by authors such as Hendry & Pettigrew 
(1990), who proposed an interactive interplay rather than a linear 
relationship between business and HR strategy, and Purcell (2001), 
who sees HR strategy as emerging retrospectively through an 
interpretation of actions taken. 
To change the strategic 'playing field' on which HR operates 
o e. g. Boxall and Purcell make a case for HR's involvement in the 
process of strategy development itself. They suggest that "Improving 
the process of strategic management has a lot to do with HRM. It 
involves making some key HR decisions (about the appointment, 
development and promotion of key individuals) but it also involves 
astute team building activities, within the senior management team 
and throughout the organisation. " (Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p46), e. g. 
Tyson, 1997, discusses a role for HR in the management of 
organisational meaning. 
Tyson's view is that the definition of 'strategy as process', coupled with a view of 
strategy as emergent and negotiated as an interpersonal process, offers 
opportunities for HR. 
"The notion that the management process itself conditions the 
strategies which emerge has profound implications for HR 
managers, since their influence on the emergent processes could 
accord them a strategic role. The process approach therefore 
implies that, as HR strategies emerge the role of HR and the policies 
and practices of the function are subject to continuous negotiation 
and review within the process. " (Tyson, 1997, p280) 
If one relates the distinction between 'strategy as an objective' and 'strategy as a 
process' to Paauwe, it is obvious that Paauwe's model is firmly sited within the 
former definition. Paauwe's deterministic, linear model infers causal linkages 
between contextual factors and the derivative HR strategy: 'strategy as an 
objective'. However, project two suggests that strategy development may be more 
processual, and the view of strategy represented by participants is iterative, 
negotiated and emergent: 'strategy as a process'. 
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However, Tyson goes a stage further. His model sees HRM as an interpreter - 
expressed in policies and actions - between three levels of analysis: 
" Societal ("all those influences which have an impact on organisations 
through a series of influential trends": Tyson, 1997, p281) 
" Organisational (its "varying informal processes and systems": Tyson, 1997, 
p281) 
" Group/individual employee perceptions (of the organisation and society). 
The implications of this, for Tyson, are that "those'doing' HRM are engaged in the 
reinterpretation of social realities into organisational meanings" (Tyson, 1997, 
p285). However, he also goes a step further and says that this needs then to be 
conveyed (he uses the words "reinterpreted" and "negotiated", emphasising the 
socially constructed nature of this process) to the employees: 
"HRM engages in the management of meaning in the enterprise. " 
(Tyson, 1997, p285) 
To create the link back to Paauwe's concept of the 'dominant coalition', their role 
in this model, too, becomes one of negotiation and interpretation. 
"The emergent nature of strategy offers opportunities for the 
renegotiation of meanings and adjustments - strategy is changed by 
implementation. Those involved in the process, whether designated 
HR directors, personnel managers, chief executive officers, 
marketing directors, finance directors or whatever, are conscious that 
their strategic actions require a search for meaning, and that the 
strategy process is an interpersonal reinterpretation of what 'works' 
and is acceptable, within the perceptions of all those powerful 
enough to contribute to the debate in the organisation. " (Tyson, 
1997, p285) 
However, if HR's role is managing meaning, in Thomson Financial it lacks many of 
the constructs upon which meaning can be hung. The British Airways case study 
quoted by Tyson is rich in a symbolism which was critical to the change being 
contemplated. Going back to the cultural web drawn up for TF, it seems 
impoverished in terms of symbols and stories, and its rituals and rites of passage 
say little about the organisation (as they are largely non-negotiable Thomson 
Corporation processes, rather than originating in TF itself). A further challenge of 
HR in Thomson Financial, perhaps? 
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3.1.5. HR's Preoccupation with Strategy 
HR's preoccupation with a strategic role can be seen throughout the practitioner 
literature: as Grant and Oswick's (1997, p180/181) use of a religious analogy 
intimates, involvement in strategy has been pursued by the HR community with a 
fervour little short of messianic. 
To take some examples from both the practitioner and the academic literatures, 
Armstrong & Baron's 2002 CIPD text "Strategic HRM: The Key To Improved 
Performance" devotes a number chapters to defining strategy and strategic HRM; 
used extensively in project 2, Paauwe's 2004 book, "HRM and Performance: 
Achieving Long Term Viability" devotes much time to the concept of strategy and 
link to strategic HRM; Boxall & Purcell's 2003 "Strategy and Human Resource 
Management", as the title suggests, gives centrality to the linkage between 
business strategy and HR. 
If anything, HR texts promote the strategic role of HR as one into which the 
function is or should be evolving. Jaap Paauwe quotes Schuler & Jackson (2001), 
who predict 6 key roles as the future of HR, including: 
"Linking role: linking HRM issues and challenges to the business 
Strategic role: implying involvement in the strategic direction of the 
company. " (Paauwe, 2004, p181) 
Even Dave Ulrich, one of the most influential practitioner authors of recent years, 
emphasises the centrality of strategy, as figure 62 shows. 
Competency model for the HR value proposition 
Business 
knowledge 
Personal Strategic HR delivery 
credibility H Contribution 
HR technology 
From Ulrich 6 Brodcbank (2005), p222 
Figure 62: Centrality of 'strategy' in the work of Dave Ulrich 
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Ulrich's quote that "strategic contribution accounts for almost half of HR's total 
influence on business performance" (Ulrich & Brockbank, 2005, p223) shows how 
significant the concept of strategy is to writers in this field. 
The proceeding work on levels of strategy may give an insight into why this is so. 
As Tyson indicates, the term strategy itself is problematic. 
"The confusion between these aspects of organisational strategy 
compounds other problems of definition, which include the lack of a 
tangible activity to analyse or describe the sometimes blurred 
distinctions between corporate and business strategies and the 
problem of describing what a strategy is or could be. " (Tyson, 1997, 
p278) 
This definitional confusion also extends to the distinctions drawn between strategy 
and tactics. This may be, in some part, related to the level one is considering (e. g. 
actions which appear strategic to an HR function may be a matter of tactics to 
actors at the corporate level), and it may be that the distinction is actually 
misleading. As Boxall & Purcell state: 
" ... it is unhelpful to make a 
hard distinction between 'strategy' and 
'tactics' or between 'strategy' and 'operations'. This is a problem that 
has crept into business ... from the military origins of strategy ... we 
still tend to associate strategy with the lofty, orchestrating overview 
of the military commander. There are lots of problems with this 
imagery ... it tends to imply that tactics or operations ... are 
things 
that we have to do but which are not really important. " (Boxall & 
Purcell, 2003, p28) 
This quote is particularly insightful, as it both presents the distinction between 
'strategy' and 'tactics' as a spurious one, but it also alludes to the relative value 
placed upon each. This is echoed by Tyson. 
"The phrase 'strategy ... is loaded with the power concepts of senior 
management. " (Tyson, 1997, p288) 
Looking at the connotations and the value attributed to 'strategic' activities, the 
coveting of the strategic role by HR becomes more explicable. 
Some authors, unsurprisingly, have surmised that this preoccupation with HR's 
strategic contribution may not be appropriate. David Guest has been an 
outspoken critic of HR's preoccupation with being 'strategic' and, as Boxall and 
Purcell state: 
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"One thing we must definitely avoid is the profligate application of 
strategy language simply to impress. This has become something of 
a disease in the HRM literature. Very often writers in HRM have 
slapped the word 'strategic' in from the other old sub-functional 
categories of selection, appraisal, pay and training to produce, as if 
by magic, a book on 'strategic HRM'. " (Boxall & Purcell, 2003, p29) 
It is interesting to surmise why the HR profession appears to be obsessed with 
making a strategic contribution. This may be linked to the strong sense of 
inferiority and antipathy to HR articulated within the interview with practitioners. 
3.2. Dynamic Capabilities and Organisational Agility 
This section moves from the discussion of the term 'strategy' to the second 
element of the literature review: recent research on dynamic capabilities and 
organisational agility was reviewed to contextualise a discussion of change in 
organisational contexts. 
3.2.1. Dynamic Capabilities 
Work on dynamic capabilities is in its infancy. Wang & Ahmed's 2007 paper is the 
most systematic review of the concept to date, and will be referenced in project 
three. Synthesising the existing (and somewhat conflicting) research on dynamic 
capabilities, they produce a working definition: 
"We define dynamic capabilities as a firm's behavioural orientation 
constantly to integrate, reconfigure, renew and recreate its resources 
and capabilities and, most importantly, upgrade and reconstruct its 
core capabilities in response to the changing environment to attain 
and sustain competitive advantage. " (Wang & Ahmed, 2007, p35) 
This moves RBV beyond a static concept into one which is more reflective of the 
dynamic post 1990 business environment. However, the dynamic capabilities 
concept can also be seen as a 'call to arms' for HR: how does HR support a 
business in its building and deploying of dynamic capabilities? 
Work on dynamic capabilities addresses a fundamental concern with RBV: the 
focus on building up resources and core capabilities presumes a stable 
environment (the exception to this is when the core competency being developed 
is change, which can be a source of competitive advantage in an environment of 
dynamic change, as the paper by Dyer & Shafer (2003) suggests). 
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Without stability, investment in the type of resources typically considered under 
RBV would not bring competitive advantage, and would, in fact, inhibit an 
organisation's ability to compete in a changing environment; as Leonard-Barton 
(1992) points out, core capabilities can become "core rigidities" in a dynamic 
environment: Wang & Ahmed describe this in the following terms. 
"In such conditions, firms create a 
becoming even better at an eves 
(Wang & Ahmed, 2007, p36) 
'competency trap' for themselves, 
less relevant set of processes. " 
Dynamic capabilities, for Wang & Ahmed, are more than processes, resources or 
capabilities. Wang & Ahmed propose a wider definition of capability. 
"Capabilities refer to a firm's capacity to deploy resources, usually in 
combination, and encapsulate both explicit processes and those tacit 
elements (such as know-how and leadership) embedded in 
processes. " (Wang & Ahmed, 2007, p35) 
They view dynamic capabilities as a 'third order' organisational capabilities, which 
build upon 'first order' capabilities (those which are necessary to generate 
organisational performance) and 'second order core capabilities (strategically 
important resources which contribute to competitive advantage). Wang & Ahmed 
define the contribution made by these'third order capabilities as follows: 
"... the 'third order dynamic capabilities emphasize a firm's constant 
pursuit of the renewal, reconfiguration and re-creation of resources, 
capabilities and core capabilities to address the environmental 
change. " (Wang & Ahmed, 2007, p36) 
They are careful to distinguish dynamic capabilities as higher order capabilities: for 
Wang & Ahmed, dynamic capabilities are not a subset of core capabilities, but are 
those capabilities which allow the first and second order capabilities to change, 
and potentially to adapt, more quickly than the competition. 
Disputing Eisenhardt & Martin's contention that dynamic capabilities cannot in 
themselves be a source of sustained competitive advantage, Wang & Ahmed 
argue that the ability to anticipate and respond to market movements, and to 
change rapidly, is difficult to imitate, hence can form the basis of sustained 
competitive advantage. This creates an immediate link with the work of Dyer & 
Shaffer (2003), who purport that agility is a potential source of competitive 
advantage and can be systematically built in an organisation through its 
incorporation into HR processes. 
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Wang & Ahmed then go on to define the composite elements of dynamic 
capability. Their model (reproduced in figure 63) identifies three component 
factors: adaptive capability, absorptive capability and innovative capability. 
Market 
dynamism 
Component 
factors 
Common " Adaptive 
Features capability " Absorptive 
capability 
" Innovative 
capability 
Underlying 
Firm-specific processes . Integration 
processes " Reconfiguration 
" Renewal 
" Recreation 
Figure 63: Wang & Ahmed's 2007 Research Model of Dynamic Capabilities 
They are summarised in figure 64 below. 
Component 
Factor 
Definition Manifested In Key Researchers 
Adaptive The firm's ability to identify Inherent flexibility of Chakravarthy, 1982; Hooley 
capability and capitalize on emerging resources and resource et al, 1992; Miles & Snow, 
market opportunities deployment, alignment of 1992; Sanchez, 1995; 
internal organisational Gibson & Brikinshaw, 2004 
factors with external 
o anisational factors 
Absorptive The firm's ability to identify, High level of learning from Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
capability assimilate and utilize partners and external Woiceshyn & Daellenbach, 
information from external sources, combination of that 2005; Zahra & George, 
sources to its own external knowledge with 2002 
Firm strategy -- 
Dynamic 
capabilities 
Capability 
development 
Firm 
performance 
" Market-based 
performance 
" Financial 
performance 
-º Direct relationship 
"'"' Indirect relationship 
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advantage; this has been internal knowledge and high 
described as comprising 4 level of utilization and 
elements (knowledge embedding of that 
acquisition, assimilation, knowledge in the firm 
transformation and 
exploitation: Zahra & George, 
2002). 
Innovative The firm's ability to develop Linkage of the firm's Wang & Ahmed, 2004; 
capability new products and/or new resources and capabilities Capon et al, 1992. 
markets, through the linkage to the external market, 
of a strategic approach to shown in a strategic 
innovation with innovative innovative orientation and 
behaviours and processes innovation in behaviours, 
processes, product and 
approach to market (Wang & 
Ahmed, 2004). 
Figure 64: The Component Factors of Dynamic Capability 
Wang & Ahmed's model infers three things: 
The more dynamic the market, the stronger the push a firm experiences 
towards enhancing dynamic capabilities; 
The firm's strategy will direct the development of capabilities, dynamic as 
well as first and second order. 
Dynamic capabilities are expected to enhance a firm's performance, but 
only if this capability development is appropriate to the organisation and its 
market position; the link between dynamic capabilities and performance is 
mediated by the firm's strategy, as the following quote indicates: 
°... the effects of dynamic capabilities on capability development and 
firm performance are relatively complex: a firm strengthens particular 
capabilities as directed by its own strategic goals; and when 
capability development and firm strategy are effectively aligned, a 
firm's dynamic capabilities lead to better performance and hence 
sustained competitive advantage. " (Wang & Ahmed, 2007, p43) 
However, Wang & Ahmed's model is not without limitations: although these are 
acknowledged by the authors, they limit its usefulness when in consideration of 
Thomson Financial. Wang & Ahmed (2007, p42) consider only organic growth 
(problematic, given the highly acquisitive nature of Thomson Financial) and, by 
definition, capability building approaches consider only organisations with a long 
term orientation. In the light of a number of comments made by respondents, it is 
dubious to say that Thomson Financial adopts a long term orientation. 
"... we're so focused on chasing this year's revenue, this year's 01, 
that we don't look beyond the 31st of December, each year. So it's 
very difficult to be long term in the planning when that's your that's 
your horizon. " [RA: 13] 
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Irrespective of some limitations as to the applicability of Wang & Ahmed's model to 
this particular organisation, it is obvious that their work is a 'call to arms' for HR. If, 
as the concepts of the knowledge economy and the knowledge worker infer, HR's 
role in the organisation of the future is to be the acquisition, creation, development, 
nurturing and management of organisational capability, it must be concerned with 
the fostering of dynamic capability. 
3.2.2. Organisational Agility 
Looking at Wang & Ahmed's model in figure 63, a key element to the achievement 
of dynamic capabilities is capability development: for an organisation to succeed in 
a dynamic environment, it is necessary to have HR systems which can acquire, 
build and manage organisational agility. 
The linkage between dynamic capabilities and HR is made in the following quote 
from Dyer & Shafer. 
"The logic is as follows: (a) dynamic organisations compete, and thus 
make money, in turbulent marketplaces through marketplace agility, 
(b) dynamic organisations achieve marketplace agility through 
organisational agility, one element of which is human resources 
strategy; and (c) the mindset and behaviors (sic) of employees are 
key mediators between marketplace agility on the one hand and 
organisational agility on the other. This brings us to the fundamental 
proposition ... For dynamic organisations, the basic task of human 
resources strategy is to foster, in the context of other features of 
organisational agility, the employee mindset and behaviors (sic) 
required to achieve marketplace agility. " (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p11) 
This project intends to explore the role of HR in a high velocity market, and what it 
can (or should) be doing to support an organisation which operates in such a 
market. 
This project will look to Wang & Ahmed's model to provide a definition of dynamic 
capability, and look for evidence to support the contentions in Dyer & Shafer's 
2003 conceptual paper on organisational agility: 
"... there is a human resources strategy that is particularly 
appropriate for dynamic organisations in general, whilst realizing that 
any particular dynamic organisation would find it necessary to tailor 
the specifics, or perhaps fine-tune the administration, of this human 
resources strategy to its own unique circumstances. " (Dyer & Shafer, 
2003, p8) 
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Dyer & Shafer's paper calls for "exploratory research in the form of carefully 
selected, qualitatively oriented, intensive case studies to help identify and clarify 
the nature of the variables and relationships inherent in our general model" (Dyer 
& Shafer, 2003, p12). This project may form one such case study. In so doing, it 
will look at Dyer & Shafer's two dimensions of agility: firstly, the "dynamics and 
imperatives" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p12) of marketplace agility and, secondly, the 
interaction of the elements of human resource strategy with each other and with 
the organisation: organisational agility. 
Dyer & Shafer proposed that there were a number of areas which were required to 
foster agility in an organisation (although even they do note that this is 
speculative), and which need to operate synergistically (as they point out, flexible 
infrastructure, for example, is both a cause and an effect of employee behaviour 
and mindset). Their model is shown in figure 65. 
Critical Area Description 
Agility oriented mindset Where every employee perceives and values the organisation's purpose in 
the same way and understands and facilitates marketplace agility 
Agility oriented behaviours Dyer & Shafer define these behaviours as leadership which can direct the 
organisation strategically towards marketplace agility, and employees who 
initiate and improvise, assume multiple roles and engage in continuous 
learning 
Agility oriented The stable inner core is necessary to create the strategic direction to drive 
organisational infrastructure the organisation towards agility, and to keep it from descending into chaos. A 
- stable inner core clearly articulated vision, a common set of shared values (with an emphasis 
- reconfigurable on trust) and a few key shared performance metrics are the 'anchors' for this 
outer ring stable inner core. 
This is complemented by a reconfigurable outer ring, comprising fluid 
organisational design, flexible core business processes, distributive 
information systems (real time, accessible information) and adaptable 
workplace design 
Agility oriented HR strategy Agility oriented HR strategy is reduced to 6 principles by Dyer & Shafer, 
organized into 3 dialectic pairings: drive and discipline, autonomy and 
accountability, growth and continuity. 
Drive and discipline refers to the need to build a common sense of purpose, 
whilst still promoting the contextual clarity required to keep employees on 
track. 
Autonomy and accountability refers to the need to provide employees with 
considerable freedom, whilst managing the resultant organisational fluidity 
through instilling consequences for actions and ownership of outcomes. 
Growth and continuity means the promoting of risk taking and the 
encouragement of employees to move out of their comfort zones, whilst 
rovidin the stability of continuous employment. 
Agility oriented HR policies, Drive ("forge a common sense of purpose": Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p27) 
programs (sic) and requires the organisational vision, core values and shared performance 
practices metrics to be communicated to employees, and employee commitment to be 
built. Key programmes include employee involvement in the development of 
the vision, values and metrics; "surround communication" (Dyer & Shafer, 
2003, p27) to reinforce these elements; team building and setting of 
"breakthrough objectives" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p28) to reinforce and embed 
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core values. 
Discipline ("promote conceptual clarity": Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p28) implies 
that employees must have the information they need to understand 
marketplace agility and the reconfigurable elements in the organisation. Key 
programmes include "surround communication" and "open book 
management", where financial and operating information is freely shared with 
employees to increase their understanding of the organisation's business 
dynamics and the way in which their work contributes. 
Autonomy ("foster fluid assignments": Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p28) encourages 
an open market for talent, and sees employees as undertaking assignments 
on a fluid basis with accountability for outcomes. Discretionary-based work 
design and a genuinely open market for talent are two of the key HR 
programmes necessary to facilitate this. 
Accountability ("instill ownership of outcomes": Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p28), for 
Dyer & Shafer, means that employees must be continually aware of what 
they are responsible for, to whom they are responsible, and what timelines to 
which they are working. The key programme in this area relates to 
"commitment management" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p29), a protocol which 
allows employees to effectively negotiate commitments with each other and 
to track the progress towards those commitments. 
Growth ("promote serial incompetence": Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p30) relates to 
the concept of employees continually developing in new directions. Key 
programmes include careful selection, surround communication, an open 
talent market, a heavy investment in employee development (including a 
redefinition of mistakes as learning opportunities) and establishment of 
communities of practice. 
Continuity ("encourage continuous employment": Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p31) 
is self explanatory, with HR programmes aimed at minimising voluntary 
turnover and layoffs/the impact of layoffs as critical. Careful selection, 
comprehensive orientation programmes, communication and carefully 
selected benefits underpin the former. 
Figure 65: Dyer & Shafer's Critical Areas for Fostering Agility 
Despite the promising nature of this concept, there is a significant lack of empirical 
research in this area. The exception to this is Shafer et al (2001), who conducted 
a case study on a US healthcare provider, AEHN. HR was a central tool in AEHN's 
transformation from a traditional, stable hospital specialising in acute care, into an 
agile healthcare network, providing a full range of services. 
AEHN built their HR strategy around 3 strategic capabilities. These were 
translated into a number of behavioural and personal competencies which AEHN 
called "agile attributes" (Shafer et al, 2001, p200). This is shown in figure 66. 
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Figure 66: AEHN's Strategic Capabilities and 'Agile Attributes' 
These "agile attributes" were driven through 5 key HR initiatives, which had a 
range of sample activities associated with them (this is shown in figure 67). 
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Figure 67: AEHN's Human Resource Strategy 
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This was the basis of the HR activity map shown in figure 68. 
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Figure 68: AEHN's Human Resource Initiatives and Related Activities 
Shafer et al drew a number of useful conclusions from this case study: 
" It is clear that organisational agility must be designed in: it will not simply 
happen. 
" Models (such as the process model shown in the figures above) are useful 
in ensuring a clear line of sight between strategic capabilities and HR 
activities, and also emphasise the vertical fit between the business strategy 
and the HR components. Shafer et al offered their process as a potential 
model for agility for testing in other research. 
" Horizontal fit is important between the components (this links to the concept 
of internal coherence discussed in the next section), and it appears that 
there are a small number of initiatives which are critical to the fostering of 
organisational agility. 
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Shafer's HR initiatives have much in common with high involvement work systems 
models such as that proposed by Lawler (1987): 
"Enriching work and promoting personal growth, in turn, fostered 
focus and provided both the rationale and space required for 
employees to be generative and resilient. " (Shafer et al, 2001, p209) 
Shafer et at also suggest that "commensurate returns" (2001, p 209), which they 
define as both financial and non-financial, are important in promoting an 
appropriate employee attitude towards organisational agility. 
Shafer et al go beyond Lawler, however, and propose that HR initiatives which 
were linked to 'achieving contextual clarity' and 'embedding core values' were 
particularly important, and surmised that the higher requirement for employee trust 
in an agile (as opposed to a traditional) organisation underpinned this. 
HR programmes and practices should be chosen for their relevance to the key 
human resource initiatives, rather than based on "fads, folderol, and putative best 
practices" (Shafer et at, 2001, p209). 
It is clear that this is a promising research area and that there is an opportunity to 
significantly expand empirical and theoretical research on organisational agility. 
3.2.3. Implications for HR 
In the post-1990s economic environment, the failure of 'best fit' and contextually 
based theories of HR to consider change is a potentially fatal flaw. Wang and 
Ahmed's (2007) comments about RBV apply equally to these theories: 
"Entering the 1990s, the highly dynamic business environment 
challenged the original propositions of the RBV as being static and 
neglecting the influence of market dynamism". ( Wang & Ahmed, 
2007 p32) 
This is particularly damaging, given the recent focus on the centrality of HR in 
change and change management. Dave Ulrich, for instance, sees "fast change" 
(Ulrich & Brockbank, 2005, p224) as one of his "HR competencies that make a 
difference" (Ulrich & Brockbank, 2005, p224), defining the HR role as follows. 
"In high performing firms, HR professionals make change happen 
successfully and thoroughly. They are centrally involved in planning 
and implementing change processes. But their most critical 
contribution is making sure that change happens quickly. They focus 
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on implementing decisions quickly. They involve key leaders in fast 
change. They ensure that human, financial and information 
resources are aligned with the desired changes. They monitor the 
progress of key change initiatives, and they capture important 
lessons and apply them to improve future change efforts. They not 
only set the broad framework for effective change management but 
also exercise their facilitation skills to move change initiatives 
forward. " (Ulrich & Brockbank, 2005, p224) 
The concepts of dynamic capabilities and organisational agility suggest the 
possibility of a different role for HR, where the recruiting, training and rewarding of 
change enabling competencies could provide a key role for HR in supporting 
organisational agility. 
3.3. Linking a Processual View of Strategy with Dynamic 
Capabilities 
Looking at the implications of the two bodies of literature, it is difficult to see how 
one could reconcile a definition of strategy as an objective with the work on 
dynamic capabilities and organisational agility. Strategy as an objective 
presupposes a business environment which is relatively stable and amenable to 
analysis, and on which medium to long term strategy can confidently be built. 
Given an environment of dynamic change, it is unlikely that detailed contextual 
analysis and medium to long term planning will remain relevant, apart from 
perhaps broad strategic direction setting at the very highest level in the 
organisation, and/or as a starting point for an iterative formulation of strategy. 
The processual definition of strategy is innately more appealing in an environment 
of dynamic change, as responsiveness to environmental change can be created 
through the ongoing and negotiated view of strategy. Indeed, in the more 
unpredictable of change situations, the processual definition of strategy merges 
into an emergent, perhaps even post rationalised, view of strategy. 
In summary, work on dynamic capabilities and organisational agility is predicated 
on a processual definition of strategy. Whilst one can have a statement of 
strategic intent, a processual definition of strategy infers a fluid approach to both 
strategy formulation and re-formulation in the light of changing circumstances or 
the re-negotiation of the strategy. 
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3.4. Application to the Projects 
This section will look at the implications for business strategy and the implications 
for HR. 
3.4.1. Implications for Business Strategy 
The proceeding literature review has suggested that there are competing 
definitions of the term 'strategy', and that the 'strategy as a process' school of 
thought may have greater relevance in a modern business context than 'strategy 
as an objective', particularly where the business environment is characterised by 
dynamic change. Whereas 'strategy as an objective' assumes a relatively stable 
environment in which strategic planning is a viable business tool, the dynamic 
environment depicted by Wang & Ahmed and Dyer & Shafer suggests that, whilst 
broad strategic planning may create a starting point for strategy formulation, 
effective strategy is likely to be responsive to environmental change, and as such, 
will be iterative and ongoing: 'strategy as a process'. 
'Strategy as a process' implies that strategy formulation will be a matter of 
interpretation and re-interpretation, negotiation and re-negotiation. The influence 
of the actors, hence, becomes very important. Actors are likely to have different 
views, depending on their access to information (how bounded their rationality is), 
their perceptual filters and their ability and pre-disposition towards negotiation. 
The discussion of multiple levels of strategy further infers that individual actors will 
have different views of what comprises strategy, and in how far they are engaged 
in strategy formulation and strategic activities, as opposed to tactics and tactical 
execution. Given these different views, it is reasonable to suggest that, again, 
strategy formulation will be iterative and negotiated. 
3.4.2. Implications for HR 
Project three will take a processual view of strategy, and, apropos of the research 
questions, will look at the impact of this on HR strategy formulation and HR 
strategy implementation. 
i) HR Strategy Formulation 
Turning first to HR strategy formulation, existing work tends to take a 'strategy as 
an objective' definition. The 'best fit' and contextually based HR models (e. g. 
models by Pettigrew, Storey and Paauwe) discussed in project two regard strategy 
as an absolute, a visible element in an organisation which has a tangible 
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organisational reality and is amenable to description. If these models allow the 
actors to have a role, it is a very bounded one (Paauwe's "dominant coalition") and 
they suppose that there is a singular business or HR strategy, and that a common 
view of it will be held by all of the organisational actors: in other words, that 
strategy has a first order reality. 
The social constructivist perspective suggests that this view of HR strategy is 
problematic. The majority of business respondents in project two saw no link 
between business and HR strategy, and did not see 'best fit' factors as 
deterministic. They did, however, comment on the influence of the actors and the 
politicised and negotiated process of strategy formulation. 
When a processual view of strategy is taken, this presupposes that there is not a 
one to one correlation between analysis of the business and contextual 
environments and the generation of strategy, as this link is subject to mediation by 
the actors, and affected by their perceptual filters and negotiating stances. The 
process of strategy formulation becomes a second order reality, much more fluid 
and iterative, with no consensus on the existence of a strategy, and the co- 
existence of multiple, contradictory versions of articulated strategy. It also allows 
one to take the perspective that HR is not a strategy, but rather a series of 
negotiated decisions about processes, albeit very complex ones. Whilst a 
diagnosis of the first order reality 'best fit' factors may be a useful starting point for 
strategy formulation, the perceptions of the 'best fit' factors, their influence on the 
organisation and what response to them is appropriate are all second order 
realities and, as such, subject to the interpretations and negotiations of the actors. 
ii) HR Strategy Implementation 
Moving secondly to HR strategy implementation, the strategy as an objective 
model (and the 'best fit' and contextually based approaches to HR) do not 
consider the link between strategy formulation and the implementation of that 
strategy: there is an implicit assumption that what is strategically intended will be 
realised. 
This, taking a social constructivist perspective, is again problematic. Project two's 
respondents create an elaborate set of interpretative repertoires around the 
constraints which prevent HR strategy being fully enacted. The function of this, 
given that the 'constraints' repertoire is used almost exclusively by HR 
respondents, appears to be to justify the lack of perceived fit between realised HR 
and the needs of the business. 
The processual view of strategy, conversely, allows for the possibility of a gap 
between intended strategy and the realised approach, as that involves the 
translation of a second order reality (intended strategy) into a first order reality (the 
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realised approach), and is subject both to constraints and to further perceptual 
filters and negotiation. 
iii) Towards a Processual View of HR Strategy 
In conclusion, the processsual view of HR strategy seems to better characterise 
the perspective and the expectations of the business respondents and better 
reflects the process of strategy in both the business and HR in TF articulated in 
project two. TF has no formal process of strategy development, but has an 
emergent and ongoing approach to strategy development, akin to logical 
incrementalism, which one can argue allows it to be more responsive to an 
environment of dynamic change. Strategy, in so far as it does exist in TF, has a 
significant element of post-hoc rationalisation. 
Given this model, many of the factors which emerged in project two become 
comprehensible. Respondents differed in their view of both business and HR 
strategies (business respondents generally held that there was no HR strategy, as 
opposed to the generally held contrary view of the HR respondents; there was a 
similar divergence of views on the existence and coherence of a business 
strategy); this becomes explicable when one sees strategy not as a singular entity 
with a robust organisational reality, but rather a fluid concept, in a continual state 
of negotiation and emergence. 
A view of strategy which is processual, emergent and negotiated has considerable 
implications of for HR. It moves HR beyond a search for'best fit' or a contextually 
determined approach to HR strategy formulation, allowing it to see HR as the 
emergent result of iterative negotiated processes. This allows HR to be more 
attuned to the politicised processes of organisational strategy negotiation, and to 
be more responsive to the changes in the external and internal environment. As 
such, it provides an opportunity to provide a more flexible and robust model of HR 
which is much more able to respond to the modern organisational challenges of 
dynamic change and politicised decision making. 
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4. THE PROJECT 
4.1. Creating a Descriptive Research Model 
Given this literature review, a descriptive research model of HR, thus, must work 
at the level of first and second order reality. As HR practitioners (and the 
organisational actors) attempt to interpret, understand and translate the first order 
realities of the business strategy, context and change in the organisation's 
environment, HR strategy assumes a second order reality, a matter of 
interpretation and negotiation. As intended strategy is implemented (the realised 
HR approach), it takes on a first order reality, discernable through policies, 
procedures, systems and projects. 
Project three, hence, will advance a new descriptive model of HR, as shown in 
figure 69. 
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Figure 69: A Descriptive Model of HR 
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If one takes figure 69 as a working model, one begins to view the process of HR 
strategy development and implementation as an interaction between first and 
second order realities, with mediating levels in between the two. Two of the boxes 
on the chart (the environmental factors and the realised HR approach) have a first 
order reality, but they are mediated by the influence of the actors, who create the 
intended HR strategy as a second order reality. 
It is assumed here that there is a first order reality around business strategy, 
context and change, which can be identified in organisational behaviour and in 
written reports, documents, presentations and analyses, but that a social 
constructivist approach will allow the project to look at the second order reality of 
these elements: how are the business strategy, context and change drawn upon 
flexibly in discourse to present views and support negotiations. Arguably, this 
influence of the actors is more influential than the first order realities themselves, 
as their impact is enhanced, mediated or negated, depending on the influence of 
the actors, unless those factors are so incontrovertible that they cannot be 
negotiated (these 'punch through' first order realities will be discussed in a later 
section). 
Turning to the second mediating level, some of the factors may have a first order 
reality, e. g. constraints such as HR capability may have a first order reality. 
However, the social constructivist approach allows the project to look at how such 
constraints are discursively represented and drawn upon functionally to explain the 
gap between the intended HR strategy and the realised HR approach. Although 
constraints may have a first order reality, the actors determine the level of impact 
of the constraints and the response to it: second order reality. 
Whilst purists may take the philosophical tenet to its extreme and argue that there 
is no first order reality, merely the actors' perceptions of it, this project will take the 
more practical view that strategy does have a tangible first order reality in some 
form in an organisation. This approach accommodates the definitions of 'strategy 
as an objective' and 'strategy as a process', as the 'first order' reality of 
organisational strategy can relate to a strategy which is articulated through a 
formal planning process ('strategy as an objective') or a more fluid view of strategy 
as emergent and iterative ('strategy as a process'). 
Conversely, the intended HR strategy and the factors mediating between that and 
the realised HR approach are viewed as having only a second order reality, as 
they are likely to be constructed in the minds of the actors, accessible only through 
a technique like discourse analysis (they may be made explicit in strategy or 
planning papers, but are unlikely to have any observable, incontrovertible, reality 
in an organisation). 
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The intended HR strategy/realised HR approach section of the model is described 
as a loop. A mediating level exists between the intended HR strategy and the 
realised HR approach (likely to be an articulation of the constraints which 
respondents see as preventing the complete implementation of the intended 
strategy). However, there is also a feedback loop between the realised HR 
approach and the intended HR strategy. 'Strategy as a process' suggests that 
strategy formulation will be ongoing and iterative, presupposing that there will be a 
link between what has worked (or not worked) in the realised HR approach and a 
re-formulation of the intended HR strategy. This, likewise, will occur at the level of 
second order reality, and the feedback loop will be based on perceptions of what 
has worked or not worked, and views as to what the appropriate adjustment to 
strategy will be. 
Figure 70 sets out the research agenda for this project. 
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Figure 70: Descriptive Research Model of HR and Project Sections 
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To test this model, this project will take a social constructivist approach and will 
use discourse analysis to identify and categorise interview data into 'interpretative 
repertoires' (major recurrent themes) to provide evidence to support (or otherwise) 
the descriptive research model. 
The first analysis this project will conduct is to look at the environmental factors 
which the actors see as influential on intended HR strategy (section 6.2.1. ). These 
are first order reality factors, but this project will concentrate on the second order 
reality of how respondents construct these factors in their discourse. It was felt 
that this would be a reasonable indication for how respondents would draw 
variably on these factors to support their negotiations in the strategy formulation 
process. It will look at discourse around theories of business strategy formulation, 
the influence of context on strategy and the impact of change. 
Secondly, section 6.2.2. will look at the mediating level, and will look at the 
influence of the actors on HR strategy formulation. This section will look at who 
are the actors who influence HR strategy, what influence do they exert, what is the 
relationship between the business and HR, and will discuss the negotiating 
position of HR. 
Thirdly, the intended HR strategy will be discussed in section 6.2.3. (how can the 
intended HT strategy be described and what perceptions of HR strategy are 
articulated by participants). 
The fourth element of the project (section 6.2.4. ) will look at the factors which 
participants see as mediating between intended HR strategy and the realised HR 
approach, i. e. descriptions around how that intended HR strategy is deployed in 
practice. This work develops the 'theory of constraints' repertoire identified in 
project two, looking at the interpretative repertoires which are used by participants 
to explain the perceived gap between the intended HR strategy and the realised 
HR approach. This section will also take a detailed examination of one of those 
repertoires: 'impact of change'. Project two suggested that simply adding a 
dynamic element to the environmental factors element of the model may not be 
sufficient: change appears also to be a mediating factor, dissonance between 
intended strategy and the realised approach. 
Fifthly, section 6.2.5. will provide an analysis of the realised HR approach, 
examining how participants see the intended HR strategy, mitigated by 
constraints, being put into practice. 
The final section, section 6.3.3. will look for evidence to support the existence of a 
mediating level of the feedback loop between realised HR approach and the 
intended HR strategy. 
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4.2. The Organisation 
4.2.1. The Organisational Culture 
Competency frameworks are generally a useful indication of an organisation's 
culture, and the Thomson Corporation's competency framework is reproduced in 
figure 71. 
Competency Title Competency Description 
Creating Strategic Direction Targeting the right customers with the right offerings at the right value/price 
equation. 
Thinking Like a Customer Having a deep understanding of customers, their needs, future direction 
and application of our offerings. 
Leveraging Business Acumen Using knowledge of business dynamics to make good decisions and 
sustain the core business whilst driving profitable growth. 
Driving Innovation Champions new and innovative approaches, ideas, methods, processes, 
products or services. 
Driving for Results Setting high standards, taking ownership, and driving accountability for 
results. 
Leading Change Drives significant strategic and organizational change. 
Managing Across Boundaries Working collaboratively across boundaries and getting things done despite 
diver ent Is, cultures and perspectives. 
Developing Talent Selecting the best people and helping them improve their capacity to make 
a contribution to the organization, through feedback, coaching, training, and 
developmental assignments. 
Building Relationships Establishing respect, trust and rapport quickly; understanding and 
anticipating the needs, interests and motivations of others; and getting 
thins done through the informal organization. 
Acting with Integrity Operating with honesty, a respect for others, and conviction to high 
business ethics and standards, and never doing anything to compromise 
the reputation of the Thomson Corporation. 
Figure 71: Thomson Corporation Competency Framework 
However, there are a number of limitations with taking the competency framework 
as a determinant of organisational culture. Firstly, competency frameworks tend to 
be aspirational rather than reflective of the actual organisational culture (which can 
include unfavourable as well as favourable elements). Secondly, the Thomson 
framework is applied only to the talent management process, which covers around 
200 of the 9000 people in the organisation, hence is limited to the senior 
management population and may not be reflective of the competencies or cultures 
applicable to middle management and below. Thirdly, the framework applies to 
Thomson Corporation, thus may have limited applicability to Thomson Financial. 
As such, it was decided to use this as a reference point, but to conduct a further 
discourse based analysis of the culture as perceived by the participants in this 
study. 
Thomson Financial has a distinctive and influential culture; an analysis of the 
comments made by project three's respondents on the culture creates a very 
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similar depiction of the culture to that produced in project two. Figure 72 lists the 
dominant characteristics of the culture as articulated by the respondents, with 
associated quotes. 
Characteristic Quotes 
'Can do' "I'm pretty amazed at the ability of TF in Asia to go and make something happen. ... 
I 
think that we are a can-do organisation, in Asia Pacific, and I think that's driven by [the 
MD]. I mean this is part of the image, is that [the MD] is an approachable, you know 
can-do, fairly aggressive ... we're the one who goes around and takes no prisoners. You know, we're the SAS (laughs) of the company" [DR: 10] 
Willing to take "... we're willing to take a risk. Willing to fail ... probably even more so ... It's okay to risks' have a problem, but don't let it happen twice. And secondly, try and have an 
education out of everything that goes wrong. But if you're not willing to go wrong, or at 
least take responsibility for it, you're never gonna learn" [DR: 10] 
'Performance "Of all the places that I've worked ... we are the most clear on ... we do pay for driven' performance. You know it is absolutely compelling when you show ... that we pay and 
we incent our far exceeds, exceeds and fully achieved performers, and we don't pay 
the rest of 'em. " [KBM: 2] 
'Short attention "... we don't really ... (think) does the customer want that? Does the market want that? 
span' Don't care, I think this is a great idea, so let's do it. " [RA: 13] 
"... that's probably one thing that I've seen in my couple of years at TF. There's a lot 
of momentum behind some new initiatives and new ideas and then they kind of fizzle 
out, and then there's a new one. Rather than following through. " [HC: 3] 
'Short termist' "... every year in Thomson, you have the beginning they think top line, past H1, 
everything's about bottom line and targets, and in Q3 and Q4, every year... we have 
to do every slice of challenge we can do, to do the numbers at year end ... I think the 
culture in Thomson as a whole is a short term culture. " [JD: 4] 
"Thomson is a very quota driven company, under [the President] ... I don't think we are having the right, HR's never right, but having the long term perspective. " [JD: 8] 
"... there is a perception in New York that our business is run by Finance, not by the 
business. And you know a lot of the blocking and tackling that happens is because the 
budget has to be met, the numbers have to be met, and there is no derivation from 
that course ... Well it's very short term. ' [AD: 5] 
"Thomson is a reactional kind of business. It's all about driving for results, there's no, 
there's not much that's consistent, in the business! [CP2: 13] 
'Immature' "... there are a lot of things that I think TF as an organisation, as a culture, still does 
like a small business. There are a lot of things that we, I think you know it's still act not 
think ... supporting this two billion dollar business, we are of a scale that we should be 
a little bit more mature in some of our processes. " [KG: 3] 
'US Centric' "The reality is we are a very US organisation' [JD: 8] 
Figure 72: TFs Cultural Characteristics 
389 
These characteristics are consistent with those articulated by the European 
participants in project two, with the exception of the last, which was a much more 
firmly held view in Asia. As one can see, this has similarities to elements of the 
Thomson Corporation framework, but does not reflect the 'people' competencies 
of 'Building Relationships' and 'Developing Talent' and includes an unfavourable 
variant ('Short Termist') on the 'Driving for Results' competency. A number of 
competencies appear in a negative formulation, notably 'Managing Across 
Boundaries' ('US Centric) and 'Leading Change' ('Short Attention Span'). 'Driving 
Innovation' and 'Thinking Like a Customer are not referenced at all. 
As shown in figure 73, the TF core values create a potentially closer match, 
although again the emphasis is heavily on the 'Performance Driven' and 'Can Do' 
cultural characteristics. 
TF MISSION 
Thomson Financial's mission is to be the leading provider of integrated workflow solutions that drive 
customer performance and productivity for targeted segments of the financial services industry. 
CORE VALUES 
Accountability TF employees strive to take ownership of their projects, set priorities, and achieve 
exceptional results. 
Collaboration Working together to create solutions that incorporate the input and perspective of all 
stakeholders, is essential to building a One TF culture. 
Customer-Centric Decision making involves continually challenging ourselves to meet and exceed client 
requirements and expectations. 
Bias Towards Taking the initiative to get things done, being comfortable making decisions without 
Action and perfect or complete information, working with drive, perseverance and an unwavering 
Execution commitment to getting the job done. 
Entrepreneurial Questioning the 'old ways of doing things', taking prudent risks to help grow our 
Spirit business, and view mistakes as learning experiences. 
Performance- We strive to recognize, reward and reinforce quality work. We set high expectations 
Driven and seek feedback from our colleagues to continually improve our performance. 
Ethical Communicate openly and honestly, and acting in accordance with the accepted 
principles of right and wrong business practices, are the only accepted methods of 
doing business at TF. 
Figure 73: TFs Mission and Core Values 
Drawing upon a tool developed by Johnson & Scholes (1993, p60-63) a cultural 
web was also produced for project three, which is shown in figure 74. Note that 
this cultural web relates to the senior managers' views of culture in TF, is derived 
from the project three interviews, and the cultural web produced by individuals at 
different levels in the organisation may be very different. 
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The combination of the analysis of the discourse around culture and the cultural 
web were used to produce a paradigm for the organisation, as follows: 
"Agility and flexibility is everything; this is an entrepreneurial 
organisation which abhors bureaucracy and tends towards short 
termism; it has a sales rather than a product culture but is 
intellectually elitist; a performance driven, `work hard, play hard' 
culture coupled with entrepreneurship is prone to immaturity. " 
An interesting point to note in terms of the cultural web is the interplay between 
the Corporation and the Thomson Financial division. Whereas the power 
structures, informal symbols and flexibility around routines and control systems 
are under the direct influence of Thomson Financial, and represent the 
organisational paradigm, there are a number of factors which limit Thomson 
Financial's complete freedom to operate (rituals, formal symbols) which are 
Corporation controlled and driven. In areas such as organisational structure, the 
Corporation influence is beginning to be seen in recent organisational design 
exercises. 
This has an interesting implication for HR. The organisation's formal symbology 
(performance and talent management, promotion, compensation etc. ) are major 
ways in which HR communicates organisational values: what is valued and what 
is not, how success is rewarded and failure punished. However, these are 
controlled by the Thomson Corporation, not Thomson Financial, meaning that 
there is a potential disconnect between the Corporation's translation of values 
through HR and its deployment in Thomson Financial, a perception reinforced by 
the participants, who relate no strong articulation of organisational meaning 
through HR. 
4.2.2. Dynamic Change 
Project three explores the role of HR in an organisation which represents itself as 
an exemplar in dealing with and exploiting change, and sees its ability to change 
as a core competency. Thomson Financial operates in what Eisenhardt & Martin 
defined as a 'high velocity market' (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p34), with its cross over 
between IT, media and Financial Services. Eisenhardt & Martin indicated that a 
dynamic market environment could be created by a combination of factors, 
including technological innovation, regulatory change, economic cyclicality and 
changes in the competitive landscape. Assessing Thomson Financial on these 
dimensions positions it in a high velocity market, typified by discontinuous 
transformational technological change (e. g. portal technology, thin versus thick 
client solutions), servicing a cyclical industry (Financial Services is notoriously 
cyclical and TF's buying patterns mirror upturns and downturns in the Financial 
Services market almost exactly) and with a rapidly changing competitive 
situation. Whilst barriers to entry in financial information are very high, niche 
players abound, providing data to one market or one geography, which in turn 
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leads to continual M&A activity and continual reconfiguration of the competitive 
landscape. Furthermore, Thomson's impending acquisition of Reuters will cause 
massive upheaval in the competitive environment for the foreseeable future. By 
any definition, Thomson Financial operates in a 'high velocity market'. 
Thomson Financial also meets Dyer & Shafer's description of a dynamic 
organisation, which they characterise as companies which "deliberately seek to 
be infinitely innovative and adaptable in the workplace by adapting loosely 
coupled organisational forms" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p9). This is clearly shown in 
the following participant's comment from project two. 
"... going back into the Nineties, before Dick Harrington took over as 
CEO ... there was a really strong view, coming from the top, that 
we didn't want to harmonise, and integrate. We had bought these 
these assets, and that a large proportion of the value of the assets 
resided in them staying relatively independent and decentralised. 
And you know there was this feeling that if you ... tampered too 
much, the value that we'd bought that we'd paid usually a lot of 
money for, would evaporate. So we went through this significant 
shift, when Dick took over, of moving away from that philosophy, of 
... saying ... the name of the game is to preserve that value, but at the same time get much more in terms of leverage and cost saving, 
from greater integration. So that was a significant shift and 
obviously we're going much further down that route now (in HR) 
... and all these areas we've hitherto resisted bringing together. So 
again you know that's gonna significantly change that in the 
character - of the organisation. " [NB: 6/7] 
An interesting discussion topic here is how senior managers seek to create order 
in this chaotc environment, which links to the cultural web. In the absence of 
strong values (an established organisational strategy to build alignment and 
continuity in changing environments, as Dyer & Shafer indicate in their concept of 
the stable inner core and reconfigurable outer ring: Dyer & Shafer, 2003), it appears 
that this organisation has resorted to political means to create order: the cultural 
web depicts an organisation where feudal barons manage the organisation 
through their network of political associations. 
The most extreme challenge for the demonstration of the 'linkage between 
business and HR strategy' is an environment of dynamic change. Project 3, 
hence, will continue its exploration of SHRM in TF, but will look at the 
geographical area of most intense transformation: Asia. Thomson Financial Asia 
was an ideal place to study the interaction of change and HR, given that it was 
dealing with both planned and reactive changes of significant magnitude. 
It will allow the project to look at HR in an environment of transformation and 
planned growth. This project also provided the opportunity to examine HR's role 
in an organisation undergoing a radical, unanticipated change: the research was 
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conducted in the months before the Thomson-Reuters merger (this differentiates 
this project from project two, in that the merger was announced some months 
after the research in project two had been completed). 
To look firstly at the 'planned' change, as the characteristics of the Asia business 
show, this was the area of the business undergoing the most significant 
transformation: 
" year on year revenue growth of 22% 
" expansion into new markets (2007 marked the opening of a commercial 
operation in India, as well as more tentative explorations into South East 
Asia developing markets such as Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand) 
" availability of localized product in Japan 
" defined China entry strategy 
" acquisition and integration of two sizeable organisations (ComputerShare, 
a Corporate acquisition, and XFN, a news organisation) 
" major staff changes (replacement of Managing Director Sales, Sales 
Directors in Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan, new HR Director). 
The magnitude of the transformation in the business is reported throughout the 
interview transcripts, and the following quote is typical. 
"... in the business I'm running is we've gone through acquisitions 
and acquisitions and we've got a fifty percent growth rate, so we 
are a textbook growing pains business. And with that comes 
cultural challenges, timezone challenges, all those kind of things. " 
[AD: 1] 
As this quote suggests, the Asia context provides its own complexity, although 
this is not referenced to the same extent as the impact of the growth rate. 
Managers from 'western' backgrounds (the following quote is from an Australian) 
report the difference in management style required in Asia. 
"... often I find, particularly in Asia, you almost have to spoon feed 
the whole thing into their lap. In order to say, so here are your 
instructions, and then you know when you've done that, come back 
to me and I'll give you the next bit. 
Whereas what I tend to find what my preference is, natural working 
is, this is where we're trying to get to, this is what I need you to do, 
and you you're a smart person, you're a manager, you can work it 
out from there. I'm not gonna tell you what to do. But you know 
here are some ideas, let's discuss the way we're going, it's now 
your project. But I often find in dealing with Asia, even pre- 
acquisition, this was the case. " [AD: 1] 
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The multi-region nature of the Asia business is also reported as a source of 
complexity. 
"... understanding the way that countries needs to recruit and 
identify talent. You know like in India the way you address it is 
radically different from how you might address it in Australia, 
because of turnover issues. " [DR: 1] 
However, this planned programme of change and expansion was relegated to 
secondary importance in April 2007, when the Thomson Corporation announced 
its intended $8 billion acquisition of Reuters. The impact on the Thomson 
Financial business was expected to be dramatic, particularly in terms of synergy 
realizations via product, staff and real estate consolidations. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
The project continued the discourse analysis and social constructivist 
methodological and theoretical perspectives used in projects one and two. 
Continuity was provided for the ongoing consideration of contextually based 
HRM, as the same organisation hosted project 3 as was studied in project 2. 
The methodology was defined in chapter 3, but it is useful at this point to reiterate 
the main components of discourse analysis. The following definition of discourse 
analysis is used: 
"... the constructed and constructive use of language and on the 
functions and consequences of language use. " (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987, p 206) 
The main categorisation system used in discourse analysis is the "interpretative 
repertoire" (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Mulkay, 1982,1985; Wetherell, 
1986). This is defined by Potter and Wetherell as follows: 
"Interpretative repertoires are recurrently used systems of terms 
used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other 
phenomena. A repertoire ... is constituted through a limited range 
of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical constructions. " 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p 149) 
This "interpretative repertoire" coding system will be used to analyse the data 
produced in project three, and are shown in figure 76. 
Given that the topic of change had been introduced by the respondents in the 
previous project, and was identified as a further issue with 'best fit' models of HR, 
the group of interviewees were selected from the area of the business 
undergoing the most substantial change: Asia. 
The number of interviewees was slightly smaller than for previous projects, as the 
availability of HR interviewees with the requisite English language fluency was 
limited (the Japanese HR director, for example, was excluded on that basis). 
Fluent English language was deemed essential for a project focused on linguistic 
analysis, and where interpretation of semantics and shades of meaning were 
critical. 
This was not seen as a major limitation, as it provided an opportunity, from a 
business perspective, to interview an entire management team. This allowed for 
the examination of the differing views and lenses adopted by the members of the 
team, and raised the interesting question of the differing expectations of HR and 
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how HR can respond to the different, and often conflicting, requirements of the 
individuals across the management team. 
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6. RESULTS 
6.1. Introduction 
Project three used a similar coding system to that of project two, and the first 
sections covered similar ground to project two, providing a discourse analysis of 
the data aimed at the identification of any major differences in areas expected to 
be common (business strategy, model of HR strategy in terms of best practice 
and best fit; contextual influences versus the influence of the actors). It then 
analysed the data in the areas expected to show differences from project two's 
European based study, and placed emphasis on the areas of change. Finally, it 
developed and provided further analysis of the theories on intended strategy 
versus the realised approach and the influence of the actors which emerged in 
project two. The results are described below. 
Retaining the same host organisation built consistency with project two, but 
moving the project into a context (Asia, the pending Reuters merger) where high 
levels of dynamism existed in the environment created change as a variable. 
This was a particularly opportune time to study the perceived impact of HR in a 
change scenario, as the Asia business was facing two types of change: a 
planned change over which the actors believed they had control (growth and 
expansion) and a reactive change (the pending merger) over which perceived 
control was negligible. 
The initial categorizations are shown in the Nvivo coding diagram shown in 
figure 75 below. 
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The NVivo coding provided the basic categorisation system and described the 
top level discourses used by the respondents. The second stage of the analytical 
process was to typify the interpretative repertoires (as defined in section 5) used 
by respondents, These are described in figure 76 below. Interestingly, the 
majority of the interpretative repertoires which emerged in this project (excepting 
the 'constraints') can be described in terms of a dichotomy, e. g. strategy is 
viewed as a process or strategy is viewed as an objective, HR is described as 
best fit or as best practice, HR is strategy or HR is tactical execution. 
Repertoire Example Repertoire Example 
12 
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Figure 75: Nvivo Coding for Project Three 
"... you're in an organisation like ... one of 
Cl) "... every x number of years take a step 
the big oil majors ... Shell and BP, what back, what does it really look like, what 
n does the world look like in twenty years? (a does the ten year thing look like ... that's 
... Because they absolutely have to do that `< another step back, look at all the for their business. And that is, in my view, N incrementalisms, where do all of those 
genuine strategic thinking, geo-politicals, c) incrementalism pieces take you. " [MH: 6] 
o macro-economics, that whole shebang, ö because they're making gazillion dollar 
investments, today, which will not pay 
back for twenty years. " [MH: 5/6] (D 
I 
I So I would say that HR strategy is really =I 
X 
"... there's also some components which 
a) the implementation of HR approaches that 0) are always I think self-contained within the U) meets the overall strategy for the ö° HR function, where you can define ... how business, because if you're in one of the best you want that function to achieve those v finite number and fairly easily defined set 
ý- 
. (D pieces, which are the things which are as (D CO of circumstances, for any business, I think . I'm saying, payroll, messaging, recruitment 
you can apply that as a generic case and 0m or recruitment activity, are I think can be 
therefore you know you've got to do se m self-contained ... they don't, I believe, need 
certain things within the HR side of the °c to refer back to the rest of the business, 
business ... to meet whatever it is you're o because ... that's your role to deliver those trying to achieve with the overall direction components, how you do that is entirely up 
of the business. " [MH: 1] to you. ' [MH: 3] 
"HR is a representative organisation of M 
" ,,, the way [a Thomson sister company] 
- ° 
how you do things. " [CP: 10] y works, as an HR model 
is ... almost more 
manipulative in terms of the way it works 
Q 
X CD with the senior leadership group ... the way 1 I see it is the HR director will almost try to _ 
CD 
manipulate ... the business strategy. " [CP: 1/2] 
(1) 9 
"I think there is definitely a fit between HR CO ... if you're in one of the finite number and 
strategy and the business strategy. " [KG: 1] . fairly easily defined set of circumstances, 
for any business, I think you can apply that 
as a generic case and therefore you know 
' ve got to do certain things within the you 
HR side of the business ... to meet 
whatever it is you're trying to achieve with 
the overall direction of the business. " 
[MH: 1] 
_ "... there's also some components which W "So I would say that HR strategy is really 
are always I think self-contained within the ä 
the implementation of HR approaches that 
ö C+ HR function, where you can define .., how CD meets the overall strategy for the business, 
cu n; best you want that function to achieve °- because if you're in one of the finite number 
those pieces, which are the things which and fairly easily defined set of 
are as I'm saying, payroll, messaging, circumstances, for any business, I think you 
0m 
:3X recruitment or recruitment activity, are I can apply that as a generic case and ' ýne M think can be self-contained ... they don't, I :. therefore you 
know you ve got to do certain 
2 believe, need to refer back to the rest of ir; things within the HR side of the business ... 
0 the business, because ... that's your role 
U' to meet whatever it is you're trying to 
C to deliver those components, how you do achieve with the overall direction of the 
that is entirely up to you. " [MH: 3] business! [MH: 1 ] 
co 
... you were in organisations in which the 
L n. really drove the business 
strategy. And HR supported the business 
`A strategy. HR were partners at the table, 
but the business really drove the strategy. " 
ä [KBM: 1] 
(a I "I think I would have put (HR roles) in 
order business number one and the ä employee champion number three, out of CD those. At least from my perspective. But 
from the perspective of the ... average 
cn staff it should be the other way round! 
[DR: 5] 
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o (e. g. short termism) .o "... the business strategy is 
in isolation from 
"I think the HR, and top management as a öa the management philosophy ... I think it's 
whole, Is thinking long term. I think they're ö( totally separate. I mean the business 
thinking long term. Doing this, does show. ý. 0) strategy, this is what the business 
looks 
N But then everybody's crumbling because '< N like, this is where we wanna get to. What 
c everyone's got quality, targets. And we style do we wanna run the business in? 
c get stuck into this environment ... How is Almost a separate decision. We could do 
it 
ü this possible? This is ridiculous. That to to either way. Mean Thomson, nice 
me is very clear. This doesn't make 9 Thomson. * [MH: 161 
sense. " [JD: 4] CD 
" "... the challenge we've got little outposts, ö3 right, like the Koreans and the Indians ... 
° 
just sheer distance and geography. And 
the places that we are big enough to have 
0 
3 
HR on the ground it's very nice, like 
' Singapore and Australia, but that s always 
the challenge in this region. ' [DR: 5/6] 
"But you look at overall at the things that 
' ' we re doing, and the messages that we re 
' FD- vi sending, and the day to day work that s 
9.5' going ... we're saying one thing and in our C° actions doing other things that make it 
v pretty difficult. " [KBM: 2] 
(e. g. resourcing level) 
" ' And we don t have the band width, even if 
' we had the competence. [SV: 101 
W (e. g. support) 
think I would have to be better 
equipped. To be honest" [RA: 5/6] 
-! Q 0 
c 
"... measuring success, and quality ý. (deeply impacts the way I do my job) ... s Feeding that back, to the leaders involved. 
Making sure there's there are structures in 
e place to be able to talk to the success of 
C1 programmes and initiatives. Keeping 
people updated on what's going on. " 
[CP2: 13] 
Pr ýf "I think there were just too many changes. 
0) 10 And what we tried to accomplish is you 
Qg know the, running behind, basically, and 
o fixing all different things. " [RA2: 5/6] 
"... it seems like we do a lot of change, we C 
"... yes, we're good at change, but not 
0 should have a lot of experience on that. " u change that we're not In control of. " [DR: 13J 
g [W LC: 7] 
. 
CD (D "As an organisation what struck me I think 
v 9 in the last couple of weeks was, we are 
a) very effective in BAU. Including the 
U3 93 changing, you know steady state BAU, 
CD Q changes and everything else. But this kind 
of a thing is more of a disruptive upheaval, 
and for that you need a lot more! [SV: 101 
Figure 76: Interpretative Repertoires for Project Three 
The analysis of the results will provide evidence for the descriptive model shown 
in figure 69. It will be divided into two sections: strategy formulation (section 6.2. ) 
and strategy implementation (section 6.3. ). 
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6.2. The Analysis: Strategy Formulation 
6.2.1. Discourse Around Environmental Factors 
Respondents use three major discourses to describe the environmental factors 
which they see as influencing HR strategy formulation, with a number of sub- 
discourses: 
" The influence of business strategy on HR strategy 
" The influence of context on HR strategy 
" The impact of change on HR strategy. 
There are a number of interpretative repertoires associated with discourse 
around the environmental factors which are seen as influencing intended HR 
strategy, most evident of which are as follows: 
" 'HR as legitimate (super-ordinate role of HR) versus'HR as illegitimate' 
" 'Best fit' versus 'best practice' 
" 'HR as tactical execution' versus 'bundled HR activities' 
" 'Context as culture' versus 'context as management philosophy'. 
6.2.1.1. The Influence of the Business Strategy on HR Strategy 
The first proposed element of the model was the environmental factor of 
business strategy. It was assumed that this had a first order reality at the highest 
corporate level. Moving down the organisation to the operating company level, it 
was presumed that the first order reality of business strategy would be weaker, 
and the second order reality (the influence of the actors) manifestation of 
business strategy would become more dominant. This section will consider 
business strategy as a first order reality, but, particularly in section 6.2.1.1.4. (the 
influence of business strategy on HR strategy), the manifestation of business 
strategy as a second order reality, as a negotiated and emergent process, 
formulated and re-formulated by the actors, will start to become apparent. 
It was expected that the corporate level business strategy of any organisation 
was relatively easily discoverable through documentation, but there was little 
written information on the Thomson Corporation and Thomson Financial which 
was amenable to analysis. However, it was possible to ascertain key strategic 
themes, i. e. a long term group strategy of growth through acquisition and organic 
growth and a commitment to a single technology platform. 
Given the paucity of written information, it was decided to look at the articulations 
of business strategy offered by the actors. There are obvious complications of 
402 
using actors' perceptions (second order reality) to access first order reality, but in 
the absence of other forms of information and given that this caveat was noted, 
this was deemed to be an acceptable strategy, even given the possible conflation 
of first and second order reality. 
This analysis will concentrate disproportionately on the discourses on business 
strategy offered by the MD of the business, for two reasons. Firstly, there was no 
real discussion of strategy by the other respondents, and, secondly, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the MD would exert a significant influence on the 
organisational actors and that his view on strategy would prevail. It was, 
however, clear that the MD had a very different view on strategy to both his direct 
reports and to the HR team, indicating a potential area of disconnect between 
strategy at the top level and its translation to its implementers. 
One clear difference emerged between the Asia and European respondents' 
discourse around strategy: whereas in Europe, business respondents typically 
reported an absence of strategy, there was some reference to a strategy for Asia. 
This may be related to the level of strategy perceived, and that it is easier to 
see/touch strategy (particularly emergent strategy) when one is at the SBU level, 
as a smaller organisation allows for more direct communication and a higher 
number of touch points. 
The discourse used by respondents can be divided into three categories: 
" Definitions of strategy 
" Theories of strategy formulation 
" Levels of strategy 
" The influence of business strategy on HR strategy. 
This section will go through each of these in turn. There are a number of 
associated interpretative repertoires which recur in discourse around business 
strategy, most notably 'strategy as an objective' versus 'strategy as a process' 
and 'HR as strategy' versus 'HR as tactical execution'. 
6.2.1.1.1. Definitions of Strategy 
The most senior interviewee - the MD of the business - provided a textbook set 
of definitions on strategy, starting off with a discourse of strategy as long term 
planning, clearly referencing the definition of 'strategy as an objective'. 
"... a strategy role, unless you're in an organisation like ... one of the big oil majors ... Shell and BP, what does the world look like in twenty years? ... Because they absolutely have to do that for their business. And that is, in my view, genuine strategic thinking, geo- 
politicals, macro-economics, that whole shebang, because they're 
making gazillion dollar investments, today, which will not pay back 
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for twenty years ... So that to me, that's the kind of organisation 
and the kind of business that strategy is a genuine function which 
requires you know significant and serious level of commitment of 
resources and people (in strategy). " [MH: 5/6] 
He immediately limits this approach to a small number of organisations. 
"The number of companies who are genuinely doing the long term 
strategic stuff is very very small, Especially in relation to the 
number of people who think they want a strategy job. " [MH: 5] 
And, on the basis of time scale of operation, he differentiates TF from 
organisations for which long term planning is appropriate. 
'Within a business with a much shorter time cycle, like ours, where 
our longest contract is three years ... Strategy 
is much more I think 
about divestment, acquisition, organic, build or buy kind of activity. 
This is what we want to get towards. Strategy I think specifically 
within the confines of Thomson ... is delivered at the 
Corporation 
level ... excellent example, Corporation mid nineties: our strategy 
is 
we're gonna get out of print. You know we're gonna go all 
electronic ... obviously there's a lot of thought and discussion and 
effort put into coming to that decision, but that is a two line definition 
of our strategy. " [MH: 5] 
Everything else, consequently, is defined by the MD as `tactical execution'. 
"... we deliver that down to those operating business units, get out 
of print, get into electronic. Yours. Done. End of strategy 
definition, everything else is about execution ... it's an all execution, the strategy's been summed up in two minutes. " [MH: 5] 
"... let's assume the decision is yes, we're gonna build an I-Bank, or 
at least maybe the operational part of an I-Bank, right so now what 
flows down from that in terms of execution, tactical executions to 
get to that picture in three to five years' time. " [MH: 6] 
"I have so many conversations with potential people coming in, 'I 
wanna do strategy'. Yeah, but ... in my definition, strategy 
occupies twenty minutes. Everything else, is the really hard stuff, 
about how we're gonna do things. " [MH: 4] 
6.2.1.1.2. Theories of Strategy Formulation 
Whilst the MD rejects long term formal strategy planning as inappropriate for an 
organisation working to TF's timelines, he still references the techniques of long 
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term strategic planning. Strategy development in Thomson is presented as 
evidence based, but with a probabilistic consideration of outlying discontinuities. 
"... there's definitely a role of saying, it's like Bank of England 
economic forecasts ... here's our mid point, here's our one 
standard deviation estimate, here's our two standard deviation 
estimates, we know that the future of the world in three years looks 
something between here and here. Because six standard 
deviations out implies earthquake in Tokyo and total disaster. 
Might happen, but it's unlikely in the timescale that we're talking 
about, and the standard deviation probabilities that we are 
representing. And therefore, our world in three years looks pretty 
much the same as it does today, with some outlying possibilities 
that you might wanna think about, but actually you wanna prepare 
for this you know plus or minus three standard deviations kind of 
scenarios and that's the business that we're in. " [MH: 6] 
The use of the 'strategy as an objective' repertoire, hence, is confined to the 
discussions of high level strategic scenario building, suggesting a hierarchy 
between the 'strategy as an objective' and 'strategy as a process' repertoires. 
When the MD begins to talk about running the business, he switches to a 
repertoire of 'strategy as a process', drawing on the logically incremental and 
emergent schools of thought. 
" ... the number of companies who are genuinely doing long term 
strategic stuff as a continuing operation, as opposed to periodic 
review of how our business is doing and, we're here now, we want 
to get to here, in a certain amount of time, which I think is a much 
shorter process. " [MH: 5, my emphasis] 
His model of strategy development in the business combines logical 
incrementalism with a semi-formal review process. 
"... every now and again you need to take a step back ... that's 
what TOC does, or did, previously. You know obviously what 
they're just doing now, sale of Learning, purchase of Reuters, that's 
that kind of every x number of years take a step back, what does it 
really look like, what does the ten year thing look like. " [MH: 6. my 
emphasis] 
For this respondent, strategic direction emerges as the consequence of the 
various incremental isms: an emergent model of strategy, described using the 
'strategy as a process' repertoire. 
'We've been talking about building an investment bank, in essence, 
internally. That's the kind of thing probably that we should do. And 
that's another step back, look at all the incrementalisms, where do 
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all of those incrementalism pieces take you. They take you to what 
really looks like an investment bank. And right, okay well why don't 
we build an investment bank then as a strategic aim. " [MH: 6] 
6.2.1.1.3. Levels of Strategy 
MH presents a set of textbook definitions of strategy, and presents the idea that 
true strategy - in all but a handful of organisations - only happens at very high 
levels and at a very broad directional level (e. g. selection of a growth strategy). 
This relates to Johnson & Scholes' "corporate level" strategy discussed in the 
literature review for this project. 
"... there's a picture of what we want to get to as a business, 
whether we're agreeing that as a management group or whether it's 
being handed on down to us from on high, by the shareholders. " 
[MH: 4] 
The "corporate" strategy then creates a mandate for the business, This is a top 
down, uni-directional view of strategy which infers that the SBU has little input 
into the strategic direction it is expected to follow. The consequence of this for 
the SBU is a focus on tactical execution. 
... it's all tactical execution. In reality. Because there is only one 
strategy which is set for the business as a whole, which is the part 
of the business cycle that we're in ... that's the strategy. We are trying to do this with the business, trying to grow a business, shrink 
the business, divest the business, and you know that's defined as 
'this is our position today, this is what our position is going to be at 
the end of some point in time'. End of strategy ... Everything else 
is 
execution. Now ... you can call within those pieces of functional 
executions, you can have a 'strategy' to deliver. " [MH: 3] 
One can see a clear descent through the Johnson & Scholes levels of strategy in 
this one quote, beginning at the corporate level: 
"Because there is only one strategy which is set for the business 
as a whole, which is the part of the business cycle that we're in ... that's the strategy. We are trying to do this with the business, trying 
to grow a business, shrink the business, divest the business. " 
[MH: 3] 
He then moves to the competitive/business strategy level: 
"... that's defined as 'this is our position today, this is what our 
position is going to be at the end of some point in time'. " [MH: 3] 
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And ends with operational strategies: 
"... pieces of functional executions. " [MH: 3] 
It is, however, interesting to surmise on why, when he chooses the term "tactical 
executions" in preference to a phrase such as "operational strategy". Given the 
relative value attributed to the terms 'tactics' and 'strategy' noted earlier, and that 
the explicit discussion around strategy in this interview makes this terminology a 
deliberate choice, inferences can be drawn about the respondent's perceived 
local of control in the organisation (i. e. he infers that he does not feel in control of 
the strategic direction of his business, a contention which is supported by the 
pejorative "handed on down to us from on high", MH: 4). The implications for HR 
are that this suggests that his expectations of the support functions will 
necessarily be tactical rather than strategic. 
However, closer analysis indicates that this respondent's distinction between 
strategy and tactics is less clear than it may at first appear. In the following 
quotes, he appears to be advancing a definition of strategy which is far lower 
level and much closer to tactics than his initial high level definition may suggest. 
"From that overall business strategy, which I believe is the prime 
driver of any business organisation, you've got a series of ... 
execution plans which can be termed strategy. " [MH: 1, my 
emphasis] 
" ... supporting the (HR) function there is strategy in the sense of 
nobody should be going to jail for breaking local employment laws, 
everybody should be you know appropriately serviced in terms of 
you know the pay and rations type approach. " [MH: 1/2, my 
emphasis] 
"... in my view, you can call within those pieces of functional 
executions, you can have a `strategy' to deliver, sure, because you 
can say well our overwhelming or overarching requirement is, we 
must have it done by this time, budget is irrelevant, we must have it 
done within a certain cost, it doesn't matter if we take a bit of time. 
Yep? Those kind of things? Which can set ... a strategy. " [MH: 3, 
my emphasis] 
And he acknowledges that there may be a level at which strategy and tactics 
merge. 
"... you're right on the cusp of the definition with how to define the 
strategy at a layer below, this is what the business as a whole is 
trying to achieve? Is [it] ... we want to build a recruitment process 
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that is proactive and allows us never to be running around chasing 
our tails, because we're in a growth situation. " [MH: 4] 
Indeed, he does explicitly refer to this distinction as a matter of semantics. 
"Now, is that a strategy, or is it an execution? A tactical execution 
that meets the overall strategy of we're trying to grow the business. 
You could argue that both ways. " [MH: 4] 
"... everybody therefore has a series of pieces of work to do, 
whether you call them strategy or tactics, let's just you know flip that 
question for now. " [MH: 9] 
"... within the overall picture of this is where the business is now, 
this is where it wants to get to today, this is where we want to move 
... from here to here. To me, that's the definition of a strategy, 
but 
reality is this is a series of technical executions, and we're a little bit 
into a semantic definition game I think. " [MH: 3] 
There are some limited references to strategy in other business participants' 
discourse, which have connotations of the 'strategy as an objective' repertoire 
rather than 'strategy as a process'. 
"... it was up to me to set the (business) strategy. Where do I need 
to be? ... so I had to set the parameters about what 
is what I 
wanted. " [DR: 2] 
This suggests that strategy may, indeed, be a matter of semantics: this 
respondent defines strategy at a much lower level in the organisation than the 
Johnson & Scholes corporate level activity referenced by MH. 
6.2.1.1.4. The Influence of Business Strategy on HR Strategy 
The discussion around the definition of strategy described in the previous section 
is an important one for HR because, if strategy is set at the highest level 
(reflected in the 'strategy as an objective' discourse used by the MD to describe 
strategy formulation at the Thomson Corporation level), the search for 'HR 
strategy' at the SBU level is perhaps ill founded: HR is potentially better served 
by performing good tactical execution. 
There is evidence of a straightforward 'best fit' repertoire being applied to TF in 
the discourse. 
"I think there is definitely a fit between HR strategy and the 
business strategy. " [KG: 1] 
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Although the 'best fit' repertoire appears more often in the discourse in reference 
to non-TF organisations, used on a comparative basis, suggesting that 'best fit' is 
more of a second order perception than having a clear first order reality. 
"In the brokerage business you know you can be fired in the 
morning but it doesn't matter because your contract is geared up to 
recognise that. And the bonuses are significantly higher and the 
earning potential is significantly higher than it is in this business ... it's a completely different operating model, and you know you might 
go back into a brokerage organisation for more cash, you know you 
can be fired in the morning. You're only as good as your last day's 
ticket. " [MH: 11] 
Although this respondent then goes on to categorise the brokerage model as an 
atypical operating model, inferring a more 'best practice' repertoire through his 
references to "normal", "not unusual", "regular" and "better". 
"... the best way to run our business is to have great people and 
keep them in the business and make sure they're properly 
motivated, and I think that's true for ninety percent of businesses. I 
think that ... the brokerages are the outliers. So the best way to run 
your business is to do that, I think that's generically true, and 
therefore things stem from that way. And the comp is normal comp. 
You know, this is not unusual compensation, here, it's the 
brokerages that have the unusual compensation structure. So this 
is a regular compensation structure, that we have. " [MH: 12] 
... it's an acknowledgement that it's much better to find really great 
people, keep them, train them, incentivise them, motivate them, 
reward them, than it is to you know churn the handle. Whereas in a 
brokerage business, you know that's that decision's a bit of a wash, 
because actually you can turf somebody out, pay x, you pay y to 
get somebody else in, as long as they make two y, the 
shareholders are happy. So it's a slightly different, it's a crueler 
environment, but it isn't necessarily an economically irrational one. " 
[MH: 10] 
"(In a brokerage there is) no thought of succession planning 
whatsoever, because you absolutely you can't afford to have the er 
the cost of the succession in place. It's cheaper to go out and 
recruit as required. You know, totally different approach ... it can be better and it can be better organised and you can do it in a 
different way. " [MH: 10] 
The MD builds a far more complex definition of the role of HR, combining 'best fit' 
and 'best practice' repertoires. He also presents a duality between functional 
execution and deployment of a 'bundle' of HR activities. 
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"I think the strategy is really a set of execution pieces and some 
intra-functional strategies, which are about the best delivery of 
some of those execution components. " [MH: 2] 
To firstly consider the functional element, this is presented as the effective 
execution of the distinct activities which HR is functionally tasked with performing 
(e. g. recruitment, payroll). The 'HR as tactical execution' repertoire dominates 
this discourse. 
Rather than being described in terms of the 'best practice' or'best fit' repertoires, 
this is simply seen as a fundamental requirement of the HR function. This is 
represented as an area in which HR has complete freedom to operate, without 
reference to the rest of the business. 
"... there's also some components which are always I think self- 
contained within the HR function, where you can define a strategy 
because, of what of how best you want that function to achieve 
those pieces, which are the things which are as I'm saying, payroll, 
messaging, recruitment or recruitment activity, are I think can be 
self-contained ... they don't, I believe, need to refer back to the rest 
of the business, because ... that's your role to deliver those 
components, how you do that is entirely up to you. " [MH: 3] 
"... you can deliver those (execution) pieces, in isolation is the 
wrong word, but you know what I mean. You can make the 
decision about how best you're gonna do messaging, how best 
you're going to do payroll, how best you're going to do negotiations 
with ... external recruitment organisations. Entirely within the 
purview of the HR function. " [MH: 2] 
These, interestingly, are presented as contextually neutral in the discourse of the 
respondents. This suggests that there are actions and processes which HR is 
expected to perform, which are not necessarily linked to or influenced by 
contextual factors. 
"You've gotta get the basics, or people I think it doesn't I still think 
you can be very credible, but people just you know they can't get it 
out of the back of their mind. " [KG: 5] 
These 'basic' activities are, almost perversely, presented as major determinants 
of HR credibility. This links to the constraint of the expectation placed on HR's to 
deliver of perfect administration, initially raised in project two and reiterated in 
project three: the administrative must be seamlessly performed in order for HR to 
be perceived well. 
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"... it's like wow if you can't get the headcount right, or there's 
always a problem with the payroll ... you need to get that the basics 
right. And the problem in a support function is ... if things go 
smoothly you don't hear anything. And if there are problems, that's 
when all the noise happens. So it's always kind of the top thing, 
getting those basics right, because you know you're getting them 
right when you don't hear a word (laughs) ... it eats away at people if the basics aren't right and under control. They don't hear you as 
well on some of the business partnering and objective kinds of 
issues, if there are underlying problems that are gnawing at them. " 
[KG: 5] 
This is problematic when considering a contextually based theory of HR strategy, 
which does not acknowledge this contextually neutral, but fundamental, 
component of the HR role. 
Moving on to the second element, HR is also seen as being responsible for the 
development and deployment of 'bundles' of HR activity, which are represented 
as being determined by the broad overall strategic direction, which is defined in a 
series of Johnson & Scholes type broad options (e. g. growth, divestment). This 
approach appears to have much in common with the concept of HR 'bundles' 
referenced by Boxall (1996, p 171, citing Ishniowski et al, 1996; McDuffie, 1995). 
This is characterised as the 'bundled HR activities' repertoire. 
The linkage of 'bundled HR activities' repertoire to the overall strategic direction 
is more obfuscated than the use of the 'HR as tactical execution' repertoire 
discussed above. The 'bundled HR activities' repertoire also has a complex 
relationship with the 'best fit' and 'best practice' repertoires. These 'bundles' are 
presented as 'best fit' in so far as they are appropriate to the broad strategic 
direction. This respondent does see the HR and business strategies as 
inextricably linked, initially drawing upon a 'best fit' repertoire. 
"I think that's ... a slightly leading question (is there a linkage between the HR strategy and the business strategy) ... because it implies that you can have a separate HR strategy, to the business 
strategy. And I would refute that, to some extent, because ... you have a business strategy ... of some kind for that business, whether it's growth, management, decline, cessation, expansion, merger, 
divestment, whatever. And so that's your strategy. " [MH: 1] 
"... how can an HR strategy be drawn up in isolation from what 
you're trying to achieve as a business? I mean that's a nonsense. 
Or if you're trying to do it, you're gonna get shot, because you're 
not working in you know being a team player. " [MH: 4] 
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However, the respondent then veers towards a 'best practice' repertoire when he 
references a generic bundle of activities which the HR function must perform. 
"So I would say that HR strategy is really the implementation of HR 
approaches that meets the overall strategy for the business, 
because if you're in one of the finite number and fairly easily 
defined set of circumstances, for any business, I think you can 
apply that as a generic case and therefore you know you've got to 
do certain things within the HR side of the business ... to meet 
whatever it is you're trying to achieve with the overall direction of 
the business. " [MH: 1] 
He illustrates this by referenced to the Thomson Financial Asia situation, 
articulating the broad elements of two of the HR 'bundles': growth and 
decline/divestment. 
"So take that down from massively woolly generalisations to very 
specifically here, where we're in a growth situation, with some M 
and A on the side for excitement ... your HR strategy becomes the 
execution of a growth plan, which means that you've got that whole 
... emphasis ... towards recruitment, retention, planning and talent 
management stroke succession. As opposed to ... if it was a decline or a divestment, then you might be ... much more on the 
employee communications, messaging, decline and severance kind 
of activity. " [MH: 1] 
This has linkages to the concept of strategy articulated by this respondent. 
Unlike the other interviewees in this study, he sees business strategy as 
restricted to the highest level in the organisation, and everything else as tactical 
execution. Whilst this role may not be one which is particularly appealing to the 
HR profession, this respondent applies the same concept to all of the functions 
within the business. 
"... my view is that every part of the business operates like that. 
Everybody, all the business functions, whether it's Finance, Sales, 
HR, Technology, whatever. All of them are ... running a series of technical executions, because the strategy is quite broadly defined, 
at a high level. The business is moving from here to here. How 
does that happen, within each of the operating functional streams. " 
[MH: 4] 
It is not used pejoratively and, indeed, is seen as entirely appropriate. 
"I wouldn't pick out HR as being different from any of the other 
operational functions. That there's a picture of what we want to get 
to as a business, whether we're agreeing that as a management 
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group or whether it's being handed on down to us from on high, by 
the shareholders. " [MH: 4] 
However, the obfuscation of the definition of business strategy noted earlier is 
also present in his discourse around HR strategy: 'strategy, in this quote, is used 
to describe a significantly lower level of activity than the 'corporate' view of 
strategy he initially advanced. 
"... the actual execution of some of the functional components of 
HR etcetera etcetera, and the strategy of how best to achieve 
those, the execution of those functional components that, in a cost 
effective manner, I believe is entirely within the purview of the HR 
organisation ... So you know that's your strategy. That's the independent part of that strategy, and you've got an execution plan 
of okay, how do I achieve those kind of things. But within the in the 
business aspects of it, if we are trying to grow, acquire, and expand 
the business, then the strategy you know is going to be delivered 
down is we need to recruit. " [MH: 1] 
This constrained definition of strategy is consistent with his use of the 'best 
fit'Pbest practice' repertoires, in that HR needs to be the former only in so far as it 
needs to fit a generic 'best practice' bundle of activities to the organisation's 
broad strategic direction (e. g. growth, divestment etc. ). Everything else is tactical 
execution, the parameters of which are clear and which does not need to be 
either best fit nor best practice. 
"I think you can fairly tightly define what those deliverables are for 
all of the operating functions, in fact by definition you must be able 
to, or else you're not managing the business properly, 'cause you 
don't know what you're doing, or how you're supposed to get to 
where you want to be, then something is pretty fundamentally 
broken. " [MH: 9] 
The HR view of strategy is, however, somewhat different. HR respondents draw 
upon a definition of strategy which is more akin to 'strategy as an objective' and, 
consequently, describe a lack of business strategy. This respondent's comment 
on the Corporation's strategy is typical. 
"(Business strategy influences HR) Not so much at Thomson. 
Because I haven't really seen what I'd call a strategy as such! 
(laughs)" [CP2: 5] 
"I'm still thinking in Thomson we don't understand, the strategy of 
this organisation should always have been for the customer. And 
we still don't seem to get, that. " [KBM: 3] 
The consequence of which is inevitably an unclear HR strategy. 
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" ... we don't have a real strategy, we didn't have an HR strategy as 
a corporation, you didn't have policies and procedures as an HR 
organisation. " [KBM: 1] 
This lack of clear business strategy is presented as a constraint. 
"I think from the business point of view the direction wasn't there. 
Yeah, it was like ten percent growth. Fine, but what does that 
mean? Do we have any measurements? How well does the new 
function, the new structure work? Do we need to increase, do we 
need to decrease, do we need to tweak? I think it was just go 
ahead and sell. " [RA2: 6] 
"If you think about, at one point, I think that was when you joined, it 
was still the talk about China, we need to get to China, set up a 
legal entity, recruitment plans, back and forth, okay fine. A couple 
of months later, ah nah, we're not going to do it (laughs). You 
know complete change of focus! We had all sorts of ideas, plans, 
for the China piece. " [RA2: 7] 
One respondent attempts to address the issue of HR strategy in an context 
where the business strategy is unclear. In so doing, he goes on to makes an 
allusion similar to that made by MH that strategy occurs only at a very high level, 
and that at an SBU level, business plans rather than strategy should determine 
HR activities. 
"HR strategy? Right, we struggle to even get a business strategy. 
Right? ... I mean you dilute the effectiveness of that term, too. I 
mean strategy is as I say is overly abused. I think you're right, I 
think we've gotta more tactical, but ... again by stealth. Not putting it out there on a slide for the business to look at and laugh at, for 
the sake of justifying ourselves. From insecurity about what 
strategy is. But I think HR has to be clear about what the direction 
is in terms of our own values, our integrity and the way we 
approach the business, versus, yep, calling it strategy ... It's called 
what the business wants it to be called, right. " [CP: 7] 
CP produces a sophisticated model which draws upon the 'business leads HR' 
repertoire, interwoven with the need to focus on the tactical to gain credibility, an 
awareness of the value laden nature of the term 'strategy' and a plea for a super- 
ordinate role for HR. 
Lack of business strategy, as in project two, appears to be being used as a 
functional repertoire by HR respondents to explain HR's lack of strategy. 
However, one can see this as self limiting to HR: a processual, emergent model 
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of business (and thus HR) strategy would allow a view of HR as an effective 
partner, even given an unclear business strategy. 
"... what [the HRBP] does well is pre-emptively responds to the 
changing strategy, or not even a strategy really, it's not a strategy. 
Whatever the business plans are, whatever it is that's going on. " 
[CP: 6] 
This could be a far more functional repertoire for HR, as this respondent indicates 
as he goes on to echo MH and describe HR's role in terms of tactical execution 
rather than strategy development. 
"... we have a really unique skill in linking strategy to making things 
happen, to execution. " [CP: 7] 
This suggests that HR's obsession with a strategic role may be fundamentally 
hampering the function. Where a business values good tactical execution rather 
than high level strategy formulation, and HR itself has a 'strategy as objective' 
definition of the term which makes recognition of and responsiveness to an 
emergent and negotiated model of business strategy less likely. 
The L&D respondent, however, sees a more positive relationship between the 
business strategy and HR, using another, more enabling, repertoire. 
"... you customise learning I guess in terms of what the executive's 
priorities are for that year. Or what they wanna achieve ... I think 
strategy's an abused term in business too. I mean. So it depends 
on what the ... Market organisation needs. " [CP2: 5] 
This draws upon the 'strategy as a process' repertoire and has similarities to the 
different levels of strategy and the deconstruction of the term 'strategy' discussed 
in this project's literature review. Strategy is conflated with the views of the 
executive manager, giving pre-eminence to the influence of the actors in this 
respondent's discourse and alluding to an emergent, negotiated model of 
strategy. 
This model offers a possibility of a 'business partner' relationship to HR 
practitioners, where HR's role is that of one of a number of actors and negotiators 
in the organisational strategy process. 
"... it's critical to always be in conversation with the leaders of each 
function to understand what their needs are ... and circle back. So that would be something that I'd be doing ... a lot. " [CP2: 6] 
Linking this to the 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire allows this respondent to 
go a stage further and to present HR as a coach and facilitator in the strategy 
negotiation process, with the super-ordinate responsibility of recognising 
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coaching opportunities and shaping and directing executives through the strategy 
formulation process. 
"... another thing L&D facilitates is the conversation and clarity 
around priorities. For the business. And it's actually a coaching 
model to help leaders get really clear about what they what success 
will look like at the end of the year. " [CP2: 6] 
"... the important thing there is really around, ... in my 
L&D 
capacity, is to get leadership buy in ... a big part of our role in 
L&D 
is ensuring that they're not taking anything for granted. " [CP2: 4] 
Going still further, there is a sense that HR's role is that of a co-creator of 
business strategy. 
"I would sit with him (the sales MD) at the beginning of the year, 
and I'd get him to do some visioning exercises ... I get him to think 
about, sitting here, take yourself out of your body, sitting here in a 
year's time, what will your sales force be doing. What will the 
results look like? That's where I start at: the results. What sort of 
capability would you have in a team, which would get you those 
results. What would you have? " [CP: 6] 
This respondent does, however, realise the complexities of the super-ordinate 
role, and the lack of transparency of this approach to the business. 
"So we used a few techniques, including going by stealth. " [CP2: 8] 
And that the super-ordinate role may cut across what the business perceives it 
wants. 
"It's very hard, though, to give your preferred, to represent a 
vendor, to put someone forward that doesn't you know fit with the 
leader's needs. Because ultimately they're the clients. And I've 
had those situations but I've let I've disagreed with who they've 
chosen, I've let them go with them, and let it fail in some instances. 
And then come in, because they need to get that. And it's not 
about pointing the finger and saying, see I told you you were wrong. 
It's about understanding where they're at in the learning process, 
themselves as leaders. And embracing that. " [CP2: 8] 
This is a clear representation of the 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire, where 
HR is seen as having a higher order responsibility to educate less able business 
representatives, with an obvious link to the 'HR as legitimate'/'HR as illegitimate' 
repertoires. 
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It is interesting to surmise on the respective impacts of these repertoires: a focus 
on HR process, a fruitless and frustrating search for business direction and, 
finally, an enabling repertoire which elevates the status of HR in the business to a 
genuine business partner. This suggests an opportunity to create more enabling 
discourses - as in Ford & Ford's "shifting conversations" for HR staff as part of a 
change project. 
6.2.1.2. The Influence of Context on HR Strategy 
As context had not emerged as a significant driver in project two, this was not 
explicitly explored in the project three interviews. However, a number of 
contextual factors were seen as influential by respondents, namely the influence 
of global systems and processes, market and culture. Neo-institutional factors 
were not cited, with the exception of normative factors (legislation and best 
practice), which will be considered at the end of this section. 
i) Global Systems 
Respondents provide a strong sense that, when talking about day to day HR, 
global systems are enabling rather than constraining. This is in contrast to some 
of the comments which emerged during the first set of interviews about the 
difficulties of providing 'best fit' HR in an environment where the unit (functionally 
or geographically) is a small part of a larger whole, and there is a pressure (either 
centrally driven or created by the constraints of limited resources) for global 
conformity. 
Although use of a US-centric recruitment system is represented as initially 
challenging. 
"... it's definitely a challenge because I think when I came on board, 
we weren't really using a system, a global system per se, we were 
sort of sneaking around a global system, to get to what we needed 
todo... 
At the very beginning it was very impeding, it was tough to sort of 
deal with it because there were so many things that weren't related 
to Asia, it was very US centric, but we seemed to skim past most of 
those and use the system in a way that works for us, but it's still 
sort of adhering to the overall system. " [DH: 1] 
A responsive US team were prepared to create work arounds and 
customisations. 
"I would say eighty to ninety percent of those one off things that pop 
up are raised, and most of them are resolved. Most of them are 
resolved. So there's a workaround for example where they'll create 
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an extra drop down for us, where that doesn't exist in the US, for 
example. 
Referral programme, one good example that would be referrals ... 
they've just simply added another drop down for us ... So they've done little things like that, little adjustments, which was quite nice. " 
[DH: 2] 
Resulting in a system which is perceived as high value add. 
°... it sort of put a bit of a structure on how we sourced ... I think 
for 
us it's good because we can be on a common ground with people 
in other regions as well, so we can talk the same talk, it means we 
can even share information a bit more easily, go back and we can 
have the same sort of process in that respect. So even though 
we're not, again we're not one hundred percent there yet, but there 
is we're moving in that direction. It's much easier to have sort of an 
anchor there, for us. " [DH: 1] 
All three of the respondents in this section similarly report that access to global 
systems is a benefit, as long as local customisation is possible and permissible. 
"... as long as there's work arounds ... I think the benefits 
definitely 
outweigh the negatives. " [DH: 2] 
"I always had the freedom to customise, and you know everything 
I've asked for I got. But nobody has ever told me how to do it here. 
Or that it HAS to be a global standard. " [RA2: 2] 
"So I've just had a call this morning ... about re-designing or tailoring the management development programme that we're 
running in both New Zealand and in Australia to ensure that it 
meets the local needs. And the gaps that have been identified or 
you know the skill gaps that have been identified, hopefully through 
a thorough competency review in both parts or in both countries. 
So as a result I take the global pieces and create not only a 
programme. " [CP2: 1 ] 
This is supported by arguments that customisation is required in Asia due to the 
countries' cultural specificity. 
"... in Japan, we've looked at local translation, and we're talking 
about cultural translation, it's not just the literal translation, that's a 
key piece. That and we had an example of that a little while ago 
when I was fortunate enough to have an exceptional translator, who 
translates the coaching models into the cultural Japanese lingo, 
which really works. So that's some ways how the global piece is 
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impacted locally. And stuff I need to consider and work on on a day 
to day basis. " [CP2: 1] 
Asia's autonomy is seen as being to its advantage. 
"I didn't have the feeling that we were too restricted, by global 
approval policies, for example. I actually felt it quite positive in my 
time here in Asia to have somebody like Mark who is authorised to 
take decisions and he's authorised to make changes, and not 
having to go up the global path and get final sign off. I found that 
quite refreshing and I haven't had that experience for a long time in 
my previous life. It was easy. I could go in there and say, 'can I do 
this? ', and he says yes, and that was fine. So it's probably also just 
working out of headquarter, where you just walk in, versus be 
somewhere in a satellite office. I don't know. I just felt that as a 
very positive factor. " [RA2: 9] 
But there is a counter-argument which expresses the difficulties inherent in this 
autonomy. 
"Manila for me it's a separate country, it's a separate, it's separate 
everywhere. It's an operations centre, so it's only in small parts 
linked in with the rest of Asia. ... when (the Manila HRD) joined he 
obviously also was very keen on understanding how are things 
done at Thomson. You know, our compensation philosophy, comp 
and ben, how we're doing it, etcetera. And what (the Manila HRD) 
found out, and what I remember he had some struggles with is yes, 
there is something, but you don't necessarily need to do it that way. 
So, again, being able to shape and form and, some restrictions are 
clearly there. But for the rest, they're fairly separate. He was able 
to structure his organisation, look at the skills he needs, and I don't 
think he had the opportunity to really act with such a with so much 
freedom before. He probably was in big organisations before and 
whatnot, but to have that freedom to create and structure, that was 
new for him. That's definitely, not that much influence. I think 
Manila has even less influence globally. From the global side. " 
[RA2: 10] 
Autonomy is presented as a response of necessity rather than choice. 
"To be honest I feel like we've got a lot more regional control over 
the process. There's been very little communication that I've seen, 
and there is general guidelines, but again I feel that lost, when I see 
all these documents, because they're so legally written and so 
North American centric ... That I seem to be getting, I get lost in it. So I kinda sift through and find the major one two three interview 
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you know checks here and there and sort of I feel like I follow the 
general bare minimum standards and then apply our own regional 
sort of way of doing things. " [DH: 3] 
Limited global intervention is attributed to a lack of interest in Asia from the global 
teams, and a desire for more global contact is articulated. 
"... at Thomson I always felt like the global connection is not and 
the global alignment is not as big as I would wanted it to be. So 
yes, I would always look at anything that's already there, that's 
global, that's consistent, or that's at least from another region, and 
then see how I would handle it for Asia here ... It makes it easier, and whether it's a global resource or whether its just something 
somebody else has done elsewhere, and you can build on, yeah, 
doesn't really matter. " [RA2: 1] 
"I think Asia has been pretty much left to their own devices, as to 
how we are using what's out there ... I really feel over the last two 
years that I've been here, that we've been really kind of left alone, 
in a way. " [RA2: 2] 
An alternate view is posed by the L&D specialist, whose desire for global 
conformity is based on a number of arguments about the need to maintain the 
integrity of flagship programmes and the L&D 'brand'. 
"In order for the MDP programme to maintain its integrity I've got to, 
for it to be tagged as a management development programme, 
sponsored by Thomson University, it certainly has to be, well the 
material that I go through, I would roll out, would have to be aligned, 
or meet certain principles and guidelines, by Corporate. So there's 
a fine line there. So yes, definitely, take what we can, and adapt it 
to the local market needs, which makes sense, from the Centre of 
Excellence. But at the same time, it's a reason why it's a Centre of 
Excellence, we've gotta trust that. And ensure that we meet certain 
criterion ... The integrity of the brand is critical. " [CP2: 1/2] 
And the role which HR can play in creating a common language. 
"(If there wasn't global consistency) ultimately the first thing I think 
about is employee branding, of the organisation. And it would 
impact succession planning, it would impact pay, I would almost 
say succession planning or, I guess, development planning and so 
forth. If we're not talking a consistent language, and now we're 
going into competencies. Around the place. It would be hard to 
integrate one individual from one part of the world to the other. " 
[CP2: 2] 
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The strong impression conveyed by the discourse of these respondents is that 
global systems are useful in that they provide a structure and a framework, and 
can assist efficiency of process, but that there are other factors (e. g. the needs of 
the business, the need to fit with the Asian culture) which have a more powerful 
influence on the way in which HR is conducted. 
The apparent contradiction between the discourse around global systems and 
the 'limits of local customisation' repertoire is readily comprehensible if one looks 
at the context for the discourse. In both cases, respondents are making the case 
that limited resources in Asia make customisation (which is seen as necessary 
due to the region's unique geographical requirements) infeasible. The 'limits of 
local customisation' repertoire suggests that it is not expedient to customise HR 
for locations (and, by inference, functions) where there are limited people 
(especially given limited resources). The global systems discussion alludes to 
the perception that those limited resources can be spread further if global 
systems are available to provide structure, consistency and reduce workload. 
ii) Market 
Of all the contextual factors, unsurprisingly, the external market is seen as the 
most powerful influence on recruitment. 
"... if the market was a different market, if the market was if we 
were dealing with a fifteen percent unemployment rate, it would be 
a very different recruiting scenario. So it's the sort of heartbeat of 
how we deal with things. Because of course in Asia right now, in 
Singapore, Hong Kong especially, just very tight. Speed you know 
efficiency is really the key, so yeah it just really affects the way I 
work every day. One hundred percent. " [DH: 4] 
Although there is a sense that this may be an impact limited to recruitment, and 
not other areas of HR. 
"(Market influences) not to a big extent. I think to be honest, it 
where I see it saw it influencing was only on the recruitment side ... I think it did not influence bigger. " [RA2: 9] 
And there is an inference that the 'problem' of market should be addressed 
through different areas of HR, not just recruitment. 
"What I would you know see that we probably should have other 
measures instead of, not just throwing money at candidates (in the 
recruitment process). But offering more career pathing models 
etcetera etcetera. " [RA2: 9] 
Even for the recruiter, ultimately, process is still seen as the guiding force, and 
market influences only the urgency, not the process followed. 
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"I don't think it compromises. I mean I think as long as there is a 
common and constant communication going, and I think if that's the 
market norm, if people in that market are recruiting in a similar 
manner, and candidates are used to being contacted within a 
certain time period, I think that it wouldn't compromise too much. 
And it is not you know it's not sort of putting that on hold and going 
through the entire process with a hotter markets vacancy, but I think 
its more of sort of the urgency to push here first, you know you can 
do things concurrently of course, but the priority the urgency will 
always first go to these hotter markets. " [DH: 4/5] 
iii) Culture 
Culture was seen as influential on two levels: the Asian culture and company 
culture. 
Looking firstly at the Asian culture, the influence was noted, although limited to 
certain countries (most notably Japan) and specific parts of HR. Whilst the 
recruiter notes no influence of the Asian culture, seeing market conditions and 
adherence to process as his major drivers, the generalist presents culture as a 
constraint, in so far as finding talented HR staff is concerned. 
"... the Asia HR team? I think everybody is doing what he she like 
and thinks is best. It's the hardest part to actually get this team 
together and get them to share and to talk, and to understand that 
there might be something they could learn from each other and do 
differently. And talk about best practice. And it's also look outside, 
go to some HR forum, networking, whatever. Still, not there ... It's 
probably cultural. And they come here to work and to earn their 
money, and really sticking to rules, and they probably have never 
been exposed to having to think for themselves, thinking of what 
that's gonna bring for them, as well. In that part, I think it's missing 
and they probably haven't been exposed to it. " [RA2: 3] 
Likewise, in L&D, significant customisation is seen as required for certain 
countries. 
"... the TU sponsored coaching programme, Inside Out Coaching. 
So I facilitated that in Japan, a couple of weeks ago ... We looked 
at the language, the coaching questions, and we did a literal 
translation first and it just didn't work. 'Cause number one, the 
questions just seemed a bit weird, number two a couple of them 
were too hard hitting for the Japanese culture. So we changed that 
the language of what the actual coaching formula in a way that was 
acceptable. So we maintained the 'grow' model, and the intent of 
what the questions were, so there was a bit of too-ing and fro-ing, 
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what is the intention of this question? Well how could we ask it in 
Japanese, that will achieve the same outcome? That was one part. 
The other part was the role playing ... here's some instructions 
around the way you handle performance feedback, in the Inside 
Out model, but in Japan the feedback I got there was no, I want a 
table in front of us, I need to see that, and stop staring into my eyes 
so much. And take it a step back. A bit. And also, I need you to be 
a bit more directive about what you expect. So that they were the 
key learnings I got from that. " [CP2: 4/5] 
There is again a sense, however, that other things are more influential on L&D, 
namely the meeting of business needs and the ability to negotiate and shape 
those business requirements. 
Looking secondly at company culture, this respondent supposes that company 
culture may exert an influence, but does not see this as impactful in Thomson 
Financial. 
"I suppose maybe company culture (may influence recruitment)? 
But again that wouldn't really affect the process. I suppose it could. 
It could. I haven't experienced this in other companies, but ... for 
example at Nokia, the way they approach their recruitment is really 
based on their culture, their company culture of community or 
something and they have all these community interviews and such. 
But I haven't experienced that here ... our culture wouldn't affect here in process, but I could think that that could be another area 
that might, for other recruitment functions. " [DH: 1 1] 
To look at culture first, unlike project two, the respondents in project three saw 
the positive attributes of the cultural factors described in section 4.2 as a strong 
driver of the organisation's approach to HR. 
"I still think that company culture is absolutely critical, right? The 
way the company wants its employees to think about the company, 
its customers to think about the company, and you know, everyone 
has views of companies that are good and bad. Companies that 
are aspirational or inspirational, whatever you wanna call it. 
Companies people wanna work for, companies that are known as a 
good place to work. And I'm not sure we necessarily understand 
what exactly we would like people to think about us. Personally I 
think that we have a good shot of people thinking about us being a 
thought leader and a visionary, and being able to take calculated, 
high value risks, like we have done in the last ten years. " [DR: 9] 
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However, this positive culture is represented as aspirational, whereas the 
negative cultural elements are seen as exerting a real negative influence on the 
current organisation, as this comment on short termism indicates. 
"I think the HR, and top management as a whole, is thinking long 
term. I think they're thinking long term. Doing this, does show. But 
then everybody's crumbling because everyone's got quality, 
targets. And we get stuck into this environment ... How is this 
possible? This is ridiculous. That to me is very clear. This doesn't 
make sense. " [JD: 4] 
These negatives are also seen as impacting HR, as the following quote from an 
HR respondent suggests. 
" ... we're tactical now. 'Til the end of the year, that's what I see, that's the message. That's the message that's come from [the 
CEO], that comes from anywhere. We need our 01, we want our 
bonus pool, we're not hiring, we're looking short term, then Reuters 
comes and then everything will be fine. To sum up - you know - 
seriously this is, so why bother? Em why should I fight? You know 
you pick your fights ... why should you try and do something that's 
not - valued. " [RA: 7] 
There was also a second variant on context: this respondent reverts to a 
management philosophy argument, seeing the way in which change is managed 
as a stylistic choice, discrete from the business drivers. 
"... the business strategy is in isolation from the management 
philosophy. You could run we could run this business in a Goldman 
Sachs style, if we wanted to. No issue, it would be a completely 
different philosophy and feeling around the business, but we could 
certainly still achieve the same kind of aims. Wouldn't be the same 
people (laughs), doing it, but it would be the same aims ... you 
could certainly run this business, on a basis of we're gonna go with 
twenty percent organic growth, but we're gonna do it in a Goldman 
Sachs style. Which would mean essentially every month we'd look 
at sales numbers and we'd can the bottom anybody who was less 
than eighty percent of quota for that month. That kind of thing. We 
could absolutely run it like that. No question. " [MH: 15/16] 
"... I think it's totally separate. I mean the business strategy, this is 
what the business looks like, this is where we wanna get to. What 
style do we wanna run the business in? Almost a separate 
decision. We could do it either way. Mean Thomson, nice 
Thomson. " [MH: 16] 
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This suggests two inferences for HR, firstly in that it suggests that the factors 
driving HR strategy do not operate as a single system or as a limited range of 
variations, but that they operate independent of one another. This infers that a 
diagnostic approach to initial strategy development, rather than the utilisation of 
one factor (such as the `bundled HR activities' repertoire infers) may be more 
useful. 
Secondly, the influence of culture on HR may relate as much to a conscious 
choice of management philosophy as to cultural factors: HR must be stylistically 
responsive as much as driven by business strategy. This relates to Tyson's 
concept of HR's role in managing organisational meaning: the way in which HR 
processes are conducted can be a powerful conveyor of messages about 
organisational values and priorities. 
iv) Normative Factors 
In Asia, normative factors such as legislation are not seen as exerting a 
significant influence: 
"In certain countries, (laws are) ... different, but we've come to a like a bare minimum, the common denominator in the region for 
what we want ... So that's really the only way that I would think they would influence ... our daily work. " [DH: 10] 
Best practice, another potential normative factor, is also not seen as influential: 
"I do wanna be aware of like employment laws when they change 
and what we can and can't do ... But it wouldn't be that influential. The biggest thing is just being in touch with the market in those 
different regions. So not so much you know recruitment best 
practices, of course attending conferences here and there and sort 
of hearing best practices globally, how to set up a recruitment 
function, that's always what we aim for, but I don't I would say that 
market knowledge and the latest market scoops and what's 
happening is probably the biggest influence on how we recruit. " 
[DH: 10] 
6.2.1.3. The Impact of Change on HR Strategy 
A final environmental influence was considered in project three: the impact of 
change. 
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6.2.1.3.1. Types of Change 
However, the consideration of change immediately raised an definitional issue: a 
clear distinction emerged in the discourses around change between proactive 
and reactive change. 
"... yes, we're good at change, but not change that we're not in 
control of. " [DR: 13] 
"As an organisation what struck me I think in the last couple of 
weeks was, we are very effective in BAU. Including the changing, 
you know steady state BAU, changes and everything else. But this 
kind of a thing is more of a disruptive upheaval, and for that you 
need a lot more. " [SV: 10] 
6.2.1.3.1.1. Reactive Change 
The Reuters acquisition is described as an unprecedented type of change, in 
both scale and locus of control. The unprecedented size of the acquisition is 
seen as pushing the organisation into the unknown. 
"I think this is a remarkably unusual change. Because you know 
we're the one doing the buying, and we're the one who's good at 
change and integration, but we're now gonna integrate something 
bigger than us ... I think the sheer scale of it, and the fact that we 
may not necessarily be in the driving seat of everything, right. 
Because I think the changes we've been through before have 
always been us pulling in something that's like ten percent or less 
of the company size. So that's a group hug sort of approach, come 
in and welcome to the family. Whereas this is well beyond that. 
[DR: 12/13] 
The point is raised that the change was not initiated by TF, as it was undertaken 
by the Thomson family, without consultation with any of the TF management. 
"... the whole senior management in Thomson wasn't involved, this 
was between you know, the select family and the select family, on 
the vendor side. " [KBM: 8] 
Change which is not under TF's control ('reactive change') is seen problematic 
for change management. 
"... this is not necessarily voluntary from TF's point of view. Right. 
We as an organisation, we did not make a decision to do this. This 
is being done, to us. And it's being done with an extremely large 
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weapon as well (laughs) in the shape of Reuters. And we'll never 
look the same again. And we're not gonna turn Reuters into us. 
Which is what we did to other integrations: we turned those 
companies into us ... I think it goes back just to the sheer scale. Right? Because you can do that, if you are a, voluntarily and b, 
ingesting something that is able to be ingested. There's no 
ingestion going on here. Right? It's a huge challenge, putting two 
things together like this. " [DR: 13] 
"... we all understand that the Reuters thing is a very intricate 
merger, that there's a lot of no-dos, don't-do and sort of thing, don't 
talk ahead of the merger. Doesn't make anyone's life easier. 
Including yours. Now again, we've had increasingly the feeling, 
yes, that that was a Reuters merger. Reuters buy out. And for all 
of the communication going out, it's clear for everyone that a lot of 
top jobs are going to be clearly Reuters. We do appreciate this 
from a TOC perspective, because at the end of the day, they've 
done the best of it, they've bought a very large company and that's 
fine. Now, it would probably be good to make sure we secure good 
TF people, and send the message across that, hey guys, you have 
a job in this organisation. Not something like, 'I can assure you, 
you have a job'. And the more you can be specific, the more we 
can retain talent in this organisation. " [JD: 2] 
Reactive change, consequently, is seen as a disruptive influence which makes 
previous formulations of strategy and ways of working irrelevant. 
... So this 
is I think is unprecedented. We don't know how to deal 
with this bit, so we're learning as we're going along. " [DR: 12/13] 
"I think that as an organisation, this has caught us so back on our 
heels we're not prepared, we got ahead of ourselves, I think that we 
were you know nobody expected what we have tried to do, and I 
don't think we had the infrastructure in place ... we don't have I think the capabilities within the organisation, yet, to do that. I think 
we've got a ways to go in HR. " [KBM: 8] 
As such, reactive change operates as a constraint, rather than an environmental 
factor, and will be discussed further in section 6.3.1.3. 
6.2.1.3.2.2. Proactive Change 
Proactive change, however, is represented in a very different way from reactive 
change. Respondents echo the organisation's stated view that change is a core 
competency. 
"... it seems like we do a lot of change, we should have a lot of 
experience on that. " [WLC: 7] 
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However, there is doubt expressed that simply doing a lot of change equates to 
doing it well. 
"So I believe we are really changing a lot, but are we good at it, I 
dunno. Just because you go through that kind of cycle many many 
times, doesn't necessarily mean you're doing it good. " [WLC: 6/7] 
i) The Influence of Business Strategy 
MH's management philosophy argument, referenced earlier, is extended to 
represent the way in which change is managed as a stylistic choice. For this 
respondent, how an organisation chooses to manage change, and the approach 
taken to emotional support, depends on the style in which it wants to operate. 
"... it's then the HR function's role to make sure that that activity 
(make redundancies) is done in a style for which the company 
would like to be known. (Laughs) Do we want to do Merrill Lynch 
style 'my way or the highway', 'thank you very much, don't let the 
door hit you on the way out', or do you wanna do it in the slightly 
you know probably more TF way of 'okay, understand, let's work to 
an exit', it's 'why don't you look for something else, we'll give you a 
couple of months, three months, not gonna turf you out the door but 
clearly we're coming to an end, we'll support you while you know 
you move on to another role'. That kind of thing. You've gotta pick 
one or the other approaches, I think. I suspect we'll be down at the 
more cuddly end of it, because I think that's the way people wanna 
be seen operating the Thomson business, but it's a very clear 
choice. " [MH: 14/15] 
He echoes the 'best practice' or generic HR approach as he compares the Merrill 
Lynch style to the 'more cuddly' approach. 
"... there's a benefit in both of those as well, because ... there's a benefit in if you take the supportive route then that gives you certain 
plus points in that area of emotional feeling. Within the existing 
organisation and with people coming in. Because you get a 
reputation for being supportive. So you know it works both ways, I 
think ... If you're putting yourself out as a caring and a stroke 
paternalistic employer, then people would join you for at least partly 
people will make a decision you know based on that reputation. 
Whether to join you or not. " [MH: 15] 
There is also a sense in this respondent's discourse that the organisation's 
environment may require management of ambiguity, rather than management of 
change, and that this may limit the organisation's ability to manage change. 
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"Now the question is does change and dealing with ambiguity the 
same thing? I don't know. And I think they probably need to do a 
lot more introspection, whether our organisation is more 
ambiguous, or whether it's constantly changing. I do not know 
whether there's a massive difference there. " [SV: 4/5] 
ii) The Influence of Context 
The influence of context on HR's ability to effectively support change is seen as a 
negative in an environment of planned change, in the same way it is seen as 
problematic in a steady state environment. The short termist culture described in 
TF's cultural web is seen as creating a deleterious influence on HR's ability to 
promote initiatives with a longer term payoff. 
"... it sounded great, doing a culture audit and then ... some 
follow 
up and working through it. Nothing ever really came out of it. So. 
This is how the organisation deals with change. We might have an 
idea, and oh we might start something, but then, oh yes, other 
important things, so we'll go left again, or right. And not follow 
through. " [RA: 9] 
"I think we do as an organisation we do we go here the path of least 
resistance. In a lot of circumstances. That goes a little bit away 
from change, but ... if you touch on the Corporate organisation, there are a lot of other things we could have done ... to shake it up 
or to challenge it more, to get another foot into that door, which 
didn't happen. Which were raised, which were discussed. And 
`yeah fine, why, it's kind of working, it's kind of flowing, good, fine'. 
Your decision! " [RA: 11 ] 
Organisational immaturity and the entrepreneurial nature of the organisation are 
also cited as factors which inhibit systematic change management, as they 
engender resilient employees, for whom change management is not a high 
priority. 
"... the only explanation that I've had on that (poor change 
management) is because ... at least on the 
Thomson side, it's 
grown through acquisition of small organisations, which are 
basically entrepreneurial. The average entrepreneur doesn't think 
of what he's building as part of a change process. So there's I 
would assume that a fair number of people have much more sense 
of resilience of handling whether it's change, ambiguity, uncertainty 
or risk. So the temperament is probably what carries most of us 
through, a lot of this. And because it's driven by temperament 
you're not even conscious that you're dealing with half of it. ... So 
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possibly because your people by, this predominant significantly by 
these kind of temperaments, in positions of whatever it is, I guess 
they've not felt the need to kind of put a structure, compared to a 
person who has not had, who comes at it from a different place. 
Would feel the need. " [SV: 6] 
This argument, using a Paauwe-type configuration factor, suggests that an 
implicit, unconscious competence in organisational agility is an underlying reason 
for the lack of explicit change management capability. 
iii) The Influence of the Actors 
The influence of the actors is seen as critical in defining organisational priorities, 
and de-emphasising change management. 
"I don't think ... it's HR's responsibility. Because what we do is we 
alert them and we can actually push certain things along ... I think it's the organisation. It comes from the top. It's what is important to 
us. What does ... [the MD] talk about, what does [the Head of HR] talk about. Not only talk but do. Implement. Where are their 
priorities? 
Which then gets driven through the organisation, and so here for 
example, in Asia, and if you have a [MD] for example, who would 
put time aside, who would join some of the calls or meetings around 
change management, if we are just currently go through something. 
That will then make the next level more receptive, and more open. 
I think everybody knows the theory, everybody understands it, 
knows how important it is. But even if you don't do it, Thomson still 
carries on. That's the unfortunate side. " [RA: 3] 
"... that stems from the top as well. Your directorate of propaganda 
would have to be something that was sanctioned from a Thomson 
Corporation this is a good thing and we will do it. You can't you 
know you couldn't just stick your hand up and say we're gonna do 
that for Asia. I mean alright you could, but it would be really hard 
because you know kind of everybody else would be saying why are 
you doing that? What's all that about? Why are you trying to set off 
on a lone furrow? " [MH: 18] 
A strong theme emerges that change, not change management, is seen as the 
organisational priority in TF. 
[Change management] It's on the side ... the actual change is a lot 
more important, is like ninety nine percent out there and this 
change management is like one percent gets mentioned. That's 
how I receive it. " [RA: 3] 
430 
6.2.1.3.2. Implications for the Descriptive Research Model 
As discussed earlier, at one level, change is referenced by respondents as a 
straightforward environmental factor to which the organisation must respond, 
hence its categorisation as an environmental factor and place on the first row of 
the model is likely to be correct. 
However, there are two complexities with this simple placement of change. 
Firstly it appears that it is only applicable to proactive change, not reactive. 
Reactive change is seen as qualitatively different from proactive change, 
operates as a disruptive element, and has more similarity with a constraint on the 
organisation's ability to realise an intended HR strategy: it operates as a 
mediating level factor between the intended HR strategy and the realised HR 
approach. 
Secondly, when one begins to analyse the discourse around proactive change, 
the situation becomes more complex. Like a matryoshka doll, once one starts to 
open up change as a discursive topic, it becomes apparent that respondents see 
the change itself as influenced by the business strategy and contextual factors. 
Furthermore, the organisational actors are also seen as influential, suggesting 
that respondents do not see proactive change as qualitatively different from 
steady state. This infers that the descriptive research model needs to have a 
further reference to change in the middle part of the model. 
6.2.2. Mediating Level: Discourse Around the Influence of the Actors 
The analysis of contextual factors provided above suggests, as in project two, 
that Thomson Financial in Asia is not perceived as overly influenced by the 
business strategy or contextual factors such as global systems, market, culture or 
normative factors. Proactive change, likewise, is not seen as a powerful 
influence. In Paauwe's language, this would suggest that the "dominant 
coalition" would have significant room for manoeuvre and would exert a powerful 
influence. 
6.2.2.1. Who are the Influential Actors? 
Although no explicit question was asked around 'who does HR', several 
respondents referenced the influence of a number of people on the approach to 
HR, pre-eminent of which was the HRD. 
"HR as a functional group is very much a reflection of the director of 
HR, and how that person chooses to interact with the business. 
And maybe it's not a choice, I don't, choose maybe the wrong word, 
but how that person's perception of what HR's role is, maybe within 
the business. " [SK: 1] 
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"... the management team didn't change, and I don't think our 
strategy [changed] ... but I think it really was more a reflection of the strengths of the head of HR, that we were working with, and 
what skills they brought to the table, which influenced the way that 
we engaged with HR as across the business. " [SK: 3] 
"The guy who ran [HR] ... was a Canadian, who had been moved to Japan, for a couple of years. So he brought US ... HR process out. Because normally in Asia I'd dealt with local Asians who had taken 
over the role, and often you know the people who'd been put into 
HR had no real HR background. They were like a secretary who'd 
been promoted into an administrative position, then ended up ... here, who're completely unqualified, but they've been around a long 
time and they've been willing to work hard. So this guy was a real 
HR professional ... he really brought process. Right? And he 
actually just got rid of all the other HR people in the region and 
recruited new ones, who were HR professionals ... who followed his 
way of dealing with it. And that was what made the difference is he 
was an HR professional, from the ground up. Not just someone 
who just ended up by accident. " [DR: 3] 
This view of the need to have HR professionals in place offers a contrary 
perspective to that offered by a number of other respondents in the study (this 
will be discussed in a later section). 
Returning to the influence of the actors, The influence of other HR teams is 
reported as variable. Some respondents cite them as influential. 
"I feel like there was a change when [the new head of HR for 
Thomson Corporation] came on board], and more of a partnership 
and more of a 'here's your dedicated person for each of the 
segments or groups' ... the HR business partners sit in on the 
management meetings with each of the teams, and getting to know 
the business and the players, and the personalities and all of that 
... enables you all I think to understand the organisation and what it 
might need ... going forward. " [KG: 1] 
"(The influence exerted by HR is) huge. And you need to keep 
them in the loop ... keeping HR in the loop is pretty important on a day to day casual basis, keep just getting them involved in 
meetings for L&D, ensuring that it fits in with other HR strategies is 
absolutely critical. Because it does L&D does cross over, with the 
advisory role of HR. Or OD certainly does, anyway ... I guess what I would do is, without HR is just not possible, because I'm very 
much about business delivery. " [CP2: 9] 
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Although contrarily, the recruiter sees process as the main driver, and the 
influence of other players as consequently limited. 
"The rest of the HR function? Hm. I think they influence us of 
course because ... they hold the regional HR policies and 
procedures of course ... So we of course need to follow their 
policies for that, and that would influence how we work. But as far 
as how we go day to day recruitment or process, I wouldn't think it 
would affect too much. " [DH: 10] 
"(HR staff) can offer a bit of advice in the beginning of the process 
... They can give a bit of advice on you know what types of people 
might fit, but again it's sort of it's very minor sort of how that would 
influence how we would recruit. I suppose. As opposed to 
process. " [DH: 10] 
In terms of the influence of the business actors, the MD is seen as impacting HR 
in two ways: firstly, he is seen as lacking in appreciation of HR's potential 
contribution, which his own quote shows. 
"... it's a cultural thing as well ... Because my background's 
in 
brokerage and ... they don't give a damn, you know. HR 
is about 
making sure that people are paid, making sure the contracts are 
watertight, and sacking 'em with the least amount of fuss. Literally, 
and that was what I was used to and kind of alright with that, that 
was just the way it worked. And so to come into an organisation 
which ... genuinely believes in talent management and planning 
for 
continuity and succession ... It took me a while to believe that that 
was - true. Fighting twenty years of programming. " [MH: 10] 
This suggests that a knowledgeable business head is required to allow a 
proactive HR service to emerge, using the 'business leads HR' repertoire in an 
interesting way, alluding to what can happen when the business fails to lead HR 
and fails to provide visible sponsorship. 
"(The MD) never really understood what HR could do, he was 
exclusive rather than inclusive, in many many cases ... that ... is his style, and I think that didn't help us, or some sort of visibility and 
leadership, that the organisation can feel. " [RA2: 8] 
Secondly, using a construct which echoes the references to the mismatched 
dominant coalition in project two, the respondent indicates that the MD's 
management style resulted in a management team who do not coalesce as a 
unit. 
"... not only of HR, I mean his way of communication was here a 
little bit, this person a little bit, and they can kind of try and figure it 
out between themselves, asking have you heard this, have you 
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been involved? There was always very very very difficult to get 
anything together, as a team. I don't think it was ever a good 
functioning management team here either. " [RA2: 8] 
This is seen as having constrained HR. 
"So how well are we doing that? ... bit tricky for me this one because I think specifically here we didn't get ahead of that curve, 
quickly enough. 
So Manila's a great example, we're only now getting to factory 
process in Manila, which is where I think we should have been 
some time ago, in reality ... I'm so used to a completely uncaring 
and unsupportive HR environment ... So to come into an 
organisation which is genuinely proactive in ... HR was a little bit of 
a culture shock for me. So it took a little while to get used to that. 
And maybe if I'd been more used to it when I came in, I might have 
identified earlier that we were being a bit slow in gearing ourselves 
up to be proactive rather than reactive. " [MH: 9] 
Corresponding to the comments about the lack of drive from the MD, the 
business actors here are seen as creating little or no `pull' for strategic HR 
products, resulting in the creation of a strategic vacuum. 
"... we'd have to look at where do the managers come from. I 
mean a number of the managers come from abroad, so there's no 
excuse, but others are here, all of their life, more or less, or are 
local managers, and they don't know anything different. They don't 
they don't even think about that HR could or should be involved in 
certain things and should do more than just the tactical work. So if 
nobody comes and shows them what it could look like, there will be 
no push. " [RA2: 4] 
Senior HR figures, hence, are seen as the centre of the dominant coalition and 
there is an inference that HR in Asia drives the business to its agenda (legitimate 
or illegitimate). Senior managers are seen only as a non-influence, and 
employee stakeholders are not mentioned, for instance), The potential mitigating 
influence of a strong, HR literate MD does not exist, hence HR has the ability to 
work in the way it sees fit, but does not have powerful, legitimating support from 
the MD. 
6.2.2.2. The Actors' Expectations of HR in Steady State 
Discourse describing the actors' expectations of HR in a steady state 
environment between the relationship between the actors and HR is 
characterised by four interpretative repertoires: 'business leads HR', 'HR as 
strategy versus 'HR as tactical execution', 'multiple roles' and the 'super-ordinate 
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role of HR'. These repertoires indicate how HR's role is perceived by the actors 
and give an indication of the role HR is expected to play. 
6.2.2.2.1. `Business Leads HR' 
The 'business leads HR' repertoire is clearly in evidence in the discourse of 
project three's respondents. 
"... you were in organisations in which the customer really drove the 
business strategy. And HR supported the business strategy. HR 
were partners at the table, but the business really drove the 
strategy. " [KBM: 1] 
The business is seen as a profound influence on HR, with the emphasis on the 
business leading and determining HR rather than development of a partnership. 
"... it was up to me to set the [business] strategy. Where do I need 
to be? ... so I had to set the parameters about what is what 
wanted [from HR]. " [DR: 2] 
"I certainly think that the business drives what we do. And I think 
that having [a business person] as the leader of HR, that we try 
very hard to make sure that what we're doing, and the overall TF 
HR structure, aligns with what the business is asking for. " [KBM: 2] 
"[The previous HRD's approach] ... was still around the more traditional HR stuff of trying to get the right people into here to run a 
successful business as opposed to helping to define the business 
strategy ... I think she tried to steer ... [the MD's] strategy, 
but 
again it was more as a result of what she was hearing around the 
organisation ... as opposed to her own ... desire to impact the 
strategy or her own ability to contribute to that strategy, it was more 
of here's someone's strategy, how do I ... help support that? " [SK: 4] 
This leads to a need to analyse the business's expectations of HR: if, indeed, the 
business does lead HR, what does it expect it to do? This can be summarised in 
the second and third repertoires: 'HR as strategy' versus 'HR as tactical 
execution'. 
6.2.2.2.2. `HR as Strategy' Versus `HR as Tactical Execution' 
Given that 'business leads HR', it is necessary to look at the role posited for HR 
by business respondents. This section looks at the interpretative repertoires 
around HR as 'HR as strategy' versus 'HR as tactical execution'. This was 
represented in project two as the 'strategy versus tactics' repertoire, but given 
that one of the objectives of project three was a deconstruction of the term 
'strategy', the analysis was deepened for project three, looking at the value 
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associations made with each of these: whereas the latter is linked to 
administration, the former presents HR as business value-add. 
Both business and HR respondents in project three make a similar distinction 
between HR as administration and HR as business value-add to those in project 
two, several respondents commenting positively on the change from 
transactional to business focused HR in TF Asia. 
"... over the past four years or so, ... I've seen a change in HR becoming more of the kind of strategic partner and getting to 
understand the business. " [KG: 1] 
This business respondent sees tactical execution and strategy as both necessary 
aspects of the HR role. 
"I think HR is extremely critical in terms of as a business partner. I 
see it on two or three levels. Purely you have a business strategy 
which you need to execute, and they need to see how best to 
support it. So it could be in terms of okay, we've got to recruit 
people, so how do you build pipelines, how do what's the best way 
of doing things. The other side of it is in terms of making sure that 
the execution is really effective and building the capability for doing 
it. So that's more about the nuts and bolts of how the HR side of it 
works. So that's it you need it for execution itself. " [SV: 1] 
However, she goes on to comment that the administrative side is not consistently 
well done. 
"I think the place where we fail is to close the execution loop on 
many things. I think we are good you know at let's say the eighty 
percent of the routine things. The twenty percent gets dropped. I'm 
talking about the routine execution stuff. " [SV: 2] 
An HR respondent uses Dave Ulrich's model to explain the difference between 
the various roles of HR. 
"... where [the other Thomson company] I suspect is stuck is in the 
old realm of administrative expert, or perceived administrative 
expert ... And therefore quite literally becomes a tick 
in the box 
exercise, to the business it's like sorry we have to do this but we 
just have to get it done ... because someone else says so ... 
Not 
even me as the HR director. It's someone else that's telling me. " 
[CP: 3] 
Note that there is a value judgement associated with these two repertoires: the 
'tactical execution' repertoire is devalued and seen as a 'policing role', imposed 
by HR upon the business. 
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This value differentiation is emphasised when CP goes on to contrast the 
administrative role with a functional expert, consultant, role. 
"... versus being a functional expert of both the tool and who you're 
dealing with. Selling it and then getting the case for it and so forth 
and being a consultant, realise that you are a cost to the business. " 
[CP: 3] 
This distinction between administration and business value add is echoed by the 
business respondents. 
"... (I saw HR as) more of a control function ... an administrative function. Until my previous company, where I had a much much 
better experience, where there was a business driven HR function 
... it was the first time I'd come across HR being proactive about things like talent management, trying to build appropriate recruiting 
functions for each country, understanding the way that countries 
needs to recruit and identify talent. " [DR: 1] 
"I've had more unsuccessful than successful, experiences (with 
HR), and I'm not sure whether it's an Asian thing or a more generic 
thing is most of the HR I've come across has been people who 
view HR's role as not a lot more than documenting procedure ... 
and not much of a business function. " [DR: 1] 
"... that's unfortunately way too common in Asia is you find you get 
these HR people who just view it as an administrative role. It's not. 
No executive role should be administrative (laughs). Every single 
one should be strategic ... Every single one should be connected to the business ... Right? And not just a means of documenting 
process. That's part of HR's role, don't get me wrong, but it's not 
what the executive members of the team should be doing. They 
should be doing what you're doing, which is trying to look out where 
the business needs the help, and we can influence the strategy that 
has been set. " [DR: 3] 
Although HR respondents making the same point are more overtly critical, as in 
this quote, where the use of the word 'insecurity' infers an underlying motivation 
for HR's non-involvement with the business: the capability of HR staff. 
"I see with other HR functions ... 
is, number one, they don't 
understand the business, they don't know the products. Nor do 
they see the case for attending [a] sales ... conference. 
Or any 
other, or sitting in on business initiatives. They don't see the case 
for that. They don't see it as their role. Or they feel insecure, in 
doing that because they don't perceive that they'll be contributing at 
all. Therefore they steer away from it. So by not understanding the 
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business, being inductive to the markets, the products, the culture, 
or even the personalities of the leaders, they come from a different 
angle which is imposing, I guess, their beliefs, experience and 
values, based on the past. Again all well intentioned. And a lot of 
judgements made on behaviours ... So I guess I've seen first hand the damage that that can do. " [CP: 2] 
Note that both of these respondents choose examples outside the TF 
environment, suggests that they may be unwilling to offer any perceived criticism 
of the researcher in her role of HRD, and that there may be some researcher bias 
in operation. 
The two roles are value laden, and similarly higher value is placed on the non- 
administrative role to that articulated in project two. 
"HR is not about payroll. We can outsource payroll. You cannot 
outsource HR. You've gotta understand it. You've gotta 
understand the needs of the guys. " [JD: 9] 
"I think when we look at getting HR involved in the business, it's 
gotta be more than just reporting on recruiting on open positions 
and training. " [AD: 4] 
A strong linkage is developed between HR as an administrative function and HR 
as an illegitimate source of control in the business. The metaphor of HR as 
`police', which appeared in project two, is reproduced here. 
" [HRBPs] look like 'I'm following 
PMAT, did you do your comp, did 
do this, did you do that'. " [KBM: 6] 
up with you on did you do your 
you, I'm your HR police, did you 
N... (I saw HR as) more of a control function ... an administrative function. " [DR: 1] 
The focus on the transactional is seen as causing problems for HR, causing inter- 
functional problems. 
"... the problems within the HR function it causes, potential disunity, 
within ... the 
HR generalists. Versus a true business partner's ... It 
causes problems within the function as well. Because you've got 
also HR generalists supporting different functions as well, and there 
could be conflicts between those, departments as well. " [CP: 3] 
And a problematic relationship with the business. 
"... this is where I think HR needs to watch out. And this is services 
in general ... some functions like Finance, consider themselves, 
almost take the fact that they're a cost centre, they even ignore that 
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and take their role for granted. And don't manage themselves as 
internal consultants. So I think HR needs to and it's got no choice, 
but to start being more authentically in demand by the business. " 
[CP: 4] 
And a limitation on HR's strategic involvement. 
"I don't think we're involved in the good parts about this business 
(slight laugh). The acquisitions, the ... exciting innovation pieces of the business. The strategy, really talking about the priorities. " 
[KBM: 6] 
This is also presented as a potentially damaging, self-perpetuating cycle. 
"... here's a danger, not only for the business, but for up and 
coming HR professionals, such as a smart girl like [a junior HRBP]. 
So she had some limited experience ... and you could see that there was just something wrong for her. There was a difference. 
So, at TILR it was 'push back on the business' ... the principles of HR where she came from was, around that 'they're wrong, we're 
right, they don't get the process and they're not experts, but we are, 
and we dictate to them. ' So I think she was a bit conflicted, based 
on her limited experience beforehand, on what she didn't need to 
do. Now what that caused is, number one, she pushed back a lot 
of work which actually paradoxically I guess served to just to get 
her more involved in administrative type of stuff, versus consulting 
with the business. " [CP: 4/5] 
"The danger is that these people [HRDs working in the 
administrative expert mode] are bringing up people in that way... 
there is this backlash and fear from the traditional HR community as 
well right now, as they see that [business partner model] coming 
up. " [CP: 8] 
However, although transactional support is seen as the traditional role for HR. 
"... through a lot of that crisis management, HR have been 
involved, and I think that's traditionally that's probably, after the 
horse has bolted, HR comes in and tries to sort out the problem, 
and why did that person leave and so on. By having a lot of that 
kind of so called day to day fire-fighting, " [AD: 2] 
An alternative view represents this as a way into the business for HR and a lead 
into more strategic dialogues with the business. 
"... from an HR, engagement with the business, through that fire 
fighting process, is then we've actually had to really go back to 
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basics and really understand how scalable is this business. 'Cause 
it is gonna double in size in the next two years. So it ain't gonna 
double the way it is at the moment, so, that's probably one of the 
most regular conversations with my management team is, okay 
that's fine the way it is, sort it out for today, but in six months or 
twelve months time, is this gonna be suitable? ... And I think that's 
where I'm finding HR is really very valuable, in that role. " [AD: 3] 
"... we've got everything else that falls under the HR umbrella ... But again, it's having got into the business with the fire-fighting, 
understanding the business structure. " [AD: 4] 
There is an inference of the 'permissioning' of HR to operate at the strategic 
level, which is also seen in KG's discourses on the need for excellent tactical 
execution referenced in the previous section. 
6.2.2.2.3. `Multiple Roles' 
The 'Multiple Roles' repertoire refers to the requirement articulated by the 
participants that HR is expected to play multiple roles. 
"I think I would have put (HR roles) in order business number one 
and the employee champion number three, out of those. At least 
from my perspective. But from the perspective of the ... average 
staff it should be the other way round ... HR is viewed primarily as the best friend of everybody in the organisation, but not a push 
over. Not that warm touchy feely thing. It has to have a side that's 
happy to say no. Right? " [DR: 5] 
"I think HR is extremely critical in terms of as a business partner. I 
see it on two or three levels. Purely you have a business strategy 
which you need to execute, and they need to see how best to 
support it. Er so it could be in terms of okay, we've got to recruit 
people, so how do you build pipelines, how do what's the best way 
of doing things. The other side of it is in terms of making sure that 
the execution is really effective and building the capability for doing 
it. So that's more about the nuts and bolts of how the HR side of it 
works. So that's it you need it for execution itself. 
The other piece of it, which is frankly far more critical, is in terms of 
their ability to understand human behaviour and therefore help 
business see certain interpret situations more effectively ... 
The third part is help with the communication. It could be 
communication with the staff, it could be communication with the 
peers, it could be communication upward or outside the day to day 
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operations. And in our kind of matrix world, try and see how the 
matrix, the communication matrix itself, have a better sense of that. 
Because HR as a community is a partner with almost every 
business group. And how well can they pick up what are the let's 
say the drivers, one is the business drivers, the other is what are 
the implications of some of those business drivers in the team, 
because maybe that particular group is going through far more 
change than you are, and therefore it needs to be kind of, certain 
issues need to be, you need to be aware of it. So when you're 
communicating, you're far more alert in communicating the right 
information proactively. Rather than saying a passive 'oh you know 
we have a weekly call', kind of thing. So they can actually act as a 
bridge. There are some that are able to do it far more effectively 
than others. " [SV: 1/2] 
This creates potential conflicts in prioritisation and role definition, supporting the 
concept of HR strategy being a negotiated, emergent, and perhaps post 
rationalised process. 
Although the actors tend to be seen as a broadly positive influence on HR, three 
negative consequences were articulated. The first is the impact of a non-HR 
literate MD and lack of 'push' from the management team, as referenced above. 
Secondly, the short termist culture of TF (as described in the section 
characterizing TF and the cultural web diagram) is seen as ultimately hampering 
the organisation in the longer term. The inference is that whilst HR is led by the 
business (the 'business leads HR' repertoire will be discussed in the next 
section), it can be led in the wrong direction. This quote provides an example, 
where HR is not seen as challenging the organisation's short termism. 
"I think HR has to be flexible, because yes, there are some short 
term fixes. But there needs to be a longer term picture, and the 
long term picture is around, okay we want the best people. And the 
best people, how do you get the best people? How do you retain 
those people, how do you grow them? ... So I think actually HR is 
probably not doing the right amount of pressure and not pointing 
enough at the fact that the human resources and staff, is just 
everything. What is the quality of the organisation? If our service is 
crap, we're in service, if our service is crap, the results will be crap, 
then that's it. If sales don't reach out, if support don't do their job if 
they won't go the extra mile ... as a whole TF needs a longer term 
strategy. " [JD: 4] 
This raises a question around timeframe. In a short termist business, how does 
HR (many of the activities of which - e. g. talent management and learning & 
development - have impact only over the longer term) function? 
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6.2.2.2.4. `Super-ordinate Role of HR' 
An interesting repertoire which emerged in this study was the `super-ordinate role 
of HR' repertoire, which appeared to suggest that participants expect HR to play 
a higher order or super-ordinate role. This role is unlikely to be directly derived 
from business strategy, and may indeed run contrary to it. 
HR is seen as having a super-ordinate responsibility to demonstrate integrity. 
"I wonder if it's a challenge for ... (HR) folks to keep their objectivity, because they are a member of the management team ... and 
is it a 
challenge for her [the EVP of HR] to keep her objectivity and be that 
you know kind of voice of reason. " [KG: 2] 
Furthermore, it is seen as a touchstone for organisational values, hinting at a role 
for HR in managing organisational meaning. 
"HR is a representative organisation of how you do things. " [CP: 10] 
There is an inference in the quote above that HR has a responsibility to 'do the 
right thing' for an organisation, irrespective of whether this is recognised or 
requested by the business: this is characterised as the 'super-ordinate role of HR' 
repertoire and is the counter-balance to the'HR as illegitimate' repertoire. 
This repertoire raises an interesting conundrum for HR. Does the function do 
what the business articulates that it wants or expects, or is there a 'super- 
ordinate' role which HR is obligated to perform? This super-ordinate role is 
described as the identification, education and delivery of needs which the 
business has not yet perceived. It is also used to describe the requirement for 
HR to do the 'right' thing, even when the articulated business directive runs in a 
contrary direction. Is it appropriate for HR to go 'against' the business where it 
has identified a need not yet perceived or acknowledged by the business? 
The 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire tends to be used when respondents 
are discussing issues which they believe to be legitimate, but which the business 
has not yet perceived the need to address. It is interesting, however, how this 
respondent is aware of the potential negativity around this, and feels it necessary 
to qualify this behaviour as "not underhanded". 
"The business may perceive this is where we wanna go, we wanna 
get there quickly, HR does things in parallel. One is almost like a 
stealth stream. Does that make sense? And manages a lot of that 
interference. Em I mean it's authentic it's not underhanded, but 
also delivering on what they want. " [CP: 6] 
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Linked to the 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire, thus, is an 'HR as legitimate' 
repertoire. However, this repertoire is also found in the negative: 'HR as 
illegitimate'. In this quote, the influence of the HRD and his use of power is 
perceived as negative and illegitimate. 
",,, the way [a Thomson sister company] works, as an HR model is 
... almost more manipulative in terms of the way it works with the 
senior leadership group ... the way I see it is the HR director will 
almost try to manipulate ... the business strategy ... What the 
approach was there of the HRD was to go to his boss and say ... this is what he needs. ... So they kind of drive, again well intentioned way of what the HR director perceived he saw from 
initial conversation, and ... [what] he saw fit.... more imposing his 
view, based on his experience, of what the business needed. " 
[CP: 1 /2] 
"... it starts from the top ... The same individual [HRD] can play 
each of the directors off, depending on their needs, but maintain 
some kind of relationship. " [CP: 3] 
This is endorsed by the L&D representative uses the 'HR as illegitimate' 
repertoire to suggest that HR may gain influence (and hence negotiating power) 
by attending to the personal needs of the executives. 
"... it's an integrity issue, what I've seen, firsthand, is that if you 
manage as an HR director the personal needs, and sometimes 
wants, of the very top people, you get away with it ... that's what's happening. That's how they manage. That's how they see 
relationship management, within the business ... if you as a key business leader ... if I can protect (the executive's) expat package, 
or whatever else she needs for her function, to look good, then I'm 
being an effective HR partner. And the way that's sold - and the 
rest of the HR function can see it, that that's what's going on. And 
the business, but it doesn't matter. Because the key decision 
makers, have got this relationship with them. So that's business 
partnering to them. " [CP: 10] 
This raises an extremely interesting question. Given that both business and HR 
respondents see that there is a need for HR to play a 'super-ordinate' role, how 
does HR ensure that that is legitimate and - perhaps more importantly - 
perceived as such? One can see that the HRD in this case may believe that he 
is playing an appropriate role (and doubtless the same could be said of the "HR 
police" referred to elsewhere in the projects), but that this is not a view which is 
shared by other actors in the organisation. Seeing strategy as a negotiated 
process between the actors, one can see how different views around the super- 
ordinate role and the legitimacy of this may differ. 
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This section suggests a major conundrum for HR: business managers have an 
expectation that HR will be an upholder of organisational integrity, and will be a 
challenger to a business which is not 'doing the right thing'. However, there is a 
secondary repertoire around legitimacy, which creates an issue: as legitimacy is 
a perception and a politicised social construction, the pressure on HR to perform 
a super-ordinate role is open to claims that it is illegitimately using its power. 
6.2.2.3. The Actors' Expectations of HR in a Change Scenario 
Respondents specifically discussed their expectation of HR in a change scenario, 
setting out two roles for HR. The first is a functional one, the second related to 
management of emotions. 
"(HR has) two very different roles (in change scenarios), one is just 
more kind of technical, and the other is more on the kind of soft 
side, of things. " [KG: 9] 
This respondent talks first about the functional role of HR in a change situation. 
"I've done a lot of this, this is, I've lost count, the sixth M&A 
transaction I've been involved in, you know as either a buyer or an 
acquiree. And I think some things are generic even in these 
circumstances, which are, you've got a lot of mopping up of blood 
to do, irrespective of how gentile the approach is meant to be. 
Right? There will be blood, to mop ... that's generic, and I think that applies ... to us in this circumstance just as much as anywhere 
else. 
Then ... I see that's a key thing for HR because you've got to deal 
with ... the functional process, you know the legal piece of it, you know the paperwork, the contract law, the employment law, all of 
that kind of stuff, you've gotta be absolutely on top of that, manage 
it, make sure that that's done properly and messaged right and 
everybody else within the organisation believes that it's being done 
correctly. " [MH: 13] 
He then goes on to articulate the second role for HR, centred on the 
management of emotions and the support of staff through the change. 
"... then you've got the ... emotional side of it, you've got the ... fear 
anger denial and acceptance cycle to manage, whether that's 
explict, you've got one person who's impacted, 'oh I'm gonna kill 
you all', or the general morale of the organisation, which is equally 
moving through that cycle as a group. So you've got to manage 
those aspects of it, because I believe that should be driven by the 
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HR function who should really have the highest EQ of anybody in 
the organisation ... 
... Thinking aloud a 
little bit with that, I guess the actual practical 
upshot of that is ... from the point of strategic HR management, is to understand and accept that that (change) is coming, and steer 
the business to work with that. Which essentially means accept 
that there will be a lot of disagreement, disgruntlement and a higher 
turnover than you would have normally expect, so be ready for 
corrective action to deal with that, whether it's recruitment or 
whatever. And you know deal with the messaging and the EQ 
piece of it as well, whether to the people who are left or whether 
you want to ... turn around people who are having fundamental disagreements with the way the change is happening. 
It's hard, I think sometimes you've just gotta say to people, well 
you're right, that's the way it is, and you know it doesn't fit, sorry ... It's probably not going to work out. " [MH: 13/14] 
For this respondent, management of the psychology of change is an important 
HR role. 
"... when people are going through change, identifying pockets in 
the groups which need a little more support, more in terms of 
talking it through. Because the biggest problem is people tend to 
have a sense of fear of what's going to happen to me. I'm losing 
control of what they have been in charge of. And they any kind of 
support that as an organisation we can put in place will ensure that, 
if this is going to be the way we work, they know who to go to, and 
you have some people who at least help them step back and look 
at it from a rational viewpoint. " [SV: 5] 
A variant on this emotion management role sees HR as a useful conduit of 
information about emotional issues to management. 
"One area that I found very valuable was that I actually encouraged 
[the HR Director] to have one on ones with any member of my 
team. ... they felt they could bring up things with him that they felt 
was probably not something they should bring up with me. You 
know 'I'm frustrated about this, I'm worried about that'. And I found 
that to be a really really useful function. It meant he understood 
exactly the issues that were going on at the ground level in my 
organisation. I got to hear stuff that they probably would not have 
wanted to bring up to me ... 
But it was it meant that everybody if you went to talk to anybody in 
the organisation, they would say'HR listens to me'. And I feel that, 
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maybe I don't get what I want all the time, but at least they listen. 
And if they don't agree, they will tell me. And I've had the 
conversation and I understand why. So that was probably the most 
powerful way to get people to feel like the business was interested 
in them, as an individual ... it was great to have that, that I had this 
other mechanism of knowing what was happening, in terms of 
people's comfort and whatever. " [DR: 4] 
"... what is HR about? HR is about ... providing management with the right angle, the right level of understanding, about'hey guys you 
know what, the machine downstairs, this is what you need to delve 
into, these are the big topics. A, this is the feedback I'm getting, 
and b, this is we have a problem, we have a misconnect between 
what you wanna do and what's gonna happen downstairs'. In the 
machine". [JD: 4] 
"The other piece of it, which is frankly far more critical, is in terms of 
their ability to understand human behaviour and therefore help 
business see certain interpret situations more effectively. It could 
be as simple as you have a managers' meeting and we're sharing 
some information, their ability to kind of slightly pick up the mood of 
the room as a result of the information that you're conveying, it 
could be a business as usual scenario or even a change scenario, 
or it could be because in that meeting you have a lot of group 
dynamics which you might want to kind of get a handle on. You 
might find that there are, let's say, groups within that meeting room 
who are not seeing eye to eye but on the surface seem to be 
agreeing to things 
The ability to pick up that and kind of share that ensures that you're 
able to go and have that conversation off line with the players, what 
you need to do to kind of bridge the gap that might be needed. " 
[SV: 1 ] 
"HR as a community is a partner with almost every business group. 
And how well can they pick up what are the let's say the drivers, 
one is the business drivers, the other is what are the implications of 
some of those business drivers in the team, because maybe that 
particular group is going through far more change than you are, and 
therefore it needs to be kind of, certain issues need to be, you need 
to be aware of it. So when you're communicating, you're far more 
alert in communicating the right information proactively. Rather 
than saying a passive 'oh you know we have a weekly call', kind of 
thing. So they can actually act as a bridge. There are some that 
are able to do it far more effectively than others. " [SV: 1] 
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This extends into a discussion around HR's role as a coach to managers, which 
again hints at a super-ordinate responsibility and emotional literacy competency. 
"I'm not saying that HR is solely responsible ... I think everyone 
needs to everyone on the management team needs to try to play 
that role. I think what I'm saying is more a natural fit with HR as a 
function ... I think HR is can also help kind of coach management 
on what you know needs what more needs to be done or what less 
needs to be done. Or what way we should be doing it. Like I said I 
think we all need to play that role, but I think HR as a function has 
more expertise in how that gets done. You know, what are the 
ways we can be doing that? What are the ways we can all be 
acting more like the glue, keeping the organisation together. Or 
should we you know what are the three things I should be focusing 
on, to help play that role, my part of that role. " [KG: 9] 
The importance of this 'emotional support' role in a change scenario ranges from 
basic communication. 
"I think HR really needs to be the glue that kind of keeps everyone 
focused and communicating and having the right messages out 
there ... HR I mean that's critical. " [KG: 6] 
"I think HR is key ... I think they've been doing a good 
job of 
keeping communication ... no one can answer the questions that 
everyone wants to know, yet. Em but I think people are putting as 
much information as they can out there, which I think is good. " 
[KG: 6] 
"... a role that HR can and should play through all of this ... the 
obvious one, right, is just keeping in touch with the employee 
population and try to understand what their what their concerns are 
and are we communicating the right messages, are those 
messages getting through, are they answering the right questions? " 
[SK: 10] 
To more counselling type support. 
"... it's how do you guys (in HR) help prop up everybody else, to 
kind of keep our eye on the ball. " [SK: 1 1] 
"... (change management is) a role that HR can step into, probably 
easier than any other function. Kind of keeping people calm and 
focused and ... just kind of keeping those communication lines between management and employees open, and information 
flowing. I think HR can play a key role in that ... glue to kind of keep everyone engaged and keep everyone on the same page, and 
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everyone kind of on the same understanding, of how we're gonna 
move forward. So I did kind of mean it on an emotional level as 
well. " [KG: 8] 
"... maybe it's starting to engage with everyone about career 
discussions and trying to get people to look at this as an 
opportunity. All jobs are gonna be open, so don't just look at what 
job you currently have, but is there's anything else you'd really ever 
like to do. You know helping to create the right connections with 
the right people ... how do I know the right time to engage in the 
right conversations? ... I don't know how to go about putting myself forward at the best time, in the best way. So maybe it's helping 
people navigate that mess of you know what is, and I don't think it's 
about reading what the process is on a piece of paper. I think it's 
sitting down with people and saying right, here's an opportunity to 
think about what you wanna do and then I can help you get there, I 
can help you figure out how is the best way maybe you know to get 
there. " [SK: 12] 
"I think you personally could ... have an impact is to go right down this hall, talk to people about what they wanna do, about what you 
know of the process, about where you think the people are in that 
process, you know and help us figure that out. " [SK: 14] 
In its most extreme form, this emotional support becomes a highly analytical 
process based on psychological theory. 
"I think HR also grapples with how they handle change. You have 
small pockets (in HR) which understand change and can help. 
Probably some people in the OD function, or individuals in the 
larger HR community who are able to provide the insight, both in 
terms of understanding change in a systemic way and also kind of 
able to link that systemic, theoretical approach to what's happening 
on the ground. But that's more an exception, rather than an 
organisational approach to managing change. 
Er, if I go back to my AXA days, I wouldn't say they were the best 
but they certainly had a lot more systemic approach to handling 
change ... that was more easier in a sense of this is what's gonna happen ... cascade this. And you have people who provide 
psychological support for that, you have people who are able to 
kind of help you in multiple ways. 
I think within our environment, we don't do it in that structured 
fashion. " [SV: 4] 
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Respondents vary in seeing this competency as a consequence of the place 
which HR occupies structurally in the organisation, and a consequence of the 
information to which the function has access. 
"... precisely because you (HR) do know more and you are gonna 
know what the process is, you're kind of like the source, of how the 
the new organisation will need to be designed, and ... HR are 
gonna be the ones going to power that, be the engine behind that, 
getting that for making that happen. With the processes and just 
the information flow and all of that. So I think people will look to HR 
to kind of give that guidance or give that heads up on how they're 
gonna go. Who else would do that? " [KG: 8] 
"Because HR as a community is a partner with almost every 
business group. And how well can they pick up ... the business drivers, the other is what are the implications of some of those 
business drivers in the team, because maybe that particular group 
is going through far more change than you are, and therefore it 
needs to be kind of, certain issues need to be, you need to be 
aware of it. " [SV: 1] 
Or is an inherent competency of HR practitioners: 
"... you've got the ... emotional side of it ... I believe that should 
be 
driven by the HR function who should really have the highest EQ of 
anybody in the organisation. " [MH: 13] 
"I think HR professionals are pretty good at ... seeing facts for what they are and just kind of putting them out there. I think you know 
people are the most difficult thing to deal with in any organisation. 
And the personalities and whatnot ... everything about it is just the 
most difficult, you know there's difficult conversations to have, it's 
the most difficult topic, it's tough! And I think HR is probably in the 
best position to be the most objective about talent and if it's the 
right fit or not ... if there are issues and ... laying out what those issues are, as an advisor, to the business. To any of their 
colleagues that they work with, to the you know the managing 
directors, I think you know they're that function is to me as a 
business partner there, to call those things out. And its not an easy 
job, and you know and it's gotta be a difficult balance to keep that to 
be able to deliver those messages and keep retain those 
relationships. Because it's almost always a difficult message to 
deliver. " [KG: 3] 
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6.2.2.4. The Negotiating Position of HR 
Having looked at the expectations of the actors, the next stage of the analysis 
was to look at whether and how this influenced the negotiating position of HR: 
what are the factors that support or compromise a strong negotiating position for 
HR, and what accounts are provided of the negotiating process? One can see 
three elements in project three's discourse which are described as influencing 
HR's negotiating position: credibility, criticality and sponsorship. 
6.2.2.4.1. Influences on HR's Negotiating Position 
It is reasonable to suggest that the negotiating position of HR is, at least partially, 
based on its credibility with the business. The first question, thus, to be 
considered, is how well (or otherwise) is HR perceived within TF. 
i) Credibility 
When looking at the level of credibility held by an HR function, a key question to 
ask is how HR is perceived by the business and on what basis credibility is 
attributed. 
Perceptions of HR performance in TF are variable. Some respondents report 
good HR support: 
"I think we're doing extremely well [in HR], we're doing better than 
even my previous company, where I was totally amazed by how 
good they were, compared to what I was used to. And we have HR 
professionals in place as well. That makes it work. " [DR: 6] 
"I also think we get very good support from HR. " [WLC: 5] 
" ... what I see with TF a lot more, is ... there's a greater level of 
respect of the HR function. " [CP: 4] 
Whilst others see HR performance as less effective. One of the more negative 
views of HR, however, comes from the MD, who takes some responsibility for the 
slow responsiveness of HR. 
"I think specifically here we didn't get ahead of that curve, quickly 
enough ... we were being a bit slow in gearing ourselves up to be 
proactive rather than reactive. " [MH: 9] 
Looking at the basis on which respondents attribute credibility, looking at the 
repertoires used in the previous section, on the basis of project two, it is 
reasonable to suggest that 'business leads HR' and 'HR as tactical 
execution'/'HR as strategy will be the basis on which HR credibility is afforded. 
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One could also suppose that some reference to the 'multiple role ' and 'super- 
ordinate role of HR' repertoires could be made. 
Looking firstly at 'HR as tactical execution', HR's credibility is routinely seen as 
determined by its ability to effectively conduct transactional processes. 
"... without a good tactical HR support, you know, you never get the 
satisfaction or the buy in from any of the managers. " [RA2: 5]. 
In TF, there is a sense that HR's position has been compromised by its 
performance on the transactional element. 
"... some of that (poorly executed transactional) stuff has been a 
little bit damaging to HR here. In TF, you can't even get the basic 
numbers in the system to compare year on year, you know some of 
the just calculations and things were off ... I think that did do some level of damage, although I think people understand that it wasn't 
anything that was under your control, or that you really had 
anything to do with, but ... it's still HR. " [KG: 5/6] 
Without provision of a perfect transactional service, a more strategic role is not 
possible. 
"... without a good tactical HR support, you never get the 
satisfaction or the buy in from any of the managers. You need to 
have the foundation. That needs to just work. It needs to just 
function. And then you can forget about it. You can think about a 
shared service centre for HR or something, you know, get your 
processes in order, that's a machine, that's back office, it runs. You 
shouldn't even have to think about it. " [RA2: 5] 
Business value-add is only possible once the transactional processes are 
managed. 
... achieving for me is kind of building that foundation, base line, 
and then being able to really add to the business, to the growth, to 
whatever is you know the plan, basically, to add to this. And I just 
felt I've been kind of running behind and patching here and 
patching there. I had the feeling I was getting fairly close to really 
have the base line, everything sorted, oiled machine, but yeah. " 
[RA2: 7] 
The second way in which credibility is attributed is on the basis of business value 
add, and respondents reference the 'HR as strategy' repertoire to differentiate 
this from the transactional role of HR. One respondent sees gaining credibility as 
a steady and incremental process of delivery of business value add. 
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N... you show what you can do ... you pick one thing and you ... 
show, and if we had gone through and implemented certain things, 
he would have said, oh yes, now that all makes sense, and that 
brings me forward, etcetera. And the next time he will come and 
probably share some thoughts or some issues he sees with HR, 
say shall we can we do anything there. " [RA2: 5] 
And a higher level, business driven HR was seen as a key enabler by business 
respondents, alluding to the'business leads HR' repertoire. 
"I would say that I'm spending half of my time in HR related topics, 
since I've arrived here, and that clearly in that respect, the HR 
business partner's been helping me a lot. " [JD: 1] 
"HR would come to me and say `what are you gonna need from 
us', and primarily my number one worry was attrition. Always. And 
it was great to have someone who was gonna worry about it with 
me and not just me. So that was great, that was a very proactive 
thing ... I found HR to be a fantastic enabler ... Primarily because 
all I had to do was often have to say is where I wanted to end up 
and HR would make sure from a people perspective we ended up 
there. " [DR: 1] 
Allowing business people to get on with their business roles. 
"It was the first time I had that length of thinking out of HR, because 
to be honest, it wasn't high on my list, every day, because what was 
high on my list every day was getting dollars in the door, right, so it 
was nice to have somebody worried about the foundation of the 
business, it was great. " [DR: 2] 
This suggests that a basic level of HR activity is necessary in a business, and 
that this activity which business people need to take care of if this is not 
adequately handled by HR. It also possibly indicates that value in HR is 
accorded by this business at the transactional level. 
Alternatively, however, the ability of HR to understand the business is also 
presented as an equally critical determinant. 
" ... (the HRBP is) on the management team ... where we have 
weekly meetings, and HR ... is a standing part of the agenda. And it's not just about open headcount and training, it often becomes 
quite a key part of, well we've got some real key deliverables we 
wanna achieve. " [AD: 3] 
"... whilst I don't have formal meetings with HR on a regular basis, I 
meet with HR almost every day, because there's stuff happening 
every day and it's just making moving that stuff along. Because 
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there isn't an end of quarter HR event, or it, because HR happens 
every day ... I think that's probably why it's working now whereas it 
wasn't working before. Because I have access to somebody in the 
office, within a few feet away but also somebody who really has got 
themselves immersed into our business. " [AD: 4] 
This is problematic for HR, as it suggests that, for it to have any credibility 
whatsoever, it has to manage transactional processes seamlessly. However, 
excellent tactical execution is not, in itself, sufficient to gain credibility: 
demonstrating business value add is necessary. HR thus is caught on the horns 
of a dilemma: does it concentrate on tactical execution exclusively until problems 
are resolved, or does it try to do both tactical execution and HR as strategy 
simultaneously? 
ii) Criticality 
A second suggested determinant of HR's negotiating power is how critical it is 
perceived to be. The following quote suggests that HR does have a level of 
importance in TF. 
"I think HR is very key in Thomson Financial, because we are in a 
service organisation, service business, which means that our 
assets walk out of the elevator every night, and our growth is 
basically grounded on how good our people are. I think if I speak 
from my point of view we have improved quite substantially from a 
more of a mid starting point, payroll sort of thing, and are getting 
into really assisting and embracing what are the needs. " [JD: 1] 
Perceived business criticality of HR is, however, variable, as the following quote 
suggests. 
"... we'd have to look at where do the managers come from. I mean 
a number of the managers come from abroad, so em there's no 
excuse, but others are here, all of their life, more or less, or are 
local managers, and they don't know anything different. They don't 
they don't even think about that HR could or should be involved in 
certain things and should em do more than just the tactical work. 
So if nobody comes and shows them what it could look like, there 
will be no push. " [RA2: 4] 
iii) Sponsorship 
The issue of sponsorship, and the 'business leads HR' repertoire, are used 
functionally by the generalist to explain a limitation on HR value add. 
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"So, yeah, that was his (the MD's) style, or is his style, and I think 
that didn't help us, or some sort of visibility and leadership, that the 
organisation can feel. " [RA2: 8] 
The MD's style creates a second limitation on HR's ability to negotiate strategy, 
by his reluctance to support an agreed negotiating forum. 
"... always very very very difficult to get anything together, as a 
team. I don't think it was ever a good functioning management 
team here either ... the resistance of (the MD) to have regular 
management meetings. You know, and if anyone wanted to try and 
change his, what does he call them, the weekly 'where are you' 
kind of thing. Kind of change and add a little bit more flavour to it, 
you can see him banging his head on the table, like it's I'm not 
interested, I just wanna know where you are, and if there's anything 
big. " [RA2: 8] 
6.2.2.4.2. The Negotiating Process 
Despite the comments above, which suggest that HR's ability to negotiate 
strategy may be limited, the L&D respondent sees his role as fundamentally 
oriented to the negotiating process. He alludes to a 'strategy as process' 
repertoire as he stresses the importance of the preferences and orientation of the 
HR actors, and sets up a discontinuity in approaches from the key players. 
"But beyond that, and you know my experience first hand, here, is 
there's different approaches to HR. And I've seen two. One is, the 
way they see it, because the L&D budget in my experience has 
come out of HR, a lot of most of the time. Are we being are we 
about compliance or are we about delivering to what is suitable to 
growing the business? ... where you've got that clash of 
compliance versus service, that's tough. " [CP2: 9. my emphasis] 
This suggests that differing viewpoints will influence HR strategy, and that the 
outcome will be the result of a negotiation process. His use of the term 
'educating' alludes to the 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire, suggesting as it 
does that there is one 'right' answer to which HR should lead other functions. 
"... normally working with the HRD with Finance as well is very 
important. So educating key stakeholders. " [CP2: 9] 
And the influence these viewpoints have on his day to day activities. 
"So I came from a compliance mindset, in terms of HR, where there 
was a constant negotiation and consulting with the HRD,... him 
involved ... in terms of what he feels comfortable. " [CP2: 9] 
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He then goes on to provide a good description of the negotiation process. 
"I kind of got what the Legal, what the director wanted in terms of 
an ... innovative learning strategy for his people, and getting them together and doing some learning around that. But then you'd have 
opinions of his manager, his manager would come in and say'well I 
don't think he knows what he wants'. And then the HR director 
would say, 'well I know what he wants, and I've got a vendor for it'. 
So it's balancing all that, trying to not make people wrong. And 
coaching the Legal director, who own this, around what he wants. 
So there's different stakeholders involved, and there's lots of 
opinions, lots of armchair critics with Learning & Development ... so it's negotiating all that, keeping people informed, understanding the 
power-plays. Something I was told I did very well in Legal in 
Australia. Because I got who was doing what and who was getting 
involved, on what basis. I could ... read their motivations. And 
understanding everybody's motivations, and kind of mapping that 
out for yourself, as to what motivates each of the people, what 
makes them feel important. It certainly plays a part. " [CP: 10/11] 
His role, however, is not just to negotiate his own position, but to help the other 
organisational actors reach consensus. 
"As simple as a day to day example, I walk into (the Legal 
director's) office, , and say, 'have you spoken to (your boss) about this? ' 'No I haven't, do I need to? ' 'What do you think? ' 'I guess I 
do, she's my boss, I need to get her on side. ' And the last thing's 
'what's (the HRD) thinking? ' I said, 'don't worry about (the HRD) 
right now, go and talk to (the CEO)'. 'Cause I know then (the CEO) 
will talk to him, so you kind of know the linkages and who will do 
what. So on a practical basis it's as simple as that. Then I'd pop 
my head into (the CEO's) office and say 'where are you at, with 
this? '" [CP: 11] 
An analysis of the negotiating process is not, however, limited to the ability of the 
respondents to offer a coherent argument. It also depends on their ability to 
privilege their own view against other, competing, positions. McKinsey's papers, 
discussed in section 3.1.1. of the literature review of this project, suggest some of 
linguistic strategies which respondents may use to achieve this. 
A particularly dominant McKinsey "Deception" used by respondents in this study 
is "Misalignment of Time Horizons". Whereas HR time horizons are seen as long 
term, respondents devalue the contrary perspective by indicating that managers 
are pursuing short term goals, ultimately at the expense of the organisation. 
"... as a whole TF needs a longer term strategy ... I think the HR, 
and top management as a whole, is thinking long term. I think 
they're thinking long term. Doing this, does show. But then 
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everybody's crumbling because everyone's got quality, targets. 
And we get stuck into this environment and I think how can you be 
in a hiring process that gets stopped, in June? How is this 
possible? This is ridiculous. That to me is very clear. This doesn't 
make sense. " [JD: 5] 
" ... like everybody else, like a lot of people, although we all know how important it is. So there we go. I think some of it needs to be 
driven from the top ... I would have to put a lot more effort in it ... don't wanna work 24 hours, yeah? I mean that's also a thing. Will 
it be I what I it's probably not the workload because if I wanna do 
something I'll do it, it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter how long it 
will take. It's will it be valued? By the business. Will they will they 
embrace it, will they be open for it, will they spend the time? I don't 
think I will be able to at this point to convince somebody. 
We're we're tactical now. 'Til the end of the year, that's what I see, 
that's the message. That's the message that's come from Sharon, 
that comes from anywhere. We need our 01, we want our bonus 
pool, we're not hiring, we're looking short term, then Reuters comes 
and then everything will be fine. To sum up - you know - seriously 
this is, so why bother? Why should I fight? You know you pick 
your fights ... why should you try and do something that's not - 
valued" [RA: 7]. 
The "Principle-Agent Problem" is also referenced by respondents, who claim that, 
the employee can be representing their own interests in an organisation, rather 
than doing what is best for the company. This is a dominant theme in CP's 
interview, used to discredit the approach taken by a previous HR director who 
facilitated the fulfilment of the personal objectives of the senior managers with 
whom he dealt. 
" ... the way TILR works, as an HR model is, for want of a 
better 
term is almost more manipulative in terms of the way it works with 
the senior leadership group. So as an example the way I see it is 
the HR director will almost try to manipulate the HR the business 
strategy. " [CP: 1] 
" 
... 
it's an integrity issue, what I've seen, firsthand, is that if you 
manage as an HR director the personal needs, and sometimes 
wants, of the very top people, you get away with it ... that's what's happening. That's how they manage. That's how they see 
relationship management, within the business ... if you as a key business leader, I understand what (the business leader wants), if I 
can protect (her) expat package, or whatever else she needs for 
her function, to look good, then I'm being an effective HR partner. 
And the way that's sold - and the rest of the HR function can see it, 
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that that's what's going on. And the business, but it doesn't matter. 
Because the key decision makers, have got this relationship with 
them. So that's business partnering to them. " [CP: 10] 
This section suggests that negotiation may involve two elements: the 
presentation of a compelling argument and, of equal importance, the devaluing of 
alternative arguments and perspectives. 
6.2.2.4.3. Implications for HR 
The implications of this section, for HR, are inconclusive; variable responses 
suggests that, on the basis that it is seen as a necessary and a business value 
add function, HR may be able to influence strategy development, but there are 
questions around its level of sponsorship and its performance based credibility. 
It appears from the discourse that HR in TF, collectively, may have some way to 
go in terms of credibility and, hence, it may have a somewhat inferior negotiating 
position. This suggests that the expertise of the individual negotiator may then 
become critical, implying that a skill set which includes political acumen and 
influencing and negotiating skills may be as critical to the performance of HR 
practitioners as one based on technical expertise. 
6.2.3. Intended HR Strategy 
6.2.3.1. Thomson Financial's Intended HR Strategy 
The intended HR strategy for Thomson Financial was not explicitly stated, but 
could be extrapolated from discourse and policies and practices as a general set 
of shared philosophical principles. It was summarised for a Cranfield HR 
Strategy Workshop (Barrett, 2008, slide 14) in terms of the Dyer & Shafer model 
of organisational agility, as shown in figure 65. 
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Figure 77: The Intended HR Strategy in Thomson Financial 
This diagram reflects the desire of the organisation to have a consistent set of 
practices at the core of the HR organisation, but to have flexibility around these 
core processes to reflect the differing HR requirements of different regions and 
businesses. The degree to which this was actually put into practice will be 
discussed in section 6.3.2., under the heading of the realised HR approach. 
6.2.3.2. The Respondents' View of the Intended HR Strategy 
Moving through the model, the next requirement was the analysis of the 
articulations of intended HR strategy which appeared in the data. 
Given that the model shown in figure 77 was not explicit or formally shared, and 
given the perspectives on the absence of business strategy, unsurprisingly, 
respondents did not reference a clear intended HR strategy. 
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"HR strategy? Right, we struggle to even get a business strategy. 
Right? " [CP: 7] 
Business respondents are particularly negative about the lack of top level HR 
strategy, as the following quote, alluding to 'HR's as strategy' role, shows. 
"I don't know how [the EVP HR] is viewed. I don't really know what 
the strategy for HR is. I've never had somebody stand up there and 
say I mean I tongue in cheek they say that they wanna be business 
partners, it's a little bit of an overused phrase, but I've never seen 
any action where they're actually engaged in trying to you know 
redirect strategy based on what they are. " [SK: 5] 
Whereas HR practitioners are more likely to reference a strategy vacuum created 
by the lack of business direction. 
'We were constantly going through changes, and yeah as I said, I 
think from the business point of view the direction wasn't there. 
Yeah, it was like ten percent growth. Fine, but what does that 
mean? Do we have any measurements? How well does the new 
function, the new structure work? Do we need to increase, do we 
need to decrease, do we need to tweak? I think it was just go 
ahead and sell. " [RA2: 6] 
Using the model of 'strategy as an objective' with a 'best fit' repertoire of HR, this 
would be an impossible situation: if there is no business strategy, there can be no 
HR strategy derived from it. However, if one takes a 'strategy as a process' 
model, one can build an emergent, negotiated model of HR strategy. 
This fits with the contention of Paauwe's model that, in the absence of strong 
business and contextual drivers, the influence of the actors (the "dominant 
coalition") will become pre-eminent, and that strategy will become a matter of 
negotiation. 
However, whereas respondents did not have a strong view of the intended HR 
strategy in a steady state environment, they did have opinions on the necessary 
role of HR, and the intended HR strategy, in a change scenario. HR was seen as 
a necessary support to a business in an environment of change. 
"... what's going on in industry ... it's about change ... and 
HR 
comes up a great deal in that ... introduction of new 
legislation is 
change, or having the company having to adapt to competitive 
environment is change. You know so change is a constant, as they 
say in the textbook ... the fundamental thing with a rapidly growing business is, there is change, it's everywhere, every day, you know 
we never get it right, and bedded down, because things have 
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moved again, and moved and moved. And I think ... the one 
person I have most engagement with probably is with HR. " [AD: 1] 
"... you're constantly dealing with individuals and their evolution in 
the business. There's never a thirty June, thirty September, thirty 
one December, thirty one March, okay you're now here, you're now 
here. Every day, every week there's things shifting. And that's I 
think that's what makes it interesting. It probably also makes it a 
constant, so whilst I don't have formal meetings with HR on a 
regular basis, I meet with HR almost every day, because there's 
stuff happening every day and it's just making moving that stuff 
along. Because there isn't an end of quarter HR event, or it, 
because HR happens every day. " [AD: 4] 
A second respondent offered a detailed tripartite set of requirements from HR in 
a change scenario: the enhancement of individuals' capability to change, the 
creation of change enabling systems and processes and the management of the 
psychology of change. 
"... those three pillars (of change management), make people 
aware of it, have some process, maybe as part of the process also, 
you know what are the parameters for success, to say that you 
achieved the change as you're going through it. And have some 
kind of support system which enables you to kind of talk about it, 
while you're going through it, so you're more objective. " [SV: 5] 
She begins by talking at the level of the individual employees, discussing the 
need to develop people who can understand and deal with change. 
" ... if we genuinely believed that our DNA's change, one of the building blocks for all managers, and including staff right from 
induction has to be what does change mean and what are the kind 
of behaviours we need to exhibit in managing change or embracing 
change. It needs to be a very conscious process ... When people 
come in, you kind of build their understanding of change and what 
are the behaviours they need to have. " [SV: 4/5] 
She then goes on to describe the processual element of change management 
and the necessity to build replicable systems and procedures for change. 
"Second piece of it is identifying the types of change that are 
happening, and almost have certain processes round it, that what it 
does is that each individual is not grappling to kind of get their arms 
around those situations. So it's almost something like "have I done 
this, have I done this, have I done this". If it can ... do that a little bit, it might give people a sense of control over what they are going 
through. Now maybe that'll not solve the problem, but what it'll do 
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is at least seventy percent of situations, you could not rely on gut 
and instinct to do it right. So you would at least have seventy 
percent better effectiveness in moving to the next phase. " [SV: 5] 
"... we need the process, we need the clarity on how to kind of use 
the process to have at least some kind of control with how we deal 
with it during that time. " [SV: 5] 
Her final requirement is more based in management of the psychology of 
change. 
"... when people are going through change, identifying pockets in 
the groups which need a little more support, more in terms of 
talking it through. Because the biggest problem is people tend to 
have a sense of fear of what's going to happen to me. I'm losing 
control of what's what they have been in charge of. And they any 
kind of support that as an organisation we can put in place will 
ensure that, if this is going to be the way we work, they know who 
to go to, and you have some people who at least help them step 
back and look at it from a rational viewpoint. " [SV: 5] 
This psychology of change repertoire is also echoed by AD. 
"... getting those in getting people to sort of align with what you're 
trying to achieve, that's obviously this (OD) project that we're 
working on within the business, it's amazing how out of aligned one 
can get quite quickly, given that rate of change ... (Because of the 
project) I'm a lot more sensitive to it than probably I was two 
months ago, and I can hear it on conference calls. We had our 
management call yesterday, and okay, yes, that's those two there, 
they're not aligned. You know whereas before I probably would 
have missed that. " [ADA] 
In this quote, AD alludes to a role for HR which is objective and dispassionate, 
but recognises the psychology of individuals. 
"I'm being more inclined to use HR as a resource to achieve if we're 
gonna change alignment or get different motivational behaviour out 
of people ... rather than I could get Finance to put it together, but I don't think it's kind of the way I want help. They will crunch it, and 
that's your number. I want basically an emotive outcome, and 
therefore having HR sort of running it, rather than my sales director 
putting it together. 'Cause the sales director will put something 
together that's very favourable for the sales director! ... But having something that's very favourable to a sales team and also the 
business outcome, then that's kind of where I'm driving trying to 
drive it to. " [AD: 4/5] 
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However, unlike the steady state environment, respondents saw a necessity for 
HR input in a change scenario, and articulated an intended HR strategy based on 
the development of individual employees' ability to understand and deal with 
change, the creation of change enabling systems and procedures and 
management of the psychology of change. 
In summary, respondents in steady state saw no clear intended HR strategy, 
opening up the possibility of an emergent, logically incremental HR strategy, 
potentially with the strategic intent of developing a Dyer & Shafer type approach 
(stable inner core and reconfigurable outer ring). However, in the change 
scenario, business respondents perceived a high value add from HR and had a 
specific set of requirements. This is also echoed by an HR respondent. 
"... we are in a constant phase of change. So I don't think we're just 
strategic partners any more, we're change agents, consistently. 
The power of being a change agent, and linking strategy with 
capability ongoing. " [CP: 5] 
This respondent goes on to indicate that change expertise may give HR the 
ability to manage in an environment where strategy is unclear. 
"... so the strategy's unclear so what role does HR play? Is what is 
its expertise? It is a change agent. So it's understanding that 
that's where we are right now, we don't know what the bigger 
picture is, so what do we do in terms of capability. To ensure that 
there's limited interference to the business during this time, and that 
the end need is met. I see that's what HR's role. " [CP: 6] 
This has implications for HR: it appears to be perceived as more highly valuable 
for its role in change, therefore is this a potential area which HR could use as a 
platform for building credibility and a negotiating platform? Is this an area 
therefore on which HR should focus? 
6.3. The Analysis: Strategy Implementation 
6.3.1. Mediating Level: Between the Intended Strategy and The Realised HR 
Approach 
In discussions at this level, respondents largely used the 'theory of constraints' 
discourse, introduced in project two. As with project two, a considerable amount 
of the interview time was spent articulating the constraints on the HR function 
which prevent it achieving the 'best fit' HR strategy, suggesting that this 
continues to be a functional repertoire for HR staff to articulate. Notably, 
however, this repertoire was also articulated by business staff, suggesting a 
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greater alignment between the views of business and HR staff than had emerged 
in project two. 
Respondents in project three utilised the same division between organisational 
and professional constraints articulated in project two. The interpretative 
repertoires around the 'lack of local customisation' and 'conflicting organisational 
priorities' fell into the category of organisational constraints, whereas 'HR 
capability' and 'causality and credibility' were the major cited professional 
constraint. However, 'impact of change' also emerged as a repertoire strongly in 
project three as a constraint, and will be considered separately. 
There are six main interpretative repertoires which are used by respondents to 
explain the linkage between business strategy formulation and intended HR 
strategy: 
Organisational constraints 
o 'Lack of local customisation' 
o 'Conflicting organisational priorities' 
Professional constraints 
o 'HR capability' 
o 'Causality and credibility' 
'Impact of change'. 
This section will go through each of these in turn. 
6.3.1.1. Organisational constraints 
Project two's organisational constraints were around lack of investment in 
employees, management capability and style, perceptions and expectations of 
HR and organisational maturity. Respondents in project three also discussed 
organisational constraints, but related to the organisational issues of the Asian 
environment: the 'lack of local customisation' and 'conflicting organisational 
priorities' interpretative repertoires. 
6.3.1.1.1. `Lack of Local Customisation' 
A further constraint emerged, related to the small scale of the country operations 
in Asia. 
"... it is capabilities now ... I started looking at how can I change the 
structure, towards business partners ... (but) with having countries 
where there's only fifty, sixty employees, you can't have, you know 
everything. " [RA: 5] 
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°... we can always do more ... the challenge we've got little 
outposts, right, like the Koreans and the Indians ... just sheer distance and geography. And the places that we are big enough to 
have HR on the ground it's very nice, like Singapore and Australia, 
but that's always the challenge in this region. Is how do you make 
the one person we have sitting in Thailand feel that they're also on 
the same conveyor belt and they're not getting forgotten about. It's 
almost impossible to do. It takes a certain type of person, there, to 
deal with that. " [DR: 5/6] 
"... the rest of Asia Pac, mainly because it's so disparate and 
there's different requirements for each of the different locations, I 
think it's perhaps a bit more disjointed. " [HC: 2] 
This is also applied to HR. The ability to do 'best fit' HR in a region is seen as 
limited by the need to follow global norms: the smaller organisation needs to fit 
into the strategy of the larger. 
"... the Sales Effectiveness project that started, I don't know how 
many months ago, was looking at the structure, at more 
effectiveness going out at the market, less admin. We had we had 
all these ... external consultants doing this survey etcetera. In the 
end ... all this ... good material ... was kind of thrown in the corner 
and we just draw a picture that either fits the UK or fits the US or fits 
like the whatever you wanna do, but we didn't base it on facts. " 
[RA: 12] 
The same point is made by a manager of a specialist function, who feels that HR 
lack the specialisation to really respond to his business requirements. 
"I find we are more or less like a specialised division of the 
company. No matter whether I used to work in a bank or work in 
Thomson, whereas HR in the company is usually a very general HR 
office. " [W LC: 1 ] 
The result of this is a service which is suboptimal. 
"... because of the specialty of the people that we need, sometimes 
HR do not really have all the necessary understanding, and that in 
a sense sometimes the wrong kind of candidate will be, for 
example, sought by HR or at least the HR agency. And supplied to 
our managers. " [WLC: 2] 
Although he softens the impact of this by indicating that he has no expectation of 
a specialist HR service to his part of the business, and indicating that his 
managers pick up the responsibility. 
464 
"I'm not sure whether it really needs to take one special one at this 
moment with our small team ... the activity is also distribute to my 
managers in the country because they also understand what are 
the major projects coming on and what are the things that they 
need to learn, and what are the shortfall with the existing staff, what 
are the techniques that they need to learn. " [WLC: 2] 
He has, consequently, limited expectations of the service HR will provide. 
"... we are more or less like the supporting ... department to the business. So I- don't actually at this moment foresee that there is 
any strategic things that we actually need from another support 
group like Finance or HR, that needs to do in order for us to fulfil 
our strategy. " [WLC: 6] 
In other words, the ability of an HR strategy to be 'best fit' is limited by the needs 
of smaller units (be those functional or geographic) to be subservient to the 
needs of the larger organisation. 
6.3.1.1.2. `Conflicting Organisational Priorities' 
The repertoire of conflicting organisational priorities is used by HR respondents 
as a way of explaining a failure to respond to super-ordinate needs: there is an 
inference that there is a 'right' thing to do, from an HR perspective, but that 
conflicting organisational priorities constrain this. 
"I think some of it needs to be driven from the top. I would have to 
put a lot more effort in it, and -I don't know, is it personal 
commitment, don't I wanna work? I don't wanna work 24 hours, 
yeah? I mean that's also a thing ... it's probably not the workload because if I wanna do something I'll do it, it doesn't matter. It 
doesn't matter how long it will take. It's will it be valued? By the 
business. Will they will they embrace it, will they be open for it, will 
they spend the time? I don't think I will be able to at this point to 
convince somebody. Plus I don't have something sitting in my 
Inbox which I could convert and take and sit down with some of the 
managers and say, I've got something, you're gonna you know let's 
partner on this one. It's two way ... " [RA: 7] 
"I think that within HR we're just ignoring that part. I ignore it and 
therefore my team ignores it. That's this is if it doesn't get lived and 
valued from the top, then somebody at the bottom, even if [an 
HRBP] thinks like, 'oh, we'll do something', I will say'look you have 
another stuff to do'. You know, it's I think we just ignore that part, 
and we do other things. " [RA: 10] 
This respondent then goes on to give a specific example. 
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if you look at our Sales Effectiveness, this whole programme we 
did ... over the months. We talked a lot about the change 
management there, but to be honest in the end it was just we're 
running out of time, we need an organisation, we'll plonk it together 
that's the way it is. We announce it and we run. So where was the 
change management there? ... Again it was a half-hearted kind of 
attempt ... having some graphs and talking to the managers. The 
managers are kind of out in the field, they say 'oh yep, interesting, 
and yes I understand and yes it's true', but ... I haven't seen 
anything done with it. " [RA: 3] 
There is an interesting analysis to be conducted here on organisational 
messaging, where the MD is seen as a necessary champion for activities to be 
emphasised. 
" ... we're tactical now. 'Til the end of the year, that's what I see, that's the message. That's the message that's come from [the 
CEO], that comes from anywhere. We need our 01, we want our 
bonus pool, we're not hiring, we're looking short term, then Reuters 
comes and then everything will be fine. To sum up - you know - 
seriously this is, so why bother? Em why should I fight? You know 
you pick your fights ... why should you try and do something that's 
not - valued. " [RA: 7] 
"I think it's the organisation. It comes from the top. It's what is 
important to us. What does a Sharon talk about, what does a 
Sarah talk about. Not only talk but do. Implement. Where are their 
priorities? Which then gets driven through the organisation, and so 
here for example, in Asia, and if you have a Mark for example, who 
would put time aside, who would join some of the calls or meetings 
around change management, if we are just currently go through 
something. That will then make the next level more receptive, and 
more open. " [RA: 3] 
6.3.1.2. Professional constraints 
In project three, professional constraints on HR's ability to contribute were also 
articulated, consistent with project two. Whereas 'causality and credibility was 
used as a repertoire, the 'HR capability' repertoire dominated, as in project two. 
6.2.4.2.1. `HR Capability' 
The availability and quality of HR staff was posed as a constraint, unlike project 
two, where management capability was the major issue raised by respondents 
466 
(the HR staff in project 2 in Europe externally attribute lack of progress, whereas 
in Asia there appears greater willingness to posit reasons which are internal to 
HR). 
"... my perception is it's tougher to recruit strong HR functional 
experts or change agents now. " [CP: 8] 
"in Asia until I ... said look, we need to do something, we have a (recruitment) system ... `use it to its full capacity', nobody was even 
you know asking for that. Metrics were non existent, in a way. So I 
felt like I was going ten years back at least, when I came here. " 
[RA2: 2] 
The respondent goes on to explain this with reference to the limited vision of the 
HR team, their concentration on the transactional and their disinterest in best 
practice. 
"... the Asia HR team? I think everybody is doing what he she like 
and thinks is best. It's the hardest part to actually get this team 
together and get them to share and to talk, and to understand that 
there might be something they could learn from each other and do 
differently. And talk about best practice. And it's also look outside, 
go to some HR forum, networking, whatever. Still, not there ... they really struggle with that. It's for me I have the feeling they go 
there ... because I push them or they go there because then they have a free day, so to say. But I've never really had the feeling that 
they're getting anything out of it ... It's probably cultural. And they 
come here to work and to earn their money, and really sticking to 
rules, and they probably have never been exposed to having to 
think for themselves, thinking of what that's gonna bring for them, 
as well. In that part, I think it's missing and they probably haven't 
been exposed to it. " [RA2: 3] 
A clear argument emerges that, to be credible in a business scenario, HR staff 
need to be business focused. 
"I also think you need to carry the bag as well. Even if you've 
grown up fully in HR, at least be attend business meetings, be part 
of the conversation. You know gain some cred that way. My sales 
supply chain background has been invaluable in getting me to 
where I am right now. It just carries cred. It's not by putting it on 
resumes, as I said to you before. It's not my CV. It's in the 
language. That I have. The conversation I have with a leader. 
Where again I'm not even aware that it comes out. I'm not there 
talking, it's through the questions and stuff. " [CP: 9] 
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As in project two, the difference between true business partners and 
administratively focused HR staff is articulated. 
"I think in TF we had some tremendous individuals in our HR 
community. Who spend time out in the businesses, spend time with 
the senior leaders, go to all the management meetings. They really 
get the business. And that makes a huge difference. " [KBM: 6] 
"(the business focused HR person) sees the business need. She 
understands HR. She makes the connection. She is able to 
actually translate some of the business goals into HR, where do I 
need to get some help now, where do I need to come in as an HR 
partner? I think that's really making that connection. Whereas ... (the administratively focused HR person) there's just no way. She's 
just not making she's another more or less administrator and I think 
she's in HR because there you can gossip. " [RA: 5] 
"I think the structure that we've got or are trying to create in terms of 
having business partners working closely with the business and 
senior management team is a good one. I think it's good having 
Ricarda and K2 very involved in the business and I think you can 
see probably more success stories I guess coming out of Japan in 
the way that sort of operates, and the fact that HR is obviously such 
an integral part of the whole way that the business is run there. 
I can definitely see the benefits and the kind of ownership, and 
perhaps it might even have gone too far the other way, in terms of 
them getting very very involved in lots of things that you might think, 
hm, not sure why HR are necessarily doing that. But I certainly get 
a sense that they're very aware of what the business needs are, 
what the issues are, where we've got resource issues, training 
issues, and seem to be very cogniscent of the stakeholder 
requirements and wanting to meet the needs of the management 
team. " [HC: 1] 
"... you can just see the engagement, and when I have 
conversations with [the Japanese HR director] there, she knows the 
people, concerned, she knows what the issues are, and she knows 
the sort of interactions and what have you. I think she asks quite a 
few questions as well ... I think communication is a big one. She's 
obviously very very engaged with those people, and with Chris in 
particular ... and keen to get people involved ... communication is definitely key. Taking it, sucking it in and making sure that people 
are aware of what's going on. " [HC: 5] 
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And whereas this anecdote conveys a sense that Thomson business managers 
are receptive to the business partnering approach. 
"I went up to ... the leader of the team, and I said. 
'look, I hope you 
didn't mind [a junior HRBP] being there [in a sales meeting], was 
she a distraction'. And it was quite powerful his answer he said, 
'no, she's young in HR, I am so pleased I've got HR people 
listening, and starting to understand the business'. " [CP: 9] 
There is a sense that HR is failing to deliver on this. 
"[in another Thomson company] we have a GM of HR that reports 
to [the HRD]. Who has not once gone out to any of the business 
leaders and asked 'what do you need from our function'? That in 
itself sends a signal. And determines the level of credibility she has 
... that's 
how they operate. And that's where they stand out of 
insecurity. They don't know how to do it, they fear it. It's out of 
their comfort zone. And they make wrong those others who take 
that approach. " [CP: 9110] 
"... one of the other challenges is that we don't as an HR 
community, have as much experience in the business. " [KBM: 5] 
And one of the articulated reasons for this is a lack of business focus in HR at the 
Thomson Corporation level. 
"... you start at Corporate. I don't think they are a customer led 
organisation. I don't think that a, they know what our external 
customers need, and b, I don't think they know what their internal 
customers think. " [KBM: 5] 
This is reinforced through reference to a senior HR executive. 
"You know he's he doesn't understand, Thomson ... he's been with 
the company four years, and he's always spent time with the senior 
executives, he doesn't believe that his he has responsibilities, you 
know beyond the organisation. So that's Thomson, as a whole. " 
[KBM: 6] 
6.3.1.2.2. `Causality and Credibility' 
The 'causality and credibility' repertoire which emerged in project two was also 
referenced in project three. Although the 'causality element (the argument that 
HR finds it difficult to establish credibility because it is difficult to firmly establish 
the causal link between HR activities and business value add) is less in evidence 
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in Asia, the L&D representative indicates the political importance of metrics 
driven activity to business credibility. 
"... measuring success, and quality (deeply impacts the way I do 
my job). Both level one right through to level five, if applicable. 
Feeding that back, to the leaders involved. Making sure there's 
there are structures in place to be able to talk to the success of 
programmes and initiatives. Keeping people updated on what's 
going on. " [CP2: 13] 
Lack of credibility in HR is cited, and the reported impact is significant. The 
antipathy towards HR discourse identified in project two is still very much in 
evidence in project three, as the use of the word "victim" in the following quote 
infers. 
"I do think that the management the CEO or whoever the director is 
does kind of set the tone for how we all interact with each other and 
HR is maybe the ... more obvious victim in those circumstances because it's much easier to stereotype HR into a box. " [SK: 7] 
Less overtly, an antipathy towards HR is detectable in a discourse around the 
need for professionally qualified HR staff. Although one respondent is clear that 
professionally qualified HR staff are essential. 
"... what made the difference is he was an HR professional, from 
the ground up. Not just someone who just ended up by accident. " 
[DR: 3] 
"... we have HR professionals in place as well. That makes it 
work. " [DR: 6] 
The majority of respondents, however, take the opposite line, as this 
respondent's appraisal of a previous HR director - with no HR background - and 
her contribution to the organisation infers. 
"... in fact sometimes too much intimate knowledge is a handicap. 
So moving smart people around and getting them to focus on 
different problems without all the context means you can ask the 
stupid questions, you're not handicapped by past you know we've 
always done it this way kind of stuff. And in a way that just frees 
you up to be the right the smart person, with a lot of context about 
this business, who can change things. And I do think change for 
the sake of change is actually a really good thing. To move seats, 
obviously you can't move the CFO, you know there are some roles 
... even an HR director ... you can ... if you have the right people 
underneath you. " [SK: 9] 
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"Why are HR HR professionals? Shouldn't they been sales people 
moving in, production people moving in? 'Cause then they can 
learn what HR's about, they can bring this to other departments, I 
think yeah, a valid point: should HR be HR people? HR 
professionals. Because if there's no reason, valid case, they 
should be moving from elsewhere. " [JD: 9] 
"I think you know with Sarah in that role, supporting Sharon now, 
and having come from the business back- the business side of 
things, I think that really helps a lot. And I know (the previous head 
of HR) didn't kind of grow up in the HR world either, I think he 
actually had a Finance background originally. So I think having you 
know having someone like that who has been out in the business 
and understands kind of the dynamics of a business and has 
worked with a lot of the players before, probably helps with that with 
that partnering. And coming up with appropriate strategy. " [KG: 2] 
6.3.1.3. `Impact of Change' 
As well as being seen as an environmental factor which influences organisational 
strategy, change was also seen as a constraint. Change is presented as a 
magnifier for existing organisational and professional constraints (as described in 
the relevant sections above), but that change (linked to the concept of reactive 
change) creates its own unique constraints. 
Change is reported as disruptive, even in process-driven functions such as 
recruitment. 
"I would say that (the Reuters scenario) affected our performance in 
a lot of ways. I think. 'Cause these the freeze would pop into these 
requisitions one week it would be open, the next we could be 
frozen, for example, and of course you've got candidates in 
process. So dealing with that is a bit of a song and dance, you 
know, keeping people happy, assuring them, things, being honest, 
saying it may take a bit longer than we expected ... it's 
just a lot 
more difficult to get them across the line, of course, if those sort of 
things happen. So a lot of sort of one off situations, that we just 
needed to address as they arose, but in general I think you're right. 
The external factor, the external sort of view of Thomson, we had to 
address, we had to sort of put that into our communication, into our 
sales, into our pitch, and the rest of it. And then yeah, just the drag 
of the internal process, which really affected our performance, to 
get people across the line. " [DH: 12/13] 
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The constraints articulated by respondents in the environment of change can be 
divided into organisational and professional constraints, in the same way as 
occurred in the analysis of discourse pertaining to steady state. This again 
suggests that proactive change should be regarded as a variant of steady state, 
rather than being a factor in itself, as the following quote infers. 
"There's no other aspect of it, apart from communication. Because 
everything else is just business as usual. Are you are paid 
correctly, are you being trained, are you being enabled to do your 
job? All those things you do anyway so there's no difference. " 
[DR: 12] 
However, there is again a sense that the HR role (or the failure to fulfil it) is more 
critical and more highly valued than it is in steady state. 
i) Organisational constraints 
Lack of clear organisational alignment is seen as an inhibitor. 
"I thought that we spent a tremendous amount of time, and I 
thought we put together a great process, an interviewing guide ... here's these great tools and I had to laugh that that came out in 
December and less than a week and a half later, job freeze! ... 
You 
know we absolutely looked ridiculous ... I think it's a disconnect, of the strategy. You know that came out, did they not know we were 
gonna do a job freeze? " [KBM: 4] 
"... really what does the organisation want. What's the ultimate 
view of it? ... So why should I focus? Why should I put my time and 
effort into something where in the end it might not actually be 
needed? Yeah? I mean I've got my plate full as well. So, and 
there is nothing, I maybe if I search, but there's nothing sitting in my 
Inbox somewhere that's saying here's a toolkit, how you facilitate 
some change management, ... workshops or lunch meetings or 
whatever. There's nothing sitting in there I can take. " [RA: 6/7] 
Poor implementation and lack of follow through is cited as an organisational issue 
in change management, again referencing a disconnect between intended 
strategy ('formulation') and the realised HR approach ('implementation'). 
... we've checked box, these are green, these have been 
completed ... this huge process that has been put in place, 
required these teams to put a tremendous amount of energy and 
effort in, and it's as if nothing's happened ... to this point, neither of 
us have seen it applied ... It just seems to be very disjointed ... as I 
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think through this merger, we have our moments with, the 
difference between design and the implementation. " [KBM: 7/8] 
The multiple and compounding nature of the number of changes being attempted 
simultaneously by the business is also presented as a constraint. 
"I think there were just too many changes. And what we tried to 
accomplish is you know the, running behind, basically, and fixing all 
different things. There was a hell of a lot of recruitment, a lot of 
turnover in the sales team, new leadership in the sales team, 
Simonne left, you came on board, you know we had business 
changes, HR changes, Mark wasn't here that long, before that it 
was Chris, it was a constant handover, kind of it was well waiting, 
what are we gonna do, where are we gonna go, what is our 
business strategy, what is our focus. Yeah, I felt it was more 
patching, than anything longer term looking. " [RA2: 5/6] 
The impact of multiple changes is an inability to build and execute strategy. 
" ... you're always behind, you do the tactical stuff. I don't you how 
you mean that, how does that impact what you do? It gets driven 
by events that happen. So it's like every morning you switch on 
and you think, bugger! I can't say oh for the next couple of days I'm 
gonna focus on this or focus on that, doesn't work. It gets driven by 
day to day events that are happening and are changing so, em I 
can't plan, my week, my work, my focus, it gets planned by 
surrounding changes, basically. " [RA2: 6] 
A further negative organisational influence is referenced by another respondent, 
who cites an organisational confusion about what comprises change 
management; this respondent defines HR's role in change in the negative, as 
being more than simply employee communications. 
"... what I've seen, and I might just have overlooked it, but for me 
(the current change activities are) ... communication and employee 
... engagement, but it's not it's not what I believe and see as 
change management. " [RA: 4] 
ii) Professional constraints 
HR capability is presented as a constraint in the change scenario. 
"I think HR also grapples with how they handle change. You have 
small pockets which understand change and can help ... But that's 
more an exception, rather than an organisational approach to 
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managing change. ... I think within our environment, we don't do it in that structured fashion. " [SV: 4] 
HR's tactical focus is seen as deleterious to the function's ability to perform a 
change management role. 
" ... what 
do we get, we get PMAT reminders that we need to do 
things, okay ... you've gotta go through some level of process, you have to. (But) yes, you can always do better, yes you can always 
do more, I think. What I'm saying here yes, this is something HR 
might be voicing, say look guys, there is a great sense of worry. 
How do we - okay that's the feedback, now how do we address it? 
Well maybe one way forward is just to involve the managers, so 
that they don't feel they're left out. " [JD: 3] 
"I'm not sure HR is really able to voice the some feedback and 
really say look, are, the assets the guys, we need to address their 
worries and engage them. " [JD: 4] 
"... we get sucked up in the tasks, in the integration planning, 
structure, systems, data collection, we forget about what our 
employees go through. " [RA: 4] 
Lack of resources in HR is cited as an issue: 
"... whether you think about what we're striving to do as a company, 
I do think that we are resource poor. I think there's a real 
disconnect in what we say that we're striving to do, around 
organisational development, around what we're, change 
management is a primary example ... I was in Bangalore, watching these participants and thinking of the number of, you know talking 
to them about the number of people that they manage. And this is 
a huge business for us. These are the number of employees that 
they influence, where they're gonna be, in the future. And how 
clear it is that we don't have the kind of change management 
capability, that we need. " [KBM: 2/3] 
"... because they're [HRBPs] resource deprived, you know they can 
only do so much. Not having this, again, because they don't have 
technology to support them and they don't have the staff, I think 
they're limited in what they're able to impact. " [KBM: 6] 
Resources are defined in terms of both quantity and quality. 
"And we don't have the band width, even if we had the 
competence. " [SV: 10] 
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"You can do so much in Asia Pacific when you're resourced 
appropriately. What you can do, is focus on the areas that you 
where the bleeding is or where the biggest calls are being made. 
And you do that. And you do the best that you can. With what 
you've got. If you have the kind of resources that you need. If you 
don't, or you're not getting the fullest capability of the few people 
that you do have, and in this case, no we're not ... everybody else is pulling that person's weight and everybody else's ... I don't think that we have the change management capability within this 
organisation, that we need. And so I think it's gonna put a 
tremendous amount of pressure as we move into the actual day 
one and implementation ... At the end of the day, do your 
managers have the time, are they being supported, so that they can 
then do it? You know that's the balancing act. " [KBM: 4] 
"So I believe you really have these strong business partners who, 
as and when we go through' change will really be able to tap into 
some of these programmes, get some support and help, then it 
could work ... they would drive it. They would pick up all 
programmes, theories, mechanisms. Apply, drive, work with the 
management, their teams, be the person on the ground to make 
sure it doesn't get forgotten. It's always the least important thing in 
a way - there. Which you know gets pushed aside, there is 
something else more important coming, so let's forget about it, it's 
fluffy stuff, it's soft, we don't really need it, everybody understood 
the message anyway. And off we go. So, that's where I think the 
real HR business partner would bite his or her teeth in. And have 
the full understanding how important it is. " [RA: 2] 
And in terms of access to institutional resources. 
"I think I would have to be better equipped. To be honest. So right 
now I wouldn't feel comfortable on instructing anyone, around 
change. I don't feel kind of equipped enough to do it. To do it 
sensibly, not just again to repeat some theories and to kind of 
create an awareness, or whatever. " [RA: 5/6] 
An important discourse sees HR business partners as the key to effective HR in 
a changing environment, but that the capabilities of HR representatives to fulfil 
this role are limited. This response was given to the question, 'What would make 
HR good at change". 
"I would focus a lot more on having real business partners ... Really much closer to their business. So if we're looking at Asia here, for 
example, it's not. It's a half hearted attempt what we're doing, 
that's my view. And we're not really linked and close to the 
individual units and streams. Which is for me the first step towards 
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being able and influencing em and working with management on 
change and how we deal with change. It's no from my perspective 
it's no good to just have this great change programme and pour the 
bucket (laughs) out of the organisation. This is exactly what what 
usually happens. There are some great programmes, some great 
ideas, you throw it out, it doesn't get picked up the way it should be, 
nobody runs with it, because there are other things everybody is 
busy with, so it gets forgotten. " [RA: 2] 
This is linked by another respondent to the 'multiple roles' repertoire, the need for 
an HR business partner to perform multiple roles. As this response to a question 
on the characteristics of the ideal HR business partner shows, she sees this as 
creating a requirement for an HR business partner with multiple competencies. 
"Tough one. I think one practical, the person would have to have 
multiple types of competencies. One would be very down to earth, 
systems, process, let's get things done, execution capability. Ability 
in this situation, recognising okay they have these competencies, 
these they don't have, and therefore kind of get those 
competencies from outside their own team. But at the end of it 
make sure that we do the right jobs. So that's more from an 
execution er place. 
The other is more psychological, whether it is individual psychology 
based on which you handle situations, or whether it's the group 
psychology or whatever it is. And that is actually far more difficult to 
have. A lot of people would probably have an intuitive 
understanding of it, but not many have a structured ability to kind of 
dissect some of it. So if I were to have that, those two 
competencies, if we kind of had them in the same environment, that 
would be great. " [SV: 3] 
But she immediately indicates the difficulty of finding a skill set to deliver this 
psychological element. 
"... the emotional one [role] I think is the most difficult one, because 
if we are neither trained to recognise the issues, nor are we trained 
to have the degree of self-awareness, which unfortunately is at 
least with most people, and you don't have anybody who is alive 
and alert to spotting it, then you probably have more of a problem 
syndrome than we think. " [SV: 5] 
This is echoed by one of the business participants, who sees that HR needs to 
be ready ahead of the game. 
" ... it's a little late at this juncture to turn HR into the business 
partner at the exact moment when we need it, and you don't have 
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the right people in place, you know to really do that. So maybe it's 
unfortunate, but you can't step up to do that if we don't have the 
right people. " [SK: 14] 
An alternative view on this sees change as a personal, rather than a professional, 
competency, and as such in short supply. 
"... some people who have the ability to recognise these kind of 
patterns. Obviously these people will have their own filters based 
on wherever they've come, but they have a far greater ability to kind 
of recognise the dynamic changes in the patterns that exist. And 
they could be people with any background. What I've found is 
someone who apparently seems very, you assume they are very 
traditional, you know they've not really had much exposure, they 
live in their own world, whatever that world is, probably are far more 
embracing of some of the changes and far less judgemental of 
compartmentalising in the way they look at the world. Whereas 
there are others who might have travelled all over the world, might 
have lived in every different place, but yet they have their own filters 
of how they look at the world. 
So it's more my personal view is it's more to do with temperament 
of people on how you look at the world. And how much you allow, 
how much you can compartmentalise versus how much you allow 
leakage to go through. And how much are you going to I'm gonna 
use I dunno whether it's the right phrase, but as you said the other 
day you were talking about first level, second level realities. Are 
they people who are able to go back to first level realities and re- 
look at what are the second level realities, in those situations. And 
there are some people who are able to do that better than the 
others. " [SV: 8/9] 
The contradiction created by the multiple roles HR is expected to perform is also 
cited as a constraint. This respondent talks about the inherent tension that the 
requirement to deliver difficult messages creates for HR. 
"I guess it could (hurt HR as a business partner), if the (difficult) 
message isn't received well. But I would think if the person on the 
other end is big enough to receive the message it actually 
strengthens the relationship. And builds a level of trust with HR that 
you might not even get to with any of the other functions. So it's 
almost a double edged sword, depending on who the other party 
is. " [KG: 4] 
"(The support functions' role is) safeguarding the assets ... Versus kind of just doing what the business wants to do. You've gotta be 
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that kind of voice of reason and again, you know, I think all of the 
support functions have just to lay out the facts. " [KG: 4] 
There is a clear reference to a super-ordinate role for HR in this respondent's 
discourse. 
iii) Constraints Specific to the Change Scenario 
However, the most clear limitation on HR's ability to perform effective change 
management is conveyed with reference to the 'proactive change' versus 
'reactive change' repertoires, as conveyed by the following response to a 
question on respondent's view of level of HR support in the run-up to the Reuters 
acquisition. 
'Well you know obviously could do better. But, I know why. It's the 
way it is. It's because no one knows, right. And that's part of the 
problem ... In a perfect world you would be able to go to every staff 
member and say 'you're guaranteed to have a role'. But we can't. 
Right. ... So obviously from the individual's point of view, there 
could be a lot better communication. I mean it's all about 
communication really ... I think that's a corporate wide thing and not just an HR thing. You have exactly the same information as almost 
anyone else has, and what else can you do with it, right? 
So I think it's a Corporate failing not a (HR one), and I understand 
why it's a failing, right? It's not that somebody should be slapped 
on the wrist for not doing their job. This is the way it is. " [DR: 12] 
Referring back to the professional constraint of HR capability, it is also noted that 
change agents who are, themselves, coming to terms with change, may not be 
the most effective. 
"Again, I would say it's a mixed bag (in terms of support from HR in 
change scenario). There are pockets where it's been very good, 
there are pockets where er you wish you had more. I think to be 
fair to all the players, they themselves are going through some of 
that change. So it's the fact that people are still able to help in spite 
of the fact that they themselves are going through so much of that 
change, I would say it's fabulous from that perspective. " [SV: 10] 
6.3.2. The Realised HR Approach 
The final stage of the model was an examination of the realised HR approach. 
The difference between intended strategy and realised approach in TF is 
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presented as a problem by the respondents, unsurprisingly, given the short 
termist nature of the articulated culture. 
"... we have our moments with, the difference between design and 
the implementation. " [KBM: 8] 
"This is how the organisation deals with change. We might have an 
idea, and oh we might start something, but then, oh yes, other 
important things, so we'll go left again, or right. And not follow 
through. " [RA: 9] 
The 'realised' HR approach can be considered from two dimensions. Firstly, the 
realised HR approach is the result, at a single point in time, of the various 
iterations and negotiations around the intended strategy. 'Intended', in this 
context, is defined as 'intentional'. This is represented in the following quote. 
"... we're saying one thing and in our actions doing other things that 
make it pretty difficult. " [KBM: 2] 
More usually, however, the realised HR approach is seen as influenced by the 
extent to which the intended strategy is implemented, or implementable, i. e. what 
resources and constraints enable or inhibit realisation of the intended HR 
approach. 
This section considers the interviews of three respondents: an HR generalist, a 
recruiter and an learning & development practitioner. These discussions used a 
second interview schedule, and, inverting the question, asked individuals to 
comment directly on the factors which influenced them on a day to day basis. 
This interview schedule is reproduced in appendix two. It takes a different view to 
the previous interviews, in that the respondents were asked to discuss the 
realised HR approach, and the factors which are perceived to be influential on 
that realised approach. It was expected that discussions around the intended HR 
strategy and the linking interpretative repertoires ('theory of constraints' etc. ) 
would emerge in discussions around the realised HR approach. 
A number of repertoires were used by respondents to describe the realised HR 
approach, including 'strategy as a process', 'HR as strategy' versus 'HR as 
tactical execution', 'super-ordinate role of HR', 'business leads HR', 'theory of 
constraints', 'global conformity' and 'proactive change' versus 'reactive change'. 
The realised HR approach was analysed in two ways. Firstly, as a proxy for the 
realised HR approach, HR practitioners were asked to describe what they see 
their role as being, on a day to day basis. Secondly, an analysis of the policies 
and procedures, and the messages they convey about the organisation's values 
and priorities, was conducted. 
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6.3.2.1. The Realised HR Approach Against the Intended HR Strategy 
Model 
One way of considering the realised HR approach is to compare HR in use in 
Thomson Financial with figure 77's model of intended HR strategy. Figure 78 
shows the view of the realised approach offered as a comparison to the intended 
HR strategy (Barrett, 2008, slide 20). 
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Figure 78: The Realised HR Approach for Thomson Financial 
The diagram above indicates an immediate challenge for Thomson Financial. As 
indicated in figure 65, the core stabilisers in Dyer & Shafer's model are a clearly 
articulated vision and a common set of shared values. In Dyer & Shafer's words, 
this "provides some vector for the thrust" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p20), creating a 
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common sense of direction, and prevents the organisation "from degenerating 
into a metaphor for complete chaos" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p20). Key 
performance metrics are a third force for stability and a shared sense of purpose. 
The organisation lacks both a clearly articulated vision and a common set of 
values. Although both of these exist, they are not a dominant force is the 
organisation and are not seen as influences by respondents. Conflicting value 
sets (Thomson Corporation and Thomson Financial have different value sets), in 
particular, limit the utility of values to direct and provide stability for the 
organisation. 
The stable inner core for Thomson Financial, instead, is provided by the 
processes which are shared across Thomson Corporation: performance 
management, talent management and shared systems (compensation, 
recruitment and HRIS). There is an obvious organisational utility to this (shared 
talent and performance management processes allows comparability of 
employees across the market groups, facilitating cross-group moves; sharing 
systems reduces cost and allows for cross-organisational reporting and analysis), 
but it does not provide stability or direction and consistency of purpose. 
Looking at the reconfigurable outer ring, Thomson Financial fairs much better. 
The flat organisational structures, a focus on influence rather than hierarchical 
position and the highly matrixed nature of the organisation provides an 
intrinsically fluid organisational design and the core business processes are 
highly flexible (emergent strategy, influence rather than hierarchy, 
encouragement of self-direction in employees). Likewise, the information 
systems do provide a degree of distributive information which employees can use 
to self-guide their activities, and rented facilities allow for flexible workplace 
design (although technological enablement and use of temporary rather than 
permanent employee workspaces would enhance this further). 
Agility oriented HR strategies further enhance this flexibility: the annual 
performance management process has a direct link to compensation, 
performance ratings used to determine both increments to fixed pay and long and 
short term variable pay elements. However, the performance appraisal process 
has no 360 degree element, leaving it open to potential distortion. 
There are examples of substantial agility oriented projects, including a major 
competency based initiative in the Bangalore and Manila operations centres 
(Barrett, 2007) which used a competency model to link recruitment, learning and 
development, career pathing and compensation to support the acquisition, 
building and rewarding of key organisational capabilities. 
The issue for Thomson Financial, however, is that without the stable inner core, 
the flexibility afforded by the reconfigurable outer ring results in a chaotic, sub- 
optimal approach: employees have the flexibility to determine their own work 
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activities, but lack a clear sense of direction as to what those activities should be. 
Coupled with a lack of strong contextual drivers, the consequence of this is that 
politics and negotiation dominate the organisation. This is potentially ameliorated 
by a strongly performance driven compensation strategy, but a lack of 360 
degree input into the performance management process means that this, too, is 
highly subject to political influences. In the parlance of Dyer & Shafer (2003, 
p23), this suggests an organisation which emphasises drive, autonomy and 
growth, but lacks the directional influences of discipline, accountability and 
continuity. 
6.3.2.2. The Realised HR Approach in Steady State 
The realised HR approach in steady state can be accessed in two ways: through 
an analysis of the policies and procedures, and through the discourse of the 
respondents. 
6.3.2.2.1. Representations of the Realised HR Approach in Discourse 
Given the perceived lack of strong contextual drivers or a clear intended strategic 
direction, it is logically to look at what HR practitioners see as their role. In the 
second group of interviews, both the recruiter and the generalist see their roles 
as functional efficiency, the recruiter articulating a singular focus on functional 
efficiency, the generalist seeing functional efficiency as a necessary precursor to 
more strategic activities. The L&D practitioner, in contrast, takes a more 
negotiated approach to the determination of his activities. It appears that the lack 
of deterministic contextual influences allows the HR practitioners - in conjunction 
with the "dominant coalition" to define their own roles and priorities in a way 
which, one would surmise, a more directive strategy would limit. This fits with 
Paauwe's contention that the "freedom to manoeuvre" is higher in environments 
where business and contextual drivers do not exert a strong influence. 
To look at this in more detail, the responses of respondents relied heavily on the 
'HR as strategy' versus 'HR as tactical execution' repertoires. 
Interestingly, in these interviews, a clear theme emerged in both the generalist 
HR and the recruitment interview. The process, and the need for efficiency in 
process, is presented as the over-arching influence on the way in which HR is 
carried out. 
"... we approached it like a project and this is a special case, so we 
have to sort of we have to go about doing this and different 
advertising campaigns in different places. I wouldn't say the 
process was drastically different, it was just tweaked a little bit. " 
[DH: 8] 
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"... of course its beneficial to have the overall general process, but 
if you're not able to tweak it to your local standards and you know 
the way of working in the markets you're working in, it would be a 
real it would be a really difficult thing to adhere to. And I think it 
would be a real waste of people's local knowledge and local sort of 
ways of working. " [DH: 9] 
"I think, the process just was amended a little bit, as far as how we 
you know how we push people, well how we open a position and 
how we close an offer and the rest of it. But overall I mean it's the 
same sort of process, I mean once a position was opened, em we 
have to do a lot more communication, we have to do a lot more 
selling, we had to do a lot more em we might have to pull another 
strategy and go to another avenue, try to pull a bit more people in. 
Er fill a bit larger pool. But in general we talk about the process of 
you know briefing at the very beginning, setting a strategy, going 
about the advertisement agencies, whatever we might do, interview 
structures and going through all the way to the offer. Generally stay 
the same. " [DH: 12] 
This is echoed by the generalist: process - and inefficiencies in the process - 
dominates the way in which HR is conducted. 
"... it's very much the process nature of the operation centre, of the 
jobs there ... The machine. That's still it's kind of a crap HR set up there, foundations still not working, but we had ninety percent 
turnover on the HR team, so slow progress. " [RA2: 10] 
Even for the L&D representative, process is something to which attention still 
needs to be paid. 
"I think compliance, we need some control in terms of those global 
processes. Because of payroll and the other potential 
consequences if we miss timing and so forth. So I think there 
needs to be some global consistency on certain aspects of L&D. " 
[CP2: 2] 
"Because why does Learning & Development exist in an 
organisation? I mean is it there needs to be some consistency, and 
that's where the process helps. " [CP2: 14] 
This suggests that the research model may require an additional element. The 
'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire is used to suggest that HR is governed by 
non-contextual factors, i. e. the need to be the embodiment of the positive values, 
ethics and integrity of the organisation. This super-ordinate role may also, 
however, need to include performance of the 'must do' functional elements (e. g. 
payroll, recruitment) in an efficient way, suggested by the use of the 'HR as 
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tactical execution' repertoire. This is clearly seen in the recruiter's discourse, 
where the influence of business strategy in process centric functions is seen as 
peripheral. Although business strategy is reported as requiring a different type of 
response from recruitment, it is not seen as fundamentally changing the process. 
"I think it's like a project ... you have a number of vacancies or 
critical roles that pop up at the same time, so I think you need to 
look at these sorts of quote unquote projects, and they do take, you 
have to approach them a bit differently, yeah. There's usually a 
sense of urgency, you know, as opposed to ... if we say an opening that doesn't need to be filled so quickly in another business unit. I 
think yeah you just treat it as a project ... you approach it differently because you're looking for a similar types of candidates, similar 
profiles, so you can utilise that fact to sort of your recruitment 
strategy, and where you look for those people and how you go 
about doing it. " [DH: 5] 
Ultimately, business strategy is reported as exerting an influence on recruiter only 
to the extent that it creates a need for high efficiency. For the recruiter, business 
strategy does not change process, but it determines that a project based 
approach is required. This does not change the process, but simply makes it 
more efficient. 
" ... the biggest thing is, when you have a book of open requisitions, they've all got an age to them, and you know some of them have 
been open weeks, some of them days, some of them a month or 
whatever. These are all sort of dumping in at the same time, and I 
guess if we treat them kind of as a one off, if you go one by one and 
you fill these openings, you're gonna have the last fifteen to twenty 
of them that are open for three months. And I mean so I wanted to 
sort of attack them all at the same time. They're all very similar 
reqs, and of course meeting with the business as well, I mean it 
was very clear that these were extremely urgent. So those were 
some of the factors. " [DH: 6] 
Likewise, the influence of the actors is seen as limited in process centric 
functions, such as recruitment. Where the actors are seen as exerting an 
influence, it is at a transactional level. 
"... it's quite a diverse management team across the different 
business units, so I think each group has their own little way of 
doing things, and their own hurdles that you need to know, that you 
need to get around, and manage. But once you get to know those 
little nuances, it's much easier to sort of work through the process. 
But it hasn't affected it, since the beginning when I didn't really 
know, the ways of the world, it took a little bit longer to sort of push 
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through the process. But once you know what's ahead of you then 
you can sort of prepare for that and manage. Doesn't really change 
the process too much. A little bit of tweaking here and there to 
make it go through. And make things flow a bit smoother, but 
again, same principles. " [DH: 14] 
The recruitment respondent sees the influence of the actors as again slight, and 
secondary to the process. The managers are reported as not being allowed to 
force changes to the process. 
" ... each manager's different. I would say two major types. One being, recruitment's in (my) hands, shove the piece of paper over to 
me, assuming it's churning and moving in the background. The 
other being you know, what's happening, daily calls, how's it going, 
this is really urgent, you know really chasing on a constant basis. I 
wouldn't say chasing because I wasn't really running away, but, ... 
you know what I mean ... Those are the two different styles and I 
would say I handle them both in the same way. Because I think 
that consistent approach and the consistent drive... as far as 
processing candidates, processing sort of the ads and filtering and 
what not, I think I follow the same process for both. " [DH: 6/7] 
The process, again, is seen as the primary driver. 
"... the process goes on as it is. " [DH: 7] 
"I don't change the process for anybody, really. Extreme cases of 
course, there's always exceptions, but the process pretty much 
stays the same from manager to manager ... the process is the 
same. " [DH: 7] 
Despite the negotiated process of strategy formulation (which seems to offer a 
better representation of HR in Thomson Financial) and the drive to perform HR 
activities which directly support the strategy, or which are related to credibility 
building to allow HR to exert a greater influence on the strategy negotiation 
process, there appears to be a recognition that HR also has over-riding functional 
responsibilities which are contextually independent. This is consistent with the 
view of HR offered by the MD. 
"... there's also some components which are always I think self- 
contained within the HR function, where you can define a strategy 
because ... of how best you want that function to achieve those 
pieces, which are the things which are as I'm saying, payroll, 
messaging, recruitment or recruitment activity, are I think can be 
self-contained ... they don't, I believe, need to refer back to the rest 
of the business, because ... that's your role to deliver those 
components, how you do that is entirely up to you. " [MH: 3] 
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In the interview with the generalist, these two repertoires were used in a more 
value laden way. Whilst good tactical execution is a necessary foundation. 
"... without a good tactical HR support, you never get the 
satisfaction or the buy in from any of the managers. You need to 
have the foundation. That needs to just work. It needs to just 
function. And then you can forget about it. You can think about a 
shared service centre for HR or something, you know, get your 
processes in order, that's a machine, that's back office, it runs. You 
shouldn't even have to think about it. " [RA2: 5] 
The value of good tactical execution is that it creates the opportunity for HR to 
play in a more strategic space. 
"I give the permission to myself to go and play, say right, I've got 
the foundation, that all is solid, and now I can go and play. " [RA2: 5] 
"... achieving for me is kind of building that foundation, base line, 
and then being able to really add to the business, to the growth, to 
whatever is you know the plan, basically, to add to this. " [RA; 7] 
And, conversely, poor tactical execution occupies all of the available HR 
resource, leaving no opportunity for strategic intervention. 
"... what we need to create is that foundation, to have some solid 
tactical day to day processes, currently ... [the Manila HRD] still discovers things unpaid pensions etcetera, etcetera, nobody every 
reconciled, nobody paid, it's a mess, what we're still uncovering 
from years before. And trying to fix. So all I'm saying is that these 
things need to be fixed, and then we can add more strategic. " 
[RA2: 1 1] 
Finally, the interview conducted with the L&D representative took a different 
perspective. From his viewpoint, HR was less process driven and, as indicated 
above, the major influence on his day to day activities was the business, 
business strategy and the role of the actors. 
"... you customise learning I guess in terms of what the executive's 
priorities are for that year. Or what they wanna achieve ... it depends on what the ... Market organisation needs. " [CP2: 5] 
The implication of the strong business orientation and the influence of the actors 
is that the L&D role becomes that of a negotiator and co-creator of strategy, 
directly referencing a negotiated and emergent model of strategy. 
"... another thing L&D facilitates is the conversation and clarity 
around priorities. For the business. And it's actually a coaching 
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model to help leaders get really clear about what they what success 
will look like at the end of the year. " [CP2: 6] 
This is a highly politicised process. 
°... politics come in ... Huge! Huge influence. It is power ... 
powerplay comes out through L&D so ... there's different 
stakeholders involved, and there's lots of opinions, lots of armchair 
critics with Learning & Development. Because it's kind of an 
intangible thing, and it's personal, the delivery. So it's negotiating 
all that, keeping people informed, understanding the powerplays. 
Something I was told I did very well in Legal in Australia. Because I 
got who was doing what and who was getting involved, on what 
basis. I could ... read their motivations. And understanding 
everybody's motivations, and kind of mapping that out for yourself, 
as to what motivates each of the people, what makes them feel 
important. It certainly plays a part. " [CP2: 10] 
His role, in consequence, becomes political, lobbying for support. 
"... the important thing there is really around, something day to day 
or not, I do in L&D, in my L&D capacity, is to get leadership buy in. 
Is to ensure that they (senior managers), I guess, are sponsoring 
the programme, or are sponsoring the people that are coming on 
board ... I think that's a big part of our role in L&D is ensuring 
that 
they're not taking anything for granted, that people are having 
conversations with their managers. " [CP2: 4] 
Change is also seen as problematic for this respondent, but he provides a 
different rationale, based on his politicised view of his role: it disrupts his 
understanding of the political landscape. 
"(Change brings) New personalities, new culture, new politics - turf 
... mapping out who's who in the new organisation, 
how are they 
structured, therefore how does that impact my own work ... it's disruptive, it's very disruptive ... So there's new personas, there's 
new personalities, understanding I mean what (the new Head of 
Talent) is after, what is Talent, where does Learning fit in with ... 
where is (the new Asia MD) with Learning & Development. So 
you're kind of sitting on edge, going, you know they've got other 
priorities at the moment, and you know that you're, you know the 
lightbulb on all of us, each of us, has, I mean the power, the voltage 
has increased five fold. So you have to tread very very carefully. " 
[CP2: 11/12] 
Which is echoed by another respondent. 
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"And now meeting the new head of Asia Pacific, coming in I guess 
in May, it's having to start this whole network, establishing those 
relationships, figuring out who your alliances are, which will be one 
of the things I'll talk about in the career development workshop next 
week. That is a very difficult process to start, all over again. You 
think that you've gotten that established, now do that again. So I 
think as an organisation, this has rocked us to the core. " [KBM: 8] 
6.3.2.2.2. Representations of the Realised HR Approach in Policies & 
Procedures 
Whilst there is a limited recognition that HR could play a significant role in 
conveying organisational meaning as part of the intended HR strategy, this is 
poorly translated into the realised HR approach. 
Policies and procedures are seen as exerting little influence on HR, excepting the 
references to process described above. The fluid nature of the Thomson 
organisational culture and the isolation of the Asia business means that there are 
few processes and procedures which are laid down, and those which do exist as 
global processes (e. g. talent management and the global competency 
framework) are limited only to the senior management population. 
There is some reinforcement of the 'performance driven' cultural characteristic 
through the global processes of performance management and compensation 
review: the Thomson-Reuters internal website (HR community page) stated that 
one element of the performance management vision states that "Top performers 
are recognized and rewarded and performance issues are addressed in a timely 
manner". 
This is acknowledged by this respondent. 
"Of all the places that I've worked in this organisation, in Thomson, 
we are the most clear on you know, we do pay for performance. 
You know it is absolutely compelling when you show that slide and 
you show that we pay and we incent our far exceeds, exceeds and 
fully achieved performers, and we don't pay the rest of 'em. " 
[KBM: 2] 
Annual performance appraisals (as well as a directional mid-year 'check-in') 
produce a performance rating which is directly linked to the compensation 
process, with both base salary review and bonus earnings derived from a formula 
which references the performance rating. However, this is still a politicised 
process, in that managers are provided with a suggested range for their 
compensation recommendations, and have the discretion to make awards both 
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within and outside the suggested ranges. As such, the direct link between 
performance management and compensation is obfuscated, with a resulting 
deterioration in the ability of these key elements of HR to convey the 
organisation's performance orientation value and increase in the politicisation of 
these elements. 
As well as this political influence, there is also a feeling that the organisation's 
words and actions are inconsistent, as this respondent's use of the 'conflicting 
priorities' repertoire indicates. 
"But you look at overall at the things that we're doing, and the 
messages that we're sending, and the day to day work that's going 
on ... it's now the fifteenth of January, we're in the last four days of 
performance review process, we've just been told we can't hire any 
one, in virtually every location in the world except Bangalore and 
Manila, we're getting ready to merge with Reuters. We're trying at 
the same time to tell people that they have career development in 
the organisation. We're saying that learning & development is 
important ... we're saying one thing and in our actions doing other things that make it pretty difficult. " [KBM: 2] 
There is also disappointingly little reference to the role of HR in creating 
organisational meaning, perhaps due to the articulated constraints, particularly 
the need to firstly address poor tactical execution. Exceptions to this are, 
however, found in the discourse of the L&D representative, who sees L&D as a 
key driver in conveying organisational meaning, both through the content it 
conveys. 
"If we're not talking a consistent language, and now we're going into 
competencies. Around the place. It would be hard to integrate one 
individual from one part of the world to the other. " [CP2: 2] 
"... there was a lot of resistance to the sales training ... What I wanted to do ... within the company was to create a common language, not only for sales people but anyone with a customer 
interfacing role. " [CP2: 8] 
And the message that investment in L&D itself conveys. 
NL&D in itself, the level of investment of L&D sends a signal to the 
organisation around talent, as a core process or, you know, it's 
what we're talking about, the company's values. Clearly. So 
investing in learning and development. Then the types of learning 
and development you do, if you're investing a lot in leadership 
development and the sort of stuff that's hard to measure from an 
ROI basis then that would give you an indicator to, to the sort of 
culture of the organisation, what the organisation values ... It says 
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something about having a longer term approach in terms of 
investing in people and seeing the payoff later ... It speaks to the 
competencies that we value, the sort of behaviours that we're 
espousing in the organisation. " [CP2: 3] 
6.3.2.3. The Realised HR Approach in an Environment of Change 
i) Perceptions of the Business's Performance in an Environment of Change 
Despite TF's public protestations that it is good at change, there was a strong 
contrary argument posed by the respondents, suggesting a disconnect between 
the business's intended strategy and realised approach. 
1 think the attitude here is that everybody believes we're good at 
change, dealing with change, but if you look at how it's actually 
handled, we're not good at it. Because we're not addressing it, 
we're not doing anything, we just high level say 'oh change is 
great'. I don't think as an organisation we do understand what 
change means, and what impact it has on the people, we're not 
dealing with it. " [RA: 1] 
"... there's no if you like global director of change, within HR ... All of the individual resource in HR is fully stretched with executing on 
the various existing workstreams ... I think that is, `we do a lot of 
change, and it's kind of worked out alright, therefore we are experts' 
(laughs) ... there's no propaganda directorate, at all. Which to me is an essential part of proactively managing for change. On a 
continuous basis. Which we do. I mean if you look at the track 
record, Thomson Corp does an M&A a week, on average, over the 
last eighteen months. And so to not have a propaganda team, 
running around, how can you possibly state you've got a nice slick 
process, going, which you can roll out through in any acquisition 
event. " [MH: 18] 
ii) Perceptions of HR Performance in an Environment of Change 
Discourse around HR performance demonstrates the same gap between the 
intended strategy and that which was realised as used to describe business 
performance. As in steady state, business respondents vary in the extent to 
which they see HR as playing a useful role in a change scenario. Although there 
are positive views: 
"... what I'm finding is that in fact HR's picking up on this (staff 
engagement issues), sometimes even before I am, or will say 
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actually we need to talk to so and so, about such and such. And 
that's it, that happens. " [AD: 2] 
"HR was very key for that change process we went through in 
Japan. " [AD: 5] 
HR's role in developing a proactive approach to developing a change strategy is 
seen as having limitations, suggesting that the expectations of the actors 
discussed in earlier sections were not being met. 
'Where I haven't engaged with HR around change, and can see a 
role to play, is ... when we know there is change coming or 
opportunity to engage with the business up front, and try to help 
manage through that change. [SK: 12/13] 
The realised HR approach to some of the individual change elements was seen 
as ineffective. 
"I think the one area where I would like to see us pick up a little bit 
is around employee communications ... I think employee 
communication is an area where we're not just don't seem to have 
it right. I think we do it to check the box, as opposed to actually to 
try to change what the employee population thinks. I think we've 
gotten we could have gotten better at it, but I think maybe that as a 
vehicle to help drive the understanding of change, would be quite 
useful. " [SK: 13] 
iii) HR Activities in an Environment of Change 
The intended HR strategy in an environment of change was characterised as 
enhancement of the individual employees' ability to change (an organisational 
agility model), development of change resilient systems and management of the 
psychology of change. 
Respondents tended to present an important role for HR in an environment of 
change, but had difficulty in quantifying that contribution. 
" ... the 
business leaders sometimes don't even know what 
sometimes or can't tangibly put their finger on what it is that [an 
HRD] provides, but we need her there ... We know we're gonna get 
some kind of value in the end. " [CP: 4] 
Where respondents do define HR's role in a change scenario, they tend to take a 
Dyer & Shafer perspective on the creation of organisational agility: HR's role in a 
changing environment becomes change, as this HR respondent indicates. 
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"... we are in a constant phase of change. So I don't think we're just 
strategic partners any more, we're change agents, consistently. 
The power of being a change agent, and linking strategy with 
capability ongoing ... day to day. " [CP: 5] 
This is echoed by the business. 
"... it's almost an instinctive understanding of theirs which gets built 
up, whether it's by networking or because of the kind of people you 
recruit or you have it. And if you do not have that ability, you can't 
really service this industry and be successful or effective. So as we 
said in the last thing, it's almost a self correcting environment, you 
build it, it's a core competency as you put it. " [SV: 7] 
These two respondents use a discourse which focuses on HR's role in the 
building of organisational capability. 
"So our role [in HR] is to link what they [the business managers] 
want to do with capability and making it happen. " [CP: 7] 
"... so the strategy's unclear so what role does HR play? What is 
its expertise? It is a change agent. So it's understanding that 
that's where we are right now, we don't know what the bigger 
picture is, so what do we do in terms of capability. To ensure that 
there's limited interference to the business during this time, and that 
the end need is met. I see that's what HR's role. " [CP: 6] 
Respondents also offer comment on how HR builds organisational agility, in this 
instance through change oriented recruitment: 
"I think HR delivers in a couple of ways actually. One, we actually 
hire people who are good at change. We don't hire people who 
wanna come in and have ABC career track and you know in a 
year. So I think it up front, that HR is playing a role in terms of 
defining what it takes to be successful here, and that kind of pre- 
populates the population with a group of people who are more 
responsive to change than you might find at other organisations. " 
[SK: 12/13] 
Albeit implicitly rather than systematically, the recruitment process is seen as 
selecting and producing change resilient employees. 
"I have a feeling the other thing is, if you're not able to handle 
(change), you'll either kind of bale out, or you'll find a way to handle 
it ... It's a self-selecting process. " [SV: 6] 
And training is seen as a reinforcing process: 
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"I think there is an attempt made at from a training perspective at 
gearing people up for that. The kind of 'leading through change', 
you know there is some programming around it ... there's clearly an 
attempt to make sure that our employees have a framework to deal 
with change and that it doesn't become it becomes an opportunity 
not a threat, a distressing thing. And for the most part I think 
people respond to that. And I think the people who don't leave 
because they understand it is an environment of constant change 
and if that's something that is unsettling to you, it's not gonna stop, 
so yes you know just leave. " [SK: 13] 
The leadership competency framework is referenced as a driver of cultural fit, but 
this respondent stops short of making the linkage between the competencies, HR 
processes and the creation of change resilience. 
"... if you really see our talent model, the core competencies we talk 
about is do you understand how the customer's thinking, do you 
have a strategic mindset, do you know how we make money, and 
are we being innovative. That's in the strategy bucket. The other is 
driving for results, working across boundaries, whatever it is. And 
then you're saying, are you building capability, whether it's in terms 
of integrity, whether it's in terms of relationships. I don't really 
recall, but I tend to put you know building processes and systems 
into building capability as well. But because you need to be so 
resilient, your systems and processes are, it's a very funny mix. It's 
like our HR systems. They're very clumsy, very painful, but yet if 
you really look at it, they work, in their own way. So its kind of a 
very, two very contrary things co-existing, and that's one of the 
reasons we find it so difficult to get the cultural fit into the 
organisation. " [SV: 7/8] 
Whereas the competency framework is the obvious way of making the 
connection, and her comments suggest that competencies may be a mechanism 
for creating agility, but that in Thomson Financial that explicit linkage has not 
been made and the use of competencies for creating agility may be under- 
utilised. 
"... if we genuinely believed that our DNA's change, one of the 
building blocks for all managers, and including staff right from 
induction has to be what does change mean and what are the kind 
of behaviours we need to exhibit in managing change or embracing 
change. It needs to be a very conscious process. " [SV: 4] 
"... when people come in, you kind of build their understanding of 
change and what are the behaviours they need to have. " [SV: 5] 
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This is the closest to a definition of HR's role as a manager of organisational 
meaning, but again this is presented as a theoretical concept rather than an 
organisational reality. 
Respondents are less positive about HR's contribution in the other two areas: the 
processual element of change management is not referenced at all, and the 
management of the psychology of change is seen as hampered by the the 
difficulty of finding a skill set within HR to deliver this psychological element. 
"And the third (element) is the emotional, and the emotional one I 
think is the most difficult one, because if we are neither trained to 
recognise the issues, nor are we trained to have the degree of self- 
awareness, which unfortunately is at least with most people, and 
you don't have anybody who is alive and alert to spotting it, then 
you probably have more of a problem syndrome than we think. " 
[SV: 5] 
6.3.2.4. Is the Gap Between Intended HR Strategy and the Realised 
Approach Problematic? 
A final question posed by this project was whether the gap between intended 
strategy and realised approach is problematic. The realisation of HR strategy 
may be different from the intended strategy for two reasons: firstly, an 
organisation may fully attempt to operationalise its intended strategy, but is 
hampered by implementation issues: the theory of constraints. This was 
discussed in the previous section. Secondly, intended strategy may also be 
defined as the statements made by the company about its strategy, and the 
realised approach is different because of lack of consistency with the 
organisation's actions. 
The first point of discussion is whether a gap between realised approach and 
intended strategy is perceived as a problem. In a 'strategy as a process' world, 
responsiveness to emergent changes in strategy would suggest that this could 
actually be a positive, indicating that the organisation is showing responsiveness 
to the changing environment. However, in TF the gap is perceived as 
problematic. 
°... what I don't see is that that thread that we want organic growth, 
now what do we do to get to it. I don't see that as a message going 
through. You see organic growth on presentations every now and 
again, but for me again something that's very very detached. We 
are running after revenue new sales whatever. I don't see it 
attached. I don't see the message going out to the organisation in 
general, and not only to the sales team, it needs to go out to 
everybody, this is what our analysts see, this is what the company 
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needs to achieve, this is why we're doing what. Connect it! " 
[RA: 12] 
This is perceived as impacting HR: this respondent references an inconsistency 
between intended HR strategy (in so far as this exists), and realised HR: short 
termist directives overwhelm HR staff and result in conflicting messages. 
"... you look at overall at the things that we're doing, and the 
messages that we're sending, and the day to day work that's going 
on ... it's the 
fact that we're right in the middle ... of performance 
review process, we've just been told we can't hire any one, in 
virtually every location in the world ... we're trying at the same time to tell people that they have career development in the organisation 
... we're saying one thing and in our actions doing other things that 
make it pretty difficult. " [KBM: 2] 
It is noteworthy that these quotes are both from HR respondents, suggesting that 
they are potentially less comfortable with the emergent model of strategy than 
their business colleagues, who, as previously shown, tend to perceive HR 
relatively well. 
6.3.3. Mediating Level: Between the Realised HR Approach and the 
Intended HR Strategy 
Whereas this is logically an important part of the HR model, and particularly when 
the strategy is emergent and logically incremental, it appears that this feedback 
loop is almost entirely non-existent in Thomson Financial. Despite conducting 14 
interviews in project three and a similar number in project two, not one 
respondent referenced an organisational learning from previous experience or 
the need to review the past to learn lessons for the future. Where comments are 
made, they are generic complaints at the lack of reflection in the organisation. 
"... we had some consultant material (about the effect of a sales 
effectiveness programme), but nobody put thought in, nobody 
connected these dots. So why? Why do it? Why spend the 
money? Why not use it, you know if you have it? " [RA: 13] 
This is consistent with the cultural diagnostic (short termist, short attention span), 
but potentially creates a serious problem for Thomson Financial. 
495 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The final section will review the research questions and will look at the 
implications of this study for both practitioners and academics. 
7.1. The Research Questions 
This concluding section will review how the project addressed the following 
questions. 
" What can a social constructivist approach and a discourse methodology 
tell us about the formulation of HR strategy? 
" What can a social constructivist approach and a discourse methodology 
tell us about the implementation of HR strategy? 
" How can change best be reflected in a model of HR strategy formulation 
and implementation? 
" Can a new model of HR strategy formulation and implementation be 
developed which can provide a better explanation for the operation of HR 
in an organisation than 'best fit' or contextually based theories of HR? 
A descriptive model was developed in the opening sections of project three and 
is reproduced again in figure 79 below. 
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Figure 79: Descriptive Research Model 
7.1.1. HR Strategy Formulation and Social Constructivism 
The first research question asked whether a social constructivist approach and a 
discourse analysis methodology can inform the process of HR strategy 
formulation. 
The key to this approach was a re-examination of the term 'strategy' and an 
attempt to deconstruct its use in the context of HR. Traditional models of 
strategy tend to assume a definition of 'strategy as an objective', where strategy 
is seen as a deterministic, rational process deriving from a logical process of 
environmental analysis and diagnosis. This project explored an alternative 
definition of 'strategy as a process', which assumes a view of strategy as 
emergent and iterative. 
The deconstruction of the term 'strategy' and the alternative definition was a 
potentially useful one from three aspects. Probably most importantly, the 
distinction between the definitions of 'strategy as objective' versus 'strategy as 
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process' proved very illuminating, as it allowed for the use of an emergent and 
negotiated model of strategy formulation. Secondly, this approach to strategy 
also allowed for the consideration of change in the strategy formulation process. 
Finally, this approach allowed for an examination of HR as a political process, 
looking at the differential value attribution to the terms 'strategy' and 'tactics'. 
To look firstly at the use of the 'strategy as process' definition, its view of strategy 
as an emergent and iterative process is both more compatible with a view of 
strategy development in organisations as politicised and negotiated. It also 
allows greater flexibility and responsiveness to change. In this, it seems to more 
accurately reflect the way in which strategy is described in the discourse of the 
respondents. 
Secondly, 'strategy as a process' is compatible with the work on organisational 
agility and dynamic capabilities. A processual view of strategy allows for re- 
negotiation and re-formulation of the strategy in response to changes in the 
organisational environment, availability of internal capabilities (i. e. changes in 
constraints) or assessment of what has worked or not worked. As such, this 
provides a level of organisational flexibility not possible under a 'strategy as an 
objective' regime. 
Finally, turning to value attributions, using discourse analysis to deconstruct the 
terms 'strategy' and 'tactics' showed that respondents saw a clear hierarchy 
between the two terms, with the former being perceived as higher value than the 
latter. Despite this, and acting almost in contradiction with it, effective execution 
of the tactical was seen as essential (to gain credibility and effectively use 
resources) before performance on the strategic elements was possible. 
However, this project suggested that this may be little more than a semantic 
distinction (particularly when one looks at MH's discourse, for instance, where his 
"tactical execution" can be mapped to Johnson & Scholes' "operational 
strategies" and the conflating of the two terms in his discourse). 
This analysis has several implications for the formulation of HR strategy. 
Traditional models of strategy formulation, which see 'strategy as an objective', 
appear to have been problematic for HR respondents in both project two and 
project three. In an organisation which lacks a formal approach to business 
strategy, taking a 'strategy as objective' definition to HR strategy formulation is 
problematic: how does one develop HR strategy where the business strategy is 
unclear? 'Strategy as an objective' becomes a potentially self-limiting discourse 
imposed on HR by itself, although one may also surmise that use of this 
repertoire has some utility for HR respondents, in that it offers a potential 
explanation for HR's failure to link to business strategy. 
Taking an emergent view of strategy, conversely, would allow HR staff to 
respond flexibly to a changing business strategy, deploying their knowledge of 
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the business, political acumen and technical skills to respond in a proactive way 
to changes in business direction. 
There are also implications for HR of the differential value attributions between 
'strategy' and 'tactics'. HR has an obsession with strategy and being perceived 
as 'strategic', and it may be that HR strategy is actually something of a 
misnomer, and that HR's drive towards a 'strategic' role may be diverting the 
profession's attention from what actually would build credibility: good tactical 
execution rather than 'strategic' input. 
To revert to the research question, it appears that a social constructivist 
perspective and a discourse analysis methodology can indeed offer a useful 
perspective on HR strategy formulation. 
7.1.2. HR Strategy Implementation and Social Constructivism 
The next research question asked whether a social constructivist perspective, 
using discourse analysis as a methodology, could illuminate issues of HR 
strategy implementation. 
Traditional models tend to pay little attention to issues of implementation; 'best fit' 
and contextually based theories of HR are typical in their unitary focus on HR 
strategy formulation. Where traditional models do reference implementation, 
they tend to presume a direct, unhampered, link between strategy articulation 
and its implementation. The discourse of respondents in both project two and 
project three suggests that this is an inaccurate reflection of how HR actually 
operates in real organisations, where a discrepancy is often reported between 
the intended HR strategy and the realised HR approach. 
Taking a social constructivist approach to HR strategy implementation is 
illuminating: respondents offer four types of explanation for the gap between 
intended strategy and the realised approach. The first is the 'theory of 
constraints': organisations may fully intend to implement a strategy, but may be 
limited by organisational and professional constraints, or the perception of those 
constraints. Secondly, linking back to emergent strategy formulation and change, 
changes or modifications to strategic direction can make the implementation of 
an intended strategy irrelevant. Thirdly, referencing the negotiated and political 
nature of strategy in organisations, a small number of respondents indicated a 
disconnect between an organisation's stated strategy, and the prioritisation it 
indicates through its actions. Finally, the social constructivist approach reveals 
two significant interpretative repertoires around pre-requisite activities which HR 
is required to perform: 'HR as tactical execution' and the 'super-ordinate role of 
HR', used to indicate that there are activities outwith the intended strategy which 
HR is still expected to perform. 
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The implications for HR are again significant. Discourse categorised under the 
'theory of constraints' heading is used functionally by respondents to offer 
explanations for HR's perceived 'failure' to implement strategy, but this discourse 
may be self-limiting. It may be more productive to use an emergent model of 
strategy and 'shift the conversation': this could offer alternative repertoires to HR 
practitioners, which could take a more fluid view of the relationship between 
intended strategy and the realised approach (and hence be more responsive to 
change and reflective of organisational priorities). 
Returning to the research question, this project suggests that a social 
constructivist perspective and a discourse analysis methodology can be useful in 
examining issues around HR strategy implementation. 
7.1.3. Incorporation of Change 
The third research question considered how change could best be reflected in a 
model of HR strategy formulation and implementation. 
The question raised by this study is whether change is a discreet variable (i. e. it 
should be treated as a contextual influence in the same way as, say, culture or 
market) or whether it is a factor of a qualitatively different nature. This project 
has suggested that change influences the model in a number of ways: it operates 
as a contextual influence where the change is proactive (i. e. intended by and/or 
substantially under the control of the organisation), and as a constraint when the 
change is reactive (i. e. forced on the organisation by an external party or event 
and/or not largely under the control of the organisation). It also seems like 
change is subject to the influence of business strategy, context and the influence 
of the actors, which means that analysis of change becomes akin to the revealing 
of a series of matryoskha dolls, where each level opens to reveal another level 
and so on. 
This project has considered two main dimensions of change: proactive versus 
reactive change, and change as a discrete variable versus change as an 
influence on the entire model. 
Firstly, one must consider whether change should be seen as a discrete variable, 
or whether change should be seen as an influence on the entire model. The 
respondents' discourse indicates that they see it in both ways. It is perceived as 
an environmental factor, in respect of which the organisation can develop 
intended strategy. This is the essence of the organisational agility/dynamic 
capabilities work: change is seen as amenable to management and can be 
planned and strategised for in the same way as any other contextual factor. 
However, this is potentially misleading: in actuality, the influence of the actors' 
perceptions of change appeared to operate as a 'gating' factor, i. e. it was at the 
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level of the actors that changes were perceived, formulated and decisions were 
made as to which changes would be deemed to be important and negotiations 
around how to respond to the change occurred. As such, change has a second, 
rather than a first, order reality. This corresponds with an emergent model of 
strategy formulation as well as a more fluid approach to strategy implementation, 
where organisational decision making is more responsive to alterations in the 
business environment and can take a logically incremental approach to adjusting 
organisational strategy formulation and implementation. Change, in summary, 
influences the whole model, beginning with its influence on first order reality 
factors such as business strategy and context, then operating on the mediation 
levels of the actors' influence to inform the intended strategy, then finally being 
represented as a constraint between the intended strategy and the realised 
approach. 
Secondly, to look at proactive and reactive change, the discourse in this project 
indicated that respondents made a fundamental differentiation in their discourse 
around proactive change (for which the organisation can plan and over which it is 
in control) and reactive change (anticipation of which is not possible, which may 
have been enforced and over which the organisation has limited control). 
This project considered the premise that proactive change had a first order 
reality, qualitatively similar to business strategy and context, It was envisaged 
that, in a change oriented organisation such as TF, change could have a first 
order reality (e. g. the `fact' of making and integrating an acquisition), and that it 
was amenable to the same type of analysis as these other factors. Reactive 
change, conversely, was anticipated as quantitatively different, a discontinuous 
and disruptive influence on business (and hence HR) strategy which was not 
amenable to analysis. 
However, there was little evidence that change (proactive or reactive) operated 
as a discrete first order reality; at best, change operated upon business strategy 
and/or context to modify their first order realities, but it did not appear to operate 
as an independent first order reality factor. This suggested that the inclusion of 
proactive change on the top level of the model was not appropriate. 
This relegated change to the level of second order reality, where change was 
constructed, formulated and negotiated by the actors. This applies to both 
proactive and reactive change, although discourse around change scenarios 
characterised as reactive has potentially a higher level of functionality to 
respondents: it is used to present an account of the difficulty a business finds in 
responding to the reactive, imposed, change scenario, i. e. it offers an explanation 
of the limitations on the effectiveness of strategy and strategy development in the 
similar way to the way in which the HR staff offer the theory of constraints as an 
explanation for'failure' to execute strategy. 
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The implications of this treatment of change for HR are interesting. The analysis 
suggests that HR strategy, in an environment of proactive, planned change, may 
be amenable to the same kind of 'best fit'/contextually based HR type of analysis 
as in the steady state environment, and that the influences of business strategy, 
the context and the influence of the actors may form the basis of an HR strategy 
which can build organisational capabilities consistent with a scenario of 
environmental change. This suggests that an environment of planned change 
may not be quantitatively different from steady state, in that it can be planned for, 
and strategy can be built which is likely to be reasonably appropriate, if taken 
from a logically incremental, emergent point of view: 'strategy as a process'. 
Despite the distinction made between proactive and reactive change, the role 
articulated for HR is similar. There are two elements presented as ways in which 
HR effectively supports both proactive and reactive change: a functional role 
(dealing with the transactional elements) and an emotional one. This again 
echoes the dichotomy between HR as administrative expert and HR as strategic 
business partner. 
There is a sense that, in TF, HR's contribution to change management is limited 
by a number of factors. Organisational configuration factors create an 
organisation and an employee base with perhaps higher change resistance than 
would be normal, and hence less interest in change management support. As 
the organisational hierarchy conveys the message that change management is 
not valued, HR - despite the recognition by practitioners that it is necessary - 
does not invest time in providing change support. Whilst the dominant coalition 
of the organisational actors will not prevent HR from providing higher levels of 
change management support, neither will it drive this forward. With a dominant 
coalition the priorities of which are around short term revenues and growth, and 
for whom change is, personally, relatively unproblematic, change management is 
de-prioritised. 
A longer term role for HR in systematic development of change resilience is also 
discussed via an organisational capability repertoire, but again this is, if at all, 
done on an implicit and unconscious level, whereas the competency framework 
mechanism would allow the organisation far more systematic (and hence 
impactful) nurturing of change capability and resilience within the organisation. In 
comparison, although the beginnings of an organisational agility model can be 
seen in TF, it is implicit and under-developed. 
To address the research question, this project has suggested that the influence 
of change is much more complex and multi-dimensional than the original 
descriptive research model suggested, therefore an amendment to the model 
should be made for the linking document. 
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7.1.4. Development of a New Model of HR 
The final research question asked whether a model of HR could be built which 
addressed HR strategy implementation as well as formulation, utilised an 
emergent, negotiated model of strategy, and accommodated organisational 
agility and dynamic capability, and change. 
This section will work through the elements of the model, starting with the HR 
strategy formulation and moving on to HR strategy implementation, ending with a 
review of how well the model appears to explain the data. 
7.1.4.1. HR Strategy Formulation 
Using the descriptive research model as a framework to firstly look at HR 
strategy formulation, discourse analysis was used to conduct a diagnostic of the 
environmental factors which respondents saw as directional influences on 
intended HR strategy (business strategy, contextual factors and change). 
The project then considered the influence of the actors as the mediating level 
interpreting and negotiating these factors into the intended HR strategy. 
7.1.4.1.1. The Influence of Environmental Factors on HR Strategy 
This section will look at the reported influence of business strategy, contextual 
factors and change on the HR strategy formulation process. 
i) Business Strategy 
This project indicated that there were two issues to be considered in respect of 
the inclusion of business strategy as an environmental factor: the level of strategy 
to which this referred and the definition of strategy which was applied. 
It was clear that business strategy as a first order reality factor could only relate 
to the highest level of corporate strategy (as discussed by the MD). All other 
manifestations of business strategy occurred at the level of second order reality, 
i. e. they were subject to the influence, the mediation and the perceptions and 
perceptual biases of the actors. 
Moving on to the definition of strategy, as in project two, the business strategy 
emerged as one of the major influences on the intended HR strategy in Thomson 
Financial, as predicted by 'best fit' models of HR as supported by the use of the 
'business leads HR' repertoire. This linkage, however, appeared less 
deterministic than 'best fit' or contextually based theories of HR would suppose. 
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There are a number of elements of the data which are problematic when viewed 
from a 'strategy as an objective' perspective, to which social constructivism can 
offer, an explanation: the dichotomy between 'HR as strategy' and 'HR as tactics', 
the super-ordinate role of HR and the difficulty of formulating HR strategy in an 
environment where the business environment is unclear. 
Firstly, the social constructivist approach offers an explanation for the 'HR as 
strategy' versus 'HR as tactics' dichotomy, whereas the 'strategy as an objective' 
perspective does not. 
As in project two, the dichotomy between the 'HR as strategy' and 'HR as tactical 
execution' repertoires was evidenced, with similar value attributions weighting the 
former as more valuable but organisational credibility resting with the latter. This 
had an added dimension in project three, however: the MD articulated the view 
that business strategy only occurred at the highest level in the organisations, and 
that business activities (including those in HR), become tactical execution. In his 
view, HR is a combination of execution of functional elements (e. g. payroll) and a 
'bundle' of HR activities depending on the overall strategy of the Corporation (e. g. 
recruitment in a growth market). The value of HR articulated by the business is 
based on excellent functional execution rather than 'strategy'. This calls into 
question the appropriateness of HR's pursuit of a strategic role and implies that a 
focus on better tactical execution may gain greater credibility for HR in the 
organisation. 
Secondly, a number of respondents alluded to a 'super-ordinate' role for HR, 
where HR is held accountable for doing the 'right' thing (even when the stated 
business direction runs contrary to this), identifying and addressing needs of 
which the business is not aware, or upholding values (e. g. integrity), either as a 
touchstone for organisational values and creator of organisational meaning, or 
because it is the 'right' thing to do. 
Finally, as in project two, HR respondents reported difficulty in deriving HR 
strategy from unclear business strategy. In the absence of any agreed written or 
verbal understanding of the business or HR strategies, similar discourses emerge 
in this section to those articulated in project two, relating to the difficulty of 
building HR strategy when the business strategy is unclear. However, this relies 
upon the 'strategy as objective' definition and, although this is undoubtedly a 
functional repertoire for HR staff (it explains - with an exogenous attribution of 
blame - any failure of HR to match with business strategy), it may ultimately be a 
self-limiting one. One can see (e. g. in CP's discourse) the alternative formulation 
of this argument, using a processual definition of strategy, which creates a 
flexible role for HR and HR strategy, where good HR business partners can work 
within and effectively support an emergent model of business strategy. In such a 
model, the division between strategy and tactics does become one of semantics, 
as these are second order realities, subject to re-definition, negotiation and value 
attribution. 
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This view of strategy becomes particularly pertinent in an environment of change, 
where the business strategy may be changing, negated or non-existent. 
ii) Contextual Factors 
Having failed to see Paauwe's configuration factors or institutional mechanisms 
exert a significant influence in project two, project three did not specifically focus 
on the impact of context, although it was recognised that an analysis of context 
could be an input into HR strategy formulation. 
Project three used a much more restricted model of contextual factors than that 
used by Paauwe, recognising the strong reported influence of culture in project 
three. Culture was examined from a different perspective from that of project 
two, and a cultural web and consideration of the organisation's stated values, 
supported by the discourse of the participants, was used to identify a variety of 
potentially influential features of Thomson Financial's culture. 
The influence of the context was seen as similar in both steady state and 
environments of change. The positive attributes of the culture were seen as 
aspirational rather than realised, and were countermanded by the negative: short 
termism, in particular, was seen as a profound and a negative influence on HR, in 
that HR's ability to add value is largely based in activities with a longer term 
payoff (e. g. learning & development, talent management), which runs contrary to 
a short termist culture. 
However, for one respondent at least, there was a sense that TF's 
entrepreneurial configuration has brought people into the organisation with high 
levels of change resilience, therefore the lack of formal change management 
support is perhaps less impactful - hence less valued by the organisation - than 
it would be in a company with different origins. 
The problem with this view, for HR, is that HR respondents clearly felt there was 
a need to provide change management support, but supposed that there would 
be limited organisational value placed upon it. Although some employees 
(perhaps those from less entrepreneurial backgrounds) undoubtedly feel the 
need for more sophisticated change management support, HR is unlikely to 
spend considerable time and effort on something which is not articulated as an 
organisational priority. This links to two of the major repertoires used by 
participants: should HR be negotiating for more attention to be paid to this topic 
('super-ordinate role of HR') and does HR have the negotiating position to 
represent its case satisfactorily ('strategy as a process')? 
Whilst HR does have a role to play in the management of organisational 
meaning, it clearly is subject to the priorities of the organisational actors, on 
which its influence here appears to be limited. This would appear to be an 
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excellent opportunity for HR to "shift" the conversation (in the sense of Ford & 
Ford, 1995), by, for instance, providing a cost-benefit analysis of change 
management support versus the costs of losing key staff, reduced productivity 
etc. 
iii) The Impact of Change 
A clear distinction emerged between reactive and proactive change in this 
project. Reactive change was clearly represented as a constraint, but proactive 
change was more difficult to categorise. The model proposed that change 
(proactive) would emerge as a discrete environmental variable in project three. 
However, although the prediction of organisational capability and dynamic 
capabilities work would suggest that change is a discrete variable, there is 
actually little evidence to support it in project three. Whilst change was reported 
as having an important impact on the other environmental variables (business 
strategy, contextual factors) as well as on the actors, it did not emerge as a factor 
in itself. 
One can surmise that for organisations which took a strong interest in 
organisational capability or dynamic capabilities, change may exist as a discrete 
variable, around which organisations developed intended HR strategy. However, 
in Thomson Financial, given that the approach to change was less planful, 
change did not emerge as a discrete variable. The implications of this are that an 
organisation may wish to retain a change diagnostic and approach as a 
significant input into the intended HR strategy, but that it will inevitably be 
mediated by the actors' second order reality, and this second order 'gating' will 
allow an organisational agility approach to emerge in only the most systematic, 
long termist and planful of change oriented organisations. 
7.1.4.1.2. The Impact of the Organisational Actors 
As there were no strong environmental drivers reported in Thomson Financial, 
the model then moved on to examine the impact of the organisational actors. 
Consistent with the predictions of Paauwe, one would expect that a lack of 
deterministic drivers would create considerable freedom to manoeuvre for the 
organisational actors, suggesting that Paauwe's model is not entirely 
incompatible with social constructivism and a negotiated view of strategy. 
As predicted (and consistent with project two), the impact of the organisational 
actors was seen as a major influence on the intended HR strategy. 
In steady state, by his own admission, a non-HR literate MD provided little 
sponsorship for HR and failed to use the function on anything other than a 
transactional level. Employee stakeholders, government bodies and the senior 
managers were not referenced. This leaves HR staff as the only members of the 
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dominant coalition, which has the following implications. HR has the ability to 
work in the way it sees fit, given that basic transactional functions are effectively 
taken care of, but it does not have powerful support or drive from the MD and the 
rest of the senior management team. 
7.1.4.1.3. Intended HR Strategy 
The first task in this section is to review the articulations of the organisation's 
intended HR strategy and attempt to characterise it. In the absence of a clearly 
articulated HR strategy, one must look at extrapolate the intended HR strategy, 
looking at the contextual diagnostic, mediated by the influence of the actors. 
However, at this point a short coming of the descriptive research model appears: 
respondents reference the super-ordinate role of HR and its functional 
responsibilities, neither of which are incorporated in the current model. 
The contextual diagnostic proved inconclusive: in Thomson Financial, as it 
appeared that neither business strategy, context nor change were regarded as 
fundamental influences on the intended HR strategy, and this lack of 
deterministic contextual drivers allowed the organisational actors the maximum 
'freedom to manoeuvre'. In such an organisation, the model predicts that 
strategy formulation will be a highly negotiated process. In organisations such as 
London Underground, where the influence of institutional and configuration forces 
is considerably higher and considerably more directive, one would expect more 
'punch throughs', i. e. first order contextual factors which are too deterministic to 
be amenable to significant negotiation or re-formulation by the actors. One would 
also expect 'punch throughs' in other areas, e. g. in organisations which have 
difficult competitive environments, one would expect the competitive forces to be 
relatively unmodified by the actors' reformulation and negotiation processes. 
Returning to TF, given that respondents see few deterministic factors in the 
formulation of HR strategy in TF, this suggests that the influence of the actors will 
become pre-eminent in determining the intended HR strategy. The actors offer a 
number of distinct models of intended HR strategy: those offered by the HR 
director (the organisational agility model), the MD (tactical execution and 
functional HR 'bundles') and the 'best fit'/'best practice' models offered by the 
other respondents. 
The HR director offered the organisational agility model (described in section 
6.2.3.1) as the intended HR strategy. Whereas this would have provided an 
elegant model of intended HR strategy, the HR director does not privilege the 
model as an organisationally shared view but merely presents it as a descriptive 
and somewhat hypothetical model. Had this been a consensually agreed 
representation of TF's intended HR strategy, it would have been reasonable to 
use this as the working definition of this element of the model. However, as it is a 
view presented by one of the HR actors, it should be regarded as one of a 
number of potential second order realities. The MD's model related to the 
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Johnson & Scholes' operational strategy level, combining a tactical execution role 
with a 'bundle' of HR activities which relate to the high level strategic direction set 
at the Corporation level, which potentially concurs with the focus on operational 
processes offered by some of the HR respondents. 
Using 'strategy as an objective', this lack of consensus around intended HR 
strategy would be problematic, given that there was no documented strategy and 
the fragmentation of the organisational actors was not brought to any resolution 
as there was no formal negotiating forum in which negotiation could take place. 
However, given 'strategy as a process' and the descriptive research model, the 
existence of multiple and contradictory versions of the intended HR strategy is 
explicable, albeit not an environment in which it is easy to practice HR. 
However, more problematic in terms of the descriptive research model is the fact 
that accounts of intended HR strategy indicate that HR has two components 
which the current model does not address. Firstly, it is clear that there are 
activities which fall under HR's remit, which the business has the expectation that 
HR will perform, which are not contextually driven (e. g. payroll). They comprise a 
significant percentage of the HR workload, and respondents indicate that there 
are major determinants of HR's credibility in an organisation (this appears in KG's 
comments in this project, as well as HR's transactional/administrative heritage 
being represented as a professional constraint in project two, section 6.4.2.1). 
There is a need to incorporate this functional responsibilities element into the 
descriptive research model. 
Secondly, an interesting dilemma emerged in project three. There is an implicit 
suggestion in Paauwe's model that the analysis of the factors to produce 'best fit' 
will also produce a strategy which is optimal for the business. Project three 
indicates that this may not be the case, as a number of potentially negative 
contextual factors are presented (most noticeable of which is the short termist 
culture). Respondents (both from the business and from HR) indicate that HR 
has a 'super-ordinate' responsibility to challenge this. To provide an example, if 
change is not an organisational priority, and the 'business leads HR' repertoire is 
a determinant on the intended HR approach, 'best fit' becomes sub-optimal, 
given that HR perceives a need for change management which has not been 
emphasized by the business. 
To look at the theoretical models, Paauwe's model allows for this possibility (in 
the absence of strong contextual drivers, his "dominant coalition" dictate 
strategy), but this concept is under-developed in his work and does not consider 
the effect of a dominant coalition who do not agree, or the political and 
negotiating processes within the dominant coalition. Taking a processual 
definition of strategy, one can accommodate these - potentially contradictory - 
views of the role of HR, but it does suggest a potential area of conflict between 
HR and the business which may be explicitly negotiated out, implicitly accepted 
or explicitly or implicitly problematic. Including this 'super-ordinate role of HR' will 
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also require an enhancement to the descriptive research model shown in figure 
69. 
The implications of multiple definitions of the intended HR strategy and the 
functional and super-ordinate responsibilities attributed to HR are significant for 
the HR function. When one sees strategy in a processual light, one finds 
answers to questions raised in this project about expectations of the HR role 
which are not contextually driven: 'must dos', such as payroll, and responsibilities 
arising from the super-ordinate role articulated for HR. These become matters 
for the negotiations around HR strategy between HR and the dominant coalition. 
The extent to which HR successfully performs the 'must dos' gives the function 
'permission' to contribute to discussions at a more strategic level, and the degree 
to which the latter is enacted is a matter of ongoing negotiation, in the same way 
in which all other elements of strategy development are negotiated. This also 
explains the conundrum between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' super-ordinate 
roles for HR. These have no first order reality, but are a matter of perception, 
adjudged differently by different organisational actors, depending on the lens with 
which they view the scenario, their own perceptual filters and the degree of 
perceived credibility of the HR function within the organisation. This is clearly 
shown in CP's comments, where his view of the HRD's role as illegitimate, his 
position sustained only through the management of senior managers' personal 
needs, is likely to be very different from that negotiated between the HRD and his 
business clients. 
This analysis suggests a tension in the HR role between business led HR and the 
perceived 'super-ordinate role of HR', which a best fit or contextually based 
model of HR does not reflect. Although the super-ordinate role may be related to 
best practice or to the contextual environment, the organisation may not be 
aware of the need for certain HR activities or, indeed, may be resistant to them. 
Respondents argue that the HR function is a "touchstone" for organisational 
values, a defender of the organisation's integrity and has a coaching role to 
shape and directing managers to do the "right" thing for the business. 
This raises the question of whether the optimal intended HR strategy is one 
which is solely responsive to the needs which the business articulates, or does 
HR have a super-ordinate role which it is obligated to play? This links to the 
dichotomy at the heart of the HR function, where it is expected to be both 
strategic business partner and employee champion, two roles which are 
intermittently but almost necessarily in conflict with one another. 
There is an obvious issue, given that the elements of the'super-ordinate' role are 
largely governed by the interpretations of senior HR staff, setting up HR as a 
'higher order' decision maker, which has unpleasant reflections of the 'HR police' 
discourse raised by respondents. CP's discourse is particularly interesting here, 
as he sees one HR regime as legitimate in pushing forward its own views, and 
another as illegitimate and 'manipulative'. 
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The implications for HR are that a thorough understanding of the business, as 
well as credible and objective HR staff will be required to maximise the 
contribution of HR, and that good political acumen and sophisticated negotiating 
skills will also be required. Establishing credibility, measuring performance 
against specific objectives and ensuring the exercise of the 'super-ordinate role' 
is perceived legitimately become critical, given this model. 
7.1.4.2. HR Strategy Implementation 
Analysing the topic of HR strategy implementation raised a number of points: 
what were the mediating factors between the intended strategy and realised 
approach, and how could the realised approach be characterised. 
7.1.4.2.1. Mediating Level: Constraints 
The same types of constraints emerged in this project as in project two. Although 
they can be categorised into professional and organisational constraints in as in 
the earlier project, 
However, the constraints which emerged were specific to the Asian organisation: 
organisational culture, and change itself were specifically referenced. The short 
termist nature of the culture was seen as a significant constraint on the business 
and HR's effectiveness, and it was clearly indicated that the business and HR 
should both have a responsibility - although little authority - to challenge short 
termism. This suggests that, whilst constraints in HR may fall into distinct and 
generic categories, the form which they take will be unique to that organisation. 
Furthermore, change was itself seen as a constraint. Whilst professional and 
organisational constraints impacted HR's ability to manage change effectively, 
the nature of the change itself is seen as a constraint. The discourse clearly 
indicates that participants see the Reuters acquisition as a disruptive, 
discontinuous change to which both the business and HR have little ability to 
respond. This may be due to a lack of organisational agility in TF Asia, but it 
seems more plausible that there are different types of organisational agility: 
ability to proactively manage and exploit changes initiated by the organisation 
(proactive or internally invoked change), and the ability to deal with change which 
has been imposed upon the organisation (reactive or externally invoked change). 
It is, perhaps, more interesting to see how the 'theory of constraints' is used by 
respondents. It is almost exclusively used by HR staff to explain disconnects 
between business strategy and HR implementation, and in consequence is a 
functional repertoire to divert responsibility away from HR. However, it may be a 
self-limiting repertoire, as an alternative view which sees strategy as a negotiated 
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process (and, by inference, including negotiation over constraints and resources) 
may be more successful in overcoming those constraints and delivering a better 
HR service than would otherwise be possible. At a minimum, one would 
envisage that discussion of constraints would better equip business managers to 
understand HR constraints and either provide resources to overcome them or 
renegotiate HR deliverables on the basis of the existing limited resources. 
7.1.4.2.2. Realised HR Approach 
Describing the realised HR approach, given that it had a first order reality which 
was objectively verifiable, was an easier exercise than description of the second 
order reality, intended HR strategy. 
Analysis of the realised HR approach is complex. What is realised will be the 
product of what was intended, what unexpected influences or forces impacted 
the realisation of the approach, what constraints on implementation existed and 
how far they were overcome, as well as what the outcome was of negotiations 
around the implementation. What was realised is also subject to the different 
views of the actors: it has a second, rather than a first, order reality. 
As there was no articulated intended HR strategy in Thomson Financial, the 
realised HR approach was accessed through the policies and procedures and 
through the views of the participants. The policies and procedures were 
reasonably consistent with the organisational agility model shown in figure 65, 
although they did suggest some gaps between the organisation's realised HR 
approach and a fully implemented organisational agility model. 
HR in Thomson Financial in Asia was better perceived than in Europe by 
business participants, who had generally positive comments to make about the 
performance of HR. Whereas HR's support in the reactive change scenario was 
seen as more limited, a strong attribution of causality allots responsibility for this 
externally. 
The obfuscation of the realised HR approach is a limitation for HR, in that it is 
necessary to demonstrate success to gain and retain credibility in an 
organisation. Greater use of metrics, perhaps, would be beneficial to 
demonstrate positive impact. 
Like the intended HR strategy, it is clear that the model for the realised HR 
approach needs to incorporate the functional responsibilities of HR. It is clear 
from the discourse in this project that process was a major component of the 
realised HR approach. 
Several respondents saw the influence of factors which could be reasonably 
expected to influence 'best fit' (global systems and processes, legislation, best 
practice, business strategy, the actors, the market and the impact of change) as 
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less impactful than the need to perform a prescriptive set of HR tasks. A clear 
theme emerged that process was the pre-eminent influence on HR for these 
respondents: contextual factors, where they did exert an influence, resulted in 
'tweaks' to the process, rather than being significant influences on the way in 
which the process is undertaken. 
This suggests that a revision to the descriptive research model shown in figure 
69 may be required: process is consistently reported as one of the major 
influences on HR, and is perceived as occurring more or less independently of 
the operant contextual factors. 
It is interesting to contrast the comments of RA2 and DH, who see process as a 
pre-eminent driver, with that of the L&D representative, CP2. RA2 and DH use 
the 'HR as tactical execution' repertoire to account for their focus on process, 
corresponding with business respondents (such as KG) who emphasise the need 
for effective delivery of HR process and the detrimental impact on credibility if 
process is not appropriately managed. CP2, however, uses 'HR as strategy' to 
create a more strategic role for himself, making few references to process. 
There are three possible reasons for this divergence: firstly, the nature of the 
L&D/OD role required a less processual approach and a greater degree of 
customisation, or, secondly, the level of strategy at which he was operating 
allowed for a more strategic lens. Finally, it could be argued that this individual 
had process under control and could concentrate on strategy. Process, to this 
respondent, becomes an almost invisible underpinning which facilitates and 
enables the contextually driven strategic element. This supports the implicit 
hierarchy project three respondents create: transactional processes need to be 
seamlessly performed before HR has the time and the credibility to operate in the 
strategic realm. 
7.1.4.2.3. Mediating Level: Feedback 
As indicated in section 6.3.3., a feedback mechanism between the realised HR 
approach and the intended HR strategy is a necessary part of the HR model, but 
it appears not to be present in TF. This is a logical effect of the short termist 
culture in TF, but is likely to significantly affect HR both in terms of its inability to 
learn from its successes and failures, and its lack of metrics and assessment on 
which to base functional credibility. 
7.1.4.3. How Useful is the Model? 
The descriptive research model was derived from the discourse, built from 
inferences and categorisations imposed on the data by the researcher. As a 
descriptive model, it explained the data reasonably well. 
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However, it is interesting to go a stage further and consider whether the model 
also has some explanatory power. The model supported the premise that, 
taking a social constructivist perspective, if one regards first order contextual 
factors as non-deterministic, the influence of the actors in the second order 
process of strategy formulation becomes critical. However, this provides little 
more insight than Paauwe's Conceptually Based Theory of HR and, indeed, 
supports his concept of the "dominant coalition". 
Where this model appeared to have some explanatory power was in addressing 
a scenario in which multiple and conflicting views of strategy co-existed. This 
was referenced in project two (where the analysis of a fragmented "dominant 
coalition" was raised as an issue for Paauwe's model), but was very much in 
evidence in project three (particularly in the representations of the MD vis-a-vis 
his management team and the HR staff). The model's differentiation between 
first and second order reality accommodates the multiplicity of perspective which 
emerged in the data in project three, and is the major contribution made by this 
model. 
The model also appeared to have some explanatory value in terms of 
differentiated strategy formulation and strategy implementation, suggesting that a 
further second order reality process may intervene between intended strategy 
and the realised approach. Related to the discourse analysis concept of 
"functional" use of language, this allowed for a considerably deeper analysis of 
why organisations 'fail' to implement intended strategy. 
The data did, however, suggest that four amendments to the model would 
enhance its explanatory power: the definition of business strategy utilised, the 
treatment of change, the inclusion of a priori HR requirements (super-ordinate 
role and functional responsibilities) and the treatment of 'punch through' factors. 
This research has shown that the inclusion of business strategy as an 
environmental factor was potentially problematic. As a first order reality, 
business strategy could only be considered at the highest corporate level, 
whereas anything at a lower level was subject to the influence of the actors, 
therefore better categorised as a second order reality and data on this topic 
analysed under the heading of 'influence of the actors'. The label was also 
changed to 'organisational strategy' to accommodate public sector and not-for- 
profit organisations. A category for contextual factors was retained, and it was 
assumed that the wider Paauwe-type definition of context would be used, i. e. 
including neo-institutional and administrative as well as competitive factors. 
Secondly, the allocation of change to the category of first order reality was likely 
to be incorrect. Even in a change orientated organisation such as Thomson 
Financial, there was limited evidence to support the inclusion of change as a first 
order reality. Instead, change appeared to operate as a variable throughout the 
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whole model, but as a second order reality, mediated by the perceptions of the 
actors, who interpret the nature of the change and the appropriate reaction to it, 
both individually and collectively. It was also decided that change could occur in 
organisational strategy, contextual factors and/or the actors' reaction to it, 
therefore change was a qualitatively different type of factor to these and should 
be pulled out to the side of the model to indicate the pervasiveness of its effect. 
This also allows change to be considered as a second order reality, and focuses 
attention on the influence of the actors and the topics which they select (or 
deselect) for consideration. 
Thirdly, the model also fails to give sufficient weight to two a priori requirements 
of HR reported by respondents: HR as tactical execution and the super-ordinate 
role of HR. These are likely to be critical elements of HR's negotiating position, 
but probably also need to be included into the 'intended HR strategy' element of 
the model, as they are not open to the same level of negotiation as the other 
elements of the model. 
Finally, the model does not accommodate the possibility of 'punch throughs', 
defined as first order contextual factors which are too deterministic to be open to 
significant negotiation or re-formulation by the actors. Inclusion of this would 
potentially enhance the explanatory power of the model. 
A revised model is shown in figure 80, which will be considered in the linking 
document. Note that this model includes HR functional responsibilities, as these 
have an element of first order reality, but does not include reference to the super- 
ordinate role of HR. It is assumed that this has only a second order reality, 
hence will be represented in the 'influence of the actors' box, as it presupposes 
the inclusion of HR staff in the 'actors', and that their ability to 'push' a super- 
ordinate role of HR will be a matter of negotiation, as with other second order 
reality elements. 
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Figure 80. Revised Descriptive Research Model 
As a final comment, this model has an implied temporality: a traditional model of 
strategy would infer that an analysis of the first order reality confronting the 
organisation (overall strategic direction and contextual influences) would precede 
the development of intended strategy, which would precede the implementation 
of the realised approach. However, this applies to a 'strategy as an objective' 
view of the process. A 'strategy as a process' definition, however, would imply a 
less linear and more iterative process, where the processes of strategy 
formulation and implementation are happening concurrently in an ongoing 
process. This means that the implied sequentiality of this diagram is potentially 
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misleading, but it is retained for the purpose of data categorisation, and the 
yellow arrows on the above diagram are a means of representing the logically 
incremental nature of the strategy formulation and implementation processes. 
This should be borne in mind when utilising the model. 
This model will be used in the linking document, and retrospectively applied to 
Transport for London's public sector environment. Its utility as both a descriptive 
and an explanatory model will be examined. 
7.2., Implications 
This section will look at the implications of the project from three dimensions: the 
organisation, the academic and the practitioner perspectives. 
7.2.1. The Organisation 
The implications for Thomson Financial of this project are potentially significant. 
The organisation aspired to achieve competitive advantage via its ability to 
change rapidly and effectively, and the organisational agility model could 
potentially provide a way of systematically embedding expertise in change into 
the organisation. However, there are two significant discrepancies: the lack of 
the stable inner core which would be provided by shared values and a common 
vision, and the lack of a feedback loop between realised HR approach and the 
intended HR strategy. 
Although these issues are unlikely to be addressed (given the pending Reuters 
acquisition, which will fundamentally change the organisation and will result in an 
operating model based on economies of scale rather than organisational agility), 
this project does suggest a 'route map' for developing HR strategy in an 
environment of change and the conscious creation of organisational agility. 
7.2.2. Practitioners 
There are a number of key concepts arising from this project which have 
implications for practitioners: HR strategy formulation and an emergent, 
negotiated view of strategy, intended versus realised strategy (constraints), 
change (organisational agility, dynamic capabilities) and the nature of the HR 
role. 
7.2.2.1. , HR Strategy Formulation 
Traditional models of HR strategy formulation infer a particular role for HR 
practitioners. Definitions of 'strategy as an objective' as well as 'best practice' 
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and 'best fit' models of HR infer that there is a single, 'best' solution for HR, and 
that HR's role is to diagnose that solution and implement against it. This 
assumption of a single 'correct' HR solution has focused HR staff on technical 
expert and business partner, which HR practitioners report as achieving with 
varying degrees of success. This project suggests that the 'holy grail' of strategic 
business partner could be a distraction, focusing HR practitioners on an 
unachievable match of HR to the business, rather than allowing them to develop 
a more fluid, flexible approach which concentrates on building credibility and 
negotiation. 
This leads to the question of whether 'strategy as a process' is a repertoire which 
is more reflective of organisational reality than the 'linkage between business and 
HR strategy' which has greater compatibility with the 'strategy as an objective' 
definition and is invariably qualified by the 'theory of constraints' repertoire. 
Should HR be content with meeting the articulated expectations of its business 
clients by delivering excellence in process? Is the claim for the 'linkage between 
business and HR strategy' incompatible with clients' expectations and ultimately 
unachievable, particularly in a dynamic environment, and hence inevitably 
doomed to failure. 
This project has explored an alternative, processual definition of strategy, which 
presents strategy as an emergent, negotiated and iterative phenomenon. The 
project indicated that contextually based models of HR may be useful diagnostic 
tools in initial formulations of HR strategy. A contextual analysis may be 
particularly useful, as it moves beyond a straight forward 'best fit' model, 
analysing not just business strategy and contextual factors, but also being 
sensitive to internal configuration factors and institutional and neo-institutional 
influences. The project suggested that, even in an environment of change, this 
type of analysis may be a useful starting point, as proactive change (both in the 
internal and external environment) is itself amenable to analysis. 
A diagnosis of contextual and political drivers becomes particularly pertinent 
when practitioners move from thinking of strategy formulation as linear, 
prescriptive and unitary, towards a model which is processual, emergent and 
negotiated. One of the key findings of this project for practitioners is that HR 
strategy formulation (perhaps based on a contextually based diagnostic) is a 
second order process, which although likely to be based on an interpretation of 
first order factors, is also subject to the interpretations, perceptual biases and 
political machinations of the actors. The analysis of 'best fit' or contextually 
based HR, hence, becomes only the first stage of an ongoing process of 
negotiation and re-negotiation, definition and re-definition, both of business and 
HR strategies, with an ongoing need to respond flexibly to both environmental 
and internal political changes of direction. 
The implications of this redefinition of the strategy formulation process for HR 
practitioners are significant. This model creates a new task for HR - the 
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negotiation and management of its own strategic position - and will require 
fundamental changes in the HR skill set required. Given this model, in order to 
gain credibility, a pre-requisite of being able to negotiate its strategic position, HR 
needs to understand the business (to be able to interpret and act in support of 
the business strategy, direction and activities), to be politically adroit (to be able 
to understand and influence the negotiated process of strategy formulation), 
technically competent and efficient (to ensure core transactional processes are 
taken care of) and have flexible and agile mindsets and HR processes which will 
allow for rapid changes of direction. This corresponds to reformulations of the 
role of HR proposed by practitioner authors such as Ulrich & Brockbank (2005). 
This is a long way from the 'best fit' or 'best practice' schools of HR thought, and 
suggests that a different competency set may be required in the modern HR 
practitioner. 
The project also suggests that HR practitioners may have a misplaced focus on 
being 'strategic'. HR activities can be defined (both by business and HR 
practitioners) as a series of tactical executions or they can be defined as 
strategic. Whilst 'strategy' and 'tactics' semantically have different values 
attributed to them, which has resulted in HR practitioners aspiring to the former 
rather than the latter, it seems that the actual value attributed to HR in the 
business does not appear to rest on the fulfilment of one rather than the other. 
Rather, the status of HR in the business appears to depend on its efficiency and 
effectiveness in fulfilling the role defined for it by the business, be that strategic or 
tactical. This is supported by the fact that the actual activities themselves may 
not radically differ (all of the respondents reference a broadly similar range of HR 
activities, but their attribution of these activities to 'strategy' or'tactics' is variable 
From the HR practitioners' point of view, pursuit of an HR strategy 'label' may be 
something of a misnomer, and that the value accorded to HR by the business 
may be determined by good tactical execution rather than 'strategic' input. 
Viewed through this lens, many of the business respondents' comments can be 
interpreted as relating to good tactical execution. 
This suggests that HR's focus on becoming a 'strategic' partner in may be 
misplaced. Business credibility, for HR, may be driven by exemplary tactical 
execution rather than strategic input, suggesting that HR's drive towards a 
'strategic' role may be diverting the profession's attention from what actually 
would build credibility: good tactical execution. 
7.2.2.2. Intended HR Strategy Versus the Realised HR Approach 
Traditional models of HR see a direct link between intended strategy and the 
realised HR approach: these are the implications of the definition of 'strategy as 
an objective'. Any discrepancy between the intended and the realised is seen as 
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a 'failure' on the part of HR practitioners, and is seen as something for which an 
account needs to be given: the 'theory of constraints' first advanced in project 
two. This relates back to the concept of 'functional' language advanced in 
discourse analysis, which suggests that individuals do not use language 
neutrally, but use it functionally, e. g. to persuade, to position, to negotiate. 
A processual definition of strategy suggests a different relationship between the 
intended and the realised approach. A definition of strategy as a negotiated 
process allows for the possibility of the co-existence of multiple, potentially 
conflicting viewpoints. This suggests a number of alternative explanations to the 
theory of constraints: if there is no agreement on the intended strategy, the link to 
the realised approach is likely to be weak. Likewise, the concept of strategy as a 
negotiation allows for a realised approach which differs from the intended 
strategy because it has morphed to reflect differing negotiations and re- 
formulations, or because political forces have intervened between the intended 
strategy and the realised approach. 
This project has suggested that the 'strategy as objective' concept may be a 
limiting repertoire for HR practitioners, and that'strategy as process' may offer a 
more functional language for HR people which sees the 'gap' between intended 
and realised as a necessary flexibility to changing circumstances, or as a normal 
part of the negotiation interplay in organisations, rather than a 'failure' on the part 
of HR. This redefinition may also focus HR's attention on the skills required in 
this re-defined organisational context (such as negotiation skills and political 
acumen) and concentrate on activities which build credibility in the particular 
environment in which they operate (be those defined as tactical or strategic). 
7.2.2.3. Change 
Definitions of 'strategy as an objective' and traditional models tend to see change 
as a disruptive variable limiting the ability of both businesses and HR to perform. 
This again is a potentially limiting repertoire, whereas a view of strategy as a 
process can accommodate change through an emergent, iterative model of 
strategy formulation and implementation. The implications for practitioners in an 
environment of change differ little from the remarks made in terms of the steady 
state environment, but the emphasis on taking a processual view of strategy and 
being flexible in strategy formulation and deployment becomes more critical. 
This project has offered a model of HR in an environment of change based on 
the Dyer & Shafer work on organisational agility. It has suggested that HR 
actually may serve a business best by developing a stable inner core, which may 
mean HR reverting to best practice in its core processes (e. g. to have robust, 
modern recruitment, talent management, training and performance management 
processes). The customisation and flexibility required by modern organisations 
can be created in the reconfigurable outer ring, which can be built in such a way 
as to ensure the core processes create and engender adaptable and agile 
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employees (e. g. a recruitment process which utilises competency based 
recruitment as a best practice and assesses adaptability as a competency; 
management of change is included in a core L&D offering in an environment 
where a best practice training approach clearly links business strategy with a 
robust training needs analysis process via 360 degree based performance 
feedback). This would facilitate the building of an organisation which could deal 
adeptly with planned change, but would also be better able to deal with 
unplanned change when confronted by this in the future. 
Furthermore, this processual view of strategy also allows for a potentially exciting 
role for HR in facilitating change; this may allow organisations be more planful 
(and more successful) in dealing with the human side of change whether the 
change is proactively planned or it is an externally prompted change to which the 
organisation is forced to react. Much of this practitioner section has concentrated 
on the possibilities for HR of shifting their own "conversation" to move away from 
potentially limiting repertoires which see a gap between the realised approach 
and the intended strategy as a failure. However, HR may also play a pivotal role 
in enabling other groups to "shift" their "conversations". The potential of a "New 
OD" (Marshak & Grant, 2008), based on the potential of language to facilitate 
change, is an exciting concept for practitioners. Marshak & Grant's (2008) call 
for a "New OD", which recognises the potential of organisational discourse, 
based on social constructivist and critical perspective, offers the potential to build 
and apply powerful new models to aid the understanding and facilitation of 
change. This builds on the Ford & Ford concept of "shifting conversations" (Ford 
& Ford, 1995). 
As Woodman (2008) indicates, "a particularly valuable aspect of organizational 
discourse and discourse analysis stems from its potential ability to surface the 
embedded assumptions in the organization" (Woodman, 2008, p35). He goes on 
to propose that organisational discourse may provide particularly advantageous 
in. two areas: organisational diagnosis and evaluation of organisational change 
programmes. In both of these areas, organisational discourse may add a deeper 
qualitative perspective which will compliment and extent the more quantitative or 
less systematic qualitative methodologies normally deployed in these areas. 
7.2.2.4. The Role of HR 
The sections above have suggested a different role from HR from the technical 
expert/business partner roles inferred by the traditional models of HR strategy 
formulation, as well as indicated a requirement for a different skill set. 
Firstly, 'credibility building (necessary to gain and maintain a satisfactory 
negotiating position in an organisation) appears to be critically linked to effective 
performance of transactional tasks and functional responsibilities. Secondly, 
given that the HR function has credibility through effective tactical execution, HR 
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staff must be able to exert an influence in the negotiation process. This means 
that there is a requirement for considerable business knowledge and excellent 
negotiating skills. Finally, linking back to the need for credibility, HR practitioners 
must also be good project managers and effective implementers. 
This provides a baseline for effective HR in an environment of negotiated 
strategy and change. There is a further opportunity for HR to exert a powerful 
influence through OD, "shifting conversations" and facilitating change, which will 
require HR to adopt a different role and develop a further OD based skill set. 
This relates also to the plausibility of HR as a conveyer of organisational 
meaning. HR, is a designer and administrator of processes which convey 
organisational meaning to employees, e. g. compensation, learning & 
development, promotion. This may be documented and relatively static, as in 
London Underground, or more emergent, fragmentary and subject to rapid 
change, as in TF. 
The second role for HR, however, taking this view, is potentially more interesting. 
One could argue that HR has a role of managing symbolic meaning for the 
organisation, through the nature and the implementation of the HR processes. 
That is, through processes such as reward, performance management and talent 
management, it can sign organisational value to employees. This goes beyond 
the traditional employee communications role. Through controlling the processes 
by which people are rewarded, recognised, developed and promoted, HR 
potentially has the ability to manage meaning for the organisation: what is the 
company, what does it stand for, what does the company value? One can 
envisage that, done well, this will result in well informed, satisfied, engaged, 
committed employees who are more likely to be productive and less likely to 
attrite. 
7.2.3. Academics 
The findings of this project also have implications for the academic community in 
the areas of contextually based theories of HR strategy formulation, intended 
strategy versus realised approach, and the treatment of change as a variable in 
strategy formulation. This project also advanced a new descriptive research 
model of HR strategy formulation which would benefit from further testing. 
To look firstly at models of HR strategy formulation, determining that neither 
conventional 'best fit' nor 'best practice' models of HR have relevance to 
business respondents, this project looked at a broader model, seeing HR as a 
complex interplay of first and second order reality, organisational negotiation and 
political, processes. It determined that, whilst a potentially useful diagnostic 
starting - point, theories such as 
Paauwe's CBHRT presume that strategy 
formulation is a linear, objective process, and fail to represent the complex, often 
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politicised, processes of definition and negotiation which shape strategy 
formulation in organisations. 
This project also addressed another problematic issue for 'best fit' and 
contextually based theories of HR: these fail to reference factors which influence 
HR, but which are not contextually derived, i. e. HR 'must-dos' and the 
requirement for HR to have a 'super ordinate' role. 
A topic which merits further study is that of 'punch-throughs'. Whereas 
contextual drivers did not exert a strong influence in Thomson Financial, leaving 
the maximum "freedom to manoeuvre" for the actors, it is reasonable to suggest 
that other organisations may be directed by more deterministic contextual drivers, 
e. g. in London Underground, where the influence of institutional and configuration 
forces is considerably higher and considerably more directive or in organisations 
which have difficult competitive environments, where one would expect the 
competitive forces to be relatively unmodified by the actors' reformulation and 
negotiation processes. 
Secondly, the project considered the distinction between intended strategy and 
the realised HR approach, and began to outline some of the factors which 
influenced the extent of the correlation between the two. A distinction was drawn 
between factors which related to the negotiated nature of strategy formulation 
(the organisation says that it intends to do something, but in its messaging 
conveys that this is not an organisational priority or that it values something else) 
and factors which related to an inability to translate intended strategy into 
organisational reality (the 'theory of constraints'). 
The third implication for the academic community is in the project's discussion 
around change, and particularly the debate around whether change is a factor in 
itself and should be treated separately, or should it be seen as an element of the 
business strategy and business context? This project advanced the idea that 
proactive, planned, change is the latter, and is amenable to the same contextual 
analysis and subject to the same theory of constraints and gap between intended 
strategy and realised approach. 
Reactive change, however, was presented by respondents as qualitatively 
different. Although organisations can build in a degree of resilience to change 
(through an implicit or explicit organisational capability model), reactive change 
could be regarded a disruptive force which destroys the linkages in the model. 
However, if one takes the emergent view of strategy to its extreme, one could 
see how even reactive change could be managed through the process of 
discussion and revision of strategy in the light of the new situation. Further 
research is required in this area, both to verify the appropriateness of the 
distinction between proactive and reactive change, and to determine whether 
they are opposite ends of the same continuum, thus are amenable to the same 
diagnostic process, or they are indeed qualitatively different. 
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The fourth implication arising from this project is that it responds to Dyer & 
Shafer's call for "exploratory research ... (into) our general model" (Dyer & Shafer, 2003, p23), providing some support for the concept of organisational 
agility and ideas such as the stable inner core and reconfigurable outer ring. It 
does, however, indicate that substantiating their research model will require 
access to an organisation which has consciously pursued organisational agility. 
It appears far more research in this area is required. 
Finally, this project tested a new descriptive research model of HR. Although this 
appears to provide a good explanation for the way in which HR strategy is 
developed and implemented in TF, it requires wider application in other 
organisations to test out its findings. A number of missing elements (change, 
super-ordinate role of HR, functional responsibilities) were identified and would 
benefit from inclusion in future models and exploration in future academic study. 
8. SUMMARY 
The conclusion of this analysis is that a social constructivist and an emergent 
definition of 'strategy as a process' could illuminate both HR strategy formulation 
and strategy implementation. It determined that 'best fit' analytical model could 
be useful as a diagnostic in the early stages of HR strategy formulation (although 
strong business strategy or contextual drivers were not reported as influences in 
Thomson Financial, it is reasonable to suggest that these may be deterministic 
influences in other organisations), but that 'best fit' models are static and, 
although the concept of the dominant coalition allowed for an element of 
negotiation, they fail to give true weight to the role of the actors in creating, re- 
creating, negotiating and re-negotiating strategy. 
Although a diagnostic of contextual factors appeared to be a useful starting point 
for HR strategy formulation, the social constructivist approach adopted in project 
three allowed the research to move beyond the concept of 'best fit'. 
This methodological and theoretical perspective appeared to support a model of 
HR strategy development which was far more fluid and negotiated than a 'best fit' 
type deterministic model would suggest. This was further informed by looking at 
a processual definition of strategy which allowed for strategy to be emergent and 
negotiated rather than fixed and absolute. In the organisation under study, this 
was an intuitively more attractive model of strategy formulation and 
implementation, likely to be more responsive to a rapidly changing business 
environment. 
Project two took a contextually based theory of intended HR strategy formulation, 
which aimed to look at a wide range of influences on HR strategy development, 
extending 'best fit' models to include political drivers (through the concept of the 
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impact of the actors and assessment of the cultural and institutional influences on 
HR) and a range of contextual features. However, this was still an essentially 
deterministic model, which failed to take full consideration of the iterative, socially 
constructed interpretations of these contextual factors offered by respondents, 
and did not provide an iterative model of strategy development which was 
appropriate to a rapidly changing environment. 
Project three took this a stage further by regarding these contextual influences on 
HR strategy development in terms of their second order reality. Although these 
contextual influences may have their basis in a first order reality, in discourse in 
organisations they are mediated by the respondents' knowledge, experience and 
perceptions, and are subject to their perceptual biases, political influences and 
their functional use of language. It also looked at change as an additional 
contextual influence, in response to the problematic nature of 'best fit' in a rapidly 
changing environment. 
This led to a discussion around implementation, and an examination of the 
factors which are held to be mediating factors between firstly, business strategy 
and HR strategy and, secondly, intended HR strategy and the realised HR 
approach. This led to a consideration of issues of implementation where 
considered through distinguishing between intended HR strategy and the realised 
HR approach. 
This was developed into a descriptive research model, and evidence was 
collated using a discourse analysis methodology and a social constructivist 
perspective. 
The premise of project three was that a contextually based theory of HR may be 
a useful starting off point for HR strategy development, but that the definition of 
context needed to be broadened, accommodating business, contextual and 
political drivers as influences on HR strategy. It then deconstructed the notion of 
strategy itself, determining that the term was open to multiple interpretations, and 
the deterministic definition of 'strategy as a process' may be less useful in the 
rapidly changing environment of modern businesses than a more fluid view of 
strategy as an emergent and a negotiated process. Contextually based HR, 
hence, was relegated to the status of a diagnostic, rather than being seen as 
deterministic. 
Project three also made a distinction between intended and realised strategy, 
and questioned the 'universality' of theories such as Paauwe's Contextually 
Based HR Theory. Whilst these provided potentially useful frameworks for initial 
strategy formulation, they do not address constraints or failures of 
implementation, nor do they recognise the adaptation of strategy to changing 
circumstances. 
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Exploring the final point further, project three also looked at the impact of change 
on HR strategy development and determined that the 'strategy as a process' 
definition allowed proactive change to be amenable to contextual analysis in a 
similar way to the steady state environment, and allows HR strategy - as long as 
an emergent, logically incremental view of strategy was taken - to be developed 
even in a scenario of considerable, planned, change. 
However, the project also indicated that respondents viewed unplanned, reactive 
change as qualitatively different, and saw that HR had two primary roles to play 
in a reactive change scenario: technical and emotional. There was also an 
inference, albeit an underdeveloped one, of another two roles for HR: 
organisational agility and management of organisational meanings. However, 
the former requires an enlightened business which is receptive to long term 
planning for agility, and a capable HR function which is appropriately resourced. 
The short-termist Thomson culture precludes the former and the 'theory of 
constraints' indicates that limited HR capability and resourcing, compounded by a 
transactional focus, is unlikely to be able to rise to the challenge. 
Although organisational agility may be engendered through an implicit 
incorporation into HR processes such as recruitment and training, suggesting an 
emergent strategy in this area, it is interesting to speculate how much further this 
could be taken in Thomson Financial (and what the resultant business benefits 
may be), using the Thomson Leadership Competency Framework as a basis. A 
developed and articulated HR strategy, focusing on the building of organisational 
agility, could be of significant benefit to an organisation the success of which 
depends on its ability to manage change. 
The second inferred role for HR is the management of organisational meaning, 
taking Tyson's view that "HRM engages in the management of meaning in the 
enterprise" (Tyson, 1997, p285). This is a potentially valuable function, where HR 
can position itself as the purveyor of organisational culture, values and 
objectives. Particularly in an environment of reactive change, one could 
envisage this role providing a highly valuable sense of direction and purpose to 
individuals going through transformational change. However, again in TF, this 
potential role of HR seems underutilised, and one can surmise that the reasons 
for this are as articulated elsewhere: the short termist, short attention span 
culture and the constraints (particularly the capability of HR staff, the level of HR 
resourcing and the transactional focus of the HR function in TF). 
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APPENDIX ONE: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ONE 
A detailed interview schedule was developed for the pilot, using Wang & 
Ahmed's tripartite categorisation of dynamic capabilities. However, it was clear in 
the pilot interview that management of change in Thomson Financial was not 
sophisticated enough for respondents to meaningfully engage with this type of 
breakdown, therefore a simpler interview schedule was used for the remaining 
interviews which used only four questions. 
9 Describe TF's approach to change. 
" What role does HR play in supporting this change? 
" Considering the pending Reuters acquisition, how do you think the 
organisation is responding to this scenario? 
" How do you think HR is supporting the organisation through the Reuters 
scenario? 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TWO 
A second set of interviews was conducted to explore the realised HR approach, 
and the questions for this were as follows: 
" On a day to day basis, what factors influence what you do, how do they 
affect what you do, and are they good or bad? 
" Global systems and processes? 
" Legislation? 
" Best practice? Inside or outside the organisation? 
" Business strategy? 
" The actors? The managers, the HR function, other functional 
personnel? 
" External or internal talent markets? 
" The current scenario (change - proactive and reactive)? 
" Anything else? 
526 
APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEWEE LIST 
Name Title HR/ Business Length of Nationality Interview 
Business Unit Service Date 
INTERVIEW SCH EDULE ONE 
Ricarda Athey HR Director, Asia HR TF Short German 27/08/07 
Pacific (based Hong 
Kong) 
Sandi Klose Managing Business TF Long American 17/10/07 
Director, (based Hong 
Segment, Asia Kong) 
Pacific & Japan 
David Managing Business TF Short Australian 18/10/07 
Runacres Director, Sales, (based Hong 
Asia Pacific Kong) 
Mark Howarth Managing Business TF Short British (based 23/11/07 
Director, TF Asia Hong Kong) 
Pacific 
Helen Cook VP, Content Business TF Medium British (based 29/11/07 
Strategy, Asia Hong Kong) 
Pacific 
Wai Leung VP, Technology, Business TGTI Medium Chinese 04/11/07 
Chung Asia Pacific (includes (based Hong 
TF) Kong) 
Jacques Director, Business TF Medium French (based 30/11/07 
Dalmas Corporate Sales, Hong Kong) 
North Asia 
Adrian Dolin Managing Business TF Short Australian 08/01/08 
Director, 
Corporate, Asia 
Con Pappas Manager, HR Thomson Medium Australian 15/01/08 
Training & Corporate 
Organisational (includes 
Development, TF) 
Thomson 
Corporation 
Kimberly Bates VP, Individual & HR TF Long American 15/01/08 
McCarl Organisational 
Effectiveness, TF 
Sandhya SVP Operations, Business TF Medium Indian 01/02/08 
Vasudevan Ban alore 
INTERVIEW SCH EDULE TWO 
David Harrison Head of HR TF Short American 22/04/08 
Recruitment, TF (based Hong 
Asia Kong) 
Ricarda Athey HR Director, Asia HR TF Short German 23/04/08 
Pacific (based Hong 
Kon 
Con Pappas Manager, HR Thomson Medium Australian 02/05/08 
Training & Corporate 
Organisational (includes 
Development, TF) 
Thomson 
Corporation 
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LINKING DOCUMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Overview 
1.1.1. . The Protects 
This final paper will review the three projects, their contribution and will provide a 
test of the descriptive research model evolved through the course of the three 
projects. 
In the broadest sense, the projects were all concerned with the exploration of 
theories of HR and SHRM and their actual use in organisations. Originating in a 
dissatisfaction with 'best practice' and HPWT models of HR, the projects used 
insights gleaned and methodologies developed in social psychology to provide a 
potentially richer, qualitative analysis than the more positivist methodologies which 
have dominated much of HR research to date. The projects shared a common 
theoretical (social constructivism) and methodological (discourse analysis) 
perspective. Given the nature of the valued elements over which HR has control, 
HR can be highly politicised in many organisations. Equally, given that HR's 
contribution to organisational success is often difficult to quantify (or that causality 
is difficult to prove), it is subject to the perceptions and influences of the 
organisational actors. These two elements make it very amenable to a social 
constructivist approach, which allows for a deeper understanding of the political 
and socially negotiated nature of HR in use. 
The three projects looked at HR in two very different contexts. Project one looked 
at industrial relations strategy in London Underground (HR was conflated with 
industrial relations in this organisation, given the all pervasive influence of IR). - As 
a public sector organisation characterised by entrenched and opposing positions, 
it provided rich data for a social constructivist analysis, demonstrating how 
organisational actors used language functionally to support their discursive 
positions. The project described a form of HR best described as a combination of 
Guest's "professional personnel management" (Guest, , 1987) and Fox's 
"paternalistic employee relations" (Fox, 1973). Project one argued that this model 
was 'best fit', given the environment confronting the organisation, confirming that 
the 'best practice' theory of HR is far from being the only one possible. 
Projects two and three were hosted by an organisation which was radically 
different to London Underground: Thomson Financial, a young, entrepreneurial 
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professional services organisation. Project two was based in Thomson Financial's 
European operation and built upon project one's interest in the 'best fit' model, 
utilising Paauwe's (2004) Contextually Based Theory of HR to provide a 
framework for the contextual factors which influenced the 'best fit' HR strategy the 
organisation adopted. Project two, however, found little evidence for a linear 
relationship between contextual factors and the HR strategy adopted, suggesting 
instead that the influence of the actors was the major determinant of the HR 
strategy adopted (although it was inconclusive on whether the Thomson Financial 
organisation was unique in its lack of contextual determinants, and whether 
another organisation would experience greater contextual influence, leaving the 
organisational actors concomitantly less freedom to operate). Project two also 
indicated a discrepancy between intended ('espoused') HR strategy and its actual 
('enacted') implementation and began to look at some of the explanations offered 
by HR and business representatives for the gap between the two. 
Project two had identified limitations with contextually based 'best fit' models of HR, 
both empirical in nature (the data provided little evidence for the influence of 
context) and theoretical (they are essentially static, unable to deal with fast change 
experienced in the majority of modern organisations). 
Project three was also hosted by Thomson Financial, but moved the project to the 
Asia operation, as the area most exposed to change, both proactive and reactive. 
The use of the social constructivist epistemology and discourse analysis 
methodology brought the role of the organisational actor to the forefront in project 
two, and this was further tested in project three, which moved from a view of 
'strategy as an objective' to 'strategy as a process'. Project three explored the 
notion that strategy existed in organisations largely as an emergent, iterative 
process, the product of multiple negotiations, renegotiations, formulations and re- 
formulations by the organisational actors. 
Project three developed a prototypical descriptive research model, and the testing 
of the model noted that, whilst the model appeared potentially useful, it had a 
number of inadequacies. The revised model produced at the end of project three 
will be further compared to the data in this linking document. 
1.1.2. The Contribution 
The three projects used a social constructivist epistemology and a compatible 
methodology (discourse analysis) to look at contextual influences on HR in 
different organisational environments. It looked at a number of different theories of 
SHRM, focusing on the resource based view (RBV) and neo-institutional theories 
of SHRM as these provided the most ready explanations for the accounts of HR 
strategy offered by respondents in the study. 
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Starting from an initial dissatisfaction with 'best practice' models of HR in relation 
to their ability to explain HR in a traditional British public sector environment 
(project one), the study moved to a test of 'best fit' approaches in a North 
American Financial Services company, firstly in Europe in a mature, saturated 
environment (project two), then in the high growth markets of Asia in the midst of a 
transformation (project three). It looked at contextually based HR in project two, 
modifying and extending that model in project three. 
Whilst project two looked at Paauwe's Contextually Based HR Theory as a 
descriptive framework for elucidating 'best fit', project three moved beyond the 
'best fit'. model to consider a negotiated, emergent and iterative model of strategy. 
'Best fit' in this project was considered, but relegated to the role of a diagnostic, 
with the focus shifting to how perceptions and conceptualisations of environmental 
factors were used by the participants functionally, to support their negotiation 
position in regard to strategy and strategy formulation. A key finding of this study 
is that strategy formulation in organisations is primarily a second order reality 
process, where the impact of first order reality factors is subject to the 
interpretation of the actors and their functional use of language to support their 
specific arguments and bolster their own negotiating position. Project three 
surmised that so-called 'punch-through' factors (first order realities which are too 
impactful, too incontrovertible or too compelling to be the subject of negotiation) 
could be an exception to this, although this linking document's re-analysis of 
project one's data suggests that such 'punch-throughs' may be more limited in 
number than one would presuppose, and that even these first order realities are 
still deployed functionally by participants in their discourse to support their position 
(and, indeed, representing a factor as a 'punch-through' may in itself be a powerful 
negotiation strategy). 
This introduction will look at six elements of the study: the theoretical and 
methodological perspective, theories of SHRM, best practice and best fit models of 
HR, and contextually based HR, a deconstruction of the term 'strategy' and the 
distinction between intended strategy and the realised HR approach. Whilst the 
first three of these remained consistent across the three projects, project three 
evolved a new descriptive model of HR strategy formulation and implementation 
which (building upon the first three elements but also incorporating the final three 
elements) produced a model which incorporated contextually based HR, a more 
flexible and non-linear definition of the term 'strategy and a consideration of the 
difference between intended strategy and the approach which was ultimately 
realised. The culmination of project three was the development of a descriptive 
research model which incorporated a contextually based approach as a diagnostic 
to the initial phases of HR strategy development, but moved on to consider 
strategy as an emergent, negotiated process, possessing a second, rather than a 
first, order reality. 
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1.1.3. Implications 
The implications for the processes of strategy formulation and implementation in 
modern organisations are potentially considerable. Whereas the definition of 
strategy as an objective may appear to describe organisations such as London 
Underground, in actuality the process is intensely politicised and the level of 
negotiation is extremely high. However, the neo-institutional forces operating on 
the organisation means that the organisation's strategy (both formulation and 
implementation) are under considerable scrutiny from external stakeholders, 
therefore one would anticipate that the organisation is compelled to articulate 
strategy as a first order reality (i. e. formal planning documentation, sign off and 
evaluation processes). Superficially, this may create the impression of the 
application of the definition of 'strategy as an objective', but the application of a 
social constructivist approach and a discourse analysis methodology clearly shows 
that strategy is, indeed, an emergent and a negotiated process, as demonstrated 
by the multiplicity of articulated perspectives (e. g. trade unionists, operational and 
HR staff). Indeed, despite the pressure of external accountability, planning is 
perceived as a much less regimented process than 'strategy as an objective' 
would suggest. In organisations which are less accountable to external 
stakeholders, such as Thomson Financial, it becomes clear that strategy 
formulation is an entirely emergent and iterative process, existing at the level of 
second order reality with little requirement for a first order reality to be produced. 
There are also a number of significant implications arising from this study for the 
HR function, most notably the new competency set required by HR practitioners 
inferred by the move away from 'best practice'/'best fit' models of HR. 
Concomitantly, the focus on the negotiation and positioning skills of the 
organisational actors in a 'strategy as a process' context raises important 
questions about the most effective approach HR practitioners can take and the 
factors which influence the negotiating position of HR in the business environment. 
This also links to the 'best practice'/'best fit' debate conveyed through projects one, 
two and three. In certain organisations, taking a 'best practice' approach to HR 
may, indeed be the most effective way of building HR credibility (and hence 
developing the most effective negotiating position for HR), given that HR 
practitioners can reference external sources (often neo-institutional in nature) to 
engender support for their activities. In others, 'best fit' may be the best way of 
presenting HR as a business oriented function which can commercially justify and 
credentialise its activities, utilising and co-opting the commercial language in which 
the strategy formulation processes of many organisations is conducted. In other 
organisations, neither of these may be as successful as attending to the needs of 
the senior managers who comprise the strategy formulators, although this perhaps 
runs the risk of creating a perception of HR's power position as illegitimate. A final 
source of credibility, although one which may be as limiting as it is enabling, is the 
performance of excellent tactical execution. Although perhaps unappealing to the 
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HR profession, with its intense interest in being accorded a strategic role, there is 
strong evidence in projects two and three that good tactical execution is an 
essential component of credibility and a necessary precursor for any kind of 
strategic role. 
The final, and perhaps the most interesting, implication of the study, however, is 
the potential for 'shifting conversations'. By taking a more fluid, social 
constructivist approach to HR and HR strategy formulation, one raises the 
potential to move HR away from its preoccupation with 'strategy' towards a, 
perhaps more fruitful, focus on what works and what develops credibility within a 
business. Likewise, strategy implementation may be facilitated by shifting to a 
positive conversation around enablers and implementable strategy than the 
recourse to the inherently negative 'theory of constraints' discourses much in 
evidence in projects two and three. 
The potential to shift 'internal' HR conversations identified here is mirrored by a 
possible application of this technique to business situations: under the "new OD" 
proposed by Marshak & Grant (2008), HR can use its ability to "shift 
conversations" to create, embed and reinforce new organisational meanings, to 
condition employees and to drive change. Manipulating language and 
organisational meaning has significant potential value, and should be further 
explored in subsequent research. Interestingly, documenting strategy (e. g. 
creating a first order reality from a second order process may be an important 
element in the shifting of conversations and the conveying of organisational 
meaning, and the obfuscation of the second order reality negotiating process 
underpinning it may be desirable to promote a single organisational focus. 
1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Perspective 
Starting with project one, a consistent theoretical and methodological approach 
was taken throughout the project, i. e. social constructivism and discourse analysis. 
It was apparent that these theoretical and methodological perspectives were 
potentially illuminating, allowing for a deeper, richer analysis of the complex and 
ambiguous second order realities used by individuals. 
The discourse analysis methodology and social constructivist theoretical 
perspective allowed for institutional and political drivers to be considered in project 
one, the approach being used to examine functional use of language by managers 
in London Underground, in their explanations and justifications of ongoing 
militancy. 
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In project two, this approach allowed for a deeper understanding of the role and 
influences of the actors to be garnered. This project looked at discourses around 
business and HR strategy, contrasting the views of business managers and HR 
staff. Again, a functional use of language was adopted, which allowed for an 
exploration of the constraints cited as inhibitors in the achievement of a business 
focused HR strategy. 
In project three, the combination of social constructivism and discourse analysis 
proved to be highly illuminating, developing the idea of the contrasting views of the 
actors into an emergent, negotiated and iterative model of the strategy formulation 
process which appeared to be more useful than alternative definitions of strategy 
as an objective in explaining the process of strategy formulation in an organisation 
such as Thomson Financial. 
1.3. ý Best Practice and Best Fit Theories of HR 
The genesis of project one was a dissatisfaction with universal 'best practice' 
models of HR, which were largely Americo-centric and reflected to a greater or 
lesser extent the high employee engagement work practices of a small number of 
organisations where profitability depended upon the knowledge, skill level and 
discretionary contribution of employees, where their ability to add (or otherwise) to 
the value of the organisation was significant. The epitome of this approach, the 
High Performance Work Team (HPWT) model, saw employees as guided by their 
professional codes of conduct, their knowledge and experience, and by HR 
practices (particularly compensation) which rewarded behaviours which were in 
line with the company's objectives. 
Project one, hence, rejected a universalistic 'best practice' model of HR for a 'best 
fit', model of HR, finding that the latter provided a better explanation of the 
approach to HR taken in LUL. An analysis was conducted to look at the HR model 
which was appropriate to an organisation which was the opposite of the HPWT 
model: one in which employees were managed via rules and process, and 
increased knowledge, skills or discretionary contribution would result in only 
marginal business performance improvements. The model in operation was 
characterised as through reference to two academic models: 'pluralistic employee 
relations', which recognises the legitimacy of trade union influences in an 
organisation, and the concomitant likelihood of conflict, and Guest's 'professional' 
personnel management (Guest, 1987, p518), where administrative efficiency and 
minimisation of cost were the primary objectives. The 'pluralistic employee 
relations' and 'professional' personnel management models combined to describe 
a 'best fit' rather than a 'best practice' model of HR. Together they could be used 
to describe the model of HR adopted by LUL; a 'best fit' model which was 
responsive to and derived from the LUL environment in which it operated. 
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Given that project one had suggested that a 'best fit' model was more appropriate 
than a universal 'best practice' model in describing HR in the organisation under 
study, this set the research agenda for projects two and three. Project two 
confirmed that 'best fit' models of HR were much more dominant in respondents' 
discourse than 'best practice', but still suggested a level of discomfort around 'best 
fit', raising questions around change and the ability of a 'best fit' strategy to deal 
with discontinuities, both internal (e. g. a disharmonious "dominant coalition") and 
external (e. g. environmental change) in nature. This was further emphasised in 
project three, where the 'best fit' model was relegated to the level of a diagnostic. 
'Best fit' was instead seen as a second order interpretation of first order realities, 
subject to perceptual biases and distortions, as well as differing attributions of 
importance and different opinions on prioritisation and the appropriate action to be 
taken. The process of determining 'best fit' was, in itself, seen as a social 
construction, the product of the perceptions, biases, perspectives and whims of 
the organisational actors, mediated by their negotiating positions and capabilities. 
This analysis of 'best fit' allowed for the development of the descriptive research 
model which was the concluding output of project three, and a model perhaps 
more representative of HR strategy formulation in modern organisations. 
1.4. Theories of SHRM 
A number of different academic theories of SHRM were reviewed, but two 
appeared particularly pertinent: the resource based view (RBV) and neo- 
institutional theory. When one looked at the accounts of HR offered in project one, 
and began to analyse the underlying contextual factors which were seen as 
directing HR strategy, there was a strong emphasis on reference to institutional 
and neo-institutional factors in the discourse of the respondents, suggesting that 
neo-institutional theory was a potentially useful concept in explaining business and 
HR strategy formulation in a public sector environment. There was less use of 
resource based factors to explain the operation of the business and HR, which 
was anticipated in a public sector environment where the main drivers are 
institutional in nature rather than business oriented. 
Projects two and three moved to a private sector organisation, theorising that neo- 
institutional theory would be less important in such a business, and that RBV 
theory would be more applicable. Although this was the case, it was clear that 
business drivers were perhaps less important than political factors: the influence of 
the senior managers and powerful individuals on the strategy formulation process 
was significant. The resource based view threw some light onto the descriptions 
offered by respondents, but it was clear that internal politics was still seen as a 
major influence on the organisation's strategic direction. 
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Both RBV and neo-institutional theories of SHRM were incorporated in the 
descriptive research model, through the explicit inclusion in project two of 
Paauwe's model (the major contribution of which is the incorporation of both RBV 
and neo-institutional factors into a single descriptive model) and through the first 
order reality of 'contextual factors' in project three's descriptive research model. 
1.5. Contextually Based HR 
Building on project one's conclusion that 'best fit' models of HR were more readily 
referenced by respondents in their descriptions of HR strategy and appeared to 
reflect their view of reality more adequately than 'best practice' models, project two 
went a stage further. It took the inference from 'best fit' that there were a series of 
factors which influence the nature of the 'best fit', and that these were amenable to 
analysis. Overlaying this with the social constructivist/discourse analysis 
perspective, the project looked at the factors through the respondents, and the 
factors which they described as being influential on 'best fit'. 
Project two used Paauwe's Contextually Based Human Resource Theory 
(CBHRT) to provide an analytical framework to examine the contextual factors 
influencing 'best fit' HR strategy in a private sector organisation. Paauwe's 
CBHRT was particularly appropriate, as it was superior to the majority of 
contextually based approaches to HR in that it attempted to combine RBV and 
institutional type influences on HR strategy development in a single model. 
Although only limited evidence was found to support Paauwe's CBHRT in project 
two, his concept of the 'dominant coalition', a group of actors who - individually 
and collectively - were influential on the nature and form of the HR strategy in the 
organisation, was useful. A number of limitations were identified with Paauwe's 
model as a universal explanation of contextually based HR. 
" The assumption of a direct link between business and HR strategies 
assumes that strategy is an objective, linear process, whereas it appears to 
be perceived as far more emergent, processual and negotiated; the 
influence of the dominant coalition seems to be perceived as more powerful 
than the other Paauwe factors on strategy formulation 
" The concentration on the development of strategy and the failure to 
recognise the challenges of implementation 
" The presumption of a relatively static environment 
" The concept of "strategy" appears to be problematic and open to a variety 
of interpretations. 
Because of these issues and the emphasis on the dominant coalition and the lack 
of support for the Paauwe factors in project two, the concept of contextually based 
HR was both changed and extended in project three. Paauwe's key contribution 
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of the analysis of context (the inclusion of both RBV and neo-institutional type 
factors) was retained as the framework underpinning the 'contextual factors' box 
on the descriptive research model, as it was clear that this would produce a more 
generic descriptive model, which could be applied equally to a public sector 
company driven largely by neo-institutional factors as to an organisation the 
primary drivers of which were 'business' oriented (e. g. a private sector, non- 
regulated company such as Thomson Financial). 
The move away from an entirely contextually based theory of HR also offers an 
explanation for two interpretative repertoires which emerged in project three which 
were not readily explicable in terms of existing models: the 'HR as tactical 
execution' and the 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire. Considerable reference 
was made in project three to the responsibilities which HR must perform, and 
which are likewise not contextually determined: this relates to transactional 
activities such as payroll. However, this becomes more explicable if one takes a 
view of strategy as a negotiated process: transactional accuracy is represented as 
a necessary basis for HR credibility and a fundamental precursor to a strong HR 
negotiating position on more strategic issues. 
Likewise, the 'super-ordinate role of HR' repertoire (articulated by both HR and 
business respondents) does not appear to fit into a purely contextually based 
theory of HR. This is used by actors to suggest that HR has a responsibility which 
over-rides contextually determined strategy and, the inference is made, should not 
be amenable to the modification of the actors. Looking at this through the lens of 
a functional view of language, however, this altruistic view of HR as having a 
higher purpose becomes more suspect. The 'super-ordinate role' becomes a 
negotiating ploy, and a way of prioritising HR issues in a business environment 
which may otherwise be less sympathetic to HR initiatives. 
1.6. A Deconstruction of the Term `Strategy' 
As the data provided only limited support for Paauwe's model as a descriptive 
framework, project three reconsidered its approach, and began with a 
deconstruction of the term 'strategy'. 
This was extremely useful, as it allowed the project to move away from a view of 
strategy as an objective, linear process, to a processual definition of strategy as an 
emergent, negotiated process, in which the influence of the actors was a 
fundamental input, amenable to exploration using discourse analysis as a 
methodology. The emphasis was changed from viewing contextual factors as 
deterministic (as suggested by Paauwe's model) to viewing them as factors which 
respondents could draw upon variably and functionally to support a negotiating 
position. Strategy formulation became the product of contextual analysis as it was 
perceived by the actors (rather than having a concrete first order reality) and of 
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negotiations between the actors (based on their perceptions of the context, 
opinions on the best strategy and tactics and their ability to negotiate). This model, 
hence, drew upon the RBV and institutional theories of SHRM, but saw them as 
ways of thinking and representing the world, drawn flexibly and functionally by the 
actors, rather than having a direct influence and a predictive value in explaining 
the interaction between context and resultant strategy in an organisation. 
This was wholly consistent with the social constructivist perspective, and provided 
a much richer explanation of the data than would have been possible using the 
'strategy as objective' definition. It then began a further examination of HR 
strategy formulation, viewing strategy as both contextually driven and negotiated. 
To this end, project three referenced both RBV and institutional forces on strategy 
formulation, but emphasised the role of political forces, creating a view of the 
strategy formulation process as one which was in an ongoing process of 
negotiation and renegotiation. 
To support this emergent view of strategy, a further concept was added into 
project three: the separation between first and second order realities. Drawing 
upon the work of Ford (1999), this project made a distinction between elements 
which have a concrete, independent verifiable existence (first order reality) and the 
social and linguistic construction of these elements by the actors (second order 
realities). This allowed a distinction to be made between the deterministic factors 
which exist in the organisation's first order reality and the interpretative dimension 
of second order realities. Project three concentrated largely on the latter, but 
recognised that first order realities shape the interpretations built within the second 
order reality and - in the case of punch through factors - can exert a very 
profound influence which minimises the level of second order interpretation. 
1.7. Intended Strategy and Realised Approach 
The final concept which evolved over the course of the three projects was the 
distinction between intended strategy and the realised approach. This is a 
potential contribution of the research, as the majority of academic work 
concentrates on strategy formulation and fails to consider implementation issues, 
or deals with the implementation of individual HR elements such as performance 
management. 
Although this distinction only occurred tangentially in project one, it was strongly 
evidenced in project two, where the difference between intended HR strategy and 
the realised HR approach was explained in project two through the articulation of 
constraints. The 'theory of constraints' advanced in project two was described as 
an interpretative repertoire used functionally by HR respondents, although it was 
537 
suggested that this may ultimately be a self-limiting "conversation" for HR 
practitioners. 
This distinction between intended strategy and the realised approach also 
emerged clearly in project three, but as well as being explained by respondents in 
terms of the theory of constraints, the impact of the actors' negotiations and the 
consequent establishment of organisational priorities were also presented as 
substantive mediating factors between the intended HR strategy and the realised 
HR approach. 
The influence of the actors' negotiations led to a further differentiation: two 
definitions of 'intended' strategy were offered by respondents. The first definition 
of 'intended' indicates a strategy which the organisation is committed to realising, 
but is prevented in so doing by a series of constraints, which may be internal or in 
origin: the 'theory of constraints'. Secondly, relating to the influence of the actors, 
'intended' was defined as the articulated strategy of the organisation. Given this 
definition, the 'realised' approach may differ from the intended because of a 
disconnect between the espoused strategy of the senior management and their 
actions and messaging about organisational priorities. This was seen clearly in 
projects two and three, where respondents described an organisation which 
espoused a particular strategy, but conveyed through its organisational messaging 
a conflicting priority of short termist financial targets. This suggests that there is a 
distinction between explicit and implied strategy, where the former may be 
different from the latter, and the process of negotiation within an organisation may 
be as - if not more - important than the process of strategic analysis. 
2. TESTING THE DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH MODEL 
This study has been something of a 'journey', which has culminated, at the end of 
project three, in a revised version of the descriptive research model initially 
proposed in project two. This linking document provided an opportunity to revisit 
project one in the light of the revised descriptive research model, but also created 
a limitation. The research in project one was not aligned to the descriptive 
research model and had a different research agenda. The interview questions 
asked in project one do not relate to the investigation of a descriptive research 
model of HR. This linking document will, however, attempt to use the data in 
project one, to the extent it can be correlated, to test the descriptive research 
model. It will also attempt a new explanation of the data, given the insights on 
contextually based HR which have been derived through the completion of all 
three projects. 
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2.1. A New Model of HR Strategy Formulation and 
Implementation 
The revised descriptive research model developed at the end of project three is 
reproduced in figure 81 below for reference. 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXTUAL HR FUNCTIONAL 
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Figure 81: Descriptive Research Model 
The descriptive research model originated as a way of representing the interplays 
between different orders of reality: first and second order reality, as conceptualised 
by Ford (1996). First order reality is defined as two elements, which can be 
loosely characterised as 'input' and 'output'. 
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First order reality comprises the 'input' contextual factors which potentially 
influence the formulation of an organisation's strategy, and would incorporate the 
'input' factors which would normally be considered in a 'best fit' analysis (e. g. 
competitive forces, configuration factors, institutional influences). HR functional 
responsibilities were also included as an 'input' factor. Whilst how many HR 
activities are performed is a matter of interpretation and organisational preference 
(i. e. second order reality), there are functional responsibilities (e. g. payroll) which 
must be performed and, thus, have a first order reality. 
However, as well as these 'input' first order realities, there are also 'output' first 
order realities (such as HR systems, documented HR policies and procedures and 
documented strategic business plans) which have a first order reality. This is 
named the 'realised HR approach' in the model and is represented by the lower 
hatched box. 
In between the 'input' and 'output' first order realities, the model proposes a 
second order reality layer: the 'interpretative' dimension. This is where the 
influence of the actors is brought to bear, as it is in these layers that the first order 
contextual factors are interpreted, negotiated and mediated. In the upper-most of 
these layers on the diagram, strategy is formulated and negotiated between the 
actors. In the lower right, the actors' perceptions of constraints on the 
implementation of strategy mediate between the intended strategy and the 
realised approach. Finally, in the lower left, the interpretation of how successful 
(or otherwise) the realised approach was provides a further second order reality 
interpretation which will feed back into future strategy formulation. 
The final element included in the model was the concept of 'punch-throughs'. It 
was theorised that some first order reality factors were too powerful to be the 
subject of formulation and negotiation by the actors, and were inarguable 
influences on the organisation and its strategy which would 'punch-through' any 
attempt by the actors to negotiate around them. 
Change was included in the model in a rather clumsy fashion. The intention was 
to indicate that the model, despite its two dimensional appearance, was actually 
representative of an ever changing, non-linear process, where strategy formulation 
and implementation were constantly changing in response to changing 
circumstances or, more importantly, the perception of circumstances changing and 
the actors' re-formulations and re-negotiations around the appropriate strategic 
response. 
The interpretative dimension (the four solid boxes at the centre of figure 1) was 
studied in some detail in project three. A number of changes to the project three 
model were made at the end of the study to genericise the model to fit public as 
well as private sector companies (e. g. the change of the word 'business' to 
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'organisation') and some of the concepts which were specific to Thomson 
Financial were rolled up to a higher level (e. g. the individual 'constraints' varied, 
but the general concept of a 'theory of constraints' still held true). 
However, whilst project three had concentrated almost entirely on the 
interpretative dimension, it was felt that reference needed to be made in the linking 
document to two other elements which underpin the interpretative dimension. 
These were, firstly, the first order reality which respondents were referencing and 
functionally constructing in their discussions about strategy and strategy 
formulation, and, secondly, the three mediating layers (influence of the actors, 
mediating factors between intended strategy and the realised approach, and the 
feedback loop between the realised approach and the intended strategy), where 
perceptual filters and the interpretation, negotiating and reformulation processes 
take place. 
Turning initially to the first order reality, it is reasonable to suggest that there is a 
first order reality to which respondents refer, although their perception of that 
reality and the way in which they choose to interpret it is a matter for consideration 
under the 'mediating factors' heading. 
The consideration of the first order reality has been beyond the scope of the three 
projects, but it may contain some or all of the elements shown in figure 82. 
Documentation relating to business strategy Strategic business plans 
Annual reports 
Strategy documentation 
Strategic plans 
Elements of the 'best fit' analysis Competitive mechanisms 
Configuration factors 
Institutional mechanisms 
Documentation relating to HR strategy Strategic HR plans 
HR reports 
Strategy documentation 
Tangible constraints Resource limitations 
Assessment of HR capability 
Documents relating to change (project plans, 
strategy documents, board papers etc. ) 
HR function Documented HR policies and procedures 
HR systems 
HR programmes and projects 
Figure 82: Elements of First Order Reality 
An interesting question which this raises is whether certain realities are too 
compelling to ignore (this linking document will refer to these as'punch-throughs'), 
and transmit into the second order reality with little or no mediation. In Thomson 
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Financial, this is apparently not the case: respondents do not report compelling 
competitive or contextual influences which have a compelling directional influence. 
A company with semi-private ownership, a secure competitive position, limited 
operant institutional or configuration factors (the latter probably mitigated due to 
the portfolio approach to the construction of the organisation through multiple 
acquisitions), coupled with an ad hoc and emergent approach to strategy 
formulation has few first order realities which one would expect to be deterministic. 
Everything, thus, is a matter of perception, functional social constructivism and 
negotiation. This raises the question of whether people take the economic 
environment as a given? This study suggests that they do, and that they make 
assumptions about the environment and operate on this basis. When confronted 
with an incontrovertible reality (a 'punch through' factor which is impossible to 
ignore) - e. g. economic crisis, the Reuters acquisition - this forces a change in the 
interpretation of the first order reality, but otherwise a stable environment appears 
to be taken as a given. This is clearly seen in the difference between the rather 
complacent views expressed by the Thomson Financial participants in project two 
(the absence of competitive forces, the implicit assumption of a stable 
environment) and those views expressed in project three, where a 'punch through' 
factor (the Reuters acquisition) has forced a reappraisal of the first order reality 
and the assumption of a stable environment. 
However, in project one's LUL, one could surmise that such 'punch-throughs' are 
more numerous. The organisation, whilst not confronting competitive mechanisms, 
is subject to significant configuration (due to its long and turbulent history) and 
institutional (as a public sector company) factors. One would expect these to 
'punch through' the mediating layer, being too significant, too influential and too 
deterministic to be open to the perceptual filters and negotiating processes which 
this layer provides. An extremely valuable piece of future research could be the 
analysis of what factors, under what circumstances, will 'punch through', although 
this is beyond the scope of the current project. 
Secondly, ' project three suggested that it would be important to look at the 
perceptual filters which operate to mediate between first and second order reality, 
and suggested that a useful starting off point for this could be two papers 
published in McKinsey Quarterly (Lovallo & Sibony, 2006; Roxburgh, 2003), which 
look at sources of perceptual bias ("distortions") and the influence of political 
factors on business decision making ("deceptions"). This project drew upon the 
McKinsey terminology and concepts, but, instead of assuming that these 
perceptual filters and distortions have an objectively verifiable first order reality, 
looked at how perceptual filters, biases and distortions were referenced by 
respondents to debunk positions held by other actors and, by so doing, how they 
attempt to privilege their own positions. The Linking Document will continue to 
take this approach. 
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The model in figure 81 contains three mediating levels: the strategy formulation 
level (in which the influence of the actors is seen and is where one would expect to 
find examples of McKinsey-type perceptual filters being referenced, and where 
one would expect to see the impact of negotiating and re-formulation processes), 
the strategy implementation level, which mediates between intended HR strategy 
and the realised HR approach (which covers the 'theory of constraints', but is also 
a further area in which the actors can be influential) and a third 'feedback loop' 
between the realised approach and the intended strategy (views on what has 
worked and what has not worked, as perceived by the actors). These three 
mediating levels will be considered in sections 3.2,3.4 and 3.6 respectively. 
It was clear that further research could very usefully consider the mediating level, 
looking at perceptual filters and the negotiating process. However, discussion of 
the mediating level in project three was limited to a brief discussion of the factors 
which may impact the negotiating position of HR. There is considerably more 
work which could be done to firstly illuminate the factors which may impact the 
negotiating position of HR (or indeed any of the actors), but project three began to 
indicate some of the factors which may be important in determining negotiating 
position (credibility, criticality and sponsorship of the function), as well as the 
negotiating and influencing skills of the individuals involved. 
2.2. Testing the Descriptive Research Model 
This linking document has developed the model of HR strategy formulation and 
implementation a further level, presenting a new descriptive model of HR, seeing it 
as based in a first order reality of articulated business and HR strategies and 
directional documents, contextual (including political) drivers and tangible 
constraints, all of which are interpreted and mediated by the influence of the actors, 
to a greater or lesser extent. 
The overall objective of this study was the development of a model. However, 
project one started with a different objective: an examination of a distinct type of 
HR model (the industrial relations centric environment of London Underground), as 
a challenge to the SHRM model which dominates the literature. The conclusions 
of project one were that there was a need for a broader, more flexible and more 
contextually relativistic HR model, which projects two and three then proceeded to 
build. However, for project one, the model was not developed, therefore this 
section will return to the raw project one data, retrospectively testing the 
descriptive research model to see if it has more general applicability. It is 
important to state that further research to validate the model will be still be 
required, but reviewing the model against three very different organisational 
contexts will give some indication of its generalisability. 
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The following section will attempt to apply the research model to project one, with 
one caveat: the data pertaining to project one was not collected with this model in 
mind (as the model evolved through the course of the three projects), therefore the 
analysis is likely to be incomplete. It will, however, provide an indication of 
whether the descriptive research model has merit as a generic model of HR and 
whether further research would be of benefit. 
In considering project one's data against the model, 'HR' was defined as the 
paternalistic employee relations approach represented by participants in the study, 
as it was consistently referenced through the study, with little evidence of alternate 
approaches of HR. For project one, HR was conflated with industrial relations. 
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3. APPLYING THE MODEL TO PROJECT ONE 
The genesis for project one was a dissatisfaction with the SHRM literature, and its 
domination by the unitarian positivist model epitomized by the large scale, 
questionnaire based surveys conducted by Huselid and Ulrich. Project one 
argued that this model had limited applicability beyond the particular organisational 
type which hosted the majority of SHRM research, and identified a number of 
limitations to the SHRM approach, including the exclusion or marginalization of 
industrial relations. Project one endeavoured to explore the application of HR in a 
different context: a heavily unionized, traditional public sector organisation. 
Project one argued that, whilst the SHRM approach can be used to describe 
elements of the HR environment which operates in a traditional public sector 
organisation, it fails to characterise the HR model, and is particularly restricted by 
its failure to address the challenges of a militant trade union environment and a 
non-compliant employee population. 
The data for project one was coded in three ways: the industrial relations history of 
LUL, the Darlington factors (influences on trade union militancy) and socially 
shared discourses. The first exercise is to see how this data compares, or does 
not compare, to the descriptive research model. Whilst this will not be necessary 
for projects two and three, where the data was collected with the descriptive 
research model and theories of contextually based HR explicitly in mind, a 
reconsideration of project one's data in the light of the interpretative level of the 
descriptive research model will be necessary. 
Where relevant, comparisons will be drawn to projects two and three, indicating 
similarity or contrast with the project one data. 
The five major headings of the model will be used to examine the data in the light 
of the descriptive research model, rather than the industrial relations centric 
analysis conducted for project one. Section 3.1. will briefly look at the first order 
reality, then subsequent sections will move to interpretative level, with section 3.2. 
examining the mediating level of perceptual filters and negotiating positioning, and 
3.3. extrapolating the intended HR strategy. Section 3.4. will consider the second 
mediating level, between the intended HR strategy and the realised approach, 
concluding with section 3.5., which will review the realised HR approach, and 
section 3.6., which will look at the final mediating level, the feedback loop between 
the realised approach and intended strategy. 
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3.1. First Order Reality 
This linking document will map the factors influencing strategy in LUL against the 
shortened version of contextually based HR theory used in project three, i. e. it will 
look at the first order realities of organisational strategy, context and HR functional 
responsibilities. Whilst concentrating on project one (as this data has not been 
tested against the model), it will bring in references from project two and project 
three as appropriate. 
An interesting dilemma for this study is that, unlike Thomson Financial in rojects 
two and three, many of the operant conditions in LUL are represented as 'punch- 
throughs', i. e. first order reality factors which are too impactful to be subject to 
much negotiation: examples include trade union history and the influence of 
institutional mechanisms (the media, political influence). However, this raises the 
question of whether these factors are genuine 'punch-throughs', or whether this is 
another manifestation of respondents' functional use of language to support their 
arguments and strengthen their negotiating stance. The existence of socially 
shared discourses (such as'rewarding bad behaviour') suggests that there may be 
a complex relationship between first order reality and its second order 
representation, and second order representations may, indeed, become first order 
realities over time, if they evolve into unquestioned organisational 'truths'. 
Although, intuitively, some organisations do have 'punch-through' factors which 
are non-negotiable, not open to formulation and do incontrovertibly influence 
organisational behaviour (e. g. one could think of organisations with extremely 
difficult trading conditions, high levels of endebtedness or major infrastructural 
constraints), this linking document surmises that even the 'punch-through' factors 
may be open to some interpretation and, indeed, that there may be a discursive 
'pay-off (in terms of, for instance, external attribution of blame or as an 
explanation for inactivity), which means that representing a factor as a 'punch- 
through' may be a functional use of language and may, itself, be a formulation and 
a negotiating gambit. 
3.1.1. The Impact of Organisational Strategy 
The descriptive research model implies that organisational strategy would not 
exert as significant an influence on LUL (as a public sector entity) as on a private 
sector company with its exposure to competitive pressures. This is consistent with 
Paauwe's model of contextually based HR referenced organisational strategy 
through competitive mechanisms: what he called the product/market/technology 
(PMT) dimension. In a public sector organisation, with virtually a monopolistic 
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position, it was not expected that participants would see competition as a 
significant contextual influence, which, indeed, appears to be the perception of the 
respondents. 
" ... market messages aren't as strong (in LUL). You know we're not 
going to go bust. " [9: 1: 8] 
Considering how people use discourse around organisational strategy functionally, 
in support of their argument, in this study, the public sector management 
respondents actually did draw upon a semi-business language, perhaps 
functionally, to create an alignment to a private sector concept of 'business'. 
'We have to provide services to London and we're given a certain 
amount of money to do that. And that money isn't limitless. " [2: 1: 4/5] 
Public sector organisations have typically been regarded as bastions of long term 
planning, given their need to demonstrate budgetary accountability to multiple 
stakeholders. However, in LUL, respondents question both the adequacy and the 
quality of the planning. 
"... one of the challenges we face is that the co(mpany), LUL does 
not have a robust business plan. " [9: 4: 10] 
There is a sense that the organisation lacks a clear strategy. 
"... we still don't have a business plan which we can't sit down with the 
trade unions and say, "look, here's the situation, this is why we must 
modernise ... And if we could sit down with all of that ... all this change 
is 
manageable, I believe in an acceptable way. If we lay out that picture. " 
[9: 4: 11] 
"(We need to have) much more of a pre-prepared agenda, around where 
we want to take the business, and being able to set the agenda ... many of the committees I've been involved with ... are essentially reactive ... it's been a complete nightmare, of sort of scrabbling around saying "what are 
we gonna do? " [9: 1: 6/7] 
It is interesting, however, that the anticipated strong contrast between the public 
and private environments did not emerge in this study. Neither project two nor 
project three suggested that competitive forces were seen as a strong influence on 
Thomson Financial", despite it being a private sector company. Like LUL, 
respondents report an absence of strategy in Thomson Financial °. 
`° C. f. GT: 10, project 2. section 6.3.1.1., page 310. 
S0 C. f. EH: 22, project 2, section 6.1., page 291. 
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Organisational strategy, thus, appears not to be a 'punch-through' factor for either 
LUL or Thomson Financial, the inference being that the lack of strong PMT type 
factors leaves actors free to formulate their own version of the impact of 
organisational strategy and use the concept in the way which is most functional for 
them, given the argument they wish to create and support. It also suggests that, 
for these two organisations, the strategy is not a deterministic influence which will 
shape and channel the actors' negotiations. 
There are two possible explanations for this: either competitive mechanisms are 
generically not a strong force on the organisational and HR strategies (which 
seems unlikely), or that TF is a relatively unusual organisation (or that its 
managers have a relatively unusual perception) in its lack of reference to 
competitive mechanisms. Further research would be required to explore this area. 
3.1.2. The Impact of Context 
To look at the model's second element, contextual factors, Paauwe's model again 
offers a potentially useful categorisation schema. As well as referencing 
organisational strategy through looking at competitive mechanisms, Paauwe also 
addressed organisational context, considering two other categories of potentially 
influential factors: configuration factors (organisation/administration/cultural 
heritage) and institutional mechanisms (the social/cultural/legal dimension). This 
section will consider whether these categorisations are useful descriptors for 
respondents' discourse in this study. 
3.1.2.1. Configuration Factors 
As discussed in project one, there are a number of configuration factors which are 
cited by respondents as influential, most notably the scale of the LUL organisation 
and its history. The following quote is representative of discourse around the 
former topic. 
"We've found it very difficult to find mechanisms ... a private sector 
company would say, 'right, we'll close the doors and we'll do a 
training day or something like that'. You would actually close the 
operation down for a day ... Engineering, you can take people off 
work ... You can't stop the Underground for a day. " [9.4: 113] 
As one might expect in an organisation of such longevity, the organisation's history 
is, however, cited as the most significant of the configuration factors. 
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"So here we have a tradition, a history, you know it is rooted, 
certainly in the 80s, maybe even in the 70s in terms of trade union 
behaviours. They've grown up, they've developed, they've learnt 
that these behaviours are well rewarded. " [10.1: 26] 
"... you have to track this back way into the past ... back in 20 years 
ago 30 years ago the organisation wasn't well managed and the 
management had kind of abdicated really and ... allowed the trade 
unions to gather and to gather strength ... that sort of built up over 
years, which is why you just can't sort of waltz in and say we'll all be 
partners now. " [9: 1: 1] 
The project interviews generated a significant amount of discourse on industrial 
relations history, particularly the role of the Company Plan in building a workable 
set of employment terms and conditions which allowed the organisation to fulfil its 
requirements, but at a cost of significant damaged industrial relations. In other 
words, configuration factors such as organisational history are presented as major 
contextual influences - largely described as non-negotiable - which shape and 
constrain the modem day organisation. 
Current events are routinely described in terms of their historical basis, adding 
evidence to the suggestion that second order representations of first order realities 
can become socially shared, can assume a first order reality, and can indeed take 
on the discursive status of 'punch-throughs'. 
Projects two and three also indicate that configuration factors are referenced by 
respondents and are perceived as influential, although the factors themselves 
differ. Instead of scale and history, entrepreneurial heritage is seen as a crucial 
influence on Thomson Financials. 
Configuration factors, consequently, are represented in respondents' discourse in 
all three projects as factors which influence the organisational - and hence the HR 
- strategy. 
3.1.2.2. Institutional Mechanisms 
Although configuration factors (especially organisational history) are referenced by 
respondents in LUL, institutional factors are also cited, suggesting that there is 
merit to using a contextual diagnostic which, like the Paauwe model on which it is 
based, includes a consideration of institutional forces as well as competitive 
mechanisms and configuration factors. 
6' C. f. LJ: 13/14 and NB: 5, project 2, section 6.3.1.2., page 311 and 312; SV: 6, project 3, section 6.2.1.3.2.2., page 430. 
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The institutional forces which are cited by respondents include political influence 
and the role of the media. 
Political influence is exerted both by the Government: 
" ... governments have all always given us huge support 
for 
management's position and have said there is no prospect of any 
more money, that's the final position and they will back us to the hilt, 
even if there is industrial action and ... of course they have never, 
never, once stuck to their position ... And that actually just simply blows management's credibility out of the water. " [9.2: 10] 
And by the Mayor of London: 
"... it's your call as managing director of a small private company ... 
whether you wanna take the aggro or not ... you're not really in that 
situation where you've got Ken (Livingstone) jumping up and down 
and telling you how to run your business. " [9.1: 114] 
Like discourses around organisational history, discourses around institutional 
factors discourse tend to be socially shared, used by trade unionists as well as 
managers: 
"I think that politicians sometimes make short term decisions, which 
is the long term create bigger problems ... I suspect if 
Ken 
Livingstone had his time again, he may not have intervened in the 
way he did 2 years ago ... the actual 'sorting' of the trade union 
problems have probably been put back 2 years because of him. " 
[26.1: 12-20] 
Project one discussed the functionality of this discourse for both groups, in that 
institutional factors offer an exogenous attribution of blame for managers: 
" ... it was a very difficult period ... 
TfL and the Mayor and the 
Evening Standard and the MPs, we knew we were fighting a battle 
that we could never actually convince people we were gonna do. 
We thought we were doing the right thing, but we knew we didn't 
have the backing. You knew you were a victim. " 
[9.4: 103-105] 
And for trade unionists: 
550 
"I got frustrated with ... having meeting after meeting where the 
people I'm meeting - and I can make the decision, I have authority in 
that meeting - haven't. " [32.1: 122] 
There is a discursive 'pay-off associated with the functional use of this repertoire, 
and this exogenous blame attribution and deflection of criticism is further 
strengthened by representing this as a 'punch-through' factor, which respondents 
can do little about. 
As anticipated, institutional mechanisms are not reported as significant influences 
on Thomson Financial 52 (although if one takes Paauwe's SCL definition of 
institutional mechanisms, which includes culture, the latter is referenced in 
Thomson Financial), suggesting that this may be a valid difference between the 
public and private sectors. Although this seems most likely state of affairs, there is 
a competing explanation (Thomson Financial is a young organisation, so may not 
have had the time to build up its institutional influences) which further research 
would need to explore. 
3.1.3. The Impact of HR Functional Responsibilities 
There is limited reference to HR functional responsibilities in project one, which is 
not unexpected, given that the focus of that project was industrial relations rather 
than HR. However, project one mirrors the discourse in projects two and three, in 
that functional IR responsibilities (in this case, those of the industrial relations 
specialist) are seen as demanding a significant amount of the individual's time, 
creating a constraint which prevents the development of a more strategic 
approach. 
"(The LUL management) are running a railway business, stations 
and trains etc., moving millions of people around London, and on the 
side here I'm running a separate business, a cottage industry which 
is actually a relationship with the trade union, which in itself 
sometimes reaches a farce, other times it's a game, other times it's 
deadly serious and damages the other business. " [10: 1: 8] 
Project one also echoes projects two and three in its suggestion that taking care of 
the functional element is a responsibility which needs to be dealt with, before more 
strategic thinking is possible. Industrial relations issues are represented as so 
time consuming and so critical that they prevent more strategic thinking or longer 
term thinking: in this sense, they operate as punch-through factors which constrain 
the ability to formulate strategy. 
52 C. f. project 2, section 6.3.1.3, page 312 on; project 3, section 6.3.1.2., page 466. 
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"... it's always been the case of trying to find that time to do [the 
strategic], isn't it; that sort of get your head up from the next issue, 
and the next dispute you have to move on. " [10: 1: 18] 
"[The ex-LUL HR director] I know had almost an issue a day 
appearing on his desk, a ballot, a business can't run like that. " [2: 1: 4] 
Project one, thus, concurs with projects two and threes', in that HR functional 
responsibilities do operate as top level factors which do influence and can 
constrain HR's strategy and its ability to be strategic. 
3.1.4. The Implications of First Order Reality Factors 
In projects two and three, where there is no shared view of the influence of first 
order reality factors on business and HR strategies, the descriptive model implies 
that, in the absence of strongly directive first order reality factors, there will be no 
'punch-through' factors and that the freedom of the actors to determine strategy 
will be concomitantly wider. 
At first sight, LUL, however, appears to have a relatively strong set of first order 
reality factors (configuration and institutional forces are commonly cited and seen 
as strong determinants of current policy and practice), some of which may have 
sufficient impact to be defined as 'punch-through' factors. 'Punch-throughs' are 
defined as factors about which respondents articulate a relatively consistent view, 
and are seen as incontrovertible and deterministic influences on the organisation's 
strategy, and which are likely to be discursively represented in socially shared 
discourses. 
However, 'punch-through' factors appear not to be as dominant as one would 
expect: although configuration and institutional mechanisms are described as 
largely non-negotiable elements with which respondents in the organisation have 
to deal, there is still a sense that these are being referenced selectively to support 
the argument the individual is making. Exogenous political influences on the 
organisation, for instance, appear to exist as a 'punch through', in that they are 
referenced by the majority of respondents, from both the management and the 
trade union population. However, it is equally clear that these groups are drawing 
upon the discourse around exogenous political influences functionally, to support 
the same purpose (diversion of criticism). Other 'punch-throughs', such as 
organisational history, are represented as shared discourses, but they are used to 
variable ends. This again suggests that even the most significant of first order 
influences are being constructed in language and are being flexibly deployed by 
respondents. 
53 C. f. BB: 14, project 2, section, 6.4.2.1., page 334; RA: 5 and KG: 5/6, project 3, section 6.2.2.4.1., page 451. 
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An interesting philosophical question is whether societally shared discourses come 
to have a first order reality: in LUL, looking at shared discourses around 'rewarding 
bad behaviour' in reference to the trade unions and the perceptions of the 
Company Plan, it appears that this can be argued in the affirmative. Although 
these elements undoubtedly had a second order reality, through a socialisation 
process, it appears that they are perceived as having a definite first order reality in 
the respondents' discourse. 
All three projects support the contention that, for HR staff, HR functional 
responsibilities have a powerful first order reality, and a directive influence on HR's 
ability to develop and negotiate strategy. 
The prediction of the descriptive research model, given strong first order reality 
factors, would be that the actors' "freedom to manoeuvre" would be somewhat 
constrained. This will be considered in the next section, where the influence of the 
actors on the mediating level of strategy formulation will be examined. 
3.2. Meditating Level 1: Strategy Formulation 
The influence of the actors is presented as a significant - if not the most significant 
- determinant of strategy formulation in both LUL and Thomson Financial, 
suggesting that this may be one of the most important aspects of the model. 
The descriptive research model implies that, if 'punch-through' factors are limited, 
the influence of the actors on strategy will be proportionately more significant: 
actors will have more "freedom to manoeuvre". 
Applying this to LUL is complex. Respondents present both configuration and 
institutional factors as 'punch-throughs', but there is clearly a functionality to this 
form of discourse, in that it explains lack of progress and/or failure to act. There 
are undoubtedly major first order reality factors which create limitations on the 
actor's ability to determine strategy in LUL, but there is a sense that these are less 
significant to the actors than the polarisation of the key negotiating parties: the 
management and the trade unions, described as being in irreconcilable opposition 
to each other. 
In Thomson Financial, by comparison, despite some references to configuration 
factors, none of these appear to be regarded as strongly deterministic in respect of 
business or HR strategy. This leaves the actors with greater "freedom to 
manoeuvre", and a lack of directional first order reality factors suggests that the 
political dimension will gain greater eminence in the strategy formulation process. 
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The most widely referenced influence on strategy formulation in Thomson 
Financial is that of a fragmented dominant coalitionu. 
Moving away from Paauwe's model, which does not consider the possibility of a 
fragmented dominant coalition, this section will look at the influence of the actors 
on strategy formulation. It will look at two elements: the negotiation process 
(section 3.2.1. ) and the positioning and the influence of the actors (section 3.2.2. ). 
It will conclude with sections on the impact of the mediating level on strategy 
formulation (section 3.2.3. ) and the linkages between organisational strategy and 
intended HR strategy (section 3.2.4. ). 
3.2.1. The Negotiating Process 
Projects two and three advanced the concept that strategy formulation in 
organisations is incremental,,. This is also reflected in the discourse in project one. 
"... the thing we have got going for us is the good relationships we 
have with many of the unions, the capability we have coming in ... The willingness to recognise skill sets and work together across the 
different functions and try to map out a way that will work for us all. 
Slowly but surely - not withstanding a big bang of some description, 
which would drive this forward faster, we will just have to be patient, 
and chip, and chip, and chip. " [2: 1: 14] 
The Thomson Financial projects also postulated that strategy was a negotiated 
process", a view which is also shared by project one's respondents. Inevitably, in 
an industrial relations environment, strategy is negotiated between the 
organisation and the trade unions. 
"... the infamous Company Plan ... we sat down, we worked out what 
our plan was to start sorting the company out, we sat down and at 
great length, for months, we talked to the trade unions about it. " 
[9.5: 20] 
However, there are also negotiations within the non-union actors, most notably the 
mayor, who is not seen as a positive influence. 
"... there was a lot of people in LU who were very very animated by 
the Mayor's intervention in the dispute last year... the view was that 
54 C. f. EH: 22, project 2, section 6.1., page 291; RA2: 8, project 3, section 6.2.2.1, page 434. 
55 C. f. project 3, section 6.2.1.1.2. 
80 C. f. EH: 22, project 2, section 6.1., page 291. 
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he set us up. In a way that disabled a proactive, management led 
drive for change in employee relations, moving forward. " [9.2: 80] 
As this manager indicates, negotiating skills (and particularly the ability to read the 
other organisational actors) are particularly critical in the highly politicised 
environment of LUL and failure to understand the influence of the other actors 
makes it impossible to be effective in the organisation. 
"(The previous HRD) didn't have the wrong idea, about what he was 
going, trying to do with the unions. What he didn't get right ... (was) timing and getting the support and have the political nouse to 
understand the reasons and the difficulties around that, he just didn't. 
And he paid the price for it. " [2: 1: 4] 
In the representation of strategy as incremental, and in the negotiated model of 
strategy espoused, the data in project one concurs with that in projects two and 
three, suggesting that this model of strategy formulation has validity. 
Models such as Paauwe presume that the organisational actors will come to some 
shared conclusion about organisational strategy, albeit that this may rapidly be 
replaced by another iteration. However, the LUL data suggests that competing 
strategies can exist within the same organisation, and that the negotiation process 
actually does not necessarily conclude in a universally shared view of the direction 
the organisation should take. In LUL, there are clearly at least two coherent 
strategies being articulated by different groups of actors. 
In this situation, it becomes perhaps more critical for the actors to privilege their 
view of events and their view of the correct strategy. This can be seen in the 
linguistic ploys used by the actors in LUL to convey their view as the 'correct' one. 
Taking the social constructivist assumption that the organisational actors will 
create second order realities which have functionality for them, where there is a 
highly fragmented, or even a diametrically opposed, dominant coalition, it is 
plausible that, in creating and privileging their own second order realities, they will 
use arguments around perceptual biases and distortions, political influences and 
deceptions to debunk other actors' positions. 
The discourse of respondents does indicate that the types of distortion referenced 
by McKinsey are utilised by respondents, including claims of status quo bias, 
herding instincts and false consensuss'. However, predictably, given the existence 
of competing strategies, most evident of the McKinsey repertoires is the "principal- 
agent problem" (Lovallo & Sibony, 2006, p22), where individual and organisational 
51 C. f. project 3, section 6.2.2.4.2. 
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agendas do not align). This is used extensively by CP in project threes, (with, one 
can surmise, the functionality of privileging his view of events over that of the 
HRD) and, in project one, also used functionally to discredit the position of the 
trade unions. 
"I think there are agendas being pushed for individual purposes and I 
sometimes feel like the staff get squeezed out. And I think that's 
what goes on, quite a lot, in London Underground. I'm not sure that 
a lot of the battles are about staff; I think they're about political 
positioning and in some ways an excuse for a fight, as it were. " 
[2: 1: 24] 
" ... it must add weight to anyone observing this process that the 
unions are in it for themselves, and there isn't consideration of the 
staff. " [2: 1: 54] 
This is given additional emotional weight by the use of the 'moral high ground' 
repertoire. 
" (The unions) they've got grapevines and they can also tell lies. 
There's no retribution for the yellow peril which is just blatant lies ... And we have to take the high moral ground and tell the truth-" 
[9.4: 121-125] 
Moral arguments are heavily used to support the points managers make. 
"We have a responsibility to London, we are here to provide a public 
service, not here to pursue the ends of any individual union, or any 
individual manager, or director or MD of this organisation. We have 
to provide services to London and we're given a certain amount of 
money to do that. And that money isn't limitless. " [2.1: 86] 
This does suggest an interesting interplay between distortions and negotiation: 
suggesting or implying that there is a distortion in another actor's representation is 
a functional use of language which devalues or questions the validity of the other 
party's position. It appears that 'rational' arguments are routinely supported by a 
moral, emotional element to reinforce their claim for superiority. 
3.2.2. The Influence of the Actors 
Projects two and three suggest that contextual factors appear to be less important 
in Thomson Financial than the actors in the formulation and deployment of HR 
58 C. f. CP: 1 and CP: 10, project 3, section 6.2.2.4.2, page 456/7. 
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strategy, and a number of respondents indicate the powerful influence of the 
actors". It was surmised that this could arise because of the lack of deterministic 
contextual factors (`punch-throughs'). The actors, however, are seen as having 
relatively equal weight in their influence on the strategy, with perhaps at most a 
skew towards the MD60. There is a sense that the actors are working in a co- 
deterministic way, making an attempt to derive a single strategy (although this, in 
itself, is obviously a perception and a social construction). 
LUL is, however, different. Strategy is not the unitary outcome of a series of 
negotiations, but is best described as the existence of competing strategies. 
Whereas the expectation of the actors in Thomson Financial is that one strategy 
will be derived87 and the organisation will fall into line behind it, there is no such 
expectation in LUL, where the conflicting strategy of the trade unions is seen as 
highly problematic to the management's attempt to pursue their own strategy. 
This raises interesting questions around competing strategies and the conditions 
and power dynamics under which one - or more - strategies will co-exist, and the 
tactics which interest groups will use to position their view of strategy most 
favourably. 
The trade unions are represented as the most influential of the actors in LUL. As 
the Batstone model predicts, their power base is seen as being based in control 
over resources (the employees, particularly the train drivers). 
" ... they have a strong power 
base in terms of their ability to wield 
industrial muscle on our services. " [10: 1: 4] 
This is enhanced by the criticality of those resources and the limitations on action 
which the management can take to mitigate the impact of the strike, again as 
predicted by Batstone. 
"Their bargaining power's incredible. And that's the real issue ... because it's a perishable product, you can't reinvent the same 
journey, the next day. You know, your revenues are getting hit. " 
[10: 2: 2] 
This has similarities to the co-deterministic model of negotiating position and 
sources of power advanced in project three62 (based on credibility, criticality and 
sponsorship), but Batstone's model is more appropriate to a conflictual 
environment such as LUL. The trade unions, by any definition of negotiating 
position, are a formidable negotiating force. 
S° C. f. SK: 1, project 3, section 6.2.2.1, page 431; RA2: 8, project 3, section 6.2.2.1, page 433. 
°0 C. f. RA2: 8, project 3, section 6.2.2.1, page 434. 
51 C. f. RA: 8, project 3, section 6.2.2.4.1., page 454, who clearly feels that she has no permission to challenge the MD and 
the MD's view. 
52 C. f. project 3, section 6.2.2.4.1. 
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This is compounded by the perceived weakness of the other chief negotiating 
party in LUL, the management. Respondents see management skills and 
behaviours as impoverished, and as little match for the trade unionists. This 
'management incapability' discourse is strongly articulated in company 
documentation; 'managerial skills and behaviours' is one of the 8 main themes in 
the Everest report (London Underground Limited, 1996, p6). 
"There is evidence of deficiencies in managerial skills and 
behaviours at all levels. In particular, these appear to be around 
leadership skills : performance and behavioural management, cause 
and effect analysis and communication skills appear to be major 
areas for improvement. These issues seem to form a common 
thread to all the issues examined. The key to success is considered 
to lie in addressing these issues as a priority. " (London Underground 
Limited, 1996, p8) 
And this argument is also made by one of the managers; 
" ... you have to do something that London Underground ... (is) 
pretty bloody awful at, is you have to develop and train your 
managers ... Systematically. You have to select them much more 
carefully than has happened in the past and you have to make sure 
they have the skills, competencies, whatever word you wanna use, 
to do the job, and if they don't and they can't perform, you have to 
get rid of 'em ... selection's weak, training and development's weak, 
and measurement of performance, and attitude, and behaviour is 
weak. " [9.5: 109-117] 
The two other actors, the media and the mayor of London, are also offered as 
potential influencers, but their reference in discourse is as a feature of the 
environment rather than as active players in the negotiation. As such, they are 
probably better categorised as environmental influences with a level of first order 
reality, constructed in the respondents' discourse as a second order reality, 
although the influence of the mayor, in particular, is commonly represented by 
respondents as a 'punch-through'. 
3.2.3. The Impact of the Mediating Level on Organisational Strategy 
Formulation 
Whereas respondents in project two and three infer the intention to derive a single 
strategy, management respondents in project one see the outcome of the 
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imbalance between the actors as, at best, an impasse, where no side is sufficiently 
dominant to drive negotiations to a conclusion. 
"I don't believe that we can negotiate with that trade union as they 
are shaped, constituted and as they and as they present themselves 
now. I don't think we can ... I find it difficult (to believe) we could turn this around. " [10: 1: 10] 
But the more generally held view is that the situation is favourable to the trade 
unions. 
"... management has traditionally bowed to the pressures on them. " 
[10: 1: 3] 
However, respondents do offer a counter to this skewed power balance: the 
fragmentation of the trade unions. Much of the discourse about trade unionism 
(from both managers and trade unionists) references intransigent inter- and intra- 
union divides. 
"(The RMT and ASLEF are) deliberately blocking each other's 
initiatives. " [10: 2: 5] 
"... the national officials ... there's real aggro. And I'm talking real 
aggro. " [10: 2: 1] 
The result of this, for respondents, is a poorer negotiating position than would 
otherwise be the case, and creates a situation which industrial relations staff can 
exploit. 
" ... the benefit of having a multi-union environment ... we don't 
necessarily end up with facing industrial action or difficulties across 
the piece, with one union, as we have at the moment, for example 
industrial action by RMT members, but with ASLEF staff in the main 
trying to get into work, so we are running some services. So there's 
an advantage ... you could play one union off against another, pay the peace divided for ASLEF because you're trying to isolate RMT. " 
[10: 1: 2] 
This analysis has taken the concept from organisational strategy models (e. g. 
Paauwe, McKinsey) which make the a priori assumption that negotiation is a co- 
deterministic process in organisations, the aim of which is to produce a single 
organisational strategy. However, perhaps a more useful way of viewing the data 
is to interpret the data with the view that there are multiple, co-existing strategies 
operating simultaneously in the organisation. Managers in LUL represent the 
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situation as an impasse because they are unable to make their strategy dominate 
the organisation, and they are unable to eradicate competing strategies. Their 
impasse is the existence of an alternative strategy and their inability to move the 
organisation to a single strategy. 
This suggests that organisations may have two (or more) competing and co- 
existing strategies. This transforms the functionality of the discourse from 
bolstering one's arguments in support of a largely agreed strategic direction to 
defending and attempting to privilege one's own world view against a compelling 
and widely held, but diametrically opposed, alternative. Although views on 
strategy inevitably differ in private sector organisations, the negotiating process 
presupposes a desire to move to a single agreed strategic direction. In LUL, the 
existence of diametrically opposed strategies represents a qualitatively different 
scenario for respondents, and creates a need to use discourse around strategy to 
very different ends. 
3.2.4. Linkages between Organisational Strategy and Intended HR Strategy 
3.2.4.1. Factors Influencing Strategy 
The previous sections have looked at some of the influences on strategy cited by 
respondents. In this, both Thomson Financial and LUL appear to follow the 
descriptive research model. Organisational strategy is not a significant influence 
on the direction of either organisation, although the reasons cited for this differ. In 
Thomson Financial, lack of any strong competitive or contextual drivers allows the 
actors the maximum freedom to manoeuvre, and a fragmented "dominant 
coalition" results in a vague organisational strategy which is subject to the vagaries 
of the CEO's interests and preferences. In LUL, lack of organisational strategy is 
attributed to inferior planning capability and a lack of competitive drivers, whereas 
contextual factors (configuration and institutional) are perceived to exert a far 
greater influence; in some instances, these are represented as 'punch-through' 
factors. 
In LUL, the first order context allows the actors some room to formulate strategy, 
but the polarisied negotiating positions of the actors means that the organisation 
has at least two co-existing strategies. The management strategy is, at the 
highest level, to run a railway and provide transportation for people in London, as 
referenced by this quote. 
"(The senior managers) are running a railway business, stations and 
trains etc., moving millions of people around London. " [10: 1: 8] 
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A variety of strategies are posited for the trade unions, ranging from survival, 
increased membership, personal prestige for the union officials to destruction of 
the capitalist state. 
This creates an additional strategy, or strategic necessity for the organisation: the 
management of industrial relations. Whilst "running a railway" is the overarching 
strategy, the impact and the complexity of the industrial relations element 
becomes a critical sub-strategy for the management. Indeed, one could see 
industrial relations as the only strategy shared by the management and the unions, 
although the objective is obviously different. 
3.2.4.2. Relationship Between the Organisation and HR 
One of the significant differences between the two organisations is the perceived 
status of HR. Whereas in Thomson Financial there is considerable antipathy 
expressed towards HR, from within the profession, as well as from outside". 
LUL's HR (IR) is regarded as central to the organisation's success. 
Given the centrality of IR to the achievement of LUL's overall goals, the 
relationship between the organisation and IR (IR being used here as a proxy for 
HR) is intense. IR's criticality to the achievement of the organisation's overall 
goals ensures its centrality. 
As such, the repertoires seen in projects two and three ('business leads HR', 
'strategy versus tactics' and 'multiple roles', as well as the 'super-ordinate role of 
HR') do not emerge in project one. One interview does allude to a more 
sophisticated HR model. 
" ... that's what we're trying to do ... can we honestly say hand on heart for our 18 thousand employees that they feel their development 
paths are clear, that the training that's available to them to develop 
their skills and their careers, is clear, that they're supported, that they 
feel fairly performance (managed) ... that's why my passion in HR is 
getting these fundamental blocks in place, get something in that's 
starting to rock and roll, and then we become believable. Become 
an organisation that actually invests in its people, inspires individuals 
and they come to work, or just allows people to pitch up, irrespective 
of how they're performing. " [2: 1: 6] 
But recognises that this is not achievable in the current environment. 
63 C. f. BB: 9 and DH: 5, project 2, section 6.5, page 337. 
M C. f. SK: 7, project 3, section 6.3.1.2.2., page 470. 
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"Lots of organisations are in the 21st, 22nd Century, about these 
things. We're still back in the 19th Century. So let's get everybody 
up to the 20th Century first, and go directly to the 21st Century where 
it seems suitable. " [2: 1: 5] 
This lack of a modern approach to HR, coupled with the pervasive influence of the 
trade unions, conflates the organisation's HR strategy with the IR strategy, and 
sets out the need to establish reasonable HR before forward progress is possible 
on other, perhaps higher order, HR issues. As such, this mirrors the hierarchy 
between strategy and tactics which emerged as an interpretative repertoire in 
project three. 
3.3. Intended HR Strategy 
Despite attempts to retrospectively construct the intended HR strategy in Thomson 
Financial°5, it is clear that some respondents do not perceive that there is a 
strategy 8B . There is no clear theoretical model which would explain the 
manifestation of HR in Thomson Financial. Whereas the organisation may aspire 
to a HPWT model"", the 'theory of constraints' repertoire is heavily drawn upon to 
indicate that this is an aspiration rather than a reality behind which the 
organisation is prepared to put resources". 
In LUL, the intended HR strategy is, however, easier to reference against existing 
models. Given the conflation of HR and IR strategy, this section will examine the 
intended IR strategy in LUL. Project one characterised the HR model operating in 
LUL as having commonality with the tradition of British pluralistic of employee 
relations, defined by Fox as follows: 
"... the pluralistic British employee relations model which, whilst 
recognising the legitimacy of trade unions, may find that relationship 
conflictual. " (Fox, 1973, p196) 
Additionally, elements of Guest's "professional" personnel management, with its 
concentration on administrative efficiency and cost control, can also be seen in 
LUL. This can broadly be interpreted as a 'best fit' perspective on HR strategy, in 
which the strategy reflects the actors' views on the conditions and constraints 
under which HR at LUL operates. 
85 Project 3. figure 77, page 480 
58 C. f. EH: 22 and GT: 5, project 2, section 6.2.3., page 305. 
C. f. KBM: 2/3, project 3, section 6.3.1.3, page 474. 
B8 C. f. KBM: 6, project 3, section 6.3.1.3, page 474. 
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Using this as a broad description of the IR strategy, the linking document then 
interpreted project one's data in the light of the descriptive research model. For 
LUL this suggests that, whilst some powerful configuration and institutional factors 
guide and constrain the organisation, the major determinant of HR/IR strategy in 
LUL is the influence of the actors, specifically the conflicting strategies of the 
unions and the management, and the latter's concomitant requirement to manage 
the former. 
There are a number of articulations of IR strategy in LUL, from the Company Plan. 
" ... when this company did Company Plan ... we spent 2 years with 
a value analysis team developing proposals, developing where we 
wanted to be, the structure of the organisation we wanted. " [10: 1: 16] 
" ... the infamous 
Company Plan, where we actually removed 6 and 
a half thousand jobs ... In that we swept away all the agreements of the previous decades, the index alone was an A5 book, quarter of an 
inch thick, double sided, one line for titles, all this junk that had built 
up, we threw it in the bin. And we put new framework agreements in 
place. " [9: 4: 1] 
To the aspirational formulations of the then new IR director. 
"... within the strategic plan that we've just driven out, what we've got 
is the old model of where we are today and where we want to be 
tomorrow, and some clear blue sky thinking, in there, and it really 
translates into ... 5 major areas. One is policies, procedures and 
agreements that we need to pick up with them, another one is pay 
and performance which has implications for other areas in the 
business, the other one's training because I'm looking at joint 
initiatives as a part of it. The other one is trust 'cause I'm trying to 
build trust and that again is working together, staff engagement 
looking at a staff engagement policy, trying to build the trust, and that 
would be looking at things like engagement, getting behind the 
unions to the employees, there's a number of areas you'd want to 
have a go at. " [10: 2: 3/4] 
This project has added further evidence to the premise that models of HR do not 
have to take the form of 'best practice', HPWT models, but are likely to be the 
outcome of a myriad of external and internal factors, formulations of and 
responses to these factors, and the ability of the parties to successfully negotiate 
and gain dominance for their preferred version. Furthermore, this is an ongoing 
process, where re-formulations and re-negotiations occur on an on-going basis. 
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3.4. Meditating Level 2: Strategy Implementation 
3.4.1. Constraints 
This section will reframe the project one data in the light of the 'theory of 
constraints' developed in projects two°a and three'°. There are similarities between 
the constraints on strategy implementation articulated in London Underground and 
in Thomson Financial, namely capability and conflicting organisational priorities. 
Resistance to change, which appeared only implicitly in projects two and three, 
emerged as an explicit constraint in project one, reflecting the different challenges 
posed by the long serving, less compliant employees in LUL. 
i) Capability 
Whereas Thomson Financial's respondents articulated HR'1 and management 
capability72 as major constraints, in LUL, as already discussed, management 
capability was seen as the fundamental issue. This was considered in detail in 
section 6.3.2.2. of project one. 
ii) Conflicting Organisational Priorities 
Thomson Financial's conflicting organisational priorities repertoire has marked 
similarities with an LUL repertoire on the challenges of organisational prioritisation 
and lack of consistency repertoires (considered in section 6.3.2.3. of project one), 
as the following quote conveys. 
"... one of the most successful times I had in managing the Trains 
Functional Council was when for various reasons I was able to 
devote a whole day to it, every week ... by and large we were 
successful, y'know, that period. But if you know the day to day hurly 
burly doesn't generally allow you to do that. And we've under- 
invested in my view, in the sort of the support and resource we give 
to the employee relations. " [9: 1: 2] 
This is extended into a full 'consistency' repertoire. 
"I certainly do hold up my hands from a management perspective 
and say ... we haven't laid down a strategy for where we're trying to take the organisation, you know we've been stuck in the PPP debate 
for 7 years, which actually was always an excuse, for not laying 
69 C. f. project 2, section 6.4, page 324 on. 
70 C. f. project 3, section 6.3.1., page 462 on. 
" Cl RA2: 2 and RA2: 3, project 3, section 6.2.4.2.1, page 467. 
72 C. f. BB: 7/8 and EH: 5, project 2, section 6.4.1.2., page 327. 
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down a strategy ... I think from my perspective it's kind of just 
perpetuating the unhelpful relationship that exists. " [9.2: 64] 
iii) Change Resistance 
Change resistance appears only implicitly in the Thomson Financial discourse, but 
is seen as a major constraint on LUL. 
" ... what we tend to 
forget is the length of time that it takes for 
people to really believe there is a change, as opposed to being told 
there's a change ... it's not that you say nothing can happen for then 3 or 5 years, but you say you need to choose a direction and believe 
in it over the 3 and 5 years, so that it really becomes part of the 
culture ... we haven't had that sort of continuity of purpose - for 
recognising ... this is a5 year programme. " [9: 1: 5/6] 
Indeed, vested interests actively preclude the organisation from changing 
(suggesting McKinsey's status quo bias). 
"... there are these Spanish practices and we're identifying them, we 
know where they are and we just need tae move against it. We 
know we'll have a million reasons as to why people want the status 
quo. " [10: 2: 10] 
This suggests that although this constraint does have a first order reality (it is 
demonstrated in the "Spanish practices"), its impact may be exacerbated or 
mitigated by the influence of the actors, depending on their conceptualisation of it 
and reaction to it. 
3.4.2. Influence of the actors 
As with the influence of the actors on strategy formulation (linking document, 
section 3.2. ), the influence of the actors is presented as a significant influence on 
strategy realisation in both LUL and Thomson Financial. The 'theory of 
constraints' appears to apply equally well to both organisations, suggesting that 
this is an important part of the model and a possible contribution to knowledge. 
As indicated in the previous section on strategy formulation, weak management 
and the competing strategies of the trade unions are presented as the major 
constraints on HR/IR strategy in LUL, inferring that strategy implementation is 
unlikely to be an easy process. 
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The influence of the actors, generally, is reported as preventing implementation of 
strategy in LUL. With echoes of the 'strategy versus tactics' repertoire, this 
respondent indicates how low level trade union activity demands to be dealt with 
before strategic thinking is possible. 
"I definitely need strategic thinking but I need people really that can 
deal w' the issues at the moment, and I'll free up enough time to take 
on the strategic issues ... there's a lot of ping pong going on. 
And I 
need to think through how I'm gonna do it, 'cause I'm gonna do it. I 
have to do it. " [10: 2: 5] 
"I can well understand in the past people panicking w' ballots and all 
the rest o' it. You see I've got 4 of them, 3 of them are actually the 
square root of bugger all ... if you put one down, another one pops 
up. You solve one another appears. " [10: 2: 6] 
Actual implementation of strategy is seen as critically dependent upon the 
negotiation process, and hence the influence of the actors, as these two subtly 
different views of the same strategy implementation suggest. Whereas the first 
respondent describes principled negotiation to the key to a successful 
implementation. 
"... the infamous Company Plan, where we actually removed 6 and 
a half thousand jobs, with no strikes, not one jot of an industrial 
relations problem at all. It's because we sat down, we worked out 
what our plan was to start sorting the company out, we sat down and 
at great length, for months, we talked to the trade unions about it ... 
now, that just proved that, if you talked to them as grown ups, and 
listened to them as grown ups, and negotiated in a fair and honest 
way, you could get what you need. " [9: 4: 1/2] 
The second respondent interprets the same implementation exercise as an 
imposition, for which the organisation has been paying ever since. 
"And after 2 years (of development work on the Company Plan), we 
would then negotiate this with the trade unions, after 2 years of work. 
Now we were very very fortunate, 'cause in 1992 - 1993, high 
unemployment blah blah blah, all the reasons why one could say the 
trade union strength was not there: we had the high ground and we 
pushed it through. Or as a person said to me at that time, 'You'll 
only ever do that once, get away with it once'. And we got away with 
it or did we? Because the echoes are still there ... The fire never 
went out. " [10: 1: 16] 
566 
This raises an important question for organisations: under what circumstances do 
competing strategies reconcile? The quote above describes one approach, which 
is the imposition of the organisational strategy, and the consequences of so doing. 
This may have greater acceptability in private sector organisations such as 
Thomson Financial, where there is a presumption of a management team working 
towards consensus, even if this obfuscates a very politicised decision making 
process, which may indeed involve the imposition of a preferred view by the 
powerful on the less powerful. References can be found to this in the "business 
leads HR" repertoire in projects two and three". 
However, imposition is seen as a cardinal sin in LUL's industrial relations 
environment. 
"... you're raced with a dilemma of do you therefore implement and 
be accused of imposing, a heinous thing to do with any trade union. " 
[10: 1: 2] 
The alternative presented by respondents is that of principled negotiation 
(probably the best description of strategy formulation in Thomson Financial"), 
which fits with the 'moral high ground' repertoire used by LUL managers to 
privilege their argument. This is also represented by at least one manager as 
highly successful. 
"... perhaps more fundamental than that though was that the 
adversarial relationships that had built up by the union guys and the 
management, in this place was because the managers and 
particularly I'm criticising the top, the directors, didn't understand that 
if you don't treat people with respect, they won't treat you with 
respect ... that just proved that, if you talked to them as grown ups, 
and listened to them as grown ups, and negotiated in a fair and 
honest way, you could get what you need. " [9: 4: 1/2] 
Although other managers reflect the difficulties in successful principled negotiation, 
providing a variety of rationales, including organisational history: 
"I'm fighting a lot of years' history. " [10: 2: 4] 
Conditioned response: 
"... the environment is a difficult one, because the trade unions have 
seen how militancy, how confrontation, how adversarial behaviour 
"C. f. BB: 3/4 and AB: 4/5, project 2, section 6.2.2., page 304. 
74 C. f. BB: 4/5, project 2, section 6.3.2.3., page 321. 
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has actually produced results for their members: good pay, good 
conditions. " [10: 1: 2] 
Management capability: 
"... so selection's weak, training and development's weak, and 
measurement of performance, and attitude, and behaviour is weak. " 
[9: 4: 6] 
And adversarial inter-union relations: 
"... the national officials ... there's real aggro" [10: 2: 1] 
Despite this, there appears to be a common understanding that imposition is not 
an option in LUL, apart from in the most extreme first order circumstances, and 
that principled negotiation is the only alternative. In this, it is not dissimilar to 
management negotiations in Thomson Financial, where the organisational 
penalties (attrition, de-motivation, reduced productivity) can also be very high, 
albeit that the ability of the individual actors to resist an imposition may be very low. 
3.4.2. The Linkages Between Intended HR Strategy and the Realised HR 
Approach 
The two proceeding sections identified two elements which mediate between 
intended HR strategy and the realised HR approach: constraints and the influence 
of the actors. As in the Thomson Financial studies, a number of constraints (such 
as capability and conflicting organisational priorities/lack of consistency) are 
represented as powerful mediating factors in LUL. Discourse around constraints is 
used functionally in both organisations, as a means of deflecting potential blame. 
The actors are presented as a further mediating factor in both organisations, 
specifically the results of a fragmented dominant coalition in Thomson Financial 
and the ability of the trade unions and the employees to resist implementation of 
the management's strategy in LUL. However, the data also suggests a further 
issue: where competing, un-reconciled strategies exist within an organisation, it 
creates a situation in which the views of the actors on the best approach to 
strategy implementation may, in themselves, be contradictory. This creates 
another problem for conventional models of organisational strategy, and is another 
potential topic for further research. 
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3.5. Realised HR Approach 
The analysis of the realised HR approach in both organisations is difficult. Whilst 
there are some definitions of intended HR strategy proffered, they are largely seen 
as debased in their implementation. This is attributed to the lack of clearly defined 
strategy in Thomson Financials, and, in LUL, to the influence of the competing 
strategy of the trade unionists. 
"... we put new framework agreements in place, which have since 
been polluted, and muddled and so forth. " [9: 4: 1] 
"I'm suddenly finding I'm in discussions but we've agreed things, but 
then we realised we shouldn't have agreed them, and we try to break 
what we've agreed. " [10: 2: 4] 
Given this lack of confidence in the realised approach in both organisations under 
review, the focus in the analysis on negotiation and the influence of the actors 
seems appropriate, rather than the implementation of a strategy about which there 
is little agreement. 
This is a potential limitation of the model, in that it suggests that there is a level of 
hierarchy in the elements of the model, which is not adequately conveyed by the 
model in the way it is currently depicted. If the intended HR strategy is unclear (be 
that implicit or explicit), and it is possible for the actors (or a sub-set of the actors) 
to prevent the strategy from being implemented, the realised HR approach is 
unlikely to be anything other than confused. 
3.6. Meditating Level 3: The Feedback Loop 
Echoing the comments made for the realised HR approach, there is almost no 
evidence for a feedback loop in either organisation. In an environment where 
there is an articulated or readily discernable intended strategy, the difference 
between the intended HR strategy and the realised HR approach could be 
ascertained, and the success (or otherwise) of the actions could be assessed. A 
feedback loop could then be extremely useful in moderating intended HR strategy 
on the basis of what has been successful (or otherwise) in practice. However, in 
an environment where there are conflicting or unclear strategies, it is impossible to 
use a feedback loop in this way. 
75 C. f. JR: 16, project 2. section 6.3.2.3., page 321. 
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As the opposing views in section 3.4.2. (page 566) on the success of LUL's 
Company Plan shows76, respondents can disagree on the success criteria for an 
activity, and differ in their views on whether a project has been successful or not. 
As such, the feedback loop is also subject to the perceptions of the respondents 
and is also likely to be best studied as a social construction, subject to the same 
political forces and negotiating strategies as other elements of the model. 
This paucity of evidence for a feedback loop again suggests there is a degree of 
hierarchy to the elements in the model. If an organisation does not have a single 
intended strategy, it is difficult to evaluate the success of the realised approach 
against it and use that as a feedback loop to inform successive iterations of the 
intended strategy. 
4. A FURTHER EXAMPLE 
An interesting adjunct to the analysis of LUL against the descriptive research 
model is to look at one of the management respondents' discourse about the trade 
unions. Interestingly, the elements of the descriptive research model are applied 
to the trade unions by one of the management respondents, his discourse almost 
directly mirroring the model. 
One of the limitations of the descriptive research model is that it fails to recognise 
that the factors may affect different organisations to differing extents. Where an 
organisation lacks an element (e. g. competitive mechanisms in a public sector 
organisation), this will obviously not be reflected in the discourse, but other factors 
will assume dominance. This means that the model is still valid, but that it should 
not be assumed that every factor will be represented, nor will they be represented 
to the same extent in different organisations. 
The descriptions given of the LUL organisation show variable evidence for the 
influence of Paauwe's factors: as anticipated, respondents relied heavily upon 
configuration and institutional factors in their explanations of the LUL organisation, 
and made limited reference to competitive mechanisms. 
However, when one looks at organisations which have business, configuration and 
institutional pressures, such as a trade union, it is clear from the discourse that 
Paauwe's factors have a useful descriptive function for respondents. This 
respondent's interview can be divided into the categories of the model, i. e. 
competitive mechanisms, configuration factors, institutional mechanisms and the 
influence of the dominant coalition. He uses all of the elements of the model to 
build an explanation of trade union behaviour, firstly drawing upon a competitive 
mechanisms repertoire. 
76 Linking Document, section 3.4.2., page 566. 
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'What I think their aims again in common with lots of unions is to 
have lots of members 'cause that means money and industrial 
strength ... But I think that their aim is really around survival 
for 
themselves. " [32: 1: 1/2] 
MSF went through a similar thing well it became MSF when it 
merged with TAS ... TAS was the old craft union and very militant, lose loads of money, they took on a 17 million pounds worth of debt 
and they realised that they would go out of business 'cause the 
banks were quite close to calling in all the money ... that changed the politics quite significantly, 'cause they realised they couldn't 
survive if they carried on the same way. " [32: 1: 12] 
These competitive mechanisms are represented as a driver for change in trade 
unionism: 
"I think that they've (the unions) gotta understand the changing 
demographic, if that's the right word, of the workforce ... they've 
gotta make themselves more attractive to younger people who 
maybe haven't thought about joining a trade union ... I think that their 
client base will become smaller. " [32: 1: 10/11] 
But competitive mechanisms, equally, are presented as a limiting factor: 
I don't think they've got the imagination or the want to try and find 
another solution to the situation, if that's gonna mean that they're 
gonna lose quite a lot of members, and as we've discussed industrial 
strength is the key to it all as far as they're concerned. " [32: 1: 11] 
As are configuration factors, such as ideology and history. 
"... the partnership model is much more around working 
collaboratively ... I think they've tried to think much more 
progressively, in these terms, as if they don't change with it, they'll 
become obsolete ... they just don't wanna accept that. They'll hang 
on to the old industrial muscle. " [32: 1: 10] 
This respondent provides a detailed discussion of the impact of configuration 
factors to limit change. 
"I think the RMT's aims are very anti-capitalist. I think the RMT's 
aims are very much more political and openly political. I think the 
RMT don't really care who get's hurt when they're fighting that 
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politically when they're fighting that particular battle. I think that they 
are they see themselves and have positioned themselves as the last 
of the old guard trade unions. " [32: 1: 2] 
And then looks at institutional mechanisms, particularly citing the influence of the 
wider political connections on public sector organisations, and trade unions in 
particular. 
"... we know that the RMT recently have had a disagreement with 
the Labour Party because they don't think the Labour Party are hard 
line enough in terms of employment legislation ... With the Government, it's become quite adversarial ... Because the Labour Party, the Labour Government is not run by left wing militants ... they don't practice it anymore. So they're not politically aligned with the 
RMT's ideologies. " [32: 1: 7/8] 
Institutional forces which he extends beyond Britain to include Europe. 
" ... most of the trade unions 
I deal with have got much closer 
relations with European colleagues ... they've now got cuter at using 
some of the European parliamentary channels available to them to 
help them to lobby and influence ... unions are taking more of a 
proactive role in some of that stuff. " [32: 1: 13] 
Moving from the first order reality factors, this respondent also makes reference to 
the influence of the actors. As with other respondents, he sees the trade unions 
and the management as the major groupings. Looking at the trade unions first, he 
uses a number of dominant coalition type arguments to explain the unions' current 
situation, referencing the membership of the dominant coalition within the unions. 
"I think (the RMT) it's very much run by - the General Secretary. 
And that everyone else falls into line with the General Secretary. " 
[32: 1: 2] 
He makes a suggestion in his discourse that trade unions need to change their 
proposition to be acknowledged as full participants in the dominant coalition, which 
is illustrated through reference to the European model. 
"I know quite a lot of the larger organisations have union members 
on the Board, to influence in a real way ... instead of rather than fighting from the barricades ... Maybe that allows them to do their job 
a bit better and they get more forward thinking unions. They are 
available to influence top management, because RMT particularly, 
ASLEF. have got a seat on the Board, well because of the 
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organisations and the individuals involved. But that doesn't 
necessarily translate itself to TfL ... I've been over to Germany, France and Holland and Sweden, to talk to them about this. Yeah, 
the unions are less militant but they're more they're up to their eyes 
in being collaborative. " [32: 1: 13] 
For this participant, inter-union conflict means that unions, too, lack clear strategy. 
"... in common with lots of other unions, I don't think the TSSA are 
very good at articulating their aims. " [32: 1: 1] 
" ... the T&G seem to be in a little bit of disorganisation. " [32: 1: 6] 
However, moving on to his discourse around the other major group of actors, the 
managers, he attributes a potentially more powerful influence to managers than 
other respondents (perhaps, as a TfL, rather than an LUL, employee, because he 
feels less need to create a defence against blame than LUL managers). 
"... it's the management, they can choose whether they involve the 
unions or not. That will give them that kind of relevance. But I think 
they've got to get cuter in terms of being able to provide benefits to a 
management... it's finding these kind of areas where they can really 
make themselves relevant, where they can be a valued member of 
whatever organisation they happen to be part of, rather than just 
being seen as a pain in the butt. " [32: 1: 11] 
This functional view of why his perception of the managers differs is supported by 
the fact that he offers the profile of the management population as a limiting factor: 
new managers do not understand trade union relations, more experienced staff 
are reluctant to address the issues. 
"I think the new breed of management the majority of them don't 
understand why we pay so much attention to the unions in TfL ... they still find that a struggle. And the concept of having to consult 
with unions and staff rather than just staff etc. etc. I wouldn't say that 
they're necessarily anti-union, these people, but I think they feel that 
there's a layer of bureaucracy in there that may be unnecessary, 
particularly if the unions start to raise objections to things they had to 
do, I think some of them would prefer not to do that. 
I think that people who have been here longer, and by longer I mean 
people who've been here 3,4,5 years, have got used to the unions 
being around so there's less of an issue. Don't really know about the 
staff, I think staff I think most of the staff are neither here nor there I 
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think that those when the RMT start banging their drum those people 
the operational people probably think "oh god, here we go again". I 
think the management, the LU management their attitude to the 
unions is that they're a bit scared of them, and tend to give in and 
therefore make rods for their own backs. " [32: 1: 4/5] 
The result of the influence of the actors, for this respondent, is not the intractable 
situation presented by the LUL managers. For him, a lack of coherence and 
constraints in both groups provides an opportunity to renegotiate union strategy, 
albeit that this will be a lengthy process. 
"It's not a question of one day chucking everything out and starting 
again, and then you've got more of a collaborative relationship em -I 
think unions have it within their powers to be a bit more agile around 
decision making and a bit more agile ... So whilst I say it's a two way 
street I think it's I think that coming from the union side has to be a 
bit more flexible, the ability to demonstrate that they know how 
organisations work and that they are able to do things not 
necessarily everything by committee, so empower some people. 
That would dispel some of the aggravation felt by management that 
the whole system is based around bureaucracy and wasting and 
blocking and such like. So it's gonna be something that develops 
over a period of time. " [32: 1: 5] 
This is an interesting interview, in that it suggests that the factors Paauwe uses 
and the concept of the dominant coalition do have resonance for respondents, and 
can be used to articulate the context in which a business operates. This is 
different from the conclusion drawn in projects two and three, suggesting that 
context may be a variable, important in some organisations and less important in 
others. This is an important research question which could be explored in further 
work: in what environments and under what conditions does context become more 
or less important? 
The context for the trade unions is one of intense competitive pressures, a strongly 
embedded organisational history and culture and strong institutional factors; this 
means that the actors have less room for manoeuvre. In the case of LUL, 
configuration and institutional factors are strong, but competitive mechanisms are 
weak: the actors are potentially more impactful. In Thomson Financial, where the 
Paauwe factors are seen as limited in their influence, the actors are reported as 
the major drivers of business and HR strategy. This suggests that, to an extent, 
there may be 'first order' reality to Pauuwe's factors, in that in organisations 
without strong competitive, configuration or institutional influences, the actors do 
have more "room to manoeuvre", and in consequence, are seen as a more 
powerful influence. 
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Alternatively, it may suggest that the negotiation process in professional 
environments is broadly co-deterministic: respondents are culturally predisposed 
to come to an agreement about strategy, or at least to present it in a co- 
deterministic manner. This is functionally supported by a shared 'second order' 
reality upon which respondents can draw upon to support the explanations they 
provide. This is in contrast with more conflictual environments, where competing 
strategies co-exist, and language is used to privilege one's own world view against 
competing representations of reality. Interestingly, shared second order realities 
also emerge in the latter scenario, suggesting that there is an innate predisposition 
for individuals working closely with one another (even in conflicting roles) to build 
shared views of reality. 
This section has potential implications for how strategy is negotiated by 
practitioners, but does also suggest that the descriptive research model references 
a number of relatively ubiquitous factors, and, as such, may have use as a generic 
model of strategy formulation in a variety of organisational contexts. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Evidence for the Model 
This linking document has provided a test of the descriptive research model 
generated through projects two and three, by using it to revisit and re-analyse the 
data in project one. Despite limitations in the data (the focus of the initial research 
was on a different question in a different organisation), it appears that the model 
can be used to provide a reasonable description of the strategy formulation and 
implementation process in a very different organisational context to that in which 
the descriptive research model was generated in projects two and three. 
The reinterpretation of project one's data in the light of the descriptive research 
model has suggested that the model may have generic applicability, in that it 
appears to be illuminating when considering discourse generated in a public sector 
organisation as well as the private sector organisation used to generate the model. 
The application of the model to discourse on trade union organisations in section 4 
further bolsters this. 
The model provided evidence to substantiate the basic, social constructivist tenet 
of the research, which regards strategy as an emergent, negotiated and iterative 
process, fundamentally dependent upon social processes and the influence of the 
organisational actors. Even in an organisation such as LUL, where one would 
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anticipate that public accountability would create considerable pressure to develop, 
document and enact a formal strategic planning process, the image conveyed by 
respondents is of a much more emergent and less regimented process than would 
be expected. The linking document supports the conjecture that the first order 
realities confronted by the organisation do frame the 'freedom to manoeuvre' 
enjoyed by the actors, but that the most impactful element in strategy formulation 
is the influence of the actors, their negotiating position and negotiation skills. 
This study has raised a number of important issues which would benefit from 
further research. These include the following: 
" The potential of a 'best fit' analysis as a diagnostic 
" First order reality factors and 'punch-throughs' 
" The relationship between first and second order realities, and whether, via 
the formation of socially shared discourses, the latter can become the 
former 
" The fundamental role of the actors in strategy formulation and 
implementation 
" The ongoing negotiation, re-negotiation, formulation and re-formulation 
process which underpins strategy formulation 
" The politicisation of the strategy formulation process, and the factors which 
support or undermine negotiating positions 
" The conditions under which competing strategies co-exist 
" Unclear strategy and the implications for HR 
" Strategy implementation, and the 'theory of constraints' 
" The absence of feedback loops and the link to unclear strategy and metrics 
" Progressive and defeatist discourses and the potential to use 'new OD' 
techniques to change mindsets. 
Each of these areas of the descriptive research model creates potentially 
interesting grounds for further research. 
There are, however, three aspects in which the model appears problematic. 
Firstly, it is clear from the LUL analysis that not all first order categories are 
represented and those which do appear differ in the extent to which they are 
perceived as influential. It is apparent that organisations differ in the extent to 
which the elements of the model will be influential, or perhaps more accurately, 
are perceived as influential, which accommodates the social processes of concept 
formation and societal sharing of discourses. The analysis provided by a 
management respondent of a trade union considers all of the first order reality 
elements, whereas - predictably - the competitive mechanisms element is less 
applicable in a public sector company (even though project one respondents do 
use commercial language in their discourse). This suggests that the model may 
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be better providing first order reality categorisations for the purposes of guidance 
(and as diagnostics) rather than strict observance. An interesting topic for further 
research is the examination of the conditions under which first order reality factors 
do exert an influence, and under what conditions they become deterministic 
('punch-throughs'). 
This leads to the second limitation of the model: the concept of 'punch-throughs' is 
somewhat unresolved by this linking document. Organisations also differ in 
respect of 'punch-throughs': at the extreme, some organisations will be confronted 
by factors to which they must react. These may be characteristics of that 
organisation (e. g. outmoded and uncompetitive working agreements), industry 
wide (e. g. the innate uncompetitiveness of the North American airline industry) or 
may impact organisations across sectors and geographies (e. g. technology 
advances rendering previous products redundant, such as DVD technology 
replacing videotapes). 'Punch-th roughs', inevitably, relate to sectors and changes, 
both economic and otherwise, in those sectors. However, it is clear from project 
one that they can also be configuration factors: union agreements, organisational 
heritage, shared views of histories which privilege a particular account of the 
organisation's evolution. 
This study has also indicated, however, that 'punch-throughs' should be regarded 
with caution. It is extremely powerful, discursively, to represent a factor as a 
'punch-though' when a more questioning approach would have cast doubt upon 
this. This emphasis on the intractable nature of 'punch-throughs' may be further 
reinforced by the cultural and social pressures which create shared 
representations of such factors. 
The final limitation to the model is the consideration of how competing strategies 
impact the model. It appears from the LUL case study that realised HR approach 
and the final mediating level (feedback loops) may not exist in any coherent form 
unless there is greater reconciliation of competing strategies than is evident in LUL. 
This suggests a hierarchy of elements which is not conveyed by the current model. 
5.2. Implications of the Research 
5.2.1. Implications for Organisations 
The implications of the linking document's finding for organisations are diverse. 
Major issues arising out of this study include: the use of the descriptive research 
model as a diagnostic, an analysis of the influence of the actors on strategy 
formulation (including a perspective on the functional use of language to make, 
support and/or privilege arguments), and the gap between strategy formulation 
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and strategy implementation (and the factors that may mediate between the two). 
All of these areas have the potential to significantly impact an organisation's 
performance. 
5.2.2. Implications for Practitioners 
There are a number of implications for HR practitioners arising from this project: 
strategy as a process, the changing skill set of HR, insights into strategy 
implementation (constraints and evaluation of success) and the potential for a new 
approach to organisational development. 
The move from 'strategy as an objective' to 'strategy as a process' has major 
implications for practitioners. Whilst HR has been concerned with 'best practice' 
or'best fit' models of HR, a negotiated, emergent model of strategy suggests that 
HR practitioners will require a different approach and will play a different 
organisational role: negotiator, mediator, dispute resolver and potentially 
organisational conscience. 
This has implications for skill set required by HR practitioners. Whereas 'best 
practice' emphasises a pre-eminent technical expertise, and 'best fit' infers the 
ability to accurately diagnose business scenarios, understand business drivers 
and develop HR strategies which dovetail to the business strategy, the emergent 
and negotiated view of strategy adopted in these projects infers a very different 
skill set requirement. HR practitioners, in this world, become negotiators, using 
their technical skills and their knowledge of the business, as well as their insights 
human behaviour to guide (as well as course correct, as required) the organisation 
in the strategy formulation and implementation processes. Fulfilling the 'super- 
ordinate role of HR', they may also be responsible for educating the other 
organisational actors, or challenging inappropriate, ill-thought through or ill- 
informed negotiating stances (for instance, McKinsey's deceptions and distortions). 
Thirdly, the emergent model of strategy has implications for strategy 
implementation as well as formulation. The examination of both first order (e. g. 
resource limitations) and second order (e. g. resistance to change). constraints has 
implications for practitioners. This study partially elucidates the gap between 
intended HR strategy and the realised HR approach, but also suggests that an 
approach to strategy implementation which differentiates between tangible and 
perceived constraints may have utility. Understanding of real constraints to 
strategy implementation, likewise, will better position HR practitioners as 
negotiators for the resources they require to be able to deliver HR strategy. 
Fourthly, assuming this model, implementation of strategy becomes a far more 
fluid and flexible process, and HR practitioners in this environment will have to 
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develop new ways of evaluating their success: metrics driven assessment, 
perhaps, rather than the achievement of individual goals which may, by that time, 
be irrelevant, given constant formulation and re-formulation of strategy. 
Related to this, the final set of implications for practitioners are around the 
potential for new organisational development techniques offered by the social 
constructivist approach. The paragraph above has indicated that HR may have 
more discourses which are more functional than the 'theory of constraints'. It is 
reasonable to suggest that providing alternative discourses to the business may 
also be useful. Whilst this project made no claim to have implications for agency 
or for action (it simply looks at the way in which people construct their social 
realities), it is not unreasonable to suggest that individual's actions are influenced 
by their belief systems, and that the industrial relations impasse in which LUL finds 
itself is in part sustained by (or at least is justified by) belief systems which 
emphasise the constraining influence of the trade unions and organisational 
history. 
One may go further and suggest that the form of HR which is adopted by an 
organisation may be similarly impacted by the belief systems held by staff, and 
their perception of external constraints and enablers. This model goes some way 
to explaining the sustained use of the industrial relations focused model of HR in 
LUL, whilst the trend in other organizations has been to move away from this 
model towards SHRM. If staff believe that they are disempowered by institutional 
forces, they are unlikely to believe they can change or evolve the HR model. 
This was referenced in project three as the move to a "new OD" (Marshall & Grant, 
2008), based in HR's ability to create and direct organisational meaning. Given 
that certain conditions are met (for instance, tactical activities are dealt with so that 
HR people can assume a more strategic role, HR staff are suitably trained and 
skilled, and they have sufficient credibility to play this organisational role), this has 
the potential to offer an exciting new role for HR practitioners. HR undoubtedly 
has the potential to reinforce and communicate organisational meaning, through 
its influence over compensation, talent and performance management, training 
and promotion, all of which convey strong messages about what the organisation 
values and does not value. Taking this one stage further, HR may also be able to 
help organisations "shift conversations" and develop new perspectives through 
changing the repertoires, discourses and language used within an organisation. 
5.2.3. Implications for Academics 
This study has referenced a number of models of HR, looking for discourse which 
alludes to 'best practice', 'best fit', RBV and institutional theories of SHRM and 
contextually based HR theory. Although the first of these was found only in two 
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interviews, there were multiple instances of respondents drawing upon the other 
four models. However, the implication for academics is that theses theories no 
longer appear adequate, in themselves, to explain the complex and socially driven 
processes of strategy formulation in organisations, and fail to address the issues 
of strategy implementation. This study suggested that a new model, incorporating 
a view of strategy as an ongoing, negotiated, emergent and iterative process, 
would be more reflective of the way in which strategy actually is derived in 
organisations. This study has begun to consider models of HR and what it means 
to be strategic in HR, and how substantially that varies, heavily influenced by the 
organisational actors, on an individual and a collective basis. This variability in the 
role of HR and the influence of the actors upon it may be an area of considerable 
interest to academics and amenable to further research. 
The linking document has suggested that the descriptive research model may 
have some validity as a generic model of HR strategy formulation and 
implementation. This study allowed the full significance of organisational sector, 
economic environment and context to be explored, factors which have largely 
been ignored in mainstream work on SHRM. However, the validity attributed to 
the model is on the basis of application to only two organisations (albeit radically 
different ones) and further testing is certainly required before this claim can be 
made. 
Secondly, there are a number of areas in which the model appears to require 
further research (which are listed in the bulleted list on page 576). The model also 
requires some modification, specifically, the prescriptive nature of the categories of 
first order realities as they are currently represented and the issue of the 
hierarchical, sequential nature of some of the elements). More work on the 
interactions between intended HR strategy and the realised HR approach would 
also be useful. 
Perhaps most important, are two areas. Further work on how the co-existence of 
competing strategies in organisations impacts strategy formulation and 
implementation would be particularly valuable to practitioners as well as 
academics. Examination of under what conditions those competing strategies co- 
exist or are reconciled is also of considerable interest, to organisations and 
practitioners, as well as to academics. Secondly, the potential of using "New OD" 
techniques to provide new languages and thus influence mindsets is very exciting 
and is worthy of further consideration in both the academic and practitioner 
spheres of influence. 
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